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THE

YOGA APHORISMS OF PATANJALI

WITH THE

COMMENTARY OF BHOJA RÁJÁ

AND

AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION

BY

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by the mode of its refutation of adverse doctrines recognises the pre-existence of all the others, not excepting Buddhism. It also quotes Badari, a teacher, and Bádaráyaṇa, probably a grandson of Badari, and author of the Vedánta Sútras or later Mimáñs'á, as also of a commentary on the Yoga Sútra. The Vedánta in its turn refutes adverse doctrines of all the five, and thereby admits their pre-existence. This state of facts can be reconciled only by the supposition that the different dogmas and the schools which cherished them existed for a long time before the dogmas were written down in the aphoristic form in which we have them now. Oral transmission must have been the principal means of their preservation for a long time. There might have been also text-books before, but they were set aside by the very complete systems which the new texts produced, and in the new systems the refutation of adverse opinions very naturally included all the theories which were prevalent at the time when the books were compiled, and not the theories only of the time when the original dogmas were first promulgated. This is also obvious in other ways. In the case of the Sánkhya Sútra, though it is usually attributed to Kapila, one of the mind-born sons of Brahmá, we find it refers to an "ancient teacher" (*A'chárya*, A. V, 31), and to "venerable preceptors" (A. VI, 69). Sanandana and Pancha-s'ikha are cited by name (V, 32, and VI, 69). Kapila is then said to have taught his doctrine to A'surí, who is described both as a brother and a pupil of the teacher. A'surí imparts it to Panchas'ikha, who is, according

to the Puráṇics, again a brother. This Panchas'ikha, again, according to the Mahábhárata, lived in the time of Janaka, and taught the Sánkhya doctrine to that king of Mithilá. Had Kapila written the Sútra he would never have described in it his younger brother and pupil as an A'chárya.

In the Vedánta Sútra, Bádaráyaṇa, the author, is several times named in the third person (I, 3, 26; I, 3, 33; III, 2, 41; III, 4, 1, 8, 19; IV, 3, 15, IV, 4, 7, 12). This is usually explained by the statement that a pupil wrote down the teachings of the saint. Colebrooke, arguing on these facts, came to the conclusion that the text-books are much later than the saints whose names they bear. Referring to the Sánkhya he says "the text of the Sánkhya philosophy, from which the sect of Buddha seems to have borrowed its doctrines, is not the work of Kapila himself, though vulgarly ascribed to him; but it purports to be composed by I's'varakṛishṇa,—and he is stated to have received the doctrine mediately from Kapila, through successive teachers, after its publication by Panchas'ikha who had been himself instructed by A'surí, the pupil of Kapila." (Essays, I, p. 93). Professor Cowell accepts this opinion in its entirety; he says "The *Sútras*, as we have them, cannot be the original form of the doctrines of the several schools. They are rather a recapitulation, at a certain period, of a series of preceding developments, which had gone on in the works of successive teachers. The *Sútras* mutually refer to each other; thus, those of the Sánkhya school, which in itself I should consider

one of the earliest, distinctly refer to Vedánta tenets. They expressly mention the Vais'eshika in I. 25, V. 85; for the Nyaya cf. V, 27, 86, and for the Yoga I, 93." (Colebrooke's Essays, I, 354.) This is also the opinion at which I have arrived after a careful consideration of the bearings of the question; in short, my conviction is that the Sútras were written, like the Institutes of Manu and many other Hindu works, long after the date of their putative authors.

As regards the Yoga, the doctrine is described to be as old as Brahmá, and the text-book to be the work of Patanjali, who, says the commentator, "compiled the rules in the form of an institute for the use of intelligent people anxious to study them" (p. 4). That such is really the case, is obvious from the fact of the Yoga which Patanjali inculcates being identically the same which the Sánkhya accepted as the only means of salvation. It might be argued that the Sánkhya adopted the theory of the 25 principles, from the Yoga of Patanjali, and did not lend it to him. But the arguments against this theory are overwhelming. In the first place had Patanjali initiated the theory of the Tattvas he would have for certain defined them, and not left them to be inferred. He is very careful in his definitions, and he would never have left so vital an element of his system to be inferred. But following the Sánkhya no necessity was felt by him for any definition. It cannot be said that his Tattvas were different from those of the Sánkhyas, for that would make the necessity for a definition even more

imperative. Secondly, the author of the Mahábháshya cannot possibly be proved to have lived before Kapila, or his doctrine. The learned Professor M. M. Kunte, in his "Vicissitudes of Aryan Civilization," has combated, with great tact and ability, the arguments usually put forth to fix the date of Patanjali; and it may be admitted that individually each argument as put forth by Goldstücker and others admits of refutation, and I may add that a long chain of weak arguments is not stronger than any of its links. Still the coincidence of a number of names of a given period is one which in Indian history cannot be easily set aside as purely accidental. Confining, however, one's attention to the text-book only, no one who has read them carefully can fail to perceive that Patanjali has contented himself by tacking a theistic appendage of no direct utility to a positively atheistic model, without in any way blending the two ideas into any homogeneity or consistency. Hence it is that the Hindus call it *Sés'vara Sánkhya*, or *Sánkhya cum deo*, as opposed to the former which is *Niris'vara Sánkhya*, or *Sánkhya sine deo.*

The cardinal difference between the two rests on their theistic and atheistic belief, but as already stated, it makes no difference in their systems. Isolation of soul from thinking principle is the end sought in either case, and meditation in Samádhi is the only means available. The believer in the existence of the Godhead assumes that divine grace facilitates the end sought, but he does not dispense with Samádhi, and his belief, therefore, is of no material importance.

"In less momentous matters," as noticed by Colebrooke, "they differ, not upon points of doctrine, but in the degree in which the exterior exercises, or abstruse reasoning and study, are weighed upon, as requisite preparations of absorbed contemplation. Patanjali's *Yoga-s'ástra* is occupied with devotional exercise and mental abstraction, subduing body and mind: Kapila is more engaged with investigation of principles and reasoning upon them. One is more mystic and fanatical. The other makes a nearer approach to philosophical disquisition, however mistaken in its conclusions." (Essays I, p. 265.)]

And we have enough in these facts and reasons to infer that the Yoga text-book is posterior to the Sánkhya text-book, and that both the text-books are later than Buddha; but that the doctrines of the two schools are very old. Any how these are the immediate ancient Hindu archetypes of the nihilist theory of Buddha, and indirectly of the Pessimism of Schopenhauer and Hartmann.

The Yoga, moreover, is the archetype of another modern doctrine, that of spiritualism with its occult appendage. In this case the relation is direct and more intimate. The eternity of soul is recognised by both; both look to a course of gradual progress which has perfection for its goal; both admit the existence of soul in higher and higher stages; both recognise the possibility of man's commanding departed souls to come down, to become visible, and to hold converse with him; both pretend by regulation of breath and other exercises to attain occult powers of the most

transcendental kind. The details and the rationale of exercise may be different in minor points, and a few of the dogmas such as the "material reality" of soul according to the spiritualists, and its pure spirituality according to the Yogís, may be apparently contradictory; but substantially the two are as closely related as two systems separated by a gap of five and twenty centuries can well be. The cardinal theory, that "the body is the prison of the soul for ordinary mortals" but it is not so in the case of the adept, is evidently the same in both. "We can see only what comes before the windows of our body, we can take cognizance of what is brought within its bars. The adept has found the key of his prison, and can emerge from it at pleasure. In other words, the adept can project his soul out of his body to any place he pleases." The whole system in either case is based on this doctrine, and even a cursory study of the 3rd chapter of the work now presented to the public in an English dress will, I believe, fully bear out this statement.

The name of the Yoga system as we now have it is *Yogánus'ásana*, or 'the Institutes of the Yoga.' This name, however, is rarely used, the work being better known as the *Yoga-s'ástra* or 'the science of Yoga,' or *Yoga-sútra*, the 'Aphorisms of the Yoga.' According to the commentary, commonly assigned to Vyása, one name of the work would appear to be *Sánkhya pravachana*, or 'an exposition of the Sánkhya.' The words of the colophon are *Pátanjala-yoga-s'a'stre sánkhya-pravachane*, which may be translated into, in Patanjali's science of the Yoga, the *Sa'nkhhya pravachana*.

Vyása, however, if he be the author of the exegesis, which I do not believe to be the case, must have used the term simply to imply that it is a text-book on the Sánkhya system, and not to indicate the specific name of the work, for in his remarks on the first aphorism he distinctly says, "the name of the work is *Yogánus'ásana*," (*Yogánus'ásanam náma s'ástram*). Following this exegesis Colebrooke says: "the title of *Sánkhya-pravachana* seems a borrowed one; at least it is common to several compositions. It appertains to Patanjali's *Yoga-s'ástra*." (Essays I, p. 244). In short, *Yogánus'ásana* is the specific, and *Sánkhya-pravachana* the descriptive, name of the work. Anyhow it is obvious that the Yoga is recognised from an early period as a work on Sánkhya.

The Yoga text as we now have it comprises a total of 194 short, succinct aphorisms, divided into four chapters or quarters *(pa'das)*. The first contains 51 aphorisms, devoted to an exposition of the nature and character of meditation, and is entitled *Samádhi-páda*. The second is called *Sádhana-páda*, or the quarter on the exercise of meditation and its requirements, and contains 55 aphorisms. The third is called *Vibhúti-páda*, and treats of the various occult powers which may be derived by the exercises enjoined in it. It is of the same extent as the second. The name of the fourth chapter is *Kaivalya-páda*, and it gives an exposition of the nature and character of the isolation or detachment of soul from worldly ties, which is the object and aim of the exercises and meditations recommended. It is limited to 33 aphorisms.

The work opens with a definition of the term *Yoga*. It is derived from the root *yuj*, which means both "to join" and "to meditate." Some accept the first meaning, explaining it in the technical sense to imply the joining of the mind to the object of thought. Others prefer the second, but that makes no material difference in the purport. The technical meaning of the word as used in the text is a derivative one. Instead of giving prominence to the joining, it implies the detachment which that joining occasions. The definition is, "the suppression of the functions of the thinking principle." This suppression, however, need not be absolute in order to make the word applicable. It is used to imply all stages of abstraction of the thinking principle from worldly cares with a view to centre it in the peculiar meditation which serves to effect that abstraction. The word is of very ancient date. It occurs several times in the Ṛig Veda, but not in the technical sense. In the time of Buddha, six centuries before the era of Christ, it had acquired its technical meaning to perfection, and as Buddha, according to the view of the case set forth above, borrowed it from the followers of the Sánkhya school, it may safely be assumed that it dates from long before the age of Buddha. In fact, the *Tapas* of the Vedic Ṛishis got the more expressive name of Yoga at a later period, and Kapila and his followers gave it prominence in their system by making it the sole means of salvation. Many other works have since used it to indicate communion with the divinity in some way or other, and the Bhagavad-

gítá takes thirteen out of its eighteen chapters to be each a treatise on a separate kind of Yoga. The names are: 2, Sánkhya Yoga; 3, Karma Yoga; 4, Jnána-karma Yoga; 5, Karma-sannyása Yoga; 6, Dhyána Yoga; 8, Tárakabrahma Yoga; 9, Rája-guhya Yoga; 10, Vibhúti Yoga; 12, Bhakti Yoga; 13, Kshetra-kshetrajna Yoga; 14, Gunatraya Yoga; 15, Purushottama Yoga; 18, Sannyása Yoga. In fact, every phase of devotion is described as a form of Yoga. The Tantras have a great number of others, and many variations of those named above, but they need not be noticed here.

The definition of the text suggests immediately the question, what are the functions that have to be suppressed? These must first be known before they can be overcome. The author, therefore, proceeds to describe them. They are said to be fivefold, including right notion, misconception, fancy, sleep, and memory. These, directly or indirectly, comprise all the functions to which the thinking principle can possibly be directed. The means of suppressing these functions are next described. They include, (*a*) exercise, or "effort constantly made to keep the thinking principle in its functionless state," (XIII,) and (*b*), dispassion, or "the consciousness of being their subjugator on the part of one who thirsts after neither perceptible nor scriptural objects," (XV). The details of these are reserved for consideration in the next chapter.

The exercises and dispassion result in Yoga, of which there are two kinds, a conscious and an unconscious one. The former is that which is attended

by argumentation, deliberation, joy, and egoism or self-consciousness; the latter is devoid of such attendants. As long as the thinking principle argues what is good and what is bad; as long as there is deliberation as to the nature of the object of thought; as long as a person engaged in meditation feels a sense of joy; or as long as he retains a sense of his own individuality, (self-consciousness), he is said to be in a conscious state of meditation. This is, in the technical language of the school, *Savíja-samádhi* or "seeded meditation," because there is in it some nucleus on which the mind is centered. When, by arduous and long-continued exercise, this seed is lost, and the mind remains divested of all thought, a mere state of consciousness without an object, it becomes seedless, *nirvíja*, or perfect, and this is the *summum bonum* which the Yogí exerts to attain. When this is attained, the bondage of the world, of transmigration, is entirely severed, and the soul is declared to be *isolated* or free.

The expedients aforesaid are always and imperatively necessary—nothing can be attained without them; but their action can be expedited by another means, and that is "Devotion to God." This devotion is absolute resignation of one's self to the Divinity. In the language of the commentator, "it is thorough worship of God. Without wishing for the fruition of worldly enjoyments, the making over all one's actions to him, the preëminent guide." This devotion is the means by which the theism of the current Hinduism is reconciled with the philosophy of

the school. Kapila did not care for this reconciliation, and his system, therefore, did not stand in need of a Divine Providence; but his atheism being repulsive to the thinking portion of mankind, Patañjali avails himself of it to give a theistic character to his system. It will be noticed, however, that he makes his Divinity one of several means to an end, and not the end sought. The God he invokes is defined to be "a particular soul which is untouched by affliction, works, deserts, and desires," one who is existent, but not the avowed Creator and preserver of the universe. His name is I'S'VARA or "the ruler," and that may imply providence, but nothing is said on this subject. In two successive aphorisms, He is described as one "in whom the seed of the omniscient attains infinity," (xxv,) and "who is the instructor of even all early ones, for, He is not defined by time (xxvi)." The indicator of this Divinity is the syllable OM, called Praṇava, and it is by repeating it and reflecting on its meaning that the different states of meditation can be easily attained. The author could have scarcely put God and his name to a more subordinate position.

Turning now to the obstacles which stand in the way of the Yogí in the satisfactory accomplishment of his meditation, the author enumerates what they are, and suggests the means of overcoming them. The obstacles, or causes of distraction, are disease, langour, doubt, carelessness, idleness, worldly-mindedness, mistaken notions, unattainment of any stage of abstraction, and instability in the stage obtained (A. xxx);

and these are attended by pain, distress, trembling, and oppressive inspiration and expiration (XXXI). These tend to make the thinking principle unsteady, or unfit for meditation, and have, therefore, to be sedulously overcome. The means for overcoming them are various. The habit of concentrating the mind on one particular principle is the most efficacious, (XXXII,) and it is to be supplemented by cheerfulness, benevolence, compassion, complacency, and indifference in regard to happiness, grief, virtue, and vice (XXXIII). It may be effected also by a system of regulation of breath, called *Prāṇāyāma*, which is supposed to exert a powerful influence in steadying the thinking principle, and warding off disease and other obstacles (*cf.* p. 41). Although this regulation of breath is a necessary element in all the earlier or lower forms of the Yoga, one is specially called the Yoga of breathing, and technically called *Haṭha-yoga*, from the letters *ha* and *ṭha*, meaning the sun and the moon, which are the mystic names of inspiration and expiration. This form is particularly esteemed for its efficacy in procuring occult powers. When the habit of meditation has considerably advanced, and the Yogí is able to realize sensuous objects in his meditation, or when the mind is thereby so illumined, it is of itself sufficient to ward off tribulations. Meditation in the passionlessness of accomplished Yogís might also effect this (XXXVII). Reliance on dreams, or on the object of one's fancy, is, likewise, an efficacious remedy.

The author then enters into a more elaborate classification of the Yoga. The twofold division first

pointed out does not suffice fully to indicate the various shades of difference which the seeded form assumes under different circumstances, and to each of these shades he assigns a different name, and defines its nature. In course of this, he points out the theory of the mind becoming the object it thinks upon (XLI), in other words that intense thought creates objects, or becomes objective. This is the basis on which the occult powers described in a subsequent chapter are founded. The seedless form is one and simple, and it is the *ultimatum* sought by the Yoga.

The second chapter is devoted to the details of the exercises necessary for the performance of the Yoga, and is therefore called *Kriyá-yoga* or "practical Yoga." In its earliest and simplest state practical Yoga is accomplished by a strict observance of asceticism, by the muttering of a mantra a great number of times at stated periods every day, and by devotion to God. The object of these observances is to weaken afflictions and give firmness to meditation. Afflictions arise from attachment to worldly affairs, and asceticism is the best antidote for them, and the practice of repeating a mantra for a long time serves to steady the mind.

The reference to afflictions suggests the question, what are they? They are ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and ardent attachment to life, or 'the Will to live' as Hartmann designates it. Some of these are subtile, others gross, (III). The former are to be counteracted by acting against their natural bent, (X) and the latter by meditation, (XI).

The afflictions are described to be the root of all evil. They give rise to works, and works leave behind their stock of residua to be worked out in a subsequent birth, and in that subsequent birth other works are performed, and they leave their residua, and so on, the chain is never brought to an end. For instance, ignorance leads to the commission of a sin; the retribution for that sin comes in the next existence; while that desert is being borne in that existence another sin is committed through ignorance; that necessitates another birth for its retribution, and the series never breaks. And what is true of ignorance is equally so of the other afflictions. Nor does the rule apply only to sins; it applies equally to virtuous deeds. For instance, if instead of a sin a virtuous work be performed, its deserts have to be enjoyed in another existence, and the course proceeds exactly as in the case of sin. In fact, every work, whether right or wrong, has its apportioned desert, and it must be borne in a corporeal existence, and the succession of birth, decay, and death must, in the ordinary course of things, recur over and over again without a limit. The fruits may be joy or suffering according as the cause is virtue or vice, but to the discriminating they are invariably painful, (XV). They are, also inevitable, and must be borne. An act once performed must bear its fruit, and in so far there is no remedy. One may, however, avoid doing those works which bear fruit, and thereby break the spell, and the maxim is therefore laid down that only those pains are avoidable which are not yet come, (XVI).

The question then arises, what should one do to abstain from works, and avoid their consequences? and the object of the Yoga is to devise the means through which the abstinence may be effected.

In order to explain the rationale of the course by which the evil is to be brought to an end, the author next enters into an explanation of the mutual relation of Intellect and Soul. Intellect is called a spectacle, and it is said "to be of the nature of illumination, action, and rule; it is of the form of the elements and the organs; it is for the purpose of experience and emancipation," (XVIII). It exists solely for the purpose of Soul, (XXI). Soul is called the spectator; "it is absolute sentience, and, though pure, still directly beholds intellected ideas," (XX). When these two are in conjunction through ignorance (and it is ignorance which brings them into conjunction) they produce life and its consequences, (XVII,) or as the text puts it "the apprehension of the nature of the contact, power, and the lordship of power," (XXII) *i. e.*, Soul thinks it is the experiencer and Intellect thinks it is the experiencer. Now, when the light of knowledge dispels the false impression the conjunction is dissolved. Intellect ceases to think that it is the experiencer, and Soul gives up the idea of its experience, and the ignorance is removed. In other words, the conjunction being removed Soul is isolated, and there is a period put to further birth and suffering. Now, ignorance being the sole cause of the conjunction, the great object is to remove that ignorance, and

this is to be effected by discriminative knowledge, or that which will rightly appreciate the true character of the relation which exists between Soul and Intellect. This knowledge then is what is to be sought, and the means are now provided by which it may be attained.

The knowledge in question passes through seven stages before it becomes perfect (XXVII). The first stage is that in which a person feels that "the knowable has been known by me." (2) He next feels that "there is nothing remaining to be known." (3) The conviction then arises that "my afflictions are overcome, and there is nothing for me to overcome." (4) This is followed by the belief that "discriminative knowledge has been attained by me." These four suffice to effect what is technically called "liberation from work," (*Kárya-vimukti*), for when these have been acquired there is no more impulse or wish left to perform works. These are followed, in course of progress, by three more successive convictions. These are,—1st "my intellect has accomplished its purpose;" 2nd, "the three qualities have finished their dominion over me, and can no longer affect me;" 3rd, "my meditation has been identified with my soul," that is the Intellect has merged into the Soul. These three are called "intellectual liberation" (*Chitta-vimukti*). The last is called isolation (*Kaivalya*), on the attainment of which the Soul is believed to be perfectly liberated.

In order to bring on this consummation the Yogí should apply himself to improve his understanding so



as to make it completely devoid of impurities. To effect this improvement eight means are recommended, and these are technically called 1, Restraint; 2, Obligation; 3, Posture; 4, Regulation of ~~birth~~; breath 5, Abstraction; 6, Steadfastness; 7, Contemplation; and, 8, Meditation (xxix). Of these the first includes five negative acts, *viz.*, abstention from (1) slaughter, (2) falsehood, (3) theft, (4) incontinence, and (5) avarice; and the second five positive acts, namely, (1) purification, (2) contentment, (3) penance, (4) study, and (5) devotion to the Lord. These two classes of acts are called *mahávratas*, or acts of primary asceticism. They are obligatory on all classes of the community, whether householders or ascetics, and none should neglect them. Slaughter is *in se* sinful, and none should commit it, whether he be a householder or a hermit. Falsehood and theft are sins of the same gravity, and should therefore be shunned by all. Incontinence &c., are likewise reprehensible, and none should be guilty of them. Nor can a virtuous and peaceful life be secured simply by these restraints; it is necessary that one should keep himself free from filth, both material and moral; that he should be contented with his lot and not rapine; that he should submit to penance for his sins and for curbing his passions; that he should study the Vedas, and be devoted to the service of God. No one can be a good citizen who does not practice these restraints and obligations, and therefore they are recommended to all classes of the community. And if they are good and necessary for ordinary

people, they must *ipso facto* be so for the Yogí, who aspires to rise above the common herd. Nay, to him they are most imperative, for none can prepare himself for the Yoga who does not especially attend to them, as the first step in his career. The advantages of observing these restraints and obligations are described at some length; but they call for no remark here.

Restraint and obligation being thus common to both householders and Yogís the third of the eight means becomes the first special act of exercise to which a Yogí has to apply himself; this is the assumption of particular postures, which are conducive to the fixation of the thinking principle to any object to which it may be directed. No one can settle himself down for meditation while walking, or running, or doing something unconnected with his main object, and some particular postures are, therefore, deemed essential. The text contents itself by saying that it should be firm and pleasant (XLVI), and entail the least effort (XLVII); but it does not describe any particular posture as the most beneficial. Commentators, however, have supplied the omission, and described a great number of them, some of them most painful and difficult of assumption, (*cf.* pp. 102*f.*).

When the Yogí has assumed one of the prescribed postures, he should begin the fourth exercise, the regulation of his breath. This consists in drawing the breath through one nostril; retaining the air for some time in the chest; and then throwing it out

through another nostril. The details of this process will be found on pp. 42*f*.

This process of breathing should be followed by the fifth exercise, the abstraction of the organs from their ordinary natural functions. As long as they are engaged in their own works, they do not allow the thinking principle to settle down for the act of meditation, and consequently prove obstructive. To overcome them, or to draw them away from works, is an essential preliminary. When they are abstracted, they merge into their primary cause, the thinking principle, and cease to disturb it.

All these five acts of Restraint, Obligation, Posture, Regulation of breath, and Abstraction are accessories or necessary adjuncts to Yoga, for without them no Yoga can be performed; but they form no essential part of the Yoga itself. Even all the five existing together would not constitute Yoga, though without them as preliminaries no Yoga can be effectual. These are, therefore, called "practical Yoga," or "accessories to the Yoga," but not Yoga. The last three, on the other hand, are essential constituents of the Yoga, and are therefore called "intimates" or *antarangas*. These three include Steadfastness (*Dháraṇá*), Contemplation (*Dhyána*), and Meditation (*Samádhi*); and the third chapter opens with a description of these. "Steadfastness is the confinement of the thinking principle to one place," (L). As an exercise, it is of little moment to what object the thinking principle is applied: so long the thinking principle remains unswervingly attached to it, without for a

moment thinking of anything else, it is Steadfastness. When the understanding is brought to bear upon this fixation and the two act in unison the result is Contemplation (II), *i. e.*, when the thinking principle thinks intelligently and steadfastly on an object it is Contemplation. Again when this contemplation is so intense that it loses all idea of its own identity, and enlightens solely one object, it is Meditation or *Samádhi.* The definition given points to something much more intense than what the English word meditation ordinarily conveys; it implies a state of extacy or cataleptic trance when both the body and the mind are dead to all external impressions, and the thinking principle is completely drowned in the special object of its thought, or in itself, but as the degree of intensity is not fixed and is admitted to vary considerably under different circumstances, I have used the word meditation as the most convenient and conveying the nearest idea of the mental act indicated by the Sanskrit term. When these three follow successively or are united, they have the common name of *Sañyama.* How this union is to be effected, or how this Sañyama is to be performed, is nowhere described at length; but it may be directed to diverse objects, internal and external, and, when duly and thoroughly performed, results in the most extraordinary occult powers.

A subject is the correlative of the three qualities of tranquillity, enlivening and latency, and as each quality becomes ascendant the subject varies; and these variations may be produced by the power of

Sañyama, apart from ordinary mundane causes. Hence the efficacy of the Sañyama in producing occult powers. Sañyama, however, should not be applied indiscriminately to all purposes. The proper rule is to follow the stages of perfection successively attained by a Yogí, *i. e.*, it should not be applied to a subtile object, until it has been practised and perfected with regard to gross objects. In other words, it should be practised step by step according to the different stages into which the career of a Yogí is divided. Unless this is done no fruition follows (VI).

The occult powers, called Siddhis, derivable by the practice of the Sañyama are the most astounding possible. By it one may know the past and the future, the circumstances connected with his former existences, as well as the day and hour of his death. He may know what is in the mind of another person, or the meaning of the cries of animals. He may make himself or others invisible to bystanders, contract friendship with whomsoever he likes, or attain other superhuman powers. He may acquire a knowledge of things that are ordinarily too subtile, or too remote, for human observation, or so intercepted as not to be visible. He can observe the details of regions situated far away from the earth; of the stars and planets, their dispositions and their motions. He can have ocular knowledge of spiritual phenomena. He may know what is going on inside his body; subdue his hunger and thirst; or make his body so firm as none can shake it. It is possible for him, too, to make departed spirits visible, and to converse with them.

He can attain superhuman intuition, audition, taction, vision, gustation and olfaction. He may project his own soul into another's body, and then bring it back into his own. He can travel with the quickness of the mind through air or through water, and go wheresoever he lists.

When most of these powers have been attained and a Yogí is in a forward state for absolute perfection, the gods envy his success, and try to divert him from his onward course. They place temptations in his way in the forms of handsome women, great wealth, and other worldly objects of value, and thereby lead him astray (LI). In this they play the part of Mára in the Buddhist legends, and of Satan in the Bible. Great care and determination are necessary to rise above such temptations. According to the Tantras when temptations fail, resort is had to frightful forms, tigers, lions, serpents, ogres and the like, which threaten instant destruction to the Yogí. But if they are met by firm resolve, they are always ultimately overcome.

Great as are these and such like powers, of which a great many are described in the text, they are not the objects which a Yogí should seek. They are the results of his meditations, and they indicate the success he is gradually attaining, and the progress he is making towards his goal; but they are not that goal. The highest power is, even like the lowest, a part of the "seeded" or discriminative meditation. These powers are, nevertheless, of value, as they enhance the power of the understanding, and in their perfection result in the all-saving knowledge, *tárakjṇána*,

which makes manifest the relation between the thinking principle and Soul, and brings on the "seedless meditation." They are thus of use in consummating the isolation of Soul—the *summum bonum* which the Yoga promises to its votaries.

The fourth chapter is devoted to a consideration of such metaphysical topics as bear on the nature and character of Isolation. It opens by saying that special faculties may result from five different causes, (I). Some of them are described to be due to birth; such as the power of flying, or living in water, or with suspended animation for protracted periods. These are specific peculiarities of particular genera of animals which may be acquired by being born in such genera, and are not common to all living beings. Others are due to herbs, such as the effect of drugs in arresting sleep, hunger, or the like, or making the flesh proof against heat, or poison, or cold. Others, again, are due to certain incantations or mantras which are universally believed by the Hindus to have very extraordinary powers. Austerity or asceticism in the same way is credited with the power of enabling people to acquire special faculties. Of course, the tangible faculties in this case are not faculties strictly so called, but the effect of habit. And lastly, Samádhi is believed to produce the same results, and these are what have been described in the preceding chapter. The first four causes do not concern the author, and, therefore, no further notice is taken of them. The last is intimately connected with the question at issue, and great pains are taken to meet such objec-

tions as might be started against the theory of Samádhi being the cause of special faculties. The objections are assumed to proceed from opponents, and the Sútras supply the replies. In the second and the third aphorisms, an opponent is made to deny causality to Samádhi, inasmuch as it has no influence on the body, and bodily changes are known to have been produced in this life. The explanation given is that the materials of the body undergo change of their own accord, and merit resulting from Samádhi subserves only to remove all obstructions from their way. This is illustrated by the example of the husbandman, who removes the inequalities on the surface of a field in order to lead water to where it is wanted, and the water then flows of its own accord, or in obedience to the laws of gravitation. This satisfies the opponent, who thereupon, shifts his ground, and, admitting the possibility of the materials changing by themselves, raises the question as to how thinking principles, which are immaterial, can be so produced. Yogís pretend that they can, each of them, animate a number of bodies at the same time, and it is necessary that, for such a purpose, each body should have a separate thinking principle, and the questions raised are how is it provided? and how is the unity of the creating one preserved? The theory of spontaneous change in materials cannot explain this, and the reply given is that such thinking principles are emanations or scintillations from the creating one, and are therefore subordinate to it, acting in accord with the will of the creator, even as the different organs of the

body act in accordance with the will of the mind, (III—V).

The possibility of Samádhi producing occult powers being thus settled, the question next comes as to the nature of those powers—are they of the same character as those produced by other causes? or are they different? The reply is that they are different, (VI). The faculties produced by the other causes are intimately connected with former births; the residua of former births are the active principles which animate them; whereas the faculties produced by Samádhi have no such background. They are spontaneous, and do not produce those after-consequences which the others do.

This leads to the classification of works leading to residua into four groups. Some are described to be white or meritorious; some are black or vicious; some are partly black and partly white; while others are neither black nor white. The first three groups belong to ordinary life, and leave behind residua; the last pertains to Yogís, and are not calculated to leave any remnant behind, (VII).

The after-consequences of ordinary works are two-fold, instinct, and kind, age and experience. The theory is that every work, every sensation, every form of experience leaves on the thinking principle an impress of its own, and such impressions, accumulating in course of a lifetime, become the stock of residua which, though for the time being latent, are susceptible of revival by proper stimulants in subsequent existences. (*cf.* p. 26—174). This

revival is Instinct, *i. e.*, instead of believing Instinct to be spontaneous, self-evolved, intuitive reason, as European philosophers describe it, (*cf.* p. 175,) Yogís take it to be the fruit of the remembrance of former experience, revived by particular circumstances. These residua are also the causes of rewards and punishments in subsequent lives, and the rewards and punishments are represented by kind, age and experience; kind implying birth into higher or lower grades according to merit or demerit; age the span of life in such existences, which is prolonged or reduced according to one's deserts; and experience sensations of pleasure or pain. Confining his attention here to Instinct, the author describes that the residua producing Instinct do not revive invariably but according to circumstances, even after breaks caused by dissimilar births, (VIII). Nor do such breaks, produced by dissimilar births, localities, or times lead to any breach in the relation of cause and effect existing between residua and instinctive manifestations, (IX), inasmuch as the result manifests itself invariably at the first favourable moment.

The theory of residua as above propounded is open to the grave objection that it does not provide for the manifestation of instinctive action at the first birth when no residua can be predicated; but the author obviates it by assuming eternity of desires and consequently of the universe. That which is eternal can have no beginning, and consequently there is no room left for a first birth, (X). This involves a *regressus in infinitum*, but, assuming matter and the universe to be eternal, it is not objectionable, or illogical. More-

over, the necessity of keeping God apart from creation, renders the theory of eternity of the universe unavoidable. Admit God to be the creator, the necessity arises of making Him engage in work and derive its fruit; deny it, the universe must be accepted as self-evolved, and the theory of nothing comes from nothing not allowing of such an assumption, the author is driven to the only alternative left, that of eternity.

The opponent who raised the first objection now turns round and argues that if eternity be predicated of desires, how can they be removed? and if they are not removed the chain of transmigration will ever lengthen and never come to an end, and no redemption is possible, so that the performance of the Yoga for the sake of liberation from the fetters of repeated existence would be futile. To this the author replies by saying that the cause of desire is ignorance of the true nature of things; its effect is the body and its longings and their consequences; its asylum is the thinking principle; and its object is worldly enjoyment, and if these can be made inert or functionless, they would cease to produce their fruits; and if they ceased there would be no root left *in re* the individual in which they are made functionless to produce new residua, and consequently he would be free, (XI).

But, says the opponent, the thinking principle is ever changing under diverse influences, it cannot be in one existence what it was before, and consequently there is no unity, and therefore the theory of oneness, of *omne ens est unum*, is lost. This argument is met

by the theory of archetypes. Every category is eternal, all things are eternal, nothing is really created, or absolutely destroyed, and what we call creation or destruction is simply change of attributes, and in the case of the thinking principle it is nothing more. When it changes its present condition, it reverts to its former condition, or asumes a new one, but its unity is never lost, (XII). This is the theory of the moderate nominalists or conceptionalists, with their *universalia ad rem, universalia in re,* and *universalia post rem.* Change having been admitted above, the author proceeds to account for it. It is produced by the three qualities acting either on the subject, or on the object, or on both, (XIII). The action, however, is not simultaneous, only one of the qualities is predominant at a time, and therefore there is no diversity in the two, (XIV). This leads to the question are sensibles the causes of sensation? or sensations the causes of sensibles? The first idea is in accord with every-day experience. Sensation usually takes place when there is a sensible present to produce it. The relation of the two as cause and effect is, however, not constant, and under different circumstances the same sensible produces simultaneously very different sensations, and the simultaneous production of different effects by one cause is illogical and impossible. The commentator illustrates this by appealing to the different effects produced by a single handsome woman on amorous males, her rivals, and ascetics. He might have gone further, and adverted to representative sensations as distinct from presentative

ones. In fact, as Professor Müller, in his 'Elements of Physiology' (Baly's *Translation*, p. 1059), has observed, "external agencies can give rise to no kind of sensation which cannot also be produced by internal causes, exciting changes in the condition of our nerves." Sensations, too, remain on the sensorium after the sensibles producing them have been removed. Nor can sensation be the cause of sensible, or, in the language of the commentator, "if a thing were an effect of the thinking principle, then there would be nothing besides, when that thinking principle would be occupied with one particular thing." It cannot be said that the ideal presentation of things would be created and maintained by other thinking principles while one thinking principle is occupied with a particular thing, for in that case many diverse causes would be made to produce one effect. Applied to the world the inference would be that one world is the effect of many diverse causes, and, that not being possible, the alternative would be that the world is causeless. The solution afforded is that there is no relation of cause and effect between the two; they are eternal and move in different paths (xv); and their action upon each other is regulated by the triad of qualities, one or other of which predominates for the time and produce its effects. Patanjali is exceedingly brief and enigmatical, but his object is the refutation of the theory of ideal presentation as opposed to real substantiality of matter, *i. e.*, of the *Vivartaváda* doctrine of the Vedánta.

The preception above produced is still incomplete.

The thinking principle may undergo modification and assume the shape of the object presented to it, but it cannot, being unconscious, intelligently perceive what it sees, (XVII). The intelligent principle has still to be infused into it, and this is done by Soul. The reflection of the Soul acting on it makes it perceive directly what is presented to it. It is accordingly said that a thing is known or unknown according as there is a reflection of the Soul, or the absence of it, in the thinking principle, (XVI).

An objection is now raised to the effect that under the circumstances above stated, there being no stability in the thinking principle, knowledge derived by perception could not be constant. The reply given is that since the real perceiver, the Soul, is immutable, knowledge which depends on it must necessarily be constant. Inasmuch, however, as the thinking principle can undergo only one modification at a time, and the Soul perceives only that modification, and not the outside world, there can be only one perception at a time: two diverse ideas cannot arise simultaneously, (XIX).

The objector is still unsatisfied. To obviate the necessity of calling in the agency of Soul, he suggests a multiplicity of thinking principles, saying let one perception or thinking principle be perceived by another. This, however, says the author, cannot be, for the second perception would require a third, and so on, and that would lead to a *regressus in infinitum.* There would, moreover, be no certainty, for in calling one idea to mind a host would arise, and there would

be nothing to show which is the particular idea that has been invoked, or is necessary to the elucidation of the perception at hand.

There is yet another objection to urge. Accepting that perception cannot be helped by one cognition cognizing another, the opponent suggests that in life persons always express the opinion of their knowing things, and how can this take place unless the thinking principle possessed self-illuminative powers? This is met by saying that the thinking principle, assuming the form of the immutable soul, attains the light of intelligence, and is then able to understand its own cognitions, (XXI); and the conclusion arrived at is that when the thinking principle is modified on the one hand by soul and on the other by objects of cognition, it is sufficient for all purposes of understanding, (XXII). The commentator here anticipates a number of other objections, and disposes of them according to the theory of the Yoga. (*Cf.* p. 197).

These explanations, however, are not enough. There is yet a lingering suspicion that the thinking principle has a will of its own, and this suspicion is developed in the form of a question as to what motive the thinking principle can have in engaging itself in its various functions? Naturally inert, it can have no object of its own, and in performing its functions it must be acting without a motive, and as nothing is done without a motive, the inference would be that it has a will of its own, and it gratifies that will by acting as it does. This suspicion is set at rest by the remark that since it acts in conjunction with others,

its object must be to subserve another's purpose, and that another is soul, (XXIII). The commentator explains that such conjunct action for another's purpose without any consciousness on the part of the actors is possible, as we see it in the organs of sense, which act for the purposes of the mind without knowing that they are doing so. The Sánkhya-káriká adduces the example of milk, an unintelligent substance, secreting for the nourishment of the calf. (*Cf.* v.'s LVII to LX). The example of the cart carrying saffron for the use of man is also generally appealed to.

Soul is described as the witness, spectator and experiencer of the actions of nature. Conscious and always present in the body, it cannot but witness what takes place in it. This is the idea which Fichte assigns to mind, when he says, it is, "as it were an intelligent eye, placed in the central point of our inward consciousness, surveying all that takes place there," (Morell, II, p. 95). But since soul has no action or desire of any kind, and as it is, moreover, eternal and immutable, how can it be said to have a purpose of its own, which the thinking principle has to subserve? This is a crucial question, and the answer given is practically an evasion. The premises are admitted, but it is said that, inasmuch as it is a shadow of the soul that sensitizes the thinking principle, and that shadow feels and observes, by indiscriminate use of language we call the soul to be the experiencer and witness, (*cf.* p. 194). The service done is, in the same way, service done to the shadow

and not to the reality, and the benefit derived goes to nature or Prakṛiti, which is entertained and ultimately relieved of all sense of pain, and not to soul, which is painless and ever free.

Patañjali now turns to the effect of the theory and practice propounded. When a person has duly gone through the course of practice enjoined and acquired the knowledge promised, all false notions that he before had on the subject of life subside, (XXIV), and his thinking principle is bowed down by the weight of knowledge and commencing isolation, (XXV). Worldly thoughts, however, still break out occasionally, (XXVI), and these should be carefully repressed in the same way in which afflictions and obstructions were originally overcome, (*cf.* II, XXVIII). When this repression is effected, perfect knowledge rises in the thinking principle, and entirely sweeps away all remnants of afflictions and residua of former works, (XXVIII—XXX). All obscurations are removed; the triad of qualities in regard to the individual concerned ceases from undergoing further change, (XXXI); and the moment at last arrives when the qualities, having retired to rest, become defunct, and the soul abides solely in its own essence. This is isolation or salvation which is the aim and object of the Yoga doctrine, (XXXIII). This isolation is absolute and eternal, and the soul in regard to which it has been attained remains free for evermore.

Following the order of the text, the above summary does not afford a consecutive statement of the leading points of the Yoga system of theology and

metaphysics, and inasmuch as the dissertations on the Yoga now available in the English language are brief, obscure, and not unoften misleading and incorrect, it would not be amiss to attempt here a categorical resumè. The cardinal dogmas are, as already above stated, taken from the Sánkhya system, but there are differences, and the importance attached to some of them, in their mutual coöporation is markedly distinctive. The leading tenets of the Yogís are:

1st. That there is a Supreme Godhead who is purely spiritual, or all soul, perfectly free from afflictions, works, deserts, and desires. His symbol is Om, and He rewards those who are ardently devoted to Him by facilitating their attainment of liberation; but He does not directly grant it. Nor is He the father, creator, or protector of the universe, with which He is absolutely unconnected.

2nd. That there are countless individual souls which animate living beings, and are eternal. They are pure and immutable; but by their association with the universe they become indirectly the experiencers of joys and sorrows, and assume innumerable embodied forms in course of ever recurring metempsychoses.

3rd. That the universe is uncreate and eternal. It undergoes phenomenal changes, but, as a noumenon, it is always the same. In its noumenal state it is called *Prakṛiti* or nature; it is always associated with the three qualities or active forces called goodness, foulness, and darkness. Matter as an integral part of

the universe is, likewise, eternal, though subject to modifications like the world. Strictly speaking the modifications of matter produce the phenomenal world which is composed of it.

4th. That next to soul there is a noumenon called *Chitta*, or the thinking principle, or mind in its most comprehensive sense. It is subject to the three qualities aforesaid, and undergoes various modifications according to the prevalence of one or other of those qualities. It is essentially unconscious or unintelligent, but it becomes conscious or intelligent by the reflection of, or association with, soul, which abides close by it. It also receives through the organs of sense shadows of external objects, and thereupon modifies itself into the shapes of those objects. The consciousness reflected on it makes it think that it is the experiencer of all worldly joys and sorrows. In reality, however, it is merely the spectacle of which soul is by proxy (its shadow) the spectator. It is closely allied to Buddhi or intellect of the Sánkhya system, but it plays a much more important part in the system, than what Buddhi does, partaking as it does the parts of both Prakṛiti and Buddhi in a prominent degree, and also of self-consciousness. It occupies the position of Will of the modern Pessimist system.

5th. That the functions of the thinking principle are five-fold, including right notion, misconception, fancy, sleep, and memory, and that these functions are produced by the prevalence of one or other of the three qualities.

6th. That, like the universe, all sensible objects

have their eternal archetypes or noumena, which undergo phenomenal changes, but are never absolutely destroyed. When one object changes into another, it is merely a modification of its form, and the form assumed, when destroyed, passes on to some other form, but it ultimately reverts to its noumenal or primary state.

7th. That phenomena, as results of modifications of noumena, are real and not phantasmal.

8th. That sensibles are not the direct causes of sensations, nor sensations the causes of sensibles; but that the thinking principle receives impressions of sensibles under the influence of one or other of the three qualities, and the result is regulated by that influence. The influence extends both to sensations and to sensibles.

9th. That the thinking principle being changeable, constancy of knowledge is due to the immutability of the soul, and that no perception can take place until the thinking principle is made conscious by the soul.

10th. That impressions produced on the thinking principle leave on it certain residua (αναμνησις of Aristotle) which are causes of intuitions, desires, new births, and further experiences.

11th. That desires are the origin of pain in this world.

12th. That the universe being eternal, desires are likewise eternal, and it is needless therefore to enquire when residua first arose to create desires.

13th. That mundane existence is thus associated with pain, and it is the duty of every one to rise above that pain.

14th. That the pain may be finally overcome or removed only by withdrawing the thinking principle from its natural functions.

15th. That the withdrawal in question can be effected by constant and sedulous observance of certain prescribed restraints, obligations and steadfast meditation.

16th. That in the course of the exercises above referred to, the adept attains extraordinary occult powers.

17th. That when that withdrawal is complete and absolute, the soul is completely isolated from the world, and that when that isolation is attained, it is liberated from all liability to future transmigration. And this is the isolation, liberation, emancipation, or final beatitude which should be the great object and aim of human existence.

The general impression regarding the nature of the Yoga doctrine, has been hitherto exceedingly unfavourable among Anglo-oriental scholars. It is mystical, it is fanatical, it is dreadfully absurd, are among the mildest charges brought against it. Mr. Fitz-Edward Hall is so disgusted with its tenets that in a fit of virtuous indignation he says, "As few of the twenty-eight Yoga works which have fallen under my inspection are at present read, so, one may hope, few will ever again be read, either in this country or by curious enquirers in Europe. If we exclude the immundities of the *Tantras* and of the *Káma-s'ástra*, Hindu thought was never more unworthily engaged than in digesting into an economy the fanatical vagaries

of theocracy. Not less, it is observable, have the Yogins of India transcended than they have anticipated the quietistic delirations of Bonaventura, de Sales, Saint Theresa, and Molinos," (*Contributions*, p. XI). Other writers, if not equally denunciative, are still very severe in the tone of their criticisms. I believe this is due principally to the subject not having been carefully studied. The subject is dry—exceedingly so—and the enigmatical form in which it is presented in the text-books is not conducive to any interest being created in its favour. Generally speaking Indian scholars do not study it, and the few ascetics and hermits who do seldom associate with the world. Paṇḍits, when called upon to explain, frequently, if not invariably, mix up the tenets of Patanjali's Yoga with those of the Tantras, the Puráṇas, the Tantric Sañhitás, the Pancharátras, and the Bhagavadgítá—works which have very dissimilar and discordant tenets to inculcate. Some of the later avowedly Yoga works are, moreover, exceedingly allegorical and mystical in their descriptions, and in them the purport of the instruction is buried in a mass of absurdity. Practices, too, have been inculcated in them which are certainly repulsive. (*Cf.* pp. 103, 117). In judging, however, of the nature of Patanjali's doctrine it is unfair to associate it with the vagaries of fanatical, deluded mendicants, or with the modifications and adaptations which it has undergone in the hands of the Tántrics and the Puráṇics.

The tenets of Patanjali are all that concern the

critic, and the summary of them given above will show to the unbiassed enquirer that they are closely similar to those enunciated by some of the greatest metaphysicians of ancient Greece. The similitude is in some cases so close that I would not be surprised to see some enterprising dialectician, intent upon proving everything good in India to be of European origin, demonstrate that the whole system has been nefariously copied from Greek philosophers. The tenets may not be the best of their kind—some of them are unquestionably futile,—but they are certainly, not such philosophic desperadoes as to commit outrages on the chastity of our thoughts, or so vile as to make us join in the hope so fervently expressed by Mr. Hall that the works which treat of them may not again be read by the curious enquirer. If the history of the human mind be a fit subject for study, if it be desirable to compare the progress of metaphysical knowledge among different nationalities at different times in different places, if the civilization of the Hindus be an object of enquiry, we should rather earnestly desire that the works should be thoroughly examined, and not neglected, and that without in any way pledging ourselves as their defenders. There is no reason to doubt that such enquiry will not only be useful to history, but reflect credit on the grasp of the intellect of the ancient Indian sages who matured the doctrine.

It would take more space than what I have at my disposal to go through all the tenets seriatim, and show their relation to European theories, but it may

be generally observed that even the most faulty dogmas do not, on sufficient examination, appear to be so bad as they are represented to be by hasty and adverse critics. The theory of isolation is certainly very startling, but it was the logical outcome of the conception of the absolute perfection of the Godhead reacting on the Upanishad doctrine of resolution into the Divine essence.* The Bhagavadgítá thus sums up the Upanishad idea :

> 'He who all paths stops up, and in the heart
> 'Confines the mind, shuts up the breath within
> 'The head, adopts a firm devotion, utters
> 'The single syllable "Om"—the Soul Supreme,
> 'And thinks of me, and goes, abandoning
> 'The body thus, reaches the goal supreme.'
>
> (*Telang's Translation*, p. 52.)

This idea, however, involves the necessity of additions to, and abstractions from, Divine perfection. The theory is that the human soul is specifically distinct from, though generically the same with, the Divine one, and as the two dissimilars cannot melt into one, they must always remain separate, and as joy, felicity, bliss and the like imply activity and enjoyment,—a concrete heaven inconsistent with the theory of final rest,—the Yogís obviate all philosophic and logical difficulties by contenting themselves with isolation, without predicating it with joy or bliss.

The threefold division of the intellectual man into *purusha*, *chitta* and *ahankára* is the counterpart of νους, ψυχὴ and σομα of Plato and other ancient

* Dr. Weber probably refers to this Upanishad theory, and not to the Puráṇas as stated on page 208.

European authors. (Plato, *Timæus*, Aristotle, *Politics*.)

The theory of Prakriti, a noumenal absolute of the phenomenal world, or nature in the abstract, has been a stumbling-block to many Europeans, and the allegorical way in which it is frequently described, is certainly often misleading. Even among Hindus it has given rise to many frivolous and absurd stories. In the main, however, it seems to accord very closely with some of the latest European speculations on the subject. It is no other than the φυσις or plastic nature of Cudworth, which has been designed to avoid fortuitousness on the one hand and God's constant interposition on the other. Morell, in his 'History of modern Philosophy' (I, p. 208) commenting on one of the latest German systems, that of Herbarts, says:

'The process by which the necessity of philosophy comes to be felt is the following:—When we look round us upon the world in which we live, our knowledge commences by a perception of the various objects that present themselves on every hand to our view. What we *immediately* perceive, however, is not actual essence, but phenomena; and after a short time, we discover that many of those phenomena are unreal; that they do not pourtray to us the actual truth of things as they are; and that if we followed them implicitly, we should soon be landed in the midst of error and contradiction. For example, what we are immediately conscious of in coming into contact with the external world, are such appearances as green, blue, bitter, sour, extension, resistance, &c. These phenomena, upon reflection, we discover not to to be so many real independent existences, but properties inhering in certain substances, which we term things. Again, when we examine further into these *substances*, we discover that they are not real ultimate essences, but that they consist of certain elements, by the combination of which they are produced. What we term the *reality*, therefore, is not *the thing as*

a whole, but the elements of which it is composed. Thus, the further we analyze, the further does the idea of *reality* recede backwards; but still it must always be somewhere, otherwise we should be perceiving a nonentity. The last result of the analysis is the conception of an absolutely simple element, which lies at the basis of all phenomena in the material world, and which we view as the essence that assumes the different properties which come before us in sensation.'

Dr. Kay, in his remarks on this passage, observes—

'This "essence that assumes the different properties which come before us in sensation"—this which the European analyst arrives at as "the last result of the analysis"—is what the S'áñkhya expositor, proceeding, "more Indico," synthetically, lays down as his first position. This is Kapila's *múlaprakriti*—the "root of all"—"the radical producer"—that which, variously modified, constitutes all that the 'soul' takes cognizance of. This primordial essence—among the synonymes for which, given in our text-book, are the 'undiscrete' *avyakta*, the 'indestructible' *akshara*, that 'in which all generated effect is comprehended' *pradhánaka*, &c., is the 'absolute' of German speculation. The development of this principle, according to one of Shelling's views (noticed by Mr. Morell at p. 147, Vol. II) is 'not the free and designed operation of intelligence, but rather a blind impulse working, first unconsciously in the mind." So, according to Kapila, "From Nature issues Mind, and thence self-consciousness."' (*Benares Magazine*, Vol. III, pp. 284*f.*)

This Prakṛiti is believed to be unintelligent, and yet it is described to be acting for another's purpose, and this has often been stigmatized as a specimen of Indian absurdity. This theory, however, is exactly what Cudworth entertains in regard to his plastic nature, which, he says 'doth never consult nor deliberate;' 'it goes on in one constant unrepeating tenor from generation to generation; it acts artificially and for sake of ends, but itself understands

not the ends which it acts for.' 'It acts neither by knowledge nor by animal fancy, neither electively nor blindly, but must be concluded to act FATALLY, magically, and sympathetically.' ('True Intellectual System of the Universe,' B. I., Cap. III, 37.)

Again, Prakṛiti and necessarily matter are eternal, says the Yogí, and in the sense in which he predicates eternity, *i. e.*, to noumena as distinct from phenomena, we have nothing more preposterous than the "eternal verities" of the European philosophers of even our own times—verities which even the Godhead cannot undo, such as the conception of a triangle invariably including two right angles. To such archetypical eternities few can object from a pure philosophic standpoint, apart from revealed systems of religion.

The two most repellent dogmas of the system are its faith in metempsychosis and its theory about occult powers, and even these have found defenders in quarters where they were least expected; and, carefully considered, they do not seem to be so absurd as one would at first glance suppose.

Extravagant as are the ideas regarding the occult powers, and purely imaginary as, at least, some of them doubtless are, it is worthy of note that belief in such powers was almost universal in the ancient world, and well-authenticated reports are not wanting to show that some of them were attainable. Mental prescience has manifested itself on many occasions. Mesmeric and other electric conditions of the body are now objects of scientific research; and they are well-known

to produce extraordinary phenomena. Many facts have been brought to light which show that physical causes may be, particularly in unsophisticated states of society, easily mistaken for occult powers. Sir David Brewster's theory of the objective projection upon visual organs of a subjectively concieved image may account for a good many occurrences which strike the mind of the masses with wonder, and appear as the result of superhuman agency. Many psychological conditions, which are known to arise and produce startling results, but the true nature of which has not yet been fully and scientifically examined and ascertained, would account for some so-called occult occurrences. But in the present state of our knowledge it is impossible to separate the wheat from the tares—to discriminate between what powers were really attained or attainable by Yogís and what they fancied they would attain by persevering in their practices. Doubtless the pretensions of the European psychics of the day are to a considerable extent false and fraudulent; still there are among them some good men and true, and their researches carried on on catholic, honest and scientific principles will hereafter bear some good fruit, and the time will then come to enquire how far the Yogís had anticipated them. In the meanwhile all that need be said is that the extravagance of some of their pretensions should not make us spurn the Yogís as all knaves and charlatans, and their psychical system wholly false and fatuous. Such a principle of action, however necessary and prudent in shifting the merits of a lawsuit, and even then under certain

restrictions, would be intolerable in history. If some obviously false, or improbable, or unprovable, statements in any author would justify our rejecting the whole of his testimony there would be no ancient author left whose testimony could be accepted, and I know not how few of our modern authors would escape the condemnation. No Yogí myself, nor anywise interested in the doctrine, all I feel in the cause of truth is, that there should, for the present, be a suspension of judgment, and the materials afforded by the Yogís should be subjected to examination and analysis.

As regards metempsychosis something has already been said, (*ante*, p. xiii.) It is a doctrine which even Plato thought fit to adopt, and much might be said in favour of it which cannot be readily disproved; but I shall content myself here with a quotation.

Perhaps the ablest metaphysician who ever came to India from England was the late Rev. Dr. Kay, principal of the late Bishop's College. His strong Christian convictions did not by any means make him an indulgent critic of adverse faiths, but in commenting on the doctrine of metempsychosis as affording a solution of the question of the origin of evil, he says:

'The doctrine of the Metempsychosis is, in fact, the Hindu theory on the great question of the "origin of evil." The theory may be thus stated. Evil exists, and it is not to be supposed that evil befals any one undeservedly. When, therefore, for example, a new-born child, who has had no opportunity of acting either rightly or wrongly, is found suffer-

ing evil, it is inferred that the evil is the fruit of evil deeds done in a former state of existence. If you ask how the person became disposed to do evil in that former state of existence, the answer is ready—it was the consequence of evil deeds done in a state of existence still anterior, and so on. You have only now to apply the Newtonian principle—that what is true at every assignable point short of the limit, must be true at the limit—and then there is no assignable point in the existence of evil in past time at which point its existence cannot be accounted for by the hypothesis of antecedent evil-doing; it follows (argue the Hindus) that the existence of evil is accounted for on this hypothesis; and further, they contend, it is accountable on no other.

'If one will take the pains thoroughly to grasp the conception, and to view the matter, as a German would say, from the same *stand-punkt* as the Hindu, who, holding the past eternity of soul, denies that the *regressus in infinitum* here involves any absurdity, he will probably acknowledge that the doctrine of the metempsychosis, however false, is not to be treated as a fiction of the poets, when we are arguing with a Hindu. We try to make the Hindu give up the tenet—and we do well:—but we shall also do well to bear in mind that we are calling upon him to give up, without an equivalent, what he has been accustomed to regard as a complete solution of the greatest mystery in the universe—short of the primal mystery of "Being" itself. The Hindu's explanation we regard as a delusion, and we must tell him so—

but we must beware how we allow it to appear as if we were provided with a substitute. The "origin of evil" has not been revealed. The requirement that we shall maintain our entire reliance on the goodness of God, in the absence of such revelation, is one of the trials—rather it furnishes the substance of all the trials—of our faith. This we have to teach—but we have no equivalent solution of the mystery to offer. On this point the words of Whately should be treasured by every Missionary among the Hindus. We quote from the Preface (p. 12) of his 'Essays on some of the peculiarities of the Christian religion.'

'The origin of evil, again, not a few are apt to speak of, as explained and accounted for, at least in great part, by the Scripture-accounts of 'sin entering the world, and death by sin;' whereas the Scriptures leave us, with respect to the difficulty in question, just where they find us, and are manifestly not designed to remove it. He who professes to *account* for the existence of evil, by merely tracing it up to the *first* evil recorded as occurring, would have no reason to deride the absurdity of an atheist, who should profess to account for the origin of the human race, without having recourse to a creator, by tracing them up to the *first* pair.'" (*Benares Magazine*, III, pp. 286*f.*)

Elsewhere the same writer, speaking generally, observes, 'it may somewhat tend to check the mischievous consequences attendant on bluntly regarding any current and influential Hindu doctrine, that happens not to accord with our accustomed notions, as being self-evidently frivolous and effete, if it can be shown that the conceptions involved in the doctrine are still influential in directing the current of speculation in Europe, in quarters where that current runs (or is supposed to run) deepest.' (*Opus cit.*, pp. 283*f.*)

To turn now to the life of Patanjali. The brief notices to be met with of him in Sanskrit works are so legendary and contradictory that little can be made of them to subserve the cause of history. He was a great scholar and unrivalled philologist of his time, and the life of every great man was, in ancient times, so encrusted with the supernatural that it is difficult to remove the covering, and come to the truthful core. Rev. J. Ward, citing the Rudrayámala Tantra, the Vrihannandikes'vara Puráṇa, and the Padma Puráṇa, describes him to 'have been born in the Ilávrata Varsha, where his father Angirá and his mother Satí resided, and that, immediately on his birth, he made known things past, present, and future. He married Lolupá, whom he found on the north of Sumeru, in the hollow of a "Vaṭa" tree, and is said to have lived as a mendicant to a great age. Being insulted by the inhabitants of Bhoṭa-bhaṇḍára, while engaged in religious austerities, he reduced them to ashes by fire from his mouth.' (*Hindus*, II.)

There occurs in the *Sankshepa-s'ankara-jaya* of Mádhava A'chárya a story, according to which the Devas, on one occasion, repaired to Mahádeva, and besought his aid in saving the world from the baneful doctrines which Bauddhas and other heretics had widely disseminated among men. The god vouchsafed to them a kind reply, and it was arranged that certain chief divinities would from time to time appear on earth as Jaimini, Vyása, Patanjali, and S'ankara, and, uprooting all heresies, preserve the true religion from pollution. It fell to the lot of Vishṇu and S'ankarshaṇa *alias* Ananta

to depute a portion of themselves to be born as Patanjali,* and Mahádeva himself appeared as S'ankara.† The only value of this story for historical purposes is the admission that Patanjali appeared on the earth long after it had been overrun by the Buddhists. Mádhava A'chârya of the 14th century is no authority for what happened sixteen hundred years before him, but the tradition in his time was that Patanjali was born long after Buddha in order to inculcate theism, and this supports the opinion expressed on page xxiii to the effect that the Yoga doctrine as we have it in Patanjali's work is of post Buddhist origin. It is in favour, too, of the deductions made by Goldstücker and others regarding the age of Patanjali from casual historical allusions in his great work, the Mahábháshya, entirely undermining, as it does, the arguments of Professor Kunte as given in his 'Vicissitudes of Aryan civilization.' It is true that the Yoga-sútra does not anywhere refer to Buddhism, and it is not easy to accept the theory of Professor Cowell that the relegation of benevolence (*maitri*), which occupies a prominent place in the Buddhist system, to an ancillary or subordinate position in the Yoga is a direct allusion to Buddhism, (*Sarvadars ana-sangraha*, p. 273,) for benevolence as an element of religious observance is

* मध्यमं कांडमवतुमनुज्ञातौ मयैव तौ ।
अवतीर्यांशतो भूमौ सङ्कर्षणपतञ्जली ॥ १ । ५१ ।
मुनीभूत्वा मुदोपास्ति योगकाण्डकृतौ स्थितौ ॥
अपिमं ज्ञानकाण्डमुद्धरिष्यामीति देवताः । १ । ५९ ।

† यतीन्द्रः शङ्करोनाम्ना भविष्यामि महीतले ।
मद्वत्सा भवन्तोऽपि मानुषीं तनुमाश्रिताः ॥ ५८

common to all systems of religion, and reference to it cannot be taken as an unmistakable test; but apart from them, I believe, I have produced sufficient evidence to show that Patanjali cannot reasonably be believed to have lived before Buddha. Ananta is represented in the form of a many-hooded serpent, and, as an emanation of that serpent, Patanjali is frequently indicated by the homonym *phani* or 'serpent,' (*cf.* p. 1).

The references given of Patanjali in his Mahábháshya entirely upsets the statements made in Mr. Ward's notice. The sage describes himself as the son of one Goṇiká, not Satí, and his place of birth was the eastern country, whereas Ilávrata is said in the Puráṇas to lie to the north of the Himálaya. These facts are thus given by Goldstücker in his essay on Páṇini:

'Of the lineage of Patanjali all the knowledge I possess is, that the name of his mother was *Goṇiká*. It occurs in the last words of Patanjali on a Káriká to Páṇini. Of more importance, however, is the information he gives us of having resided temporarily in *Káshmír*, for this circumstance throws some light on the interest which certain kings of this country took in the preservation of the great commentary.

'His birthplace must have been situated in the east of India, for he calls himself *Gonardiya;* and this word is given by the Káśiká in order to exemplify names of places in the East. Patanjali's birthplace had therefore the name of *Gonarda*. But that he is one of the eastern grammarians is borne out also by other evidence. Kaiyyaṭa calls him on several occasions *A'cháryadeśiya*. If we interpreted this word according to Páṇini's rules V, 3, 67 and 68, it would mean "an unaccomplished teacher;" but as there is not the slightest reason for assuming that Kaiyyaṭa intended any irony or blame when he applied this epithet to Patanjali, it is necessary to

render the word by the teacher "who belongs to the country of the Achárya." Now, since Kaiyyaṭa also distinctly contrasts *áchárya* as the author of the Várttikas, with *Acháryadeśiya*, the latter epithet can only imply that Patanjali was a countryman of Kátyá. yana. Kátyáyana, however, as Professor Weber has shown by very good arguments, is one of the eastern school; Kaiyyaṭa, therefore, must have looked upon Patanjali also as belonging to it.

'Another proof is afforded by a passage in the comment of Bhaṭṭojí Díkshita on the Phiṭ-sútras which I have quoted above. For when this grammarian tells us that the *eastern* grammarians attribute the accent in question of *saha* to Páṇini's rule VI, 3, 78, we find that it is *Patanjali* himself who gives us this information, and without any intimation of his having obtained it from other authorities.' (Goldstücker's *Páṇini*, p. 237.)

Meagre as these notes on the life of Patanjali are, they are of unquestionable authority, and we must rest content with them. In the 'Indian Antiquary' (IX, p. 308), Professor Max Müller has a note on the travels of I-tsing, a Chinese pilgrim, who visited India at the close of the 7th century, and therein mention is made of a Sanskrit grammatical work under the name of *Juni* or *Chuni*. The learned professor shows on very good arguments that the work could be no other than the Mahábháshya, and then very pertinently asks, "Is this (*Juni*) possibly a name connected with Goṇiká, the mother of Patanjali, who calls himself Goṇikáputra, or with Gonarda, his supposed birthplace, from which he takes the name of Gonardíya?" Few who have studied the subject would hesitate to respond in the affirmative to the first question.

In a note on a Pálí inscription from Bhárhat, published in the Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal for March 1880, I have quoted a

great number of instances to show that in India metronymics were used to indicate illegitimacy, or the forsaking of a child by its father. If this theory of mine be tenable, the use of Goṇikáputra in the case of Patanjali would suggest a bar sinister in his scutcheon. Under that supposition it would be futile to enquire about his genealogy. If Napoleon said, 'my genealogy begins with the battle of Austerlitz,' Patanjali might well appeal to his Mahábháshya as the root of his family tree.* Professor Weber, however, has been at some pains to find a genealogical tree for him. In his 'History of Indian Literature' he has several remarks with reference to Patanjali in connection with the Vedic Kápya Patamchala. He says, on page 137, 'Again, though only in the Yájnavalkíya-káṇḍa, we have mention of a Kápya Patamchala of the country of the Madras as particularly distinguished by his exertions in the cause of Bráhmaṇical theology; and in his name we cannot but see a reference to Kapila and Patanjali, the traditional founders of the Sánkhya, and Yoga systems.' This is modified in a subsequent remark, (p. 223,) in which it is said, 'The name of Patanjali (we should expect Pát.†) is certainly somehow

* Professor Weber refers to a tradition which, he says, 'identifies Pingala with Patanjali, the author of Mahábháshya and the Yoga-sútra,' but he justly adds, it 'should answer for itself; for us there exists no cogent reason for accepting it.' ('Hist. Indian Literature,' p. 231.)

† This grammatical correction has been suggested apparently with a view to make Patanjali a derivative of Patamchala to prop the theory of relationship.

connected with that of the Patamchala Kápya of the land of the Madras, who appears in the Yájnavalkíya-káṇḍa of the Satap. Br. It occurs again (see below p. 737) as the name of the author of the Yoga-sútras.' On page 236, we are told that, 'Kapila, again, can hardly be unconnected with the Kápya Patamchala whom we find mentioned in the Yájnavalkya-káṇḍa of the Vṛihad A'raṇyaka as a zealous representative of the Bráhmaṇical learning.' This is repeated on page 284,—'Kápya Patamchala, with whom Kapila ought probably to be connected.' It is difficult to make out from these extracts a consistent account of what the real or actual theory is. In the first extract a single individual, Kápya Patamchala, is split into two persons, Kapila and Patanjali, and that as certainly as the phrase 'we cannot but see' can imply. In the second extract the Vedic personage is said to be 'certainly' connected with Patanjali only, and in the third we are told that the same individual can 'hardly be unconnected' with Kapila. In the fourth the phrase 'can hardly be unconnected' is replaced by 'ought probably to be connected.' No reason is assigned for the first two conjectures, but for the 3rd and the 4th the reason assigned is that Kápya Patamchala was 'a zealous representative of the Bráhmaṇical learning.' It happens, however, that Kapila was an atheist, who repudiated the existence of the Godhead, saying 'there is no proof that such a being existed,' and it is difficult to conceive how the relationship should be established on the ground of Kápya having been 'a zealous representative of the Hindu learn-

ing,' unless we admit that Hindu learning consisted in atheism. It is obvious that the learned professor has been led away entirely by phonetic resemblance, unless he should urge, which is not at all likely, that it is an *ex cathedra* opinion, without any reason to back it. Kápya has the letters *k* and *p* and so has Kapila, and Patamchala sounds very like Patanjali, and therefore he evidently concludes they are the same. This is a line of argument, however, which I cannot help thinking, is, to use the language of the learned Professor, 'of a very curious kind.' It reminds me, I must frankly confess, the ratiocination of Fluellen by which that jovial Welsh Captain proved the identity of Macedon and Monmouth. Had that flighty logician been reminded in the present case of the absence in Kápya of the letter *l* of Kapila, and of *j* of Patanjali in Patamchala, I can easily conceive how he would have completely dumb-foundered his antagonist with the pithy remark: 'Why, I pray you, is not pig great? the pig, or the great, or the mighty, or the huge, or the magnanimous, are all one reckonings, save the phrase is a little variations.' I have nothing to show that Patanjali was not connected with Kápya by the father's or the mother's or some other side, in family or race, but I firmly hold that we have at present no proof worth the name in support of the conjecture.

The son of a Bráhmaṇ priest, and devoted to literary studies and ascetic practices from early life, Patanjali had little to do which could afford incidents fit for historical record, and it is not remarkable, therefore, that we have no account left of his career. He was

doubtless married and probably the father of a family, but we know nothing about those points. The only memorials of his life are his literary works,—his great commentary on the grammar of Páṇini and the Yoga-sútra. It is impossible to speak in too high terms of the first. It is the noblest monument of profound erudition, of keen critical acumen, of unrivalled philological perception, which has been left to us by any ancient scholar in any part of the world, and well may the Hindus be proud of the heritage that has been bequeathed to them by their renowned ancestor. The second forms the theme of this essay. There is an *A'ryyá-pancháśáti* on the Vaishṇava theory of the relation between soul and nature which is also ascribed to him. The work has been published in the Benares 'Paṇḍit,' No. 50. He wrote also a work on medicine, but it is no longer extant. It would seem that he was, likewise, the author of a treatise on grammatical desiderata under the title of *Ishṭis*, and also certain supplementary notes on the rules of Sanskrit grammar (*Vártikas*), but these exist now only in the form of quotations in the *Mahábháshya*. The manner in which they are cited in the 'great commentary' suggests the idea that at one time they had separate existences, but they are not met with now as a separate work.

To turn now to the Bibliography of the Yoga doctrine. The leading text is, as already stated, the *Yogánus'ásana*, but its different topics have been elaborated and expounded in a great number of subsequent treatises, and its literature is now represented

by a large mass of writings. In 1859, Mr. Hall, in his 'Contributions towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems,' collected the names of 28 separate works. But recent researches carried on under the auspices of the Government of India enable me now to put in the Appendix a list including no less than 150 names. It is probable that further researches will bring to light the texts of several other works. It must be admitted, however, that while Mr. Hall's list was compiled by a single individual after himself examining all the Mss. named, thereby obviating all risks of error, mine is a compilation from meagre reports, and it is likely, therefore, that there will be found in it mistakes of diverse kinds. Sanskrit works have many aliases, and it is possible that in some cases—probably very few—of works unknown to, and unseen by, me I have recorded the same work under two or three names. I have included, too, a few works which treat of varieties of the Yoga, the Tántric and Puráṇic forms of it, and not confined myself solely to the doctrine of Patañjali. The differences in some cases are so slight, that it was not possible for me, without carefully reading the works, to mark the distinctions. On the whole, however, I believe the new list will be found useful.

In preparing my list I have followed an alphabetical arrangement, a chronological one with anything like accuracy not being practicable in the present state of our information on the subject. If the *Yoga-s'ástra-sútra-páṭha*, attributed to Yájñavalkya, be really his, it

is the oldest treatise known on the Yoga doctrine. Yájnavalkya lived long before Patanjali, and the Bháshya especially cites his name to prove that the Yoga doctrine was current from a much anterior period than the Yoga-sútra, which was compiled for the benefit of novices; but as I have not yet seen it, I can say nothing on the subject. Adverting to the work, Mr. Hall says, 'It is alleged that they (the aphorisms of Yájnavalkya) were noted down by Baudháyana, as they were orally delivered by S'ukra to Yájnavalkya. Hence they are ascribed to S'ukra, who here has the epithet of Mahákavi. This work possibly deserves a closer examination than I can at present give it: but, it is, I suspect, of comparatively recent origin, and of little worth in any point of view.' (*Contributions*, p. 18.)

Passing it over for the present I come to the work of Patanjali, the *Yoga-sútra* alias the *Yogánus'ásana* or the *Sánkhya-pravachana.* It has the benefit of a host of commentaries, explaining its tenets from different standpoints. The most ancient of these commentaries is generally believed to be the one which is known under the different names of *Yoga-bháshya*, *Pátanjala-bháshya*, and *Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya.* It is held in high estimation by the Pandits of this country. It has the advantage, too, of two exegeses by eminent scholiasts, one by Váchaspati Mis'ra, and the other by Vijnána Bhikshu. It labours, however, under the disadvantage of being of doubtful authenticity as regards the name of its author. It has been twice printed, once

at Benares, edited by Bhairavadatta Dvivedí, and once at Calcutta, along with the gloss of Váchaspati Mis'ra, edited by Paṇḍit Jívánanda Vidyáságara, in 1874 (Samvat 1929.) I have also seen upwards of a dozen Mss. of it of different dates; but in the colophon of none of these have I met with the author's name. This is a remarkable omission, inasmuch as it is rarely that the author's name, where known, is dropped out from the colophon of a Sanskrit MS. The tradition is pretty common and old that Vyása, the digester of the Vedas and the author of the Mahábhárata, is the author of it. This tradition has been generally accepted by European writers, and it has the support of the two well-known and respectable exegesists named above. Váchaspati Mis'ra in his gloss (*ṭíká*) on the commentary (*bháshya*) says, "Saluting the saint Patanjali, I attempt a short, clear exposition (*vyákhyá*), pregnant with meaning, on the commentary expounded by Veda-vyása."* The authority, however, of this writer is not, in matters connected with historical facts of olden times, of much weight. There were two writers of this name. One of them was a legist, and, according to the colophon of his *S'udráchára-chintámaṇi*, court Paṇḍit of Mahárájá Harináráyaṇa, of Mithilá, and Harináráyaṇa lived in the middle of the 16th century. The other lived between the 10th and the 12th centuries, and commented both on the Yoga and the S'ankhya texts, as well as on the Vedánta-sútras. Adverting to him

* नत्वा पतञ्जलिमृषिं वेदव्यासेन भाषिते ।
सङ्क्षिप्तस्पष्टबह्वर्था भाष्ये व्याख्या विधास्यते ॥

Mr. Hall says, 'Váchaspati's exact age has not yet been discovered. But he is mentioned, as are Udayana and Prasastapáda, in the *Nyáyasára-vichára* of Bhaṭṭa Rághava, which was written in the *S'aka* year 1174 or A. D. 1252; and he quotes from Bhoja, who was reigning in A. D. 1042.'* (*Sánkhya-sára*, p. 40.)

Vijnána Bhikshu dates from a much later time. According to Mr. Hall, 'in all probability, Vijnána lived in the sixteenth or seventeenth century. There is some slight ground, however, for carrying him back still further. His nationality is unknown; and so is his civil appellation even; for Vijnána Bhikshu is, without question, the style of a devotee.' (*Sánkhya-sára*, pp. 37*f.*)

He continues, 'In the *Prayogaratna*, a work on the sixteen sacraments, by Náráyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, son of Rámes'vara Bhaṭṭa, its author says, that he was assisted,

* This date is incorrect. It refers to the last Bhoja, whereas the Bhoja quoted must be the elder one, and elsewhere constructively admitted to be so by Mr. Hall himself. In the Preface to his 'Contributions towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems,' he observes, 'that two Bhojas have ruled over part of Central India, and that the earlier, whatever was the case with the later, was interested in literature, I have elsewhere shown conclusively. The Bhoja who reigned in the middle of the eleventh century very likely entertained learned men at his court; and the astrological compilation known as the *Rájamártaṇḍa*, and thus called in honour of him, may have been indebted, for its name, to the suggestion of the Yoga work, so entitled, written in the time of his homonymous antecessor. At any rate he came long after the date of the *Sarasvatíkaṇṭhábharaṇa;* and we are nowhere told that the Bhoja to whom it is attributed bore the epithet of Ranarânga-malla.' (*Contributions*, p. viii.)

in preparing it, by Ananta Díkshita, son of Vis'vanátha Díkshita. The father of one of Vijnána's disciples, Bhává-ganes'a Díkshita, was Bháva-vis'vanátha Díkshita; and, if the latter was one with Vis'vanátha Díkshita, and if Bhává-ganes'a Díkshita was brother of Ananta Díkshita, we are enabled to form a pretty correct estimate as to the time of Vijnána Bhikshu. For Náráyana Bhatta's youngest brother's second son, Raghunátha Bhatta, dates his *Kála-tattva-vivechana* in Samvat 1677 or A. D. 1620: Vijnána may be placed fifty or sixty years earlier.' But whatever the times of Vijnána Bhikshu and Váchaspati Mis'ra, it is futile to expect from such authors any precision as to the identity of a person who lived many centuries before them.

The name Vyása may be right enough, but there is nothing whatever to show that this Vyása was the same with the digester of the Vedas and the author of the Mahábhárata. In the Mahábhárata every epigraph gives the name of Vyása, and there is no reason why it should be omitted in the commentary. Then Vyása lived at a remote period of antiquity, in the beginning of the Kali Yuga according to Indian belief, and his classification and division of the Vedas existed long before the time of Patanjali, for we have unmistakable proofs of the existence of the classification in Pánini, Yáska, the Prátis'ákhyas, and other works of a much earlier date than that of the Yoga aphorisms, and it is impossible to reconcile the idea that he should be the author of an exegesis which could not have had a *raison d'être* before the Yoga-sútra was

composed in the 2nd or 3rd century before the Christian era. That exegesis quotes, too, authorities which are of a more recent date than that of Vyása. The evidence of style is often a suspicious one, but no one who has any knowledge of the Sanskrit language will for a moment think it possible that he who wrote the Mahábhárata could be the author of the Bháshya under notice. Compared with the works of leading scholiasts, the Bháshya appears to be the production of a third class writer. It certainly cannot be compared with the 'great commentary' of Patanjali, or with the equally renowned exegesis of S'ankara on the Vedánta aphorisms, or with the commentary of Sabara Svámí on the Mímáñsá; and, whatever his age, Vyása was by the unanimous testimony of the Hindus a far superior author and scholar to Patanjali, or Sabara, or S'ankara. Fairly good though it be, there is a looseness, an indecision, a want of logical precision, in the Bháshya which are incompatible with the universal estimate of Vyása's learning and scholarship. Bhojadeva treats it with withering sarcasam. Without naming it, but obviously aiming at it, he says, 'all commentators are perverters of the meaning of their authors; they avoid those parts which are most difficult to understand, by saying that the meaning there is obvious; they dilate upon those parts with useless compound terms where the meaning is plain; they confound their hearers by misplaced and inappropriate dissertations without number,' (p. 2). It may be that Bhoja had to justify his attempt at a new commentary by throwing discredit on his predecessors, but his remarks are not al-

together unauthorised. The invocation at the beginning of the Bháshya is also against its authenticity. No work of the leading Ṛishis which has come down to us contains any such invocation, and Vyása would be the last to pray to Mahádeva in the way in which that divinity has been invoked in the Bháshya. The tone of the Bháshya is that of a third class mediæval scholium, and I am clearly of opinion, therefore, that it is not the work of the digester of the Vedas. Its author may have borne the name of Vyása, a common family name even to this day, but he was not the digester of the Vedas nor older than the latest ancient times, or, more probably, the early middle ages.

The next commentary I have to notice is the *Rája-mártaṇḍa*, of which a complete English translation is now offered to the public. It is not so ambitious as the last. It styles itself a *vṛitti* or gloss, whereas the other is a *Bháshya* or commentary. It is mainly explanatory, when the other is discursive. It is modest in tone, when the other is dictatorial. Its author sets forth his object in writing the work by saying, 'Avoiding voluminousness, keeping clear of all mystifying and obviously worthless network of words, and abstracting the inmost meaning, I publish this exposition of the sage Patanjali for the edification of intelligent persons,' (p. 2). And he has faithfully carried out his resolution. He has interpreted all the leading words of his text, and given a very fair explanation of the meaning of his author, and the purport and bearing of his doctrine. It is, perhaps, not always quite so full in philosophical matter as its predecessor, but it

certainly omits nothing of importance for a correct understanding of the text.

It is generally taken for granted by Indian writers that Bhoja, king of Dhárá, who flourished in the middle of the 11th century, was the author of the exegesis; but the opinion is not tenable. Doubtless the colophon of the exegesis names Mahárájádhirája Bhojadeva as its author, but there have been many Bhojas in India, (*cf.* my 'Indo-Aryans,' II, pp. 385*f*,) and it does not show which is the sovereign meant: it certainly does not announce that this Bhoja was the hero of the *Bhojaprabandha* and a sovereign of Dhárá in the century named. The title assigned him in the introduction to the work is Ranarangamalla, and this, as far as we know, was not borne by the Bhoja of the 11th century. The former is, moreover, described in the introduction to have written three works, a grammatical treatise on the government of words, a medical memoir under the title of *Rájamṛigánka*, and the gloss under notice, and none of these is attributed by the *Bhojaprabandha* to its hero. On the other hand, that hero is known to have written or published in his name a work on judicial astrology as bearing on Smṛiti rites, under the name of *Rájamártaṇḍa*, and it is impossible to imagine that he assigned the same name to his exegesis on the Yoga aphorisms. Two such dissimilar works could not have been published under one common name. And even if one believed such a nomenclature to be possible or probable, the question would arise, how is it that in the introduction to the Yoga, the astrological work is altogether

left out of record? The astrological work is several times the size of the Yoga exegesis, and otherwise of considerable importance; it has been very largely quoted by subsequent writers, and it is not at all probable that an author, or his encomiast, who was particular in noticing the meagre and poor medical treatise should overlook it. It might be said that it was composed after the composition of, and therefore could not be included in, the Yoga gloss, but that would be a simple assumption without any proof, a mere begging of the question. That the *Rájamártaṇḍa* is not a generic, but a specific, name is evident from the fact of an exegesis on the S'ánkhya bearing the name of Rájávártika, which is believed to have been dedicated to Ranarangamalla. It is probable, therefore, that our author is the Bhoja of the 10th century, who was also a king of Dhárá. Adverting to him, Mr. Hall says, "That two Bhojas have ruled over part of Central India, and that the earlier, whatever were the case with the later, was interested in literature, I have elsewhere shown conclusively. The Bhoja who reigned in the middle of the eleventh century very likely entertained learned men at his court, and the astrological compilation known as the *Rájamártaṇḍa* and thus called in honour of him may have been indebted, for its name, to the suggestion of the *Yoga* work so entitled, written in the time of his homonymous antecessor. At any rate, he came long after the date of the *Saras'vatí-kaṇṭhábharaṇa;* and we are nowhere told that the Bhoja to whom it is attributed bore the epithet, Raṇarangamalla.' (*Contributions*, p. viii.)

Of the other commentaries on the Yoga-Sútra, the works of Bhavadeva, Nágojí Bhaṭṭa, Bhává-gaṇes'a, Udayankara, Nages'a Bhaṭṭa, Náráyaṇa Bhikshu, Sadás'iva, Rámánanda Tírtha, Mahádeva, Ananta, S'ankara, Umápati Tripáṭhí, and Kshemánanda, may be cited as samples. They are all inferior in importance to the work of Bhoja, and call for no special remark here.

The same may be said of the other works named in my list. Some of them treat of the various practices which Yogís resort to to acquire occult powers; while others describe modified forms of the doctrine of Patanjali, suited to Vaishṇava, Sáiva, and S ákta forms of worship, so as to lead the individual soul, in its longing for salvation, to subsidiance in, or union with, the Divinity.

Among the works of the first group the most popular and noted is the *Haṭha-pradípiká* or *Haṭha-dípiká*. It comprises 395 stanzas, divided into 4 chapters or lessons, (*Upades'a*), the first treating of postures, the second of regulation of breath, the third of gesticulation or *mudrás*, and the fourth of Samádhi. Its author is one Chintámaṇi, son of Sahajánanda, but this name of his was what he got when living as a householder. On his becoming a hermit he took the name of S'vátmáráma, and received the title of Yogíndra, and is now generally known by the name of S'vátmárama Yogíndra. He makes a great mystery of the theme of his work. He says, "By Yogis wishing for perfection, this science should be carefully kept in secret, for it is most efficient when

kept secret, and worthless when disclosed."* Like the alchemists of old, he indicates simple things by roundabout metaphorical names, and enjoins that none but adepts should know anything of his subject. This book is named *Haṭha vidyá*, or the science of the letters *ha* and *ṭha*, *ha* meaning the sun and *ṭha* the moon. This sun again stands for the breath inspired, and the moon for the breath expired, and the ultimate meaning of Haṭha-vidyá is thus the science of inspiration and expiration. Although by profession and habit a recluse who had thoroughly abandoned the world and its attractions, Svátmáráma, indulges at times in language of a grossly carnal type. Thus in one place he says, "let beef be eaten and the immortal arrack *(váruṇí)* be drunk every day. I reckon him who does so, to be a kulína (a noble householder); the rest are destroyers of their nobility."† Here beef *gomáñsa* stands for the tongue, which should be reverted and made to touch the palate, and *váruṇí* means the breath which passes over this reverted tongue. Again: "Let the youthful chaste widow be ravished on the land between the rivers Ganges and Yamuná; it is the highest glory of Vishṇu."‡ Here the two rivers are the two nostrils, and the widow is the breath which is to be forcibly suppressed for a time. This style of

* हठविद्या परं गोप्या योगिना सिद्धिमिच्छता ।
भवेद्वीर्य्यवती गुप्ता निर्वीर्य्या तु प्रकाशिता ॥

† गोमांसं भक्षयेन्नित्यं पिबेदमरवारुणीं ।
कुलीनं तमहं मन्ये इतरे कुलघातकाः ॥

‡ गङ्गायमुनयोर्मध्ये बालरण्डां तपस्विनीं ।
बलात्कारेण गृह्णीयात्तद्विष्णोः परमं पदं ॥

allegory and mystery is adopted by a great many mediæval writers on the Yoga. At the beginning of the work, the author has given a list of thirty renowned Yogís who had practised the science in question. At the head of these appear A'dinátha, who is generally identified with S'iva, who is believed to be the first and most renowned of Yogís. The work has been made the subject of comment by several writers, among whom Brahmánanda, the author of the *Jyotsná*, is reckoned to be the ablest.

It would seem that the Yoga doctrine was, at a very early period, translated to Persia, and disseminated in some form or other among different sects. The Sapásiyáns obtained it in its entirety. They believed on efficacy of discipline and austerity; they assiduously practised the regulation of breath enjoined in the Yoga; they divided the stages of their progress in meditation in the same way as the Yogís did; they held the highest meditation to be a state of trance identically the same as the Samádhi; they claimed occult powers* of the same nature and character as

* 'Of these illustrious personages they have many miraculous and mysterious deeds: such as, in the upper world, hiding the sun's disk; causing him to appear at night; making the stars visible in the day-time: and in this lower world, walking on the surface of water; making trees productive out of season; restoring verdure to dried up wood; causing trees to bow down their heads; also showing themselves between heaven and earth in the form of lightning; and such like: and, in the animated world metamorphosing animals; rendering themselves invisible to men; appearing under various shapes and forms: some of which wonders have been recorded in the *Barmgah-i-durveshí-khushí*. They relate that these great per-

did the Yogis; they were familiar with the idea of the possibility of the soul at will passing from one body into another; they believed in metempsychosis; and, if they looked upon union with the Supreme Divinity as the *summum bonum* of their faith, they but accepted one of the several forms of the Yoga, different doubtless from the Isolation of Patañjali, but not independent of it. (*Cf. Dabistán* I, pp. 5*f.*) It is, however, not known whether the system of Sapásiyáns was founded upon any translation of a Sanskrit Yoga work, or on oral communication. Some of the Sapásiyáns admitted their obligation to Hindustán, but their text-books, the few and imperfect ones that are still accessible, have not yet been sufficiently examined to throw light on the question. The close relationship existing between the two systems, even in the use of technical terms, preclude the idea of spontaneous growth, and the avowed posteriority of the Persian doctrine leaves no doubt of its Indian origin; but as at present advised, we are not in a position to spot the exact text from which it was derived.

Of interpretations of the Yoga system in foreign languages the earliest appears to be an Arabic version of the text of Patañjali. The work is no longer

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sonages were to such a degree enabled to divest themselves of corporeal elements that they quitted the body at pleasure; also that they had acquired from the court of heaven the knowledge of all sciences, whether known or occult, and *consequently* had the power of exhibiting such wonderful works; having rendered, by the efficacy of their austerities, elementary matters subject to themselves." (*Troyer and Shea's Dabistán i Muzahib*, II, pp. 107*f.*)

extant, but the testimony in favour of its having once existed is unquestionable. Abu Réhân al Nirâni, in his Târikh-ul Hind, which formed a part of his famous Kánún-i-Mas'údi (A. D. 1025-36), says, 'I have translated into Arabic two Indian works, one discusses the origin and quality of things which exist and is entitled S'ánkhya, the other is known under the title of Patanjali, which treats of the deliverance of the soul from the trammels of the body. These two works contain the chief principles of the Indian creed.' (Elliot's Historians, I, p. 99; *Journal Asiatique*, IV serie, tom. IV, p. 121; Reinaud's *Fragments Arabs et Persans.*) It does not appear that any Persian version of Patanjali was ever taken in hand in the time of Akbar and his successor, when so many Sanskrit works were rendered into that language. There is, however, an abstract of the Yoga doctrine in the Dabistán-i-Muzaháb of Mahsin-i Fáni. That author flourished in the middle of the 17th century, and, during a long residence at Allahabad as the Chief Judge (*Sudder*), collected a great deal of information on the subject. Depending evidently on oral information, he could not avoid gross mistakes in his account of the philosophy, but in regard to the details of Yoga exercises and the occult powers he has compiled as reliable an exposition as could be expected from such a source. He notices Gorakhanátha and several other celebrated saints, and states that he had seen some Yogís possessed of wonderful occult powers, but he does not name Patanjali. (*cf. Shea and Troyer's Translation*, II, pp. 123*f.*)

In English the first attempt to give an account of the Yoga doctrine was made by Ward in his account of the Hindus, but it did not produce any satisfactory result. Colebrooke's resumè in the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, is much more philosophic in spirit and faithful in details, but Colebrooke took it up only casually in connexion with his essay on the S'ánkhya, and did not notice much more than the first chapter of the work. Taylor, in the Introduction to his translation of the Bhagavadgitá, supplies the Kriyá-yoga with considerable fulness, and Windischmann's account, though brief, is tolerably good. In 1853 Dr. Ballantyne published a translation of the first two chapters of the Yoga-sútra with extracts from the commentary of Bhojadeva, and from it abstracts of the Yoga system have been compiled by Dr. K. M. Banerjea, and Rev. Mr. Mullins. The translation of Ballantyne was completed, in a disjointed way, by Paṇḍit Govindaram Sástrí in the pages of a Benares magazine called the "Pandit." The two fragments have lately been printed together by the Theosophical Society of Bombay. The text with an original commentary together with an English translation is now being printed in the *Saḍdarsana-chintaniká* of Bombay, and an abstract of the text occurs in Cowell and Gough's *Sarvadarsana-sangraha.* An account of Yoga practices may also be seen in a pamphlet by Nabinchandra Pál, published at Benares.

Little need be said in praise of Dr. Ballantyne's work. The profound learning and thorough conservancy with Hindu philosophy which that learned

scholar brought to bear on his undertaking, enabled him to produce a very accurate reproduction of the original. In his anxiety, however, to be accurate he had occasion to resort too frequently to parenthetical clauses, and they resulted in confused sentences, involving much trouble in understanding them. His extracts from the commentary are particularly amenable to this objection. The extracts, moreover, are somewhat disjointed.

When the Asiatic Society of Bengal first proposed to publish an edition of the Yoga-sútra with the commentary of Bhojadeva, I undertook to reprint Dr. Ballantyne's translation with such additions as would complete the work. I soon found, however, that my work placed beside his produced a very patchy appearance, and his parenthetical style was not desirable for a proper and easy understanding of the text. I preferred, therefore, to translate the whole in my own way. The aphorisms will be found to be as closely literal as the idiom of the English language would admit of, and the commentary a fair reproduction of the spirit, sense and wording of the original, without being a verbatim reproduction.

Much difficulty has been felt in the treatment of the technical terms. Philosophical terms in the English language have not yet arrived at that fixity and firmness which would preclude possible variations. Different writers assign different values to even well-established terms, and their latitude is frequently varying; and such as they are, they are not exact equivalents of Sanskrit words, which in their turn vary

in meaning under different circumstances and in the hands of different writers. There are instances, too, of Sanskrit terms whose literal significations are very different from the philosophical ideas they are intended to convey, and in dealing with them, the translator has either to sacrifice precision of rendering for the sake of intelligibility, or intelligibility for the sake of precision. In the following pages I have borrowed the terms mostly from Colebrooke's translation of the *Sánkhya-kariká,* translating a few myself, and transliterating the Sanskrit terms in some cases. My reasons I have explained as far as I could in my notes.

When I undertook the task I had hopes of reading the work with the assistance of a professional Yogí; but I have been disappointed. I could find no Paṇḍit in Bengal who had made Yoga the special subject of his study, and the only person I met at Benares who could help me was most exorbitant in his demands. He cared not for the world and its wealth, and the only condition under which he would teach me was strict pupillage under Hindu rules—living in his hut and ever following his footsteps—to which I could not submit. I had, therefore, to depend on my own knowledge of the Sanskrit language to arrive at the meaning of Patanjali, availing myself frequently of the aid of my learned friend Professor Mahes'a-chandra Nyáyaratna, of the Calcutta Sanskrit College, for the solution of difficulties. I had the assistance, too, of Professor Kámákhyánátha Tarkaratna, of that College, both in revising the text and in translating it. Both the Professors are distinguished

Nyáya scholars, and Paṇḍit Mahes'achandra commands a deep knowledge of the Sánkhya, and with their aid, I believe, I have been able to avoid gross misinterpretations of the text, though I cannot flatter myself with the idea that I have been able always satisfactorily to expound the meaning of Patañjali.

Manuscripts of the Yoga-sútra are common enough in Bengal, but I have not met with any particularly old, or exceptionally correct text. In carrying the text and commentary through the press, I had the use of the following codices :

A. From the Asiatic Society's Library, yellow paper 13 × 11 inches, bound in a 4to. volume. Bengali character. Lines, 27 on a page. Incorrect.

B. From the Sanskrit College of Calcutta, yellow paper, 17 × 4 inches, puthi form. Folia, 35. Character, Bengali. Generally correct.

C. From ditto, Káshmírí paper, 10 × 4½ inches. Folia, 69. Character, well-written Nágarí. Date, Samvat, 1850. Generally correct.

D. From the Benares College, Káshmírí paper, 11 × 5 inches. Folia, 30. Character, Nágari. Incorrect and incomplete.

E. From Professor Mahes'achandra Nyáyaratna, Calcutta, yellow paper, 15 × 4 inches. Folia, 55. Character, Bengali. Generally correct. First chapter revised.

G. Ballantyne's reprint annexed to his translation.

H. From Bombay, copied for me from a MS. belonging to the Government collection preserved in

the office of the Director of Public Instruction. Generally correct.

I. From my family Library, a quarto volume in Bengali. Corrupt and little used.

In the text of Patañjali, no variation of any note has been met with in the above codices. The work appears to have been preserved with every care, as may be presumed from the circumstance of its having enjoyed the benefit of a host of commentaries and glosses. The commentary of Bhoja has not been so correctly preserved. There are many differences of reading in the different codices. But on the whole the differences are not so material as would justify the assumption of different recensions, or produce any marked changes in the meaning of the author.

8 MANIKTOLLAH,
January 28, 1883.

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,,	,,	27	,,	some theory in a more	*read*	the theory of unreality in a
xiv	,,	8	,,	alternative	,,	resource
,,	,,	20		and its object is worldly enjoyment,	*read*	its object is worldly injoyment;
xxxv	,,	4	,,	birth	,,	breath
,,	,,	24	,,	rapine	,,	repine
xlvii	,,	26	,,	produce	,,	produces
lxii	,,	29	,,	Such a	,,	If it did, the
lxxx	,,	6	*after*	Bháshya,	*add*	Vyása himself is the author of a different system of Philosophy, and one cannot reasonably suppose that he would condescend to expound the text-book of an adverse school.
,,	,,	11	*after*	this day;	*add, as a footnote,*	Brahmaṇya Tírtha had a pupil named Vyása, who wrote the *Tátparya-chandriká* on the Vedánta Sútra.
17	,,	1	*for*	cive	*read*	conducive
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91	,,	28	,,	devotion	,,	steadfastness
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114	„	20-21	„	steadiness	„	steadfastness
135	„	8	„	(*anyatva*)	„	*anyatva*
152	„	27	„	out	„	out of,
158	„	1	*after*	attainment of greatness	*add*	or unlimited reach of organs such as
164	„	25-27	*for*	country	*read*	situation
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(*Sanskrit.*)

पृष्ठं	पङ्क्तिः	अशुद्धं	शुद्धं
२	१	मत्युक्तिभिः	नित्युक्तिभिः
५	१	परिणामाय	परिणामायां
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५७	७	प्रणायामानभिधाय	प्राणायामानभिधाय
५७	१८	प्रणायामात्	प्राणायामात्
५८	२	प्रणायामैः	प्राणायामः

५९	९	ज्ञानव्यतिरेकेन	ज्ञानव्यतिरेकेण
६२	१	ज्ञयं	ज्ञेयं
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THE YOGA APHORISMS OF PATANJALI.

INTRODUCTION.

Salutation to Gaṇeśa. May that semi-corporeal union* of S'iva and his spouse (S'ivá) by the recollection of which man enjoys isolation,† hard as it is to attain, shower on you all blessings!

2. We praise that eternal S'iva the thought of whom forthwith dissolves the threefold pain‡ which besets mankind.

3. That unprecedented work § of the sage Patanjali wherein he describes the severance of the soul (*Purusha*) from nature (*Prakṛiti*) to be Yoga|| (true union) reigns supreme.

4. May the sayings of the lord of snakes,¶ which are

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* A fit of jealousy, according to the Káliká Puráṇa, had caused a temporary separation between S'iva and his spouse Durgá. On their reconciliation, the lady besought her master to devise some means by which the possibility of all future separation could be obviated, and the expedient was hit of uniting their bodies so as to make of the two an androgynous figure, half male and half female. Other causes have been assigned for this union.

† Separation of the human soul from all association with nature. *Vide* p. 207.

‡ Viz., lst, those proceeding from internal causes; 2nd, those from natural and extrinsic causes; 3rd, those that proceed from superhuman causes. *Vide* Wilson's Sáṅkhya-káriká, p. 2.

§ Lit., saying.

|| A play upon the word Yoga. The purport is that a total abandonment of, lit. disunion from (*viyoga*), the world is a *conditio sine qua non* to the Yogi, which is the end sought by the Yoga system of Philosophy. In other words what is separation from sensuous objects is the union or dissolution of the thinking principle in its original source.

¶ Patanjali is believed to have been an incarnation of Ananta, and the title indicates that idea. *Vide* Introduction, p. lxvii.

even as the light of the moon to the mass of expanding darkness of the human mind, and the appreciation of which always fills the mind of good people with lasting happiness—may they prosper!

5. The glorious words of the king Raṇaraṅgamalla,* who, like the lord of snakes, has cast off all impurity from his speech, mind and body, who has (like unto him) compiled a work on the government of words, who has commented on Patanjali, and written on medicine a treatise called the Rájamṛigáṅka†—may they prosper.

6. All commentators are perverters of the meaning of their authors; they avoid those parts which are most difficult to understand, by saying that the meaning there is obvious; they dilate upon those parts with useless compound terms where the meaning is plain; they confound their hearers by misplaced and inappropriate dissertations without number.‡

7. Avoiding voluminousness, keeping clear of all mystifying and obviously worthless network of words, and abstracting the inmost meaning, I publish this exposition of the sage Patanjali for the edification of intelligent persons.

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* A title of Bhoja.
† All these works of Bhoja are still extant.
‡ "Commentators each dark passage shun—
And hold a farthing rush-light to the sun."
St. Jerome "not versions but inversions."
Italian, *Traduttori tr*[illegible] "Translators traitors."
"Surrender rather than [illegible];
Not turning, but overturning."

CHAPTER FIRST.

Now, an exposition of the Yoga (is to be made).

This aphorism explains the subject of the work, the object with which it is written, and the relation (it bears to the subject). (The word) "Now"* (*atha*) suggests (that) a (distinct) topic (here commences), and it serves also as a benediction.

(The word) *Yoga* means 'union,' or the application of the mind to abstract contemplation, from the root *yug* "to meditate." An "exposition" (*anus'ásana*) is that whereby something is expounded or described through its characteristic marks, its real nature, its distinctive divisions, its causes and effects. (The two words *Yoga* and *anus'ásana* form the compound) *Yoganus'ásana*, (which means) "an exposition of the Yoga." This is to be understood to be the topic even to the end of this work (of Patanjali).

Yoga, with the means of performing it and its fruit, constitutes the subject, that being treated of in this Institute. The object of the work is the explanation of the subject, and the fruit thereof is the emancipation obtainable by the Yoga. The relation of the work is the connection which exists between that which treats, and the subject treated of, (or the Institute and its subjects). The connection between Yoga, the subject, and its effect, which is emancipation (*Kaivalya*), or the means and the end, is also its relation. The substance of this is—that in the work are described the instruments of performing the Yoga which is its subject—that Yoga the accomplishment of which leads to the consummation of emancipation called *Kaivalya*.

[Dr. Ballantyne has rendered the word Yoga into "concentration." That English word, however, in its ordinary signification, does

* Dr. Ballantyne's text has *athátah* "now then."

not convey anything like a fair idea of what Yoga means. The word meditation would have been more appropriate, but even that does not convey all the ideas which the Sanskrit term has been made to comprehend. A perfect English equivalent is not to be had, and I prefer, therefore, to use the original term to coining a new one. The commentator so explains the word *Anus'ásana* as to convey the idea that it is a verbal noun intended to explain the purport of the work. The commentary named *Pátanjala-bháshya* takes it along with the word Yoga to be the specific name of the work. (*Yogáns'ásanam náma s'ástram*). If this be accepted, and it appears to be the most appropriate, the aphorism should be rendered into, "Now, the (work called) Yogánuśásana, (will be expounded)." Váchaspati Miśra, the annotator on the last named work, and Vijnána-bhikshu in his *Vártika*, take notice of this subject. They also raise the question about the origin of the doctrine. They hold that Patanjali was not the originator of the doctrine, for it has existed from creation, and Hiraṇya-garbha was the first performer of the Yoga; but that he was merely the compiler of the rules in the form of an institute for the use of intelligent people anxious to study them. *Nanu hiraṇyagarbao yogasya kartá nányah purátana iti yogiyájna-valkyasmṛiteh, kathám patanjaler yoga-śástritvamityás'añkya sútrakáreṇa anus'ásanamítyuktam, s'ishṭashyánusásanam.*)]

Now what is this Yoga? To this the author replies :—

II.

Yoga is the suppression of the functions of the thinking principle.

"Thinking principle" (*chitta*) is of the form of goodness without a taint. "Functions" (*vṛitti*) are modifications of the relation between each other of them. "Yoga" or meditation is described to be the "suppression" (*nirodha*), or dissolution in their primary causes, through the direction inward on the suppression of

the tendency outward, of the functions in question. This suppression is a cross-grained ascent of the "functions" of the thinking principle. Being common to all the conditions of the thinking principle, it is an attribute of all beings, and therefore it becomes at times evident in some one condition or other. The conditions, or the different states of the thinking principle, are—restless activity, mischievous ignorance, voluptuousness, concentration, and suppression. Thereof the condition of activity *(kshipta)* is induced by an access of the quality of foulness (*rajas*). Propelled by that quality it tends outwards, approaching or receding from imaginary or real pleasurable or painful objects. It is common to demons, sons of Diti, Titans, sons of Danu, &c. Addiction to evil actions without distinguishing between what should be done and what not (*múḍha*) proceeds from an excess of darkness (*tamas*). It is common to demons (Rákshasas), ghosts (Pis'áchas), &c. Voluptuousness (*vikshipta*) is the feeling of avoiding the causes of pain, and engaging in (those sensuous objects of) sound and the like which promote enjoyment. It proceeds from an excess of the quality of goodness (*sattva*), and is observable in the Devas. It amounts to this, that the thinking principle by foulness becomes restlessly active; by darkness mischievous, or desirous of injuring others; and by goodness full of happiness. These three conditions of the thinking principle are not fit for the condition of devout contemplation. The two conditions of concentration and suppression, having an excess of the quality of goodness and following the others, are reckoned fit for that purpose.

The object of arranging the qualities of goodness &c. in a disorderly way is this: notwithstanding the two qualities of foulness and darkness being very detestable, the quality of foulness is first described, because unless activity is made intelligible, no suppression of it can possibly be grasped. Hence the reversed order. The object of placing the quality of goodness last is this: that by its excess, the two (subsequent) conditions become fit for Yoga. Of those two conditions, *viz.*, concentration and suppression, that in which

the thinking principle is in a state of (exclusive) application to one point is called Yoga. What is the result of this? (It is this): by Yoga or concentration to one point the external functions cease, and on that cessation there is a complete dissolution of all functions with their residua. In both these conditions, Yoga meditation is practicable.

[The most important word in the aphorism is *chitta* which has been rendered into "thinking principle" by Dr. Ballantyne. In ordinary Sanskrit it is a synonym of the word *manas* "mind," and Dr. Ballantyne has used that word as a synonym in different places, and in the sense in which that word is used in philosophy —*i. e.*, "that which perceives, feels, thinks and wills," (Taylor, *Elements of Thought*,) "or that which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do; something stored with ideas of its intended works, agreeably to which ideas those works are fashioned," (Harris, *Hermes*, p. 227)—he is right. In the Sáñkhya aphorisms of Kapila, its counterpart *manas* has been used in the same sense (*Mahadákhyamádyam káryam tanmanah*, I, 71). But inasmuch as the philosophical writers of this country make a marked distinction between mind as above described, and as an internal organ of knowledge, the sensorium, it is desirable that the distinction should be marked by the use of a different word. In the Sáñkhya aphorisms the word *chitta* does not occur, nor is it to be met with in the Nyáya. The Vedántísts use it sparingly, taking it to be a modification or another name of Buddhi (*Vedánta-sára*). Its equivalent in the Sáñkhya is *Adhyavasáya*, which is synonymous with *Buddhi*. (*Adhyavasáyo buddhih*, II, 13). It is called *Mahat* "the great one," because "it is the first and most important of the products of nature, presiding over and pervading the whole." (*Mahattvam svetara-sakalakárya-vyápakatvan-mahaisvaryáchcha.*) It is *mati* "understanding," because every thing is understood by it, (*manyati anayá*) ; *khyáti* "familiar knowledge;" *jnána*, and *prajná*. That Patanjali implies the object of these words by *chitta* is evident from the fact of his making it the first product of nature and anterior to egotism, as the Sánkhya does, and by say-

ing that the suppression of its functions results in the completion of Yoga. (*Vṛitti-nirodhát tatsiddhih,* III, 31). Thus Váchaspati Miśra—*chitta-s'abdenántahkaraṇam buddhimupalakshayati.* According to the order of creation *prakṛitri* comes first, thence *chitta,* thence egotism, thence mind, and thence the subtile organs &c., and this both according to the Sáñkhya and the Yoga systems. The thinking principle is thus the same with intellect, and mind in the highest sense.

The next word is *vṛitti.* I follow Colebrooke and Wilson by rendering it into "functions." The functions are produced by modifications of the original principle produced by unequal exertions of the three qualities of goodness, foulness and ḍarkness. In so far they are allotropic conditions of the same principle, and so, as Vijṉána Bhikshu expresses it, the world is merely a modification of form, of which *prakṛiti* is the materiality. (*Pariṇámarúpam jagadupádánakatvantu-prakṛititvam.*) *Pariṇáma* or change is the term usually employed as its equivalent, and Bhoja explains it by saying "they are modifications of the relation between each other of the functions." Vijṉána Bhikshu calls it transformation of Prakṛiti, (*prakṛitivirúpam*). Under these circumstances Dr. Ballantyne's use of the term "modification" affords the closest rendering; but Dr. Wilson prefers functions as more idiomatic and expressive.

The last word is *nirodha,* which means stoppage, or hindering, and suppression implies the same.

The definition of Yoga as given in the text and the commentary suggests the idea that the suppression of thought must be complete before Yoga can be accomplished, but such is not the object, for in the lower stages of meditation such is not the case, and yet it is Yoga. The *Pátanjala-bháshya* points this out by saying that since the word *sarva* "all" has not been used before *vṛitti* "functions," the form of Yoga in which there is a distinct recognition is also Yoga. (*Sarvasabdágrahanát samprajṉátopi Yogah*). It is remarkable that Bhoja should have overlooked so important a qualification.]

Now the author of the Sútras, wishing to describe the words *chitta-vṛitti-nirodhah*, describes first [in two aphorisms] the word *chitta*.

III.

Then (*i. e.* at the time of meditation) there is abidance of the spectator in its own form.

"Then," at that time, the soul, as "the spectator," (*draṣhṭá*) "abides" remains in its own form, which is simple intelligence (and nothing more). The meaning is this: that on knowledge being fully developed, there being no shadow of any sensuous object cast on the thinking principle, and the egotism of one's self, which is the actor, being gone, and intellect being fit for liberation, the soul abides or obtains location in Buddhi which is its own form.

[The spectator is the soul which, abiding in the body, and influenced by the thinking principle, beholds what is done by the organs, but does not partake of the pleasures and pains resulting from their action, and in the state of Yoga the functions being-stopped there is the spectator without any spectacle to behold. This spectator is the soul.]

What then is the form (of the soul) when waking (or active, *i. e.* other than in a state of meditation)? To this he replies:

IV.

At other times it is in the same form as its functions.

"At other times"—*i. e.*, at times other than that of meditation. Its "functions" are those the characteristics of which will hereafter be described (A. V.) "In the same form" means to consist of it. The purport is this. Even as the functions, involving pleasure, pain and bewilderment, manifest themselves, so does the soul *i. e.*, it appears so to itself. If so, it follows that that object, in which, in the state of modification produced by concentration, the power of understanding finds its own form, and which

being influenced by the functions of the senses resolves itself into worldly objects, and the soul appears manifest in the forms thereof, as the moon reflected in the moving ripples on the water, appears as if it were (itself) moving, is the thinking principle *chitta*.

[It is a dogma of the Hindu metaphysicians that the thinking principle or intellect assumes the form of the object perceived. And the aphorism explains that when that principle is immersed in complete Yoga it perceives itself and nothing more, but when it is active and influenced by external objects it assumes the forms of its excitants].

To explain the term function, (the third word in A. II,) the author says:—

V.

The functions are fivefold, (and they are either) painful or not painful.

The "functions" (*vṛitti*) are certain modifications of the thinking principle. The word *pañchatayi* (five-fold) is formed by the addition of the affix *tayap* (Páṇini v. ii. 42), and implies that the totality of the forms of the functions constitutes the form-bearer, and the functions severally are the forms thereof. The five functions are what are meant.

How are they? They are painful or not painful. "Those that are involved in sufferings of the kind about to be described are painful; those that are the reverse of these are not painful."

[This aphorism is a verbatim copy of Kapíla's aphorism 33, Book II. It only propounds what are to be explained in subsequent aphorisms].

The five functions are to be described after being named.

VI.

(The functions of the thinking principle are) right notion, misconception, fancy, sleep and memory.

Of these the author gives the definitions successively.

VII.

Right notions are perception, inference, and testimony.

Here the author of the Institute has not given a separate definition of what right notion is, that being very well known, and it being made evident by the description of its different forms. In fact the real definition of right notion is that whereby is produced unquestionable knowledge.

"Perception" (*pratyaksha*) is that function of the thinking principle by which it acquires, through the medium of the senses brought in connexion with external objects having common and peculiar characteristics, a knowledge of the most important peculiar characteristic.

"Inference" (*anumána*) is the conviction produced by a previous knowledge of the necessary relation between a characteristic and that which bears it.

A trustworthy word is "testimony," (*ágama*).

[*Pramáṇa* means right notion, as also the means of acquiring that right notion, *i. e.*, evidence, and hence the two meanings are often confounded. As a function of the thinking principle it is right notion, and not evidence. The Yoga system follows the Sáñkhya in admitting only three means of right notion, and in the Sáñkhya-káriká they are said to comprise every mode of demonstration. The Naiyáyikas, however, reckon four kinds, *viz.*, preception (*pratyaksha*), inference (*anumána*), comparison (*upamána*), and testimony (*śabda*). The Vedántís follow this latter, and the Mímáñskas recognise six, *viz.*, perception (*pratyaksha*), presumption (*arthápatti*), proportion (*sambhava*), privation (*abháva*), comprehension (*pratibha*), and oral communication (*aitihya*).

The word used for perception is *pratyaksha*, which means "that which is seen," but it implies knowledge acquired through any one of the five organs of sense, or, as Reid defines perception,

"evidence which we have of external objects by our senses." For testimony Patanjali gives *ágama,* which means the Vedas, but the commentator has generalised it by giving for its synonym *áptavachana* "reliable words"; it is the declaration of one who knows the truth of that which he affirms, and whose authority may be relied upon. The scriptures, as revealed knowledge, naturally come at the head of testimony].

Having thus described the function of right notion the author speaks of Misconception.

VIII.

Misconception is incorrect notion, (or a notion) which abides in a form which is not that of its object.

"Misconception" (*viparyaya*) is a notion of something in respect of which it really is not; as the notion of silver in mother-o'pearl. "Which abides in a form which is not that of its object" is to say a notion which does not abide in that form which is its (real) form (in respect of which the notion is entertained). It amounts to this, that the notion does not reveal the real form of the thing. Doubt *(sañsaya)* founded on the notion whether a thing abides in its proper form or not, such as whether a particular object seen is a man or the stump of a tree, is also a Misconception.

To describe the function of Fancy, he says:

IX.

Fancy is a notion founded on a knowledge conveyed by words, but of which (there is) no object (corresponding in reality).

Knowledge dependant on words is *śabda-jnána.* That which follows it, is *śabda-jnánánupáti* (the epithet used to define Fancy, which in the text has been translated by the word "notion founded on a knowledge conveyed by words"). Such a notion without reference to the real character of an object

is "Fancy." Thus the words, "the intelligence of the soul (*purusha*) is its own form." Here a notion is assumed by admitting a distinction as in the notion produced by the possessive case in the phrase "the blanket of Devadatta," though it does not really exist, for in fact the soul is intelligence itself (and there is no distinction between it and its intelligence, or of possessor and the possessed).

["In the soul
Are many lesser faculties, that serve
Reason as chief; among these fancy next
Her office holds; of all eternal things
Which the five watchful senses represents
She forms imagination's airy shapes,"
Paradise Lost, B. V.]

In order to declare what Sleep is, he says:

X.

Sleep is that function (of the thinking principle) which has for its object the conception of nothing.

Of that function which is based on the conception of nothing the name is as aforesaid (*abhávapratyayá.*) Hence it follows that "Sleep" (*nidrá*) is that function (of the thinking principle) which takes place on the quitting of all objects, in consequence of the quality of darkness always preceding it. That this is a function (of the thinking principle and not a mere blank) is proved by our seeing that one recollects (on arising from a sound sleep) that "I slept pleasantly," which could not have happened without a consciousness of it, (and no memory can exist of that which is not). Hence it is a function.

In order to describe Memory, he says:

XI.

Memory is the not letting go of an object that has been recognised.

"The not letting go" (*asampramosha*) or not allowing to escape from our intellect an object which has once been recognised through (proper) evidence is "Memory" (*smṛiti*).

Of the five functions Evidence, Misconception, and Fancy belong to the waking state. When any of these, from vividness of impression, becomes perceptible (in sleep), it is a Dream (*svapna.*) But Sleep of itself has no cognisable object. Memory again is dependent on Evidence, Misconception, Fancy or Sleep.

[Bishop Hall says, "Memory is the great keeper or Master of the Rolls of the soul, a power that can make amends for the speed of time, in causing him to leave behind him those things which else he would so carry away as if they had not been." It is said to be dependant on Evidence, Misconception, &c., because the impressions it preserves are the productions of those causes.]

Having thus described the functions (of the thinking principle), in order to explain the suppression (the fourth word in A. II,) of these with the means thereof, he says:

XII.

The suppression of these (functions is effected) by Exercise and Dispassion.

"Exercise" (*abhyása*) and Dispassion" (*vairágya*) will be defined in the aphorisms about to be given. The repression by these (Exercise and Dispassion) of the functions of the thinking principle which have the form of revealing, energizing and regulating, is "suppression" (*nirodha*). What is meant is the placing of the functions, which from their turning inwards have ceased to dwell on external objects, in the thinking principle, which is their original cause, and of which they are but potential attributes.

Aversion from sensuous objects is produced by "Dispassion" resulting from a knowledge of the evil influence of those objects (on the thinking principle), and confirmed steadfastness is acquired by "Exercise," which makes it a source of happiness and quiet; and by the (conjoined effect of the) two the functions of the thinking principle are suppressed.

[The purport of this aphorism has been given by Kapila in six aphorisms, 31 to 36 of Book III.]

With a view to describe Exercise, he says:

XIII.

Exercise is the (repeated) effort that it (the thinking principle) shall remain in its functionless state.

Sthiti or "functionless state" is that condition of the thinking principle in which it abides in its own (original) form, free from all functions; and the effort or endeavour (repeated) again and again to bring it to that condition is "Exercise" or *abhyása.*

He next mentions a special character of that (Exercise).

XIV.

It is again a firm ground attained by proper devotion for a long time unintermittingly.

It (Exercise) is a firm ground, *i. e.*, it becomes steadfast, or acquires firmness, by being assiduously attended to for a long time unremittingly with an excess of regard. The meaning is that it tends to firmness.

He now mentions the definition of Dispassion (A. XII.)

XV.

The consciousness of being the subjugator on the part of one who thirsts after neither perceptible nor scriptural objects is Dispassion.

Objects are of two kinds, "Perceptible" (*drishṭa*) and "Scriptural" (*ánus'ravika*). The Perceptible is that which may be apprehended here (on earth), such as sound and other objects (perceptible through the organs of sense). The Scriptural is that which exists in the regions of the Devas or elsewhere (where it cannot be grasped by carnal organs).

That which is heard (*anus'rúyate*) from the mouth of a preceptor is *anus'rava* or the Veda. What comes to our knowledge therefrom (*i. e.*, from the Veda) is what is meant by "one heard of" *ánus'ravika.* Giving up all eagerness for these two classes of objects, on account of their becoming distasteful at the end, the reflection which ensues (in the thinking principle) to the effect that these are my subjects, but I am not their slave, is called Dispassion *(Vairágya.)*

[The word *Vairágya* (dispassion) is formed of the privative prefix *vi*, and *rága*, 'affection,' 'prepossession,' 'love,' 'desire,' the meaning being, in the technical sense in which it is used here, absence of desire for enjoyable objects. The absence, however, should not be accidental, as in the case of a child or of a stolid person where, owing to want of development of certain organs, it results without effort, but the fruit of due deliberation, and a conviction that the objects are not worth having, and that the desire for them should be suppressed.

The word *vas'íkára-sanjná* literally means "consciousness of being able to subjugate," in this instance the passions; but the commentators take it to be a mere indifference or apathy, neither affection nor hatred. Thus the *Pátanjala Bháshya:* "devoid of hatred and desirability" (*heyopádeya-sunyá*); and Váchaspati Miśra explains the phrase by the words "a sense of indifference having neither attachment nor hatred" (*ásañgadvesharahitá upekshábuddhih*).

The word rendered into 'perceptible' is *drishta* 'seen;' but, as illustrated by commentators, it means all worldly objects of sense; they may not be perceptible owing to excessive distance, extreme nearness, defect of the organs, inattention, minuteness, interposition of objects, &c., (*Sáñkhya-káriká.* V. VII.), still they are perceptible on this earth under some circumstance or other, and therefore included in the term. The *Pátanjala Bháshya* illustrates the term by naming women, food, drink, and power, (*striyonnapánamaiśvaryamiti*). Dr. Ballantyne renders it into "seen," which is its lexicographical meaning, but which is quite

inadmissible here. Wilson, following Colebrooke, renders it into "temporal" which conveys the right technical meaning, but it becomes inappropriate under certain circumstances, as when we have to deal with *adrishṭa,* the antonym of *drishṭa,* in which case *non-temporal* would be unmeaning, for the word implies fate or what has not yet happened but may happen; *the unseen* is in that case the best.

The Sanskrit term for Scriptural is *ánuśravika,* which means "that which has been heard from another," but it has not been used in that sense here. As the commentators show, the secondary meaning of *ánuśrava* is the Veda, which is also called *śruti,* or "that which has been heard," and the object is to imply those rewards which the Veda promises to the performer of sacrifices &c. Colebrooke uses the synonym '*revealed.*' The *Pátanjala Bháshya* takes the rewards to mean heaven, rudimental body, and dissolution into nature (*svargavaidehyaprakṛitilayah*). Thus the dispassion implies not only indifference to worldly enjoyments and objects, but the same feeling also in regard to celestial and other forms of pleasure derivable by the performance of the rites enjoined in the Veda. The pleasures, both of this world and of the next, are equally temporary, and therefore should not be desired by one who longs for emancipation. Thus in the *Sáńkhya-káriká:* "The revealed mode is, like the temporal one, ineffectual, for it is impure; it is defective in some respects, as well as excessive in others." (Wilson's Sáńkhya-káriká, p. 13). In fact it amounts to the moral imperturbability of Pyrrho.]

A peculiarity in it is to be described.

XVI.

Carried to the extent of indifference to the qualities it is the highest, as it is (then) conducive to a knowledge of God.

"It" *i. e.,* "Dispassion." "Highest" (*para*) the most estimable. The first degree of "Dispassion" (A. XV) has regard to (ordinary) objects; the second, has regard to the (three) qualities, and it is

cive to a knowledge of the distinction between the product qualities and the (nonproduced) soul, from its extreme conduciveness to the perfect suppressive meditation.

[The object of this aphorism is to divide Dispassion into two kinds; one referring to enjoyable objects and called *visaya-vairágya,* and the other to qualities, *i. e.,* to the knowledge of the relation between the discrete and the indiscrete, (*vyaktávyaktadhar-makebhyoviraktah*). The latter is described to be the highest, or most estimable, because it is more valuable than the former, in the attainment of the final object. The word *para* is the leading term in the Aphorism, and stands by itself, being predicated by what follow. But Dr. Ballantyne has subordinated it, by reducing it into a predicate. He says "This carried to the utmost is indifference regarding the qualities." This is obviously not the right meaning.]

Having thus stated the nature of Yoga, the author (next) mentions the differences existing between the nature of that kind of it in which there is consciousness (*samprajnáta*) and that in which consciousness is lost (*asamprajnáta*).

XVII.

Conscious, because it is attended with argumentation, deliberation, joy and egoism.

The word "meditation" (*samádhi*) is understood to be present after the word conscious to supply the ellipsis in the aphorism.

That which makes manifest without any doubt or error, *i. e.,* makes thoroughly manifest, the exact nature of the object pondered is "Conscious meditation," (*samprajnáta samádhi*). *Samádhi* or meditation is a kind of pondering(*bhávaná.*) The suppression or exclusion of every function (of the thinking principle) except that which relates to the subject pondered is Conscious or Discriminative meditation; it is the same with "Seeded meditation"—*savíja-samádhi.* And from there being distinctions of argumentation,&c.,it is of four kinds, (namely) 1st, the "Argumentative" *(savitarka)* ; 2nd,

the "Deliberative" *(savichára)*; 3rd, the "Joyous" *(sánanda)*; and 4th, the "Egoistic" *(sásmita)*. "Pondering" is the taking again and again into the thinking principle of any particular object to the exclusion of all other objects. The object to be pondered is of two kinds; the Godhead (*is'vara*), and the categories or principles (*tattvas*). The last again are of two kinds according as they are "irrational" or "rational." The irrational are the twenty-four; the rational is the soul.

Among these (the four kinds of meditation), when accepting the gross elements and the organs as the objects, pondering is carried on with reference to which is antecedent and which is consequent, and the relation of the words to their meanings, it is called 'Argumentative meditation' (*savitarka-samádhi*). Should this pondering, however, be independent of the idea of their antecedence and their sequence and the relation between their names and meaning, it would be called "Non-argumentative" (*nirvitarka*). When pondering is engaged in with reference to something subtile, as the subtile elements and the internal organ, and to their qualities in relation to space, time, &c., it is "Deliberative" (*savichára*). But should this pondering be in regard to those subjects themselves, without reference to their relation to time and space, and simply as substrata of qualities, it is said to be "Non-deliberative" (*nirvichára*). What have been described up to this time are called Tangible Forms. (*Gráhya-samápatti.*)

When the quality of goodness of the Internal Organ tinctured with a little of the qualities of foulness and darkness is pondered, then consciousness being under the influence of qualities and the quality of goodness, which is full of the manifestation of happiness, becomes enlivened, the meditation becomes "Joyous" (*sánanda*). In this (kind of) meditation those of confined intellect who do not perceive the other (*i. e.*, last of the twenty-five principles, or the chief soul) are indicated by the word "bodiless" (*videha*), because they have risen above their body and egotism. This is the Acceptance Form. (*Grahaṇa-samápatti.*)

Next, the pondering which has the pure quality of goodness untainted by foulness and darkness for its object, is called Egoistic or ontric meditation, (*sasmita*), because in it, from the enlivening of the intellectual power, the quality of goodness, which is the object of the pondering, is disregarded and its existence alone is perceived. It should not be supposed that there is no difference between this Ontric meditation and egotism, because where the Internal Organ knows objects with the use of (the word) *I* (*i. e.*, with a knowledge of the distinction between itself and the object before it) it is egotism. But when mere existence is alone manifest in the thinking principle merged in nature from its reverse action resulting from its tendency inwards, it is egoism. In this (last kind of) meditation when contented (beings) do not perceive the Supreme Soul, and their mind is merged in its true cause, they are described to be *Prakṛitilaya* 'resolved into nature.'

Of the persons, who enter into pondering, knowing the Supreme Soul, the manifestation of intelligence is called the Form of the taker, *Grihitṛi-samáptti.*

Even in the argumentative meditation all the four kinds exist potentially, and successively as each is abandoned the others remain, and all these four kinds are Conscious meditation, or that which has a distinct recognition, *samprajṇáta-samádhi.*

[Meditation is described to be of two kinds, 1st, that which is carried on with a clear understanding of the object reflected ed upon as distinct from the meditator; and 2nd, that in which no such distinction obtains and the intellect is merged in the soul. In the former, the subject of the aphorism, there are argumentation, deliberation, joy, and egoism, when the objects meditated upon are irrational objects, such as the first twenty-four of the twenty-five categoriesof the Sáṅkhya system which the Yoga school adopts; and they may not exist when the rational soul is the object. The first or Argumentative form applies to gross matter; and the second or the Deliberative appliesto subtile matter. In both these the quality of goodness plays a subordinate part. When thatquality attains ascendancy the meditation becomes "Joyous;" and it

ceases to have connection with the body, or technically becomes disembodied. When it prevails without any taint of the foul and the dark qualities, the thinking principle is then believed to have merged into primæval nature. This is, however, not the highest reward, for it does not put an end to transmigration: on the evolution of creation from nature, the merging ceases, and there is again a separation. It will be noticed that the first two forms, the Argumentative and the Deliberative, have their negatives the Non-argumentative and the Non-deliberative; and these four form a class called the *tangible forms.*

The next is the "Joyous" kind in which the sense of the existence of the body is lost, and this is called the "acceptance form." In this there is no negative form, nor is there any such distinction in the next kind, the "Egoistic," in which every thing is identified with the self. This is called the "acceptor" form. In all these six kinds of pondering, there is, it will be perceived, a distinct recognition or consciousness of individuality, and hence they all come under the term Conscious. When this consciousness is lost, we come to the next class which forms the theme of the next aphorism.]

The author now describes that form of meditation in which consciousness is lost, *asamprajnáta.*

XVIII.

The other is that in which the residua are ended, preceded by the exercise of thought as regards the cause of rejection.

By *virâma* is meant that whereby rejection takes place, *i. e.*, the abandonment of all anxiety about argumentation &c., (A. XVII). *Pratyaya,* "thought," added to *virâma,* "cause of rejection," produces the compound expression *virâma-pratyaya.* Exercise (*abhyása*) is reiteration of the idea in the thinking principle. In this condition of exercise, constantly rejecting with a nega-

tive, "not this, not this," whatever ideas spring up, the result is the other or Unconscious meditation, or that in which there is no distinct consciousness, which has nothing left, and in which the residua are ended. It is the opposite of the former kind, and it is *asamprajnáta-samádhi.* In this condition there is nothing to be known, and therefore it is called Unconscious, undiscriminative, or seedless meditation (*nirvíja*).

Now, there are four modifications of the thinking principle, waking, commencing meditation, concentration, and suppression of thought. Thereof (A. II) the waking state belongs to the two conditions of the thinking principle described as restlessness and mischievous ignorance. The quality of goodness being on the ascendant in the condition described as voluptuousness, it is that of commencing meditation. Concentration and absolute suppression are the final conditions. Each condition has its residua. Thereof, those residua which are present in the waking state are destroyed by those that are produced by the condition of commencing meditation, and those that are brought forth by the condition of commencing meditation, are destroyed by those due to the condition of concentration. The residua of the condition of concentration are destroyed by those of suppression. Even as lead melted with gold destroys the dross of gold as well as itself, so do the residua of the condition of suppression consume both themselves as well as the residua of the condition of concentration.

[The most important word in the aphorism is *Sañskára,* and it is just the one which has unfortunately not been explained either in the commentary of Bhoja, or in the *Pátanjala Bháshya.* In ordinary Sanskrit it has many meanings. In the Nyáya it occurs frequently in three different senses, *viz.*, velocity (*vega*), thinking (*bhávaná*), and elasticity (*sthitisthápaka*). (*Tarka-sañgraha*). Adverting to the second meaning the *Bhásá-parichchheda,* says: "Sañskára, called thinking, (*bhávaná,*) resides in sentient beings; and is imperceptible to the senses. Certainty

which has no inattention in its constituent, is its cause. It is also described to be the cause of memory and recognition." (*Bhávanákhyástu sanskáro jívavrittiratíndryah.*
Upekshánátmakastasya nischayah káraṇam bhavet.
Smarane pratyabhijṉáyámapyasau heturuchyate.)

Thus it is not memory as rendered by Dr. Roer in his translation of the *Bháshá-parichchheda*, for there it is described to be the cause of memory, and not memory itself. It is not sensation, nor impression, for it is not transient, but lasting. It is not perception, because that applies to the acceptance by the sensorium of something existing without, and does not serve as the cause of memory. It is not idea, for it is the result of former experience, and not spontaneous as an idea may be, nor eternal as the ancient Greek philosophers supposed ideas to be. Dr. Ballantyne renders it into "self-reproduction of thought;" but there is nothing like "self-reproduction" in it; for it is said to be revived by external stimuli, and not by its own effort. It is something then—a trace, a mark, a celule, a psychograph—which perception, whether conscious or unconscious, leaves behind in the intellect, to be revived afterwards under particular circumstances, and it is more or less connected with all intellectual acts as cause or effect. In the language of Dr. Morell ('Mental Philosophy,' p. 95) "When a given mental impression is produced upon us, it remains for a time before the consciousness, and then gives way to others. We know, however, that it is not *absolutely lost;* for, if proper conditions occur, the impression is renewed. The conclusion is, that there must be *something* deposited within us which subsists *permanently,* and which is equally there, whether it be at any moment the immediate object of our consciousness or not. This *something,* then, we term a *residuum,* using the expression, it will be observed, without implying any theory on the subject whatever." The Sanskrit counterpart of this residuum is Sañskára. Every sensation, every impression, every perception, every idea, nay, every dream, leaves its trace behind, and the traces or residua so obtained constitute the sum total of

our experience, and these are *Sañskáras.* According to Indian philosophers these remain not only all life through, but even in subsequent states of existence, and they are, therefore, believed to be the cause of our instincts. The new-born infant takes to its mother's breast from the *sanskára* it has in its mind from its experience in a former existence.

The next word is *s'esha,* and it, too, has not been fully defined by the commentators. It means 'remainder' 'balance,' or 'end.' Compounded with *sañskára* the meaning is that in which the remainders are the sañskáras, or that in which the sañskáras are ended, or brought to a close. Bhoja accepts the second meaning, and he illustrates it by saying that in the state of Unconscious meditation in its perfection all previous *sañskáras* or residua of former conditions, as well as those of the perfect state, are destroyed, even as in the process of cupellation, lead melted with gold not only destroys the dross existing in impure gold, but also itself, leaving nothing behind. Thus the Unconscious meditation is seedless or has no object whatever for contemplation. The *Pátanjala Bháshya* takes a different view. According to it, in the Unconscious stage all functions are set at rest and the residua alone remain behind. *(Sarva-vṛittipratyastamaya-sañskára-śeshah nirodhah.)* And Váchaspati Miśra emphasizes this by adding the word "alone"—sañskáras alone remain—(*sanskára-mátra śeshah.*) This contradiction may be explained by supposing that the *Pátanjala-bháshya* has in view a meditation from which there is awaking, while Bhoja describes the final meditation from which there is no further waking; for he admits that in the earlier stages of the Unconscious meditation there are residua peculiar to it. Yogis admit that people do wake from the Unconscious meditation, and that that meditation is often practiced, and in such cases the sañskáras must remain in a latent state to be revived by proper stimuli on waking. It is difficult satisfactorily to decide to what condition Patanjali himself referred to. The way in which he has used the word *śesha* would suggest the idea that he has been correctly interpreted in the *Pátanjala Bháshya.* See A. L. at the end of the chapter.

The state of Unconscious meditation above described is subject to the condition precedent, that there should be repeated acts of contemplation or exercise of thought amounting to a habit, as regards the necessity of rejecting all causes of disturbance. Without it the final stage cannot he acquired. This exercise of thought, however, forms a part of the Unconsious stage, and is totally unconnected with the Conscious form. Váchaspati Miśra says—" the first word in the aphorism (which I have rendered into 'preceded by the exercise of thought regarding the cause of rejection,' and for the sake of idiom put at the end of the sentence) describes the means, and the other two define the nature of the meditation in question" *(púrvapaderupáyakathanamuttarábhyam cha svarúpa-kathanam)*. Dr. Ballantyne has mistaken the purport of the word, and made it the *conditio precedent.* His version is " The one [kind of meditation just described] is preceded by the exercise of thought in the shape of repose;—the other [—independent of any fresh antedecent—] is in the shape of the self-reproduction [of thought, after the departure of all objects.]" After what has been stated above, it is obvious that this version is not tenable. It may be added that it is not at all usual with authors of Sútras to repeat in a subsequent sútra what has been already explained in a previous one.]

Having thus stated the distinctions and the nature of *Yoga,* and having briefly mentioned the method of performing it, the author proceeds to speak of those methods more fully.

XIX.

Of (the meditative states attained to by the two classes of aspirants technically called) the Unembodied and the Resolved into nature, the world is the cause.

The "unembodied" (*videha*) and the "resolved into nature" *(prakṛitilaya)* have been described in the aphorism on the argumentative and other forms of meditations (A XVII, pp. 18 f.)

Of their meditation the world is the cause. The word *bhava-prataya* is formed of *bhava* 'world' and *pratyaya* 'cause.'

The meaning is this: that such persons, from their entrance into the world (on account of their deserts), become participators of similar (inadequate) meditation. Not being conscient of ultimate reality, for them this is a mere exercise of the Yoga. Hence, exertion should be made for the knowledge of the ultimate reality and in the contemplation thereof, with a view to the attainment of deliverance. This is the object for which this has been said.

[In the commentary on aphorism XVII, among the conditions of Conscious meditation disembodiedness and resolution into primæval nature have been pointed out as high. Here the object is to show that those results are secondary, and of the earth earthy. They do not secure the ultimate end of Yoga. They are accordingly meditations, of which the world or Prakṛití is the cause. They are, nevertheless, desirable exercises as preparatory to the state in which the ultimate reality is revealed.]

Of others :—

XX.

(In the case) of others this (meditation) is preceded by Inclination, Energy, Memory, Meditation, and Discernment.

"Of others" *i. e.*, of Yogís, other than (those who have been described as) "the disembodied" and "the resolved in nature." "Preceded by inclination" &c.; that meditation which has *śraddhá* &c. as the first means, is called *śraddhádipúrvaka*. These, inclination and the rest, act successively as the means and the end, *i. e.* they serve as the means or instruments for the Conscious meditation. Thereof "Inclination" (*śraddhá*) is approbation in favour of the Yoga. "Energy" (*vírya*) is strenuous exertion. "Memory" (*smṛiti*) is not letting out what is once cognised. (A. XI, p. 12.) "Meditation" (*samádhi*) is intentness on a single point.

"Discernment" *(prajná)* is thorough understanding of that which is to be known. Now, he who has "Inclination" gets "Energy," or becomes persevering in favour of Yoga. In the condition of "Energy" comes "Memory" of former states, in which the thinking principle meditates; and the thinking principle which has meditated knows thoroughly what it has thought upon. All these are the expedients of the Conscious form of meditation. From the (frequent) exercise of that meditation and from extreme dispassion Unconscious meditation ensues.

[This aphorism explains the practices which should be adopted by the neophyte in the first stage of his career as a Yogí. He must have Inclination for the exercise he cannot then undertake. The Inclination then, must be followed by Energy, or active exertion. Then there should be Memory of what he has learnt. Next, there should be frequent exercise of Meditation of some being or other to bring on the habit for it. And, lastly, there should be clear Discernment of what should be done and what should be avoided.]

Of the Yogís possessing the above mentioned expedients he next describes the sub-divisions according to the different expedients they adopt (for the attainment of their object).

XXI.

Proximate for the ardently impetuous.

(To complete the aphorism the words :) "The attainment of the state of meditation" are required to be supplied. "Impetuous" (*sañvega*), energetic exertion for the execution of a work. "Ardent" (*tivra*), excessively, in a high degree. On the part of those who are thus ardently impetuous, the attainment of Meditation is "proximate" (*ásanna*). The fruition of Meditation is also proximate, *i. e.*, quickly accomplished.

[Having in the preceding aphorism pointed out the practices to be adopted by Yogís, the author in this lays special stress on the necessity for ardent application. A lukewarm feeling is not enough for immediate or early fruition. The application should be "ardently impetuous" to ensure quick reward.]

Who are then ardently impetuous? To this he replies.

XXII.

There is a further distinction, from there being the mild, the moderate, and the excessive.

There are specific distinctions among those who adopt these expedients, from the mild and other expedients being different. The divisions of the expedients are "mild" (*mṛidu*), "moderate" (*madhya*), and "excessive" (*adhimátra*). These are severally threefold, from their being severally subdivided into "the mildly impetuous," "the moderately impetuous" and "the excessively impetuous." And in accordance with this division there are nine classes of Yogís. The mild expedients are (severally) "mildly impetuous," "moderately impetuous," and "ardently impetuous." The moderate expedients are (also) "mildly impetuous," "moderately impetuous," and "ardently impetuous." The excessive expedients are (likewise), "mildly impetuous," "moderately impetuous," and "ardently impetuous." And great endeavours should be made for the attainment of the "ardently impetuous" form of the excessive method. So much for the declaration of the distinctions of Yogís.

[The object of this aphorism is to classify Yogís into different orders according to their respective arduousness. Some are mildly, others moderately, and others ardently disposed, and so each group forms an order. Again in their mildness and the rest there may be degrees varying from mildness to moderateness and ardency, and so each of the three orders has three sub-divisions, making a total of nine groups. The injunction is that Yogís should exert to pass through the several orders as quickly as possible, so that the attainment of the final stage may not be delayed.]

Now he mentions an easy expedient, distinct from the preceding expedients.

XXIII.

Or by devotion to God.

"God" (*Ísvara)* will be described presently (A. XXIV). "Devotion" (*praṇidhána*) is a form of resignation to Him. It is thorough worship of Him, and the consignment of all one's actions to Him. Without wishing for the fruition of worldly enjoyments, the making over all one's actions to Him, the preëminent guide, is "devotion," *praṇidhána.* This is an important means of meditation and of its fruition.

[In this aphorism the author departs from the Sáṅkhya system, by introducing devotion to God as a facile and ready means of attaining the end. God, however, is not made the end, but the means to an end of which He forms no integral portion. The theory of resignation or dedication of the fruits of all actions to Him, is evidently borrowed from the Bhakti system in which it plays the most important part. In entire reliance on the providence of the Godhead, the Bhakta wishes for no fruition whatever. Whatever he does is for the service of the Divinity, and He in His mercy is to grant whatever He thinks proper. In the Bhagavad Gítá this is made the cardinal point of faith, (IX, 27,) and there it appears quite consistent; but in the Yoga system Kapila found no necessity for it, and Patanjali adopts it as a sort of compromise to give a theistic character to his system; but it plays only a very subordinate part.]

It has been just stated that meditation may be achieved through devotion to God. With reference to this he now proceeds to declare, in order, the nature (XXIV), the proofs (XXV), the glory (XXVI), the name (XXVII), and the order of worship of God (XXIII), as also the fruit thereof (XXIX).

XXIV.

God is a particular soul which is untouched by afflictions, works, deserts and desires.

Those things which afflict are "afflictions" (*kleśah*). They are ignorance and the rest about to be described. "Works" (*karma*), are what are enjoined or prohibited (in the S'ástras), as also what are mixed, *i. e.*, partly one and partly the other. What ripen out of those works are "deserts" (*vipáka*). They are kind, age and experience. What abide on the field of the thinking principle until fruition is affected are the residua called desires (*áśaya*). "Untouched," (*aparámrishṭa*,) free from the contact in all the three times (past, present and future). "Particular soul" (*Purusha-viśesha*), is that which is distinct from all other souls, and that is the distinction. "God" (*I'śvara*) Almighty, or one who is able to grant salvation to creation by the fiat of His will. It is true that the contact of afflictions does not obtain in regard to any soul, still the afflictions abide in the thinking principle of all souls, even as conquest and defeat effected by soldiers abide in their master. In the case of this Soul there is no such contact of the afflictions in any of the three tenses; hence He is especially the Almighty Lord. Such almightiness of His is due to sempeternal excess of the quality of goodness. This excess is due for certain to the fulness of His wisdom. Being separately self-dependent, His wisdom aud almightiness are not mutually dependent, for they two are eternally abiding in the substance of the Almighty. His relation to that goodness is sempeternal, because the union and separation of *Prakṛiti* and *Purusha* cannot happen except by the will of that Íśvara. The thinking principle in ordinary beings, undergoing modifications into pleasure, pain and delusion, becomes, on being touched in the body of the Yogí, by the reflection of the soul, known; but such is not the case with Íśvara. His superexcellent modification of goodness abides eternally without a beginning as the sole object of enjoyment. Hence, being distinct from other souls, He verily is Íśvara. Again, in the case of the liberated soul, liability to pain and the like is removed by S'ástric means (such as the Yoga, &c.). In His case, however, being always in that condition, there is no correspondence with liberated souls. Nor

is there a multiplicity of Gods, for if we admit their equality there must be diversity of object, and the object (of the enquiry into the cause of creation) is defeated; and if we admit relative greatness, he who is the greatest, is God, because in Him almightiness attains its highest limit.

[The most important word in the aphorism is *I'śvara*. Derived from the root *I'ś*, it means 'ruler' or 'governor,' but as that is not very definite, I have preferred the precise and unmistakable term God, which, though supposed to be derived from good, is generally accepted in the sense of a ruler.

The next word is *purusha*, which means a man, or the soul of a man—that which abides (*shete*) in the body (*pure*); but it also means a male simply. Dr. Ballantyne uses spirit as its equivalent; but as the dualism indicated by European philosophers between soul or animal life (Ψυχή) and spirit, or rational life (Πνεύμα) is not recognised by Hindu writers, I have accepted soul to imply the two collectively. The use of the term shows that Patanjali did not much care for the Vedántic theory which denounces the idea of attaching sexuality to the Divinity, and, to avoid trouble, uses a neuter noun. To prevent misconception he thinks it quite enough to say that the soul was of a particular kind, quite distinct from all other kinds, and characterised by being devoid of all the accidents of humanity. For the sake of comparison with his definition it may not be amiss to quote here Udayana A'chárya's summary of the different definitions of the Godhead given in leading Hindu works. It runs thus:

"Now although with regard to that Being whom all men alike worship, whichever of the [four well-known] ends of man they may desire,—(thus the followers of the Upanishads as the very Knower,—the disciples of Kapila as the perfect first Wise,—those of Patanjali as Him who, untouched by pain, action, fruit, or deserts, having assumed a body in order to create, revealed the tradition of the Veda and is gracious to all living beings,—the Mahápáśupatas as the Independent one, undefiled by Vaidic or secular violations,—the Saivas as S'iva,—the Vaishṇavas as Puru-

shottoma,—the followers of the Purâṇas as the great Father (Brahmá),—the Ceremonialists as the Soul of the sacrifice,—the Saugatas as the Omniscient,—the Jainas as the Unobstructed,—the Mímáñsakas as Him who is pointed out as to be worshipped,—the Chárvákas as Him who is established by the convention of the world,—the followers of the Nyáya as Him who is all that is said worthy of Him,—why farther detail? whom even the artizans themselves worship as the great artizan, Viśvakarman,)—although, I say, with regard to that Being, the adorable S'iva, whom all recognise throughout the world as universally acknowledged like castes, families, family invocations of Agni, schools, social customs, &c., how can there arise any doubt? and what then is there to be ascertained?"—(Cowell's *Kusumáñjali*, p. 2.)

For a theist, intent on proving the existence of the Deity, this summary is good enough; but it is not absolutely correct. The Chárvákas do not admit the existence of the Godhead as the supreme ruler. They are atheists, and do not acknowledge any Divine supremacy. The Kápilas, though not so outspoken, still hold that the existence of the Godhead cannot be proved. Kapila, in the Sáñkhya aphorisms says, "It is not proved that there is a God." (*Is'varásiddheh* I. 92.) This idea he works out elaborately in his Fifth Book, and, for ready reference, I quote Dr. Ballantyne's translations of the aphorisms on the subject.

Aph. 2.—Not from its [—the world's—] being governed by the Lord, is there the effectuation of fruit, for it is by works [—*i. e.*, by merit and demerit—] that this is accomplished,—[" by works alone, which are indispensable,"—and if we *do* make the additional and cumbrous supposition of a Lord, He cannot reward a man otherwise than according to his works].

Aph. 3.—[If a Lord were governor, then] having intended his own benefit, His government [would be selfish], as is the case [with ordinary governors] in the world.

Aph. 4.—[He must then be] just like a worldly lord, [and] otherwise [than you desire that we should conceive of Him; for

"if we agree that the Lord also is benefited, He also must be something mundane,—just like a worldly lord;—because, since his desires are (on that supposition) not (previously) satisfied, he must be liable to grief, &c."].

Aph. 5.—Or [" if whilst there exists also a world, there be a Lord, then, let yours, like ours, be merely"] a technical term [" for that soul which emerged at the commencement of the creation,—since there cannot be an eternal Lordship, because of the contradiction between mundaneness and the having an unobstructed will"].

Aph. 6.—This [that there is a Lord] cannot be established without [assuming that He is affected by] Passion, because that is the indispensable cause [of all energizing].

Aph. 7.—Moreover were that [Passion] conjoined with Him, he could not be eternally free, [" and thus the tenet (of His eternal freedom) must be surrendered."—" Pray (let us ask)—does Lordship arise from the immediate union, with Soul, of the wishes, &c., which we hold to be powers of Nature—(not properties of Soul—)or from an influence through proximity simply, —as in the case of the magnet? Of these he condemns the former alternative"].

Aph. 8.—If it were from the conjunction of the properties of Nature, it would turn out that there is association, [which Scripture denies of Soul. " In regard to the latter alternative he says"].

Aph. 9.—If it were from the mere existence [of Nature, not in association, but simply in proximity], then Lordship would belong to every one; [" that is to say,—if Thought obtains Lordship merely from proximity, as in the case of the magnet (which becomes affected by the simple proximity of iron), then it is settled, as we quite intend it should be, that all men indifferently, experiencers in this or that (cycle of) creation, (may) have Lordship, because it is just by conjunction with all experiencers that Nature produces Mind, &c.;—therefore your tenet, of there being only one Lord, is overthrown"].

Aph. 10.—It is not established [that there is an eternal Lord] because there is no real evidence of it, [—"in the first place, there is not *sense*-evidence, so that only the evidence of inference and of testimony can be offered; and these are inapplicable;" as he proceeds to show].

Aph. 11.—There is no inferential proof [of there being a Lord], because there is here no case of [invariable] association [between a sign and that which it might betoken;—" and so there is no inferential proof of there being a Lord; because, in such arguments as 'Mind, or the like, has a maker, because it is a product,' the fact of invariable concomitancy is not established, since there is no compulsion" that every product should have had an intelligent maker].

Aph. 12.—Moreover, there is scripture for this [world's] being the product of Nature [—not of a Lord]." (*Sáṅkhya Aphorisms,* pp. 114*f.*)

I should add here that some Kápilas do not wish openly to admit their atheism, and appeal for support from the aphorism in which Kapila says "The existence of such a Lord is a settled point," (III, 5 and 7), meaning by "such" an emergent Lord who has been absorbed into nature, and who is in no sense the governor of creation. The greater part of chapter III of the first book of the Vedánta Sútra treats of this subject; but it is too long to be quoted here.

The *Pátanjala Bháshya* points out the distinction between the emancipated soul and the Godhead thus: "If isolation be it, then would there not be many isolated ones? (Not so.) For the isolated ones attain their isolation by rending asunder the three bonds, whereas in regard to God there never was and never can be such bonds. The emancipated implies previous bondage, but this cannot be predicated of God. Again, in the case of the resolved into nature there is possibility of future bondage, but it is not the case with God—He is sempeternally emancipated and sempeternally the Lord." *Kaivalyam práptáhstarhi santi cha bahavah kevalinah. Te hi triṇi bandhanám chhitvá kaivalyam*

práptáh ; íśvarasya cha tat sambando na bhuto na bhávi. Yathá muktasya púrvabandhakoṭih prajnáyate naivamíśvarasya. Yathá vá prakṛitilínasyottará bandhakoṭih sambhávyate naivamíśvarasya ; sa tu sadeva muktah sadeveśvarah.]

Having described the identity of God, the author next produces a proof that such a being exists.

XXV.

In Him the seed of the omniscient attains infinity.

In that God the seed of omniscience, as also of parvitude and magnitude and of knowledge of the knowers of the past, the future &c., attains its "infinity," *(niratisaya)** or highest perfection. Being the source like a seed it is called seed (*víja*). It is well known that of the qualities of parvitude and magnitude, which have degrees, there is an absolute perfection. Thus, the perfection of parvitude is seen in atoms, and that of magnitude in the sky. In a similar manner knowledge and other manifest attributes of the thinking principle compared with each other must somewhere attain the highest perfection, and wherever they are in the highest perfection, that is God. Although from the general character of this inference no precise being is proved, yet in the S'ástras His omniscience and other qualities may be precisely learnt.

But how does He, without any impulse of His own, cause the union and separation of Prakṛiti and Purusha? Such a doubt should not be entertained. Being merciful, He finds in His mercy to creation the impulse. His impulse is the wish "I shall rescue all creation (from pain) at the periodical minor and great pralayas." What ever is desirable to one, is his impulse.

[The logical force of this aphorism is not apparent. It is a mere assertion, and can scarcely be taken as a proof, as the Commentator puts it forward to be. He himself felt the difficulty, and escaped out of it by appealing to the authority of the S'ástra.

* *Niratisaya*, limitness, greatness, or infinity.

The S'ástra here referred to is the Sáñkhya, and the P. Bháshya quotes a passage from the work of Panchaśikha which shows that "the first knower, lord, and great sage, with a view to creation, in his mercy taught this science to the enquirer Suri." *Ádividvánnirmáṇachittamadhishṭháya káruṇyát bhagaván paramarshi rásuraye jijnásumánáya tantram pravácheti.* The first knower is Kapila, who, being an incarnation of Vishṇu, obtained the science from Sayambhu or Maheśvara.]

Having thus described the identity and proof of the existence of God, the author refers to His greatness.

XXVI.

He is the instructor of even all early ones, for He is not defined by time.

Even of the primary creators such as Brahmá and others, he is the "instructor," or preceptor, because "He is not defined by time," for He has no beginning, while the others are so defined, having a beginning.

[The word *guru* has been translated "instructor" in accordance with the text, and after the commentator who supplies the equivalent *upadeshṭá*. It may be more appropriately rendered into "noblest" or "greatest," as it would make the reason assigned, undefined by time, more consistent, for want of beginning, or being not circumscribed by time, does not imply tuition. The object of the explanation, however, is to refer to the first tutor Maheśvara to whom reference has been made in the last note. In the P. Bháshya no equivalent is given of the word, but the sense is explained by the word *yathásya sargasyádau prakarsha-gatyásiddhah, tathátikránta-sargádisvapi pratyetavyah.*

Váchaspati Miśra explains the term by *prakarsha* "superior:" *na vartate prakarshásya gatih práptih pratyetavya ágamát tadanena prabandhena bhagavánísvaro darśitah.*

In giving the purport of the aphorism he uses the words: *Samprati bhávatah brahmádibhyah viśeshamáha.*]

Having thus described the greatness of God, the author now supplies His indicator, with a view to help people in their devotion.

XXVII.

His indicator is the Praṇava.

Of the Íśvara thus described, the "indicator," name, expressive word, whereby one is thoroughly *(pra=prakarsheṇa)* lauded *(nu)* or praised, glorified, or hymned is—*praṇava,* which is the same with the syllable Om. (The sentence indirectly gives the derivation which is *pra* = "excessive" and *nu* = "to laud," whence Praṇava). Between the two (the name and the being denominated) the relation of the indicator and the indicated is eternal. This is conventionally expressed, but not produced by any one; (it is the same) as in the case of a father and his son, when one points out the existing relation (by saying) "this is the father, and this is the son," (though the relationship exists from before, and is not produced by the saying.)

[Praṇava is the technical name of Om, and the injunction is that that syllable should be frequently muttered. Care is taken to show that the relation between the indicator Om and the indicated God is eternal and not produced by man, and the example of the father and son explains what is intended. The Vedas, the Upanishads and all Hindu works recommend the same process, accepting the term as the most sacred name of the Divinity. See Chhándogya Upanishad, Chapter I. In two short notes, published in the 'Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal' for 1865, pp. 46—208, I take the word to be the Indianized form of the Hebrew *Áman* and the English Amen.]

His adoration is next enjoined.

XXVIII.

Its repetition and the reflection on its meaning (should be made).

"Its," *i. e.*, of the Praṇava, consisting of three and a half instants, "Repetition" *(japa)*, pronouncing it in due order, and the "Reflection" (*bhávana*), the perception repeatedly of the God indicated by it, are the means of concentration of the thought in it. Hence, for the accomplishment of meditation (*samádhi*) the Praṇava should be repeated, and its meaning reflected upon by a Yogí. This is declared.

[Om is ordinarily declared to be a compound of the letters अ (a) उ (u) and म (m), which supply the three instants, and the conversion of the m into the nasal mark ं supplies the half instant. In prosody the word is a long syllable, but in modulated reading or recitation its prosodial quantity is a protracted circumflex sound.]

The fruit of such adoration is next described.

XXIX.

Thence the right knowledge of the reverted perception, and the removal of obstacles.

From that repetition and that reflection the right knowledge of the "reverted perception" *(pratyakchetaná)* is effected in the case of Yogís. That "perception" *(chetaná)* or power of seeing, which turns towards its own internal organ, withdrawing itself from (or in opposition to worldly) objects, is called "reverted perception" (*pratyak* "turning back," *chetaná* "perception") and a "right knowledge" *(adhigama)* of it is thereby acquired. The "removal" (*abháva*), *i. e.*, the counteraction of the power of the obstacles about to be described is also effected.

[The natural function of the senses is to extend outwards, in order to receive the impressions of external objects and carry them to the sensorium, but that being suppressed by the Yogí, the senses turn inwards and find their object within, and therefore the function is called reversed, or reflex. The object of this roundabout way of description is to say that the senses hold communion exclusively with the soul.]

Now, a doubt arising as to what are the obstacles? he says:—

XXX.

Disease, Langour, Doubt, Carelessness, Idleness, Worldly-mindedness, Mistaken notions, Unattainment of any stage of abstraction, and Instability therein; these, causing distractions, are the obstacles.

These nine, impelled by the force of foulness and darkness, become the causes of "distractions," *i. e.*, by these enemies to concentration the thinking principle is disturbed. Of the nine:—

(1) "Sickness" (*vyádhi*) is fever and the like, resulting from disordered humours.

(2) "Langour" (*styána*) is an indisposition of the thinking principle to work.

(3) "Doubt" (*sañśaya*) is the disposition of the thinking principle which relies on both sides of a question, as whether Yoga is practicable or not.

(4) "Carelessness" (*pramáda*) is a disposition not to exert, or indifference in performing meditation.

(5) "Idleness" (*álasya*) is a heaviness of the body and of the thinking principle, which is the cause of want of interest in matters relating to Yoga.

(6) "Worldly-mindedness" (*avirati*) is the inclination of the thinking principle to enjoy the pleasures of the world.

(7) "Mistaken notion" (*bhrántidarsana*) is wrong perception, such as taking a bit of mother-o'pearl to be silver.

(8) "Unattainment of any stage" (*alabdha-bhúmikatva*) is not attaining, for some cause or other, a particular stage of abstraction.

(9) "Instability" (*anavasthitatva*) is the condition in which the thinking principle having attained a stage cannot abide in it.

These being opposed to the practice of concentration of meditation, are called "obstacles," (*antaráyáh*).

To shew that there are other causes which produce distraction of the mind, he says:—

XXXI.

Pain, Distress, Trembling, Inspiration and Expiration are the companions of distractions.

Whenever from any cause distractions are produced then pain &c., come on. Thereof—

(1) "Pain" (*duḥkha*) is a modification of the foulness of the thinking principle; it is characterised by pain, which living beings exert to remove.

(2) "Distress" (*daurmanasya*) is the agitation of the mind proceeding from external or internal causes.

(3) "Trembling" (*aṅgamejaytva*) is the shaking of the body which causes unsteadiness in the posture (of a Yogí).

(4) "Inspiration" (*śvása*) is a drawing in of the external air. The expulsion of the air from the lungs is "expiration" (*praśvása)*.

These existing along with the (other) distractions, should be removed by the exercise and dispassion already described; (A. XII) and therefore they are noticed here.

[Pain here referred to is described in the Pátanjala Bháshya as of three kinds: mental, physical and supernatural. That which affects the mind without touching the body is mental, that which proceeds from disorders in the body is physical, and that which proceeds from evil spirits &c., is supernatural. The *Sáṅkhya Karika* notices all the three. (Wilson's Sáṅkhya Káriká, p. 2.)

The *Pátanjala Rahasya* gives *píḍá* 'disease' as the equivalent of *Duḥkha.*]

Another expedient for overcoming the obstacles with their accompaniments is now being pointed out.

XXXII.

For their prevention let there be exercise on one principle.

For the "prevention" (*pratishedha*)or obstruction of those distractions, let there be "exercise" (*abhyása*) or repeated application of the thinking principle to some one selected "principle," (*tattva*), from the force resulting from which arise the condition of concentration, and thereby the distractions subside.

[In former aphorisms meditation has been declared to be of two kinds: conscious and unconscious, or seeded and seedless. The object here is to inculcate the necessity of constant exercise of the first, or the seeded form, to steady the mind, and prepare it for the more arduous and difficult phase in which there should be no object upon which to meditate, or the state in which, in the language of Wordsworth, "thought is not." The highest form of conscious meditation is intelligent communion with the soul, but this too is not at once practicable, and the instruction is that any one of the twenty-five categories may be taken up for meditation, so that the mind may be trained to the habit of concentrating itself at any one point at pleasure, and of remaining in that state of concentration without fatigue.]

Now he describes another expedient with advertence to certain works which help to purify the thinking principle.

XXXIII.

The cheerfulness of the thinking principle, through friendliness, compassion, complacency and indifference in regard to happiness, grief, virtue and vice.

"Friendliness" (*maitrí*) disposition to be friendly. "Compassion," (*karuṇá*) mercy. "Complacency" (*muditá*) to be pleased. "Indifference" (*upekshá*) to feel neither pleasure nor pain. These feelings should be felt, in due order, for the happy, the grieved, the virtuous, and the sinful. Thus, to the happy one should be friendly, (saying) "blessed is their happiness;" and not be envious to them. For persons in grief he should show mercy, and desire how to relieve them from their grief, and not remain indifferent to their suffering. To the virtuous, with a view to encourage virtue, he should express satisfaction, and not be envious of them (say-

ing) "Forsooth, are these virtuous"? For the vicious a feeling of indifference should be practised, neither encouraging nor hating them. In the aphorism, the word "happiness" &c. are intended to stand for persons possessing those qualities. These feelings of friendliness &c.,producing cheerfulness in the thinking principle, easily bring on the condition of Samádhi. These acts are external (and not intrinsic parts of the Samádhi). Even as in arithmetic, addition and the like are useful in the calculation of alligation, &c., (but are not in themselves integral parts of the main object), so the feelings of friendship, &c., antagonistic to envy, passion &c., producing cheerfulness, prepare the thinking principle for the conscious form of Samádhi. Passion and envy are the chief causes of distractions. When these are thoroughly eradicated, the cheerfulness induced, effects the concentration of the mind (to one object).

[The Aphorism suggests a second expedient that of cheerfulness. Unless the mind is cheerful it cannot be steady, and this cheerfulness is to be brought on by friendliness towards the happy, compassion for those who are in distress, complacency in regard to virtue, and indifference in respect to vice. Indifference in respect to vice might at first sight appear a very mild feeling, but hatred, detestation or other strong manifestation of feeling towards vice would mar cheerfulness, and itself be a cause of pain and unsteadiness; hence it is avoided.]

He points out another expedient.

XXXIV.

Or by expulsion and retention of the breath.

"Expulsion," *(prachchhardana)* means the throwing out of the air from the lungs in a fixed quantity through a special effort. "Retention" (*vidhárana*) is the restraint, or stoppage of the motion of breath for a certain limited time. That stoppage is effected by two acts—by filling the lungs with external air, and by retaining therein the inhaled air. Thus the threefold *práṇáyáma,* including the three acts of expiration, inspiration and retention of breath, fixes the thinking principle to one point of

concentration. All the functions of the organs being preceded by that of the breath—there being always a correlation of breath and mind in their respective functions,—the breath when overcome by stopping all the functions of the organs, effects the concentration of the thinking principle to one object. The Ágama proclaims its power of destroying all defects thus: "All obstructive functions are caused by faults." Hence, by its destroying faults, it becomes effectual in producing concentration of the mind.

[The definition of "retention" (*vidhárana*) by the terms "stoppage of motion" (*gativichchheda*) is obviously faulty, but as the aphorism refers to "retention" immediately after the "expulsion" (*prachchhardana*) and the attempt to retain the breath after it has been fully expired would be futile, it is necessary to inspire before the breath can be retained, and the commentator is obliged to include that act along with the retention. The Pátanjala Bháshya calls the retention to be *Pranáyáma* (*vidhárana pránáyamah*), and in the Sáñkhya Sútra this meaning is accepted. It is, however, not the generally accepted meaning. All other Yogic and Tántric works regard the three acts of expiration, inspiration and retention performed in specific order, to constitute the Pránáyáma. The order is not always the same. Some have expiration first, inspiration next, and retention last. Others place inspiration first, retention next, and expiration last. The word *mátrápramána* in the commentary, which I have rendered into "fixed quantity," has been rendered into *svalpa* or "little" or "slowly" in the Pátanjala Bháshya; but it does not express the true technical meaning. The object of the mátrá is to imply a fixed period of time. According to the Skanda Purána a *mátrá* is equal to the time required in one breathing, (*Eka śvásamapi mátrá pránáyáme nigadyate*), and to imply that this breathing must be natural, the *Yoga-chintámani* adds that this breathing should be during sleep (when there is no violent effort). *Nidrávasangatasya puñso yávatkálenaikaśváso gachchhatyágachchhati cha távatkálapránáyámasya mátretyuchyate.*) And this

period is equal to two and a half palas. (*Sárddha svása paladvayátmakah kálah, práṇáyáma kála siddhah.*) The *pala* here means the period occupied by a twinkling of the eye. The *mátrá* is obviously taken as a unit, and of these from 1 to 24 are devoted to a práṇáyáma according as it is inferior, middling, or superior. The mode of reckoning the time to be devoted to each act is regulated in one of two ways; 1st, by so many repetitions of the syllable Om, or the mystic mantra of the performer, or the specific mystic syllables (*víja*) of that mantra; 2nd, by turning the thumb and the index finger of the left hand round the left knee a given number of times. The time devoted to inspiration is the shortest, and to retention the longest. A Vaishṇava in his ordinary daily prayer repeats the Víja mantra once while expiring, 7 times while inspiring, and 20 times while retaining. A S'ákta repeats the mantra 16 times when inspiring, 64 times while retaining, and 32 times while expiring. These periods are frequently modified. The details vary according to each particular form of meditation, and the capacity of the performer. As a general rule it may be said that longer is the retention the more proficient becomes the Yogí. The usual mode of performing the Práṇáyáma is, after assuming the posture prescribed, to place the ring-finger of the right hand on the left nostril, pressing it so as to close it, and to expire with the right, then to press the right nostril with the thumb, and to inspire through the left nostril, and then to close the two nostrils with the ring-finger and the thum, and to stop all breathing. The order is reversed in the next operation, and in the third act the first form is required. This constitutes the Praṇáyáma, and it may be repeated after short intervals according to choice for hours. The object avowed of this performance is the steadying of the mind. The *Haṭha-dípiká* philosophises on this by saying, "by the motion of the breath, the thinking principle moves; when that motion is stopped, it becomes motionless, and the Yogí becomes firm as the trunk of a tree; therefore the wind should be stopped. As long as the breath remains in the body so long it is called living. Death is the exit of that breath, therefore it should be stopped."

(*"Chale váte chalam chittam niśchale niśchalam bhavet, Yogí sthánutvamápnoti tato váyumni rodhayet. Yávad váyuh sthito dehe tabajjívanamuchyate, Maraṇam tasya nishkrántistato vayum nirodhayet."*)

Elsewhere the text asserts that this Práṇáyáma is conducive both to health and longevity, and all minor works on Yoga and the Tantras generally expatiate at great length on the sanitary and the therapeutic advantages of practising it regularly at stated times. The *Haṭha-dípiká,* in one place, says, "all diseases disappear in him who devotes himself to the Práṇáyáma; without it in the state of practising Yoga every kind of disease arises." (*Práṇáyámádiyuktena sarvaroga kshayo bhavet, ayuktábhyása-yogena sarvaroga samudbhavah.* The idea seems to have travelled to the far West, and the spiritualists in America have accepted it as a recognised maxim of their system. Many spiritualists practice this *Práṇáyáma* under the name of "deep breathing," and A. J. Davis, one of their apostles, in his "Harbinger of Health" (pp. 52-53), gives the following directions for curing diseases through its means.

"First, if your weakness be general, and the blood is loaded with cold matter, lay flat down on your back, and, while breathing *deep, and slow, and uniformly,* WILL YOURSELF TO BECOME HEALTHY—in your feet and hands, in your knees and elbows, in your hips and shoulders, in your bowels and liver, in your lungs and brain! The heart will take care of itself. In cases where the weakness is generally distributed, all you are required to practice (while so prostrated and respiring) is the art of concentrating your Will and desires simultaneously on the extremeties first; then work upward and *inward* progressively; and when, in the lapse of ten minutes of steady, deep breathing, you have reached the brain, repeat the process in the ascending scale, as indicated in the manner aforementioned.

"By this Pneumogastric treatment of yourself, you will receive *spiritual* strength from the air—nothing is more certain! When, by practice, you can *breathe* deeply and heroically, and at the

same time put your Will upon the restoration of the general system, the art of fixing your mind upon some particularly diseased part will become less and less difficult. *Consumptive persons*, by simply breathing profoundly, and willing systematically, *may enlarge their chests and lungs beyond the possibilities of disease.* Persons of cold temperature, with irregular habits and bad practices, may "right about face" and become harmonially healthy. Learn to depend upon yourself—use the infallible remedies of Nature—and, in spite of priest or doctor, you will 'pass from death unto life.'

"TIME OF EXERCISES.—In acquiring this psychological power over the destinies of your bodily state, and in becoming a Self-healing Institution, whether home or abroad—it may be necessary to practice (either while on your back, or standing, or walking, or riding,) perhaps three times in each twenty-four hours. Never just before meals, nor soon subsequent to them; but the true time is when chilification is going on; about 90 or 120 minutes after eating. The spirit world will aid you, by forming a secret conjunction with the *pneumogastric* conductor. It is certain, gentle sufferer; do not permit yourself to doubt. Nothing is too good in Nature, in matter, in spirit, or in truth."]

In pointing out another expedient, he foreshadows the conscious form of meditation.

XXXV.

Or cognition resulting from sensuous objects may be the cause of steadiness.

"Of the mind" (*manasah* is understood to) complete the sentence. "Sensuous objects" *(vishaya)* are odour, taste, colour, touch and sound, and that in which these reside as objects is *vishayavatí*, the cognition whereof causes the steadiness of the mind. Thus, by directing the thinking principle to the tip of the nose, the cognition of spiritual odour is effected. In the same way the cognition of taste may be effected at the tip of the tongue, the cognition of colour at the forepart of the palate, the cognition of touch at the

middle of the tongue, and the cognition of sound at the root of the tongue. Thus the cognition of spiritual sense-objects resulting through one or other of those organs becomes the cause of the concentration of the mind. This is to encourage Yogís in the belief that the Yoga has a fruit.

[By this commentary the meaning of the text remains perfectly unintellegible to the uninitiated. The reason is, the commentator takes for granted that the rudimentary principles of Yoga are known to his readers. The purport is that in the act of Práṇáyáma (as explained in A. XXXIV) when the Yogí directs his mind to the tip of his nose &c., he derives in the places mentioned a sense of those objects which is ordinarily acquired by their natural organs, and having done so, he feels no inclination to exercise those natural organs, and his mind settles down into undisturbed contemplation of the object to which he directs his mind. The commentator uses the word *divya* for which I use "spiritual" as the equivalent. The *P. Rahasya* uses *alaukika* or "supernatural" as the equivalent. The word *pravṛitti* in the text has been taken by the P. Bhasya to be equal to *sañvit* or cognition. In the commentary above and elsewhere the word *manas* mind has been sometimes used for *chitta*, thinking principle].

He describes another expedient of the same kind.

XXXVI.

Or a sorrowless extremely luminous (disposition being produced causes the steadiness of the thinking principle).

(The sense of the aphorism must be completed) by the terms, "disposition being produced causes the steadiness of the thinking principle."

The word "lumen" *(jyotis)* means the manifestation (of the quality) of goodness. When it exists in its fulness, in any disposition it is called "extremely luminous" disposition *(iyotismatí)*. "Sorrowless" *(viśoka)* is that disposition in which the power resulting from the exercise of the delightfully pure element (goodness)

has removed the grief which is produced by the quality of foulness. It steadies the thinking principle. The purport of this is this:—when the thinking principle is in the quality of goodness located in the cup of the lotus heart as on the waveless milky ocean, and the sensuous functions are all destroyed by the light of knowledge, the steadiness of the thinking principle results as a matter of course.

[Briefly, the purport is that when the thinking principle is totally griefless, and manifest in the extreme refulgence of the quality of goodness, it is steady, and has no cause for vacillation.]

In course of pointing out another expedient, he describes the object of the conscious form of meditation—or discriminate meditation.

XXXVII.

Or the thinking principle taking a passionless object (becomes the cause of the mind's steadiness).

The phrase "becomes the cause of the mind's steadiness" is understood to complete the sentence.

"The Passionless" *(vítarága)* are those who have abandoned all longings for sensuous objects, and their thinking principle, which has destroyed all pain, by being made the object of thought, becomes the cause of steadiness.

[The next expedient is the making the thinking principle of those who have overcome all passions the object of contemplation. Váchaspati Miśra explains this by saying "the passionless are Kṛishṇa Dvaipáyana and others. To make their thinking principle the object of thought is to rely thereon. *Vítarágáh Kṛishṇadvaipáyana prabhṛitayah. Teshám chittam tadevávalambanam, tenoparaktamiti.*]

He describes another expedient of this kind.

XXXVIII.

Or reliance on knowledge resulting from dream or sleep.

"Dream" (*svapna*) is the perception by the thinking principle alone of the soul's agency when the functions of the external organs are dormant. "Sleep" (*nidrá*) has been already defined (A. X). The knowledge which results from "reliance" thereon, *i. e.*, reliance on dream or reliance on sleep, produces steadiness of the thinking principle.

[Although sleep has been defined to be absence of consciousness, the Yogís believe absence of consciousness to be a kind of knowledge. (See. A. X,) Váchaspati Miśra gives an illustration to show how the beatific vision of an image of Maheśvara may, on waking, tend to steady the thinking principle in the contemplation of any particular object. Perfectly sound sleep of which on waking we know only that we have slept well and nothing more, is also favorable to steadiness in the same way, perfect calmness of the mind being thereby produced.]

Different men having different tastes, Yogís may affect each a different expedient according to choice, and by meditating thereon attain his object (*scil.* steadiness of mind). To stablish this he says—

XXXIX.

Or by meditating according to one's fancy.

By thinking on anything according to choice, whether external, as the moon, or internal, as a plexus of arteries, the thinking principle becomes steadied.

[The object of this aphorism is to show that by constantly reflecting on any object of choice, the habit is acquired of keeping the thinking principle confined to one object. The choice of course does not extend to carnal objects, for they would tend to excite, instead of allaying, the passions. The moon, or the sun, or other similar object has no such tendency, and certain plexuses within the chest and the abdomen which are believed to be the seats of the thinking principle, are held particularly beneficial in producing steadiness.]

Having thus described the different methods, he proceeds to point out what the fruit thereof is.

XL.

His mastery extends from the minutest atom to the limit of infinite magnitude.

Having by these means acquired steadiness of the thinking principle, the Yogí, by thinking on minute objects, acquires unfailing "mastery" (*vaśíkára*) over the minutest atoms, *i. e.*, his thinking principle is not baffled even by the reflection of the most minute objects, such as the minutest atoms. In the same way, the reflection of big objects, like the sky &c., to infinite magnitude, never causes any disturbance of the thinking principle, *i. e.*, it becomes independent everywhere. Such is the meaning.

[The purport is obvious. When steadiness is once fully acquired, the thinking principle acquires mastery over every thing, and nothing can baffle it. The result of this perfect nature is transcendantal power over all material and spiritual objects: of this full illustrations will follow in Chapter III. The P. Bháshya adds that when the thinking principle of the Yogí is perfect in this respect, it does not any longer care for the appliances of exercise elsewhere enjoined. *Tadvaśíkárát paripúrṇam yoginaśchittam na punarabhyásakṛitam parikarmápekshate iti.*]

What becomes of the condition of the thinking principle purified by these methods, he now proceeds to describe.

XLI.

To him of overpowered faculties, there are a concentration and a consubstantiation in (matters relating to) the perceiver, the means of perception, and the perceivable, as in a transparent gem.

He, whose faculties have been overpowered, is "of overpowered faculties" (*kshíṇavṛitti*). With reference to him there is, in regard to the objects of his faculties, no distinction about the perceiver, the means of perception, and the perceivable, and there result a "concentration" and a "consubstantion." *Tatsthatva* is concentration in it, (*ekágratá*). "Consubstantiation" (*tadañja-*

natva) is becoming of it, for when the thinking principle is lowered, (or reduced in its carnal functions in the way described,) the object of meditation attains superiority. The meaning is, that such a condition (*samápatti*), or modification to that form, results.

Of this an example is given. In the case of "a transparent gem" or clear rock-crystal jewel, whatever colour it dwells upon, the same it obtains. In the same way in the transparent, clear thinking principle the form of the object thought of is imposed.

Although the text gives the perceiver, the means of perception, and the perceptible, but, according to the order of precedence, the terms should be understood to stand as if written "perceptible, means of perception, and perceiver," for first the meditation is directed to the perceivable; then it is devoted to the perception; and then it is confined to the perceiver, which is mere egoism; for in the case of the soul alone there can be no thinking. Even so, the thinking principle tinged by a substantial or a subtile object of perception assumes its character. In this sense the condition is implied also to the perceived.

[The word *kshíṇa* in the text means weakened, but this weakness is not general; according to the P. Rahasya it is confined to those subjects which are not thought of, the power remaining in full force in connexion with the special object of thought: *kshíṇa-vṛitteh álambanavishayátirikta-vishayanirúpita-vṛitti-sunyasya.* *Tatsthatva* is literally being in a thing, *tat* 'there,' and *sthá* "to be reposited;" but the commentator gives the equivalent concentration, *ekágratá.* *Tadanjanatva* is literally being tinged thereby, and the stock illustration of the crystal being coloured red by the shoe-flower placed in it is adduced; but the commentator prefers the equivalent *tanmayatva* "being of that substance." He is, however, not singular in these interpretations. The P. Bháshya amplifies the explanation by adding that when the soul, as agent or perceiver, is made the object of thought, the thinking principle becomes manifest in the special form of that soul, and when the emancipated soul is thought upon the think-

ing principle becomes of its special form. *Grihitripurushálambanoparaktam grihitripurushasamápannam grihitripurusha-svarúpákárena nirbhásate. Tathá muktapurushálambanoparaktam muktapurushasamápannam muktapurushasvarúpákárena nirbhásate.*]

Having explained the conditions, he now points out its fourfold differences (in three aphorisms.)

XLII.

The argumentative is that which is influenced by the fancy of word, meaning, and understanding.

That which is perceivable by the organ of hearing, or is an explosion or bursting of sound (*sphota*), is (technically sound or) "word" (*śabda*). "Meaning" (*artha*) is (the sense conveyed by the word indicating) a genus (such as the cow or the horse). "Understanding" (*jnána*) is a function of the intellect in which the quality of truth prevails (in preference to the other two qualities). "Fancy" (*vikalpa*) has been already defined (A. IX) "Affected" (*sankírna*) influenced by them, *i. e.*, by the three, words &c. That modification, in which the three (words &c.) are apparent in an undefined fanciful shape, (*i. e.*, their relations are doubtful in the mind), as the word *gau* "a cow," meaning a cow, and conveying the notion of a cow, is called "argumentative," (*savitarka*.)

[The conditions adverted to in the preceding aphorism are fourfold, and thereof the first is called argumentative, inasmuch as in that condition the thinking principle fancies or doubtfully accepts a thing without positive discrimination of the relations between a word or its meaning and the idea conveyed by it. The P. Bháshya explains it by saying, "*Gau* is the word, a cow is its meaning, and the idea is that of a cow, and accepting these distinct positions in an undivided form." *Gauriti śabdo Gaurityartho Gauriti jnánamityavibhágena vibhaktánámapi grahanam drishtam.* The P. Rahasya puts it more clearly by saying "when on hearing the word there is a doubt as to whether the *gau* is a word, or it is

a meaning, or it is an understanding. *Gauriti s'abde s'rute sati gauriti s'abdo vá gaurityartho vá gauriti jnánam vá evamvikalpah.* (See p. 18.) This is an inferior condition.

The word *sphota,* which I have rendered into "bursting," is the technical name of the sound which is eternal, and of which spoken words are but manifestations. The theory of some grammarians is that words are eternal, and they become manifest when spoken. Dr. Ballantyne, in his essay on Hindu Philosophy, has given a full account of this dogma.]

The opposite of it or the non-argumentative is next described.

XLIII.

That is non-argumentative in which, on the dissolution of memory, the meaning alone without any definite identity is apparent.

When the memory of words and of their meaning has subsided, and the shape rises manifest and distinctly graspable, excluding the sense of understanding, and appearing as if devoid of a definite identity, it is "non-argumentative."

[The P. Bháshya explains the purport thus: when the intellect, intent upon the form of the object of acceptance, forsakes the accepting understanding which is like itself, and becomes solely of the form of the object, *i. e.*, it becomes of the form of the object accepted, it is non-argumentative. *Gráhyasvarúpoparaktá prajná svamiva prajnárúpam grahanátmakam tyaktá padárthamátrasvarúpá gráhyasvarúpápanneva bhavati sá nirvitarká samápatti.*]

To indicate varieties of it, he says:

XLIV.

By this the deliberative and the non-deliberative as pertaining to subtile objects are also described.

"By this," *i. e.*, by the explanation about the argumentative and the non-argumentative conditions, the deliberative (*savichárá*)

and the non-deliberative (*nirvichárá*) conditions have been described. How are the latter? "Subtile objects," (*sukshmavisaya*)— "subtile" rudimentary matter and the organs are so called. By this the former two propositions are made to refer to gross objects. They are dependant on gross matter, whether connected with the ideas of words, meaning, and understanding (as in the case of the argumentative form,) or without them (as in the non-argumentative form.) "The deliberative" (*savichárá*) is that which is an abstract notion defined by place, time, quality, &c. "The non-deleberative" (*nirvichárá*) is that in which the abstract notion is manifest as a mere substratum of quality, perfectly independent of all ideas of place, time, quality, &c. These refer to subtile objects.

[The object aimed at is to assign the argumentative and the non-argumentative conditions to gross matter, and the deliberative and the non-deliberative to subtile objects. The distinction seems to be purely technical, implying only slight differences.]

To explain how far this subtile object extends, he says:

XLV.

This subtile objectivity terminates in the indissoluble.

What has been described about the object of the deliberative and the non-deliberative conditions being subtile objectivity extends to the indissoluble. That which does not merge into anything, nor indicates or implies anything is the "Indissoluble" (*aliṅga*) or First Principle (nature, Prakṛiti), and subtile objectivity extends to that limit. Now in the resolution of qualities, there are four stages, *viz.*, 1, defined character, (*viśishṭa liṅga*); 2, undefined character (*aviśishṭaliṅga*); 3, mere character (*liṅgamátra*); 4, devoid of character, or indissoluble, (*aliṅga*). The objects of defined character are the (gross) elements. Those of undefined character are the subtile elements and the organs. Mere character is indicative of the Intellect; and devoid of character, the First Principle. Hereby it is said that there is nothing more subtile than the First Principle.

[The word *liñga* has been defined to be that which indicates or characterises, a mark or sign which is inseperable from it, and, I believe, the word character is its nearest equivalent. The First Principle or Prakṛiti is called *aliñga* or that which is without anindicator, because by itself it does not specifically indicate anything, and is the subtlest of the categories, and there is nothing more subtile. "It may be urged," argues the P. Bháshya, "that the soul is more subtile than the first principle, but, though it is true that the characterless (*aliñga* or Prakṛiti) is more subtile than the characterised, still the same cannot be the case with the soul, since the soul is not the material but the instrumental cause of character, and therefore the utmost limit of subtility must rest with the First Principle." *Nanvasti purushah sukshma iti. Satyam yathá liñgát param aliñgasya saukshmyam, nacháivam-purushasya, kintu liñgasya anvayí-káraṇam purusho na bhavatí hetustu bhavatíti, atah pradháne saukshmyam nii atisayam vyákhyátam.*]

He now points out the necessity for these mental conditions.

XLVI.

These verily constitute meditation with a seed.

"These verily," *i. e.,* the conditions above described, exist with a seed or object. "With a seed," (*savíja*) means conscious meditation, (or Samádhi having a distinct recognition,) because such meditations have always something to rest upon.

[These four conditions have been already described in the commentary on Aphorism XVII, and call for no further remarks here.]

Now, these (conscious conditions) maturate into the non-deliberative condition, and therefore he describes the fruit thereof.

XLVII.

In the purity of the non-deliberative (condition) there is intellectual contentment.

"Non deliberativeness" has been already defined. (Aph. XLIV). "Purity" (*vaisáradya*) means freedom from dirt. The non-argumentative condition is superior to the argumentative. To that the deliberative which has a subtile object in view, (is superior). Again, the non-deliberative, which has no object in view, is superior to the preceding. When by rigorous practice "purity," as the condition of freedom from dirt, is attained "intellectual contentment" results, *i. e.*, the thinking principle, being free from pain and longing, becomes fit to flow in an even course. This is the purity of the thinking principle, abidence in which is steadfastness (Aph. XXXII).

[The four conditions are graded in due order, and the last is declared to be the best of them, because in the highest purity of that condition there is perfect intellectual contentment, in which one can behold all knowledge like one seated in the palace of wisdom can look, as from the top of a mountain, upon groaning mortals below on earth, without being in any way disturbed. *Prajnáprásádamáruhya as'ochyah s'ochatojanán, Bhúmishṭhániva s'ailasthah sarván prájnonupasyati.*]

He next explains what happens when this condition is attained.

XLVIII.

In that condition knowledge becomes truth-supporting.

That "knowledge" *(prajná)* which supports the "truth" (*rita*) or reality, and never permits it to be covered by misconception (A. VIII) is "truth-supporting" (*ritambhará*), and in the condition (aforesaid) this is acquired. With the light of that knowledge the Yogí perceives everything in its true character, and acquires the highest Yoga.

[In the next aphorism it will be shown that this perfect knowledge is the same with the transcendental power of knowing things, independently of the ordinary means of ascertaining truth.]

Its distinction from other forms of knowledge is now to be explained.

XLIX.

The knowledge which results from testimony and inference is general, (and differs from this) which has a specific object (in view).

"Testimony" (*s'ruta*) is knowledge founded on sacred texts. "Inference" (*anumána*) has been already defined (Aph. VII). The knowledge which results from these two has generals for its object, since neither words nor characteristic signs are able, like the organs of sense, to convey a knowledge of particularities. While this knowledge (the one under notice), resulting from the purity (fulness) of the non-deliberative condition, is distinct from them, inasmuch as it has a speciality for its object. When one is in the condition of this knowledge, the truth of all subtile, intercepted, and remote objects becomes manifest in a clear form. The advice is, that for this reason it is proper that every exertion should be made by Yogís for the attainment of this knowledge.

[The transcendental powers referred to above are here described to be the power of observing things which are so subtile, or so intercepted, or so remote that they cannot be observed by the ordinary appliances of perception.]

He now describes the fruit of this knowledge.

L.

The residuum of this is opposed to all other residua.

"The residuum" (*sañskára* Aph. XVIII) which is produced by that knowledge, obstructs all other residua, whether arising during worldly condition or during meditation, *i. e.,* it renders them incapable of achieving their respective works. Since the residua produced by knowledge being absolute, are more powerful, they are able to preclude all residua resulting from non-absolute knowledge. The purport is that for this reason that absolute knowledge should be exercised.

[The purport of this and of the next aphorism has already been explained in the comments on aphorisms XVII and XVIII.]

Having thus described conscious meditation, he now explains the un-conscious form of meditation, (Aph. XVIII).

LI.

On the removal of this also, everything being removed, there is meditation without a seed.

"Of this," *i. e.*, of conscious meditation. "Removal" (*nirodha*) is dissolution. On its dissolution all functions of thought melting into their causes, and the mere residua which arise in this state being also rejected by the conviction "this is not, this is not," meditation without a seed becomes manifest. On this being accomplished the soul *(purusha)* becomes pure, and abides solely in its own nature.

[The *P. Bháshya* explains the aphorism thus: "That meditation is not only antagonistic to the impressions of the Samádhi state, but also to the residua left by those impressions. But how do the residua of the suppressed (*nirodha*) state remove the residua of the meditative state? By the influence of the duration of the suppressed state the existence alone of the impressions produced by the suppressed thinking principle is perceptible. As the thinking principle then merges into its own natural form along with all the impressions of the waking, the meditative, the suppressed and the isolated states, their residua can no longer be antagonistic to the natural state of the thinking principle, nor the causes of its (separate) existence. And since the thinking principle, divested of its functions, along with the residua of the isolated state, is suppressed, and in that suppression the soul resides in its own form, it is called pure and liberated."]

Now in this (chapter) have been described Yoga, the subject of the work (A. I), its definition by the words the cessation of the thinking principle (A. II), exercise (XIII), dispassion (XV), the

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nature of the two means and their varieties (XVI, the conscious and the un-conscious forms of Yoga, the inferior and superior Yoga (XVII—XVIII), the various means of exercising Yoga, easy means of accomplishing it (XIX—XXIII), definition of God (XXIV), his proof (XXVIII), greatness (XXVI), indicator (XXVII), mode of worship (XXV), and its results (XXIX), the perturbations of the thinking principle (XXX), and the pains thereon consequent (XXXI), the means of obviating them by study and benevolence (XXXII-XXXIII), regulation of breath (XXXIV), condition preceding the conscious and un-conscious meditations (XXXV), meditation with a seed, mental afflictions (XLI), their definitions (XLII-XLIV—XLV), their fruits (XLVI—XLVIII), their object (XLIX), and meditation without a seed (LI). Thus is the Yoga chapter explained.

[The above summary has not been translated literally. The original is interrupted by a number of participles and explanatory words which have been omitted as they would have served only to make an uncommonly long sentence very much involved.]

This is the end of the first quarter or Yoga chapter of the commentary entitled *Rájamártaṇḍa* on Patanjali's Institutes of the Yoga by the great king, the superior king, the illustrious Bhojadeva.

CHAPTER SECOND.

May the three-eyed Lord of the universe, by whom has been disclosed the several means of obtaining the occult powers of the difficultly-achievable Yoga, be favourable to the attainment of the desired object!

Having in the first chapter explained the Yoga for those whose thoughts are collected, together with the means thereof, the author now, anticipating the question what should be the practice of the means for the achievement of the Yoga for those whose thoughts are in a waking (worldly) state, describes the *Kriyá-yoga* (practical Yoga), with a view to establish the mode of accomplishing it.

[This chapter is designed for persons who have not obtained control over their passions, but who are nevertheless desirous of practising those works which are calculated to train them for the performance of the highest branches of the Yoga, and to enable them to acquire supernatural powers (*ṛiddhis*). Inasmuch as this training can be attained only through active exercise of certain duties, and those duties form the topics of this chapter, the chapter is called Kriyá-yoga or "Practical Yoga."]

I.

Asceticism, muttering, and resignation to God constitute the Practical Yoga.

"Asceticism" (*tapas*) is the observance of the fasts called Kṛichchhra, Chándráyana and the like enjoined in another S'ástra (*Dharma-śástra*). "Muttering" (*svádhyáya*) is the inaudible repetition of particular mantras preceded by the Praṇava, (*i. e.*, the syllable Om). "Resignation to God" (*I'śvara-praṇidhána*) is the dedication to the Supremely Venerable all one's works, without

any concern for their fruits. These, it is said, are the Practical Yoga.

[This aphorism defines what Practical Yoga is. It includes the three acts of Asceticism, Muttering, and Resignation to God. The first includes all those acts of fasting and the like which the Smṛiti ordains for the mortification of the flesh. In this sense *tapas* would be best rendered by religious austerity or self-denial, but the examples given are included under the head of penance. The Yogís do not exclude any of them, nor, except in the form of seats &c., add any new form of penance. The *Kṛichchhra* named in the commentary is by some believed to be the same with the Prájápatya, and by others with the Sántapana. The first is effected by eating once a day for three days in the morning, then once in the night for three days, then subsisting for three days on food given, unasked, as alms, and lastly fasting for three days. The fast is absolute, and not even a mouthful of water is allowed to be drunk. The second is effected by living for six days on the five products of the cow and water in which *kuśa* grass has been steeped, and absolutely fasting on the 7th day. The Chándráyana has several varieties, but all of them are regulated by the moon's age, the food being daily reduced by one mouthful from the first day, till on the newmoon no food is taken, and then on the next day beginning with one mouthful the full allowance is got on the day of the fullmoon. These penances are ordained for particular heinous sins. In citing their names it is not the object of the commentator to enjoin that these particular penances should be regularly practised, but simply to cite examples. The Haṭhadípiká enjoins some forms of asceticism suited to the Rája-yoga. The object is, there should be constant mortifying of the flesh so as to subdue its longings.

Muttering, like the last, is a part of the Smṛiti ritual, largely dwelt upon in the Tantras. Every householder has a particular mantra which he is required to repeat for a certain number of times every day, the number varying from twelve to many thousands according to choice. The muttering is so done as not to be audible to a bystander, but in a manner so that each repe-

tition may be clear and distinct, and fit to be counted by the mutterer. The *P. Bháshya* and the *P. Rahasya* add that *sádhyáya* implies either the muttering of a mantra, or the study of that s'ástra which relates to emancipation. *Praṇavádi-pavitráṇám japo mokshas'ástrádhyayanam vá.*

Resignation to God (*praṇidhána*) has been already explained on p. 28.

These are essentially necessary as preliminary practices, but they do not constitute the Yoga itself.]

(To the question) of what use are these, he replies:

II.

It is for the purpose of the contemplation of Samádhi and for weakening afflictions.

"Afflictions" (*kleśáh*) will be presently described (II, III.) To "weaken them" is to make them unfit for their respective works. "Samádhi" (meditation) has been already explained (I, XX.) Its "contemplation" (*bhávaná*) is repeated cogitation of it in thought. That Yoga which has these contemplation and weakening for its purpose (*artha*), object, is so called (*kriyá-yoga*). What is said is this: These mortifications, &c. when practised, weakening the afflictions of the ignorance residing in the thought, become accessories to Samádhi. Therefore the advice is that the Yogí should first turn his attention to this Practical Yoga.

[The purport of this aphorism has been already anticipated in the remarks on the last preceding Aphorism.]

It has been said (above that the Practical Yoga is wanted) for the purpose of weakening the afflictions, and what those afflictions are he now describes.

III.

Ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and ardent attachment to life are the five afflictions.

"Afflictions" (*kleśáh*) are the five, ignorance, &c., which will be (presently) described. These, being of an obstructive character, *i. e.*, producing distress, become the object of the term affliction. These, abiding in the thinking principle, strengthen the modifications of the (three) qualities which constitute mundane existence.

[Here the names of the afflictions are given, but their definitions are reserved for subsequent discussions. The reason why they are called "afflictions," is explained to be that they tend to promote those modifications of the thinking principle which the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness tend to for worldly purposes. In other words, those functions which attach the mind to the world are afflictions, because they stand in the way of emancipation.]

Although all these are equally afflicting, nevertheless ignorance, being the source (of all of them), is the chief, and to establish this he says:

IV.

Ignorance is the field of those which follow, whether they be dormant, weak, intercepted or simple.

"Ignorance" (*avidyá*) is delusion; it is in fact the assumption of that being the soul which is not soul. It is the "field" (*kshetra*), or ground of production, of those which follow, *i. e.*, egoism and the rest, and each of them may be in one of the four conditions of dormancy, &c. Wherever the reverse-idea-producing ignorance becomes weak, there egoism and the other afflictions are not seen to arise, for it is seen that where the mistaken notion exists there they arise, it follows, therefore, that ignorance is their source.

The "dormant, weak, intercepted or simple." Of these afflictions those which, existing in the thinking principle, do not, owing to the absence of an exciting cause, produce their

effect, are called "dormant" *(prasupta)*, asleep. Thus in childhood. Though residing in a child in the form of instincts those afflictions do not, from want of co-operation of an exciting cause, flare up.

Those afflictions are said to be "weak" (*tanu*) which, becoming overpowered in their effort to perform their respective functions by their mutually contradictory inclinations, reside in the thinking principle in the form of instincts, but are not able to carry on their work without the aid of numerous auxiliaries. This is the case in the practising Yogí (who being engaged in one particular contemplation does not allow the afflictions to disturb his thoughts. They are in him, but in a condition of weakness produced by their non-indulgence).

Those afflictions are said to be "intercepted" (*vichchhinna*) which remain with their powers overcome by a particularly potent passion, as desire when the prevailing passion is aversion, or aversion when the prevailing passion is desire: being mutually opposed to each other, they cannot dominate at the same time, (one must for the time intercept the other).

Afflictions are said to be "simple" (*udára*) when, having their auxiliaries beside them, they carry on their respective functions. This is the case of the waking condition of those who follow not the ways of the Yoga.

Each of these four (afflictions) has ignorance for its root, and is also attended by it, for nowhere are the afflictions found existing by themselves as opposed to, or independent of, the attendant. When that ignorance, a mere falsehood, is removed by thorough knowledge, these afflictions, like roasted seeds, never sprout again. It follows that these are both rooted in, and attended by, ignorance; hence they are all implied by ignorance. The conclusion is that as all these afflictions are calculated to produce distractions of the thinking principle, it is the foremost duty of the Yogí to exert for their removal.

[In A. III the afflictions have been described to be five in number. In this the author shows that four of them owe their

origin, and are subject, to ignorance. He also shows that they are always present, though not always active. The causes of their want of activity are described to be dormancy, weakness and interception]

He now defines ignorance.

V.

Ignorance is the assumption of that which is non-eternal, impure, painful and non-soul, to be eternal, pure, joyous and soul.

The assumption of a thing being what it is not, is "ignorance" (*avidyá*). That this is its general definition follows from its distinctions as pointed out (in the aphorism). Thus the assumption of eternity in the non-eternal water jar and the like is ignorance. In the same way, the assumption of purity in impure objects, like the body and so forth, that of joy in pain, and that of the soul in the body (which is not soul, are results of ignorance). By these is explained the mistake of confounding vice with virtue and the useless with the useful.

[The *P. Bháshya* argues that although the word *avidyá* is formed of the privative particle *a* with *vidyá* "knowledge," it does not mean simple absence of knowledge, but a conception distinct and the opposite of it, and illustrates it by the examples of *amitra* and *agoshpada,* the former of which, though formed of *a* (absence) and *mitra* "a friend," does not mean the absence of a friend, but an enemy, and the latter, formed of *a* and *goshpada* "the footprint of a cow," does not mean the absence of the footprint of a cow, but a country. *Tasyás chámitrágoshpadavadavastu sa tattvam vijn̲eyam, yathá námitro mitrábhávo na mitramátram, kintu tadvirudhah sapatnah, yathá vágoshpadam na goshpadábhávo na goshpadamátram, kintu des'a eva, tábhyámanyat vastvantaram, evamavidyá na pramáṇam na pramáṇábhávaḥ, kintu vidyáviparítam jn̲ánántaramavidyeti.*]

With a view to explain egoism, he says :

VI.

Egoism is the identifying of the power that sees with the power of seeing.

"The power that sees" (*dṛik-śakti,*) is the soul (*Purusha*). "The power of seeing" (*darsana-śakti*) is the internal organ produced by the quality of goodness unaffected by the qualities of foulness and darkness. What is said is, that the assumption of the two extremely different things,—the one being the enjoyer and the other the enjoyed—the active and the inert,—being the same is egoism (*asmitá*). Thus, when nature (*prakṛiti*), though really devoid of the power of enjoying and of intelligence, fancies "I am the enjoyer," "I am the intelligent," the blunder is the affliction called egoism.

[The internal organ is a modification of the quality of goodness, which marks the distinction between itself and the things around it. In this state it is egotism; but when that internal organ ceases to perform this function, and only a sense of mere existence is felt in the thinking principle without any distinction of the self and the things around it is egoism. This definition was anticipated by the commentator in his remarks on A. XVII chapter I, (p. 19) and the author gives it here.]

He defines desire.

VII.

Desire is dwelling on pleasure.

"Dwelling on pleasure" (*sukhánuśayí*) is lying on pleasure. The longing or thirst for pleasure on the part of him who had experienced it before, and is impelled by its remembrance, is the affliction called desire (*rága*).

[The root *śí* is "to sleep" or "lie down," and literally the translation of *anuś'ayí* should be the sleeper, or that which lies on something, but idiomatically I prefer dwelling, as it conveys more clearly the idea intended by the author. Obviously he means the

dwelling on, or keeping alive in the mind, the idea of some object or other. *Anuśaya* means "to follow" or "to pursue," and that would afford a very appropriate rendering of the term here, but in the next aphorism it has been used with reference to pain, and as no one pursues pain knowing it to be pain, that rendering cannot be adopted. It is true the word also means "repentance," and it may be assumed that the author has used the word in two different senses in the two aphorisms, but such an assumption would be unjustifiable in dealing with definitions. The author, in his aphorisms, has nowhere evinced any leaning for rhetoric or verbal ornament, and it is very unlikely that he should use the same word in two consecutive aphorisms in two contradictory senses, when his object is to make things clear, and not to confound.]

He next defines aversion.

VIII.

Aversion is dwelling on pain.

"Pain" (*duhkha*) has been already defined, (C. I, xxxi). That which one, having experienced it, and remembering it, is averse to its means as undesirable, is the affliction called "aversion" (*dvesha*).

[Three of my MSS. has *pratikúla-lakshṇam* for *ukta-lakshṇam*. If that reading be adopted, the meaning would be "Pain is of an opposite nature," *i. e.*, in the case of pleasure there is a longing or thirst to get the object, while in that of pain, the feeling is the reverse, or avoiding to get it.]

He now defines tenacity of life.

IX.

Tenacity of life is an attachment to the body which relates to the residua of one's former life, even on the part of the wise.

The fear arising from the memory of pain from death endured in a former life prompts the constant wish, "May I not be separated from the body and its objects," and the attachment to the body resulting therefrom, an attachment which exists without an inducing cause, in all beings from Brahmá to an earthworm, is the affliction called "Tenacity of life." (*Abhinivesha.*) Thus, it is afflicting in the waking or mundane state. These afflictions should at the outset be destroyed by the Yogí by the exercise of concentration of the mind to one point.

[The only doubtful word in the aphorism is the first. It is formed of the three words, *sva* "one's own," *rasa* literally "wish," and *váhí*, "that which carries:"—"that which carries or keeps in current one's wish." The commentators have, however, not rendered it so. Without giving a synonym of *rasa*, the *P. Bháshya* uses the word *vásaná* in its place (*maraṇa-duhkhánubhavádiyam vásaneti*), and that word is the equivalent of *sañskára*, which I have rendered into residua. In this way the term *svarasaváhí* means 'that which carries the residua of one's former life.' It proceeds from the memory of former experience, and since no one has in this life experienced the pain of death, it must follow that the fear of death must be the result of the unconscious memory of the experience of a former state of life—and this fear is the cause of attachment to life.]

Since it is not practicable to remove these afflictions without first knowing what they are, the author, having described their names (II, III) fields, (I, IV) divisions, (II, IV) and characteristics, (II, V to IX,) now explains the division of the means of destroying them, according as they are gross or subtile.

X.

These, the subtile ones, should be avoided by an adverse course.

Those are "subtile" (*súkshma*) afflictions which exist in the form of residua, but have not assumed a modification in the

form of active work. They are to be avoided (*heya*), eluded, by an adverse course *(pratiprasava)* or reflex modification. When the thinking principle, with its residua, has accomplished its course and entered into egoism, which is its source, how can these, (afflictions,) being rootless, exist?

[The five afflictions aforesaid are described under two heads, subtile and gross. They are subtile when they exist in the form of residua, *i. e.*, they exist potentially, but are latent. They become gross when they break out into active operation. Now, the latent ones are to be overcome by an adverse course. The natural course is to allow them to manifest themselves through the stimuli of external objects; but if the thinking principle be directed inwards towards egoism, the course of action is adverse to the natural tendency of the residua; and, in the absence of stimuli, they cannot manifest themselves. They cannot sprout, and are, therefore, compared in the *P. Bháshya* to roasted seeds.]

He next describes the means for the destruction of the gross (afflictions).

XI.

Their functions should be avoided by meditation.

The functions of these afflictions in active operation, which manifest themselves in the form of pleasure, pain, and delusion, should be "avoided," destroyed, by meditation characterised by the concentration of the thinking principle on a single point. These, being gross, are suppressed by the mere exercise for the purification of the thinking principle, even as dense thick dirt on cloth and the like is removed by mere washing, while that which is subtile in it requires heating and other (arduous) means.

[The means of suppressing the gross afflictions, or those afflictions which are in active operation, is meditation, or confining the thinking principle to one action, and focussing it there to the exclusion of all other objects. The difference lies in this—that in the case of latent afflictions the thinking principle

is directed inward, and no opportunity is given to the latent ones to become active; and in the case of gross ones or those which are in active action, the thinking principle is confined to one object, and thereby all others are excluded. In the one case a desire is repressed by turning away from it, and keeping the thinking principle occupied with another, and in the other no opportunity is given for external stimuli to excite the latent wishes.

The illustration given shows that the subtile ones are more difficult to repress than the gross ones.]

Having thus defined the true character of the afflictions he, with a view to explain the residua of works, says:

XII.

The residua of works have affliction for their root, and are felt (either) in this manifest birth, (or) in the unmanifest one.

By the term "residua of works" (*karmás'aya*) the nature of the residua is explained, for all works are of the form of residua. By (the phrase) "Have affliction for their root" (*kles'amúlah*) their cause is indicated, for of good or evil works the afflictions are the cause. By (the phrase) "felt in this manifest birth, or in the unmanifest one," the fruition is described. What is felt in the present existence is called "felt in this manifest birth" (*drishtajanma-vedaníyah*); that which is to be felt in another existence is called "felt in an unmanifest one," (*adrishtajanma-vedaníyah*). Thus, some virtuous actions, such as the worship of the gods and the like performed with excessive ardour, produce fruits even in this life in the form of kind, age, or experience. Thus, to Nandís'vara, through the influence of his worshipping the lord Maheśvara, change of kind was secured even in this life. Similarly to Viśvámitra and others kind and age accrued through the force of penance. In the case of some kind alone is changed. Thus in the case of Nahusa and others performing vicious acts with excessive ardour kind alone was changed. So Urvas'í was

metamorphosed into a creeper in the garden of Kártikeya. Thus is the rule to be explained distributively or collectively.

[The leading word in this aphorism is *karmáśaya*. Formed of *karma* "works" and *áśaya* "virtue and vice," it implies the results which follow from the performances of works. The word *áśaya* has been accepted in aphorism 24, chapter I, to be the equivalent of *vásaná* and *sañskára*, and for the sake of concordance, and in accordance with the commentators, I render it here in that sense, inasmuch as the results do not manifest immediately, but remain latent to even a second or subsequent life in the form of residua.

The works are described to have afflictions for their root, because all works proceed from ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity for life, technically called the five afflictions, (II, III). No work can be performed unless impelled by one or other of these five, and so they are the roots of the residua that are left behind. The fruits of these residua are borne either collectively or singly, and at different times, either in this life or in a subsequent one, and the commentator cites instances to prove this. The story of Nandíśvara becoming a demigod occurs in the Vṛihannandikeśvara Puráṇa. The Rámáyaṇa and some of the Puráṇas give the story of Vis'vámitra, a Kshatríya by birth, becoming a Bráhmaṇa. The Mahábhárata relates the story of Nahusa being changed into a snake by a curse. The story of Urvaśí's becoming, like another Daphne, a creeper, occurs in the drama of Vikramorvaśí.]

Now he describes the varieties and distinctions of the residua of works with their fruits.

XIII.

The root existing, the deserts are kind, age, and experience.

The "root" (*múla*) is the afflictions aforesaid. As long as the afflictions are not removed, the deserts (*vipáka*), fruition of works,

good and evil, follow in the form of kind, age, and experience. "Kind" *(játi)* means being a man or some other being. "Age" (*áyus*) is always remaining in the same body. "Experience" (*bhoga*) means sense objects, the senses, and consciousness of pleasure and pain, according as it is accepted in the passive, instrumental, or abstract sense.

The purport of this is this: That as the residua of works reposited in the thinking principle from time without a beginning, attain maturity, so they, according to their measure, lead to fruition in the form of kind, age, and experience. The afflictions existing with their roots uncut, the residua of works become the originators of deserts. Even as unhusked S'áli paddy, like unroasted seeds, are able to germinate, but husked grains, like roasted seeds, cannot, so the residua of works, unparted from the afflictions, become the germinators of deserts; though such is not the case when the afflictions are removed, or the residua are reduced to the condition of roasted seeds.

[The first difficult word in the aphorism is *játi*. Its meaning is obvious enough, but I call it difficult because I can find no satisfactory equivalent for it in the English language. It is formed of the root *jan* 'to be born,' and means that which is born; but in philosophy it is used to imply species in a very comprehensive sense. It means caste, *i. e.*, distinction of family; or species, that is one distinct from another, as several species in a genus or order; or broader distinctions than what is implied by species; as also the broadest distinctions which naturalists indicate by the term kingdom. The examples given show that the word *játi* equally applies to the change of caste, as in a Kshatríya becoming a Bráhman; or to that of species, as in a man becoming a demigod; or to that of a kingdom as in a woman becoming a creeper: I know of no such comprehensive term in the English language. Dr. Ballantyne uses *rank,* but I doubt if the change of a woman into a creeper or a stone, the change could be idiomatically described as one of "rank." Colebrooke uses

"birth," but the change may take place without a regular birth. For the sake of English idiom the best course would be to use different equivalents under different circumstances, but that would upset the line of argument of the author. Genesis appears to bear close approximation to *játi,* and kind is its Anglo-Saxon counterpart. In using "kind" as the equivalent, I use what appears less liable to objection than others, but it is by no means a good one.

The second word *áyus* has been so explained by the commentator as to imply longevity, but the word means simply "age" or "duration of life," which may be long or short according to circumstances:—a meritorious work leading to prolongation of existence in a particular body, whereas a vicious one tending to shorten the span of life.

The third word is *bhoga,* which Dr. Ballantyne renders into "enjoyment;" but inasmuch as here it means the endurance of pain as well as the delectation of pleasure, I prefer "experience," which covers both.

The purport of the aphorism is that the fruition of works leads according to circumstances to change of body into a higher or lower grade, to the prolongation or reduction in the span of life, and to the experience of pleasure or pain.

The *P. Bháshya* thus explains the time of fruition: "The deserts are of three sorts, kind, age and experience. In regard to them the questions are discussed, 1st, Is one work the cause of one birth, or is it the cause of many births? 2nd, Are many works the causes of many births or of one birth?

One work is not the cause of one birth. Why so? Because there would be no regularity in the fruition of the remainder of innumerable works accumulated from time without a beginning along with a recent work. The objection would also be there would be no inducement for people (to perform many works). Therefore it is wrong.

Nor is one work the cause of many births. Why? Because if out of many works each work was to be the cause of many births,

there would be want of time for the fruition of all the remaining deserts. Therefore it, too, is wrong. Nor can many works be the cause of many births. Why? Because it is not possible for many births to happen simultaneously, and consequently it must be said to happen successively, and then the objection before urged (about want of time) would apply. It follows then that the diverse stock of residua of virtuous and vicious actions performed from birth to death remains in a dominant or a dominated form, and on a death taking place it becomes the cause of a birth, being itself liable to destruction on another stock becoming dominant."]

The above described kind, &c. being the fruits of works, the author, in order to show that they produce fruition according to the works which are their cause, says:

XIV.

They have joy or suffering for their fruit, according as their cause is virtue or vice.

"Joy" (*hláda*) is pleasure, and "suffering" (*paritápa*) is pain. Those which have joy and suffering for their fruits are so called, (*i. e.*, by the term *hláda-paritápa-phaláh*).

"Virtue" (*punya*) is fortunate action, and the reverse of it is "vice" (*apunya*). Those which have virtue or vice for their cause are so called (by the compound term *punyápunya-hetutva*).

What is said is this:—those works which proceed from virtuous actions yield joyful fruition in kind, age, and experience. Those which result from vice have painful fruitions.

[The meaning is obvious, and calls for no remark.]

To all ordinary beings the fruition is thus of two kinds; but to the Yogí all are painful; to show this, he says:

XV.

To the discriminating all are verily painful, because of the adversity of the actions of (the three)

qualities, and of the pains of sequence, anxiety and residua.

The meaning is, that to the "discriminating" (*viveki*) who has had experience of the afflictions, &c., all manifest sense-objects are painful, like tasteful food infused with poison, and therefore should be known as adverse to him, since the thoroughly experienced Yogí feels oppressed by even the slightest pain. Even as the eyeball feels the acutest pain from the mere touch of a fibre of wool which the other organs do not, so the discriminating Yogí is distressed by even very slight pain.

To explain why it should be so, he says, "because of the pains of sequence, anxiety and residua." Inasmuch as the longing for objects of enjoyment increases in the same ratio in which they are enjoyed, and the pain proceeding from their non-attainment is unavoidable, therefore pain always follows pleasure, and there is nothing but pain. This is the pain of sequence (*pariṇáma-duhkhatva*).

Again, since even in the enjoyment of pleasing objects there is always a feeling of aversion against that which is antagonistic to them, anxiety cannot be eluded even while in the enjoyment of pleasures. This is the "pain of anxiety," (*tápaduhkhatá*).

"Pain of residua" (*sanskáraduhkha*). The sensation of pleasure, or of pain, arises in the presence of a desirable or an undesirable object, and a corresponding residuum is left on the field (of the thinking principle), and since from such a residuum a corresponding sensation is produced, and since from a great number of such residua the mundane condition is never cut short, therefore all residua are painful.

"From adversity of the action of the qualities" (*guṇavṛitti-virodhát*). The effects of the three qualities of goodness, foulness and darkness, manifesting in the forms of pleasure, pain, and delusion, being mutually overpowering or overpowered, are hostile to each other. They are everywhere connected with pain, hence they are painful.

What is said is this:—To the discriminating who is anxious to obviate pain to the utmost and absolutely, all the four causes above described, appear in the form of pain, and hence all deserts are said to be of the form of pain.

[The object of this aphorism is to establish that everything connected with worldly life is painful, and Yogís should, therefore, shun them all. To prove this, it is first shown that all joyous actions are followed by pain. (The word *pariṇáma* in the text here is used for sequence or result, and not modification as in most other places.) There must be a change after the enjoyment of pleasure, and as there is an increase of desire from enjoyment there must be frequent disappointments, and they inflict pain. Even in the act of enjoyment there is always a dread of something that may disturb it, and so it is not unalloyed. Then all actions and all impressions leave behind residua in the field of the thinking principle, and they revive sensations of pleasure and pain. And lastly, the three qualities are adverse to each other, and therefore they create disturbances and cause pain. The conclusion is a state of pessimism, from which the only relief is to be had by totally cutting oneself off from all worldly affairs. This pessimism forms the basis of all the leading systems of Indian philosophy, and is not unknown in Europe. According to Hartmann, "if we balance our pleasures and pains, the latter greatly exceed the former." Schopenhauer goes further, and assigns a negative nature to pleasure, which is very much the same as the doctrine of Leibnitz who assigns a privative character to pain. He holds that "all pleasure causes an exhaustion of the nervous processes, and are in themselves indirect, resulting from the cessation or intermission of pain, and seldom emerges into consciousness, whereas pain *eo ipso* generates consciousness." He asks, "what, for instance, are all the pleasures of health, of youth, of freedom, of sufficient means? Are they anything but the absence of sickness, of old age, of slavery, of poverty? and is not work itself an evil? How great misery does it entail upon the toiling masses of

our fellow countrymen? Does any one work of his own free will?" He adds, "no amount of pleasure can compensate for any degree of pain." Again, "human life oscillates between pain and ennui, which states are indeed the ultimate elements of life." Hartmann holds pleasure and pain to be "qualitatively similar, and only different in quantity." (*Philosophie des Unbewussten*). Socrates aptly describes pleasure and pain to be "fastened together from one crown." (*Plato, Phædo.*) Poets generally revel in the pleasures of this world, but Byron, one of the greatest among them, says—

> "Count o'er the joys thine hours have seen,
> Count o'er thy days from anguish free;
> And know, whatever thou hast been,
> 'Tis something better—not to be."

The question then arises whence is the deliverance to come? and an able writer thus summarises the answer of the pessimists. "In knowing that the world is radically and necessarily bad. Such knowledge leaves no ground for that old affirmation of the Will to live. It leads to a negation of Will, to a renunciation of desire, which, completed by means of asceticism and mortification, must attain that perfect freedom of the Will, that true nirváṇa, in which there is no more Will, and therefore no longer an ideal presentation or a real world." (*Westminster Review*, XLIX, 128.) This is almost the very language of Kapila].

Since pain, residua, works, and the fund of deserts, as aforesaid, are produced by Ignorance, and since Ignorance is of the form of false knowledge, and should be destroyed by perfect knowledge, and since perfect knowledge is that which decides what should be rejected and the cause thereof, and what should be approved and its cause, he says this by way of explanation:

XVI.

Avoidable is the pain not yet come.

Inasmuch as the past is gone (and cannot be recalled), and that which is being experienced cannot be avoided, that worldly pain which has not yet come (but may come) is what should be avoided. This is what is said here.

[The word *heya* is derived from the root *há* 'to quit,' and means both that which should be shunned and that which can be avoided. The English equivalent has not this double sense, but it affords the nearest approach to the Sanskrit term. The injunction is, since the past and the present are beyond control, exertion should be made to preclude the possibility of future pain. Dr. Ballantyne is quite right in rendering the aphorism into "what is to be shunned is pain not yet come," but when *heya* is used as an adjective, this phrase "that which is to be shunned," is too lumbering to be used with convenience. Avoidance-worthy conveys the exact meaning, and is more easy of manipulation, but it too is lumbering. A single term is wanted, and, not knowing any English word of the kind, I use what appears to me to approach the nearest to the original, without being its exact equivalent.]

He now describes the cause of the avoidable.

XVII.

The conjunction of the spectator and the spectacle is the cause of the avoidable.

The "spectator" (*drishṭá*) is the soul of the form of intelligence. The "spectacle" (*dṛiśya*) is the principle of understanding (intellect). The conjunction," *sañyoga, i. e.*, coming into the relation of the enjoyer and that which is to be enjoyed, of these two, without due discrimination, is the "cause," (*hetu*) producing agent, of the "avoidable," (*heya*) which is pain resulting from the modifications of the qualities, and that is the world. The meaning is that on the cessation of that conjunction worldliness subsides.

[In this aphorism "the avoidable" is used to imply the affairs of the world. Those affairs result from the conjunction or

interaction of the soul and the intellect, and inasmuch as worldliness is invariably associated with pain, and that pain cannot be suppressed as long as that worldliness lasts, and for the sake of emancipation worldliness should be avoided, that which is to be avoided is here called the avoidable, or the avoidance-worthy. The word *sañyoga* means conjunction, but here a mere reflection of the soul is what is meant. The reflection results from propinquity. There is never an actual contact.]

Having described the conjunction of the spectator and the spectacle, he now explains the nature, the function, and the motive of the spectacle.

XVIII.

The spectacle is of the nature of illumination, action, and rule; it is of the form of the elements and the organs; it is the purpose of for experience and emancipation.

"Illumination" (*prakáśa*) is the nature of the quality of goodness. "Action" (*kriyá*) in the form of exertion, is that of foulness. "Rule" (*sthiti*), in the form of regulation, is that of darkness. That which has illumination, action and the rest for its essential nature is so called, (*i. e.*, by the term *prakáśa-kárya-sthiti-śílam*). By this the nature of the spectacle is defined.

"It is of the form of the elements and the organs" (*bhútendriyátmakam*). The "elements" (*bhútas*) are, according as they are gross or subtile, the earth, &c. and the rudiments of odour, &c. The "organs" (*indriya*) are threefold, according as they are the organs of sense, the organs of action, and the internal organ. That of which these two (the elements and the organs), in the forms of the preceptor and the precept, are the natural modifications, not different from its own form, is called "of the form of the elements and the organs." By this its action is also described.

"Experience" (*bhoga*) has been already defined, (II, XIII). "Emancipation" (*apavarga*) is the cessation of worldliness result-

ing from discriminative knowledge. That which has these two, (*bhoga* and *apavarga*) for its "object" (*artha*) or requirement, is the spectacle. This is the meaning.

[There would be no spectacle if there was not in it a power of manifestation, *i. e.*, of illumination, or light. Without some action, too, it could not be manifest; and to be manifest it must have some rule or order. Hence the three are described to be the three essentials of its existence, or in other words its nature. The esoteric interpretation of this is that the spectacle is essentially the three qualities of goodness, foulness and darkness, which must be in action to produce spectacle. It is of the form of the elements and the organs. The organs could not alone produce spectacles, nor would the elements produce spectacles if there were no organs to perceive them and communicate them to the intellect. The independent existence of the two, unconnected with each other, would also fail to produce a spectacle. They must be brought together to do so, and therefore it is that the spectacle is described to be of the nature of illumination, and of the form of the elements and the organs. The purport of this roundabout expression is that the intellect is the spectacle when it is acted upon by the elements and the organs, or the elements and the organs are modified in the form of the intellect. The word used in the text is *átmá*, and it is explained to be a modification not different from its natural form or identity (*svarupábhinnah pariṇámah*. What this natural form is is not apparent. Obviously the natural form of the intellect, or Buddhi, would be the meaning, but from what follows, Prakṛiti would seem to be what is meant. I shall notice this lower down, (A. XIX, XXI).

The motive or object of the spectacle is twofold,—it ministers to our enjoyment, and it may be made to help us in our endeavours to attain emancipation from the bondage of the earth.

The word *sthiti* means fixity or abidance, but the *Sáñkhya-tattva-kaumudí* explains it to mean rule, regulation, or order. Had there been no order or rule, illumination and action would be continuous, and there would be no cessation or break. It is the

intervention of darkness that causes the break or order of the manifestation of light and action; this is implied by *sthiti.* It implies the quality of darkness.]

To describe the phases of this spectacle in its various conditions, in the forms of modifications which should be known as fit to be avoided, he says:

XIX.

The specific, the unspecific, the solely mergent, and the immergent are the divisions of the qualities.

"The divisions of the qualities," *i. e.*, their specific conditions, should be known to be four—this is enjoined. Thereof the "specific" (*viśesha*) are the gross elements and the organs. The "unspecific" (*aviśesha*) are the subtile elements and the internal organ. The "solely mergent" (*liṅgamátra*) is intellect. The "immergent" (*aliṅga*) is the unmanifest or undiscrete, *i. e.*, Prakṛiti. This is what is said. Since the relation everywhere of this undiscrete of the form of the three qualities is necessary to be known at the time of commencing knowledge, the four divisions are defined.

[The object of this aphorism is to explain that the spectacle assumes different forms under different circumstances. It is "specific" or well-defined when it refers to the elements and the organs. It is "unspecific" or undefined when related to the subtile elements and the internal organ or the mind. It is "solely mergent" or mere thought when it refers to the intellect or the thinking principle. And it is "immergent" or unmanifest or undiscrete when referring to Prakṛiti. Here Prakṛiti is included as one of the forms or phases of the spectacle, though in the commentary on the seventeenth aphorism the spectacle has been defined to be the intellect or the principle of understanding (*buddhitattva*). This inconsistency is explained away by saying that the intellect is but a modification of Prakṛiti, and, inasmuch as its primary form is Prakṛiti, the spectacle must include

Prakṛiti. The words used in explaining the term *átmá* in the commentary on the last aphorism—"a modification not different from its primary form," (*svarúpábhinnah pariṇámah*)—supports this inference. This is, apparently, different from the doctrine of Kapila who assigns 23 out of the 25 categories to the spectacle, leaving out the soul and Prakṛiti; but in reality there is no difference, except in the phraseology, as will be shown in the twenty-first aphorism.

The four terms have been differently rendered by different translators. The terms used above have been taken from Colebrooke and Wilson's 'Sáñkhya Káriká.' Mr. Davies, in his 'Hindu Philosophy,' adopts the first two, but for "mergent" uses "attributive," and for "immergent" its negative. Dr. Ballantyne uses "diverse," "non-diverse," "merely resolvable" and "irresolvable." In translating aphorism 45 of Book I, I have rendered these words collectively with the subject, *liñga,* into "defined character," "undefined character," "mere character" and "devoid of character."]

Since the detestableness of spectacle must be first known, and it having been described along with its conditions, to show what should be accepted, the spectator, the author now says:

XX.

The spectator is absolute sentience, and, though pure, still directly beholds intellected ideas.

"The spectator" (*drashṭá*) is soul. He is "absolute sentience" (*dṛiśimátra*), sensation only. The object of using the term "absolute" (*mátra*) is to preclude the idea of the quality and the qualified, (*i. e.* he is himself sensation and not possessed of sensation). Some explain sensation to be an attribute of soul.

He, the spectator, 'though pure,' (*śuddhopi*), *i. e.* although existing by himself in his own essence, being above all liability to modification and the like, "directly beholds intellected ideas." "Intellected ideas" (*pratyayas*) are knowledge tinctured by

worldly objects. "Directly" (*anu*), without any intervention, or without any medium, he beholds *(paśyati)*.

What is said is this. Soul attains his spectatorship by his proximity to intellect, which alone is tinctured or influenced by passing objects.

[The soul is sentience only, *i. e.*, it consists of sentience and nothing more. In this condition it is absolutely pure, being unalloyed by any other object. It, nevertheless, directly beholds intellected ideas, or is the percipient, of all ideas without any intervention. This is effected by its proximity to the intellect, which receives the impressions of the outer world. The act of modification or change which perception implies is effected in the intellect, and does not extend to the soul. This distinction is necessary for the purpose of maintaining the immutability and perfect purity of the soul, for the admission of change would destroy its immutability and absolute purity.]

To show that soul alone is the experiencer, he says:

XXI.

Only for his purpose is the soul of the spectacle.

"Spectacle" (*dṛiśya*) has been defined above (II, XVIII). 'Its soul' (*átmá*) is its true nature. It, "the soul of the spectacle," is required for "his purpose," for the purpose of consummating the experiencership of soul to the exclusion of all selfish ends. Pradhána in activity does not work with a view to attain any aim of its own, but to accomplish the experiencership of soul.

[The meaning is that the true nature of the spectacle acts solely to accomplish the purpose of soul, and not for any purpose of its own, for it has none such. It will be noticed that the text says it is the soul of the spectacle, and not the spectacle itself, that subserves the purpose of soul, and the question arises what is its soul? The word used in the text is *átmá*, which means soul, *i. e.*, the soul of the spectacle subserves the purpose of the soul of a living being. The commentator explains *átmá* by *svarúpa* "it own natural form,"

or true nature. In the commentary on A, XIX, he uses the words *svarúpábhinnah pariṇámah,* or "a modification not different from its primary form," neither of which carries us directly to what is meant. It is obvious, however, from the use of the word Pradhána—Prakṛiti in the commentary on the aphorism under notice, which in activity, is said, "not to work with a view to attain any aim of its own," that the "soul of the spectacle" is but another form of expression for Prakṛiti. That Prakṛiti n activity is the spectacle is abundantly evident in the leading works of the Sáñkhya system. Thus, in the Sáñkhya-káriká: "For the sake of soul's wish, that subtile person exhibits (before it) like a dramatic actor, through relation of means and consequence, with the aid of nature's influence." (Verse XLII). Again, "as a dancer, having exhibited herself to the spectator, desists from the dance, so does nature desist, having manifested herself to soul." (Verse LIX). Again: "Generous nature, endued with qualities, does by manifold means accomplish, without benefit (to herself), the wish of the ungrateful soul, devoid as he is of qualities." (Verse LX). Again "he desists because he has seen her; she does so, because she has been seen. In their (mere) union there is no motive for creation." (Verse LXVI). Similarly the Sáñkhya Sútra: "Nature's creating is for the sake of another, though it be spontaneous,—for she is not the experiencer,—just like a cart carrying saffron (for the sake of its master)." (Ballantyne, III, LVIII). Again, "just like a dancer, does she, though she had been energising, desist, because of the end having been attained (in the shape of soul's aim)." (Ibid. III, LIX). Nor is there any inconsistency in this, for intellect does not differ from Prakṛiti except in being in activity; and "soul," "true nature," "original shape of the intellect," and other similar expressions must imply Prakṛiti or nature, and nothing else. This will explain the remarks made in the note on Aphorisms XVII and XIX.

Commenting on the passages quoted from the Sáñkhya-káriká, Mr. Davies observes, "Beautiful as poetry, but not very

philosophic, nor in direct harmony with other parts of the Sáñkhya philosophy. Kapila, or I'śvara Krishṇa, forgets that nature (*Prakṛiti*) has no personality, no powers, no volition, and no consciousness," (p. 95.) This is not fair towards I'śvara Krishṇa, who provides for such criticism by saying, "as the production of milk, which is unintelligent (unknowing), causes the growth of the calf, so the developement of nature causes the liberation of soul;" (Verse LIX;) and Kapila cites the unintelligent cart carrying saffron for its owner.]

If the accomplishment of the experience of soul be thus the only aim, then, on the accomplishment of that object, Prakṛiti, having no other object in view, should cease to be active, and the cessation of all modification in it, itself being pure, (*i. e.*, having the three qualities in equipose) all spectators should be free, and it would follow that the world would be cut short. Suspecting such a consequence, he says:

XXII.

Destroyed in the case of him whose purpose has been attained, she is still active, for she is common to others besides him.

Although she (*Prakṛiti*—nature) becomes "destroyed" (*nashṭa*), devoid of action, in the case of some one soul which has attained its purpose, (*kṛitártha*), by experiencing the world till the manifestation of discriminative knowledge, yet she, being common to all souls, remains active (*anashṭa*) in other cases. It follows that Prakṛiti, being common to all experiencers, can never be totally destroyed, nor can the emancipation of one imply the emancipation of all. This is what is meant.

[The conclusion arrived at in the next preceding aphorism, to the effect that on knowledge being attained, Prakṛiti ceases to act, and becomes functionless, is calculated to suggest the idea that her cessation from her action would apply to all souls, so that on one soul attaining emancipation all souls would be free, there being no active ministering Prakṛiti to keep them supplied with

external impressions. This, however, is not the case. The destruction, or cessation, of action, is confined to the particular soul concerned. When a soul has, through discriminative knowledge, attained his aim he ceases to be influenced by Prakṛiti, and *quod* that soul Prakṛiti is destroyed; but as regards other souls which have not attained their aims she remains fully active; and this is indicated by the paradox "though dead, still she is alive:" *nashṭopyanashṭam.* This is the natural consequence of nature being one, and souls many. The *P. Bháshya* explains the reason by saying that the contact of the quality to the qualified is without a beginning; *dharmiṇám anádisañyogát dharmamátrá-námapyanádisañyogah.*]

Having described spectacle and spectator he proceeds to describe their conjunction.

XXIII.

Conjunction is the cause of the apprehension of the natures of the inherent power and the lordship of power.

He defines it through its function. "Inherent power" (*svaśakti*) is the nature of the spectacle. "Lordship of power" (*svámi-śakti*) is the identity of the spectator. That "conjunction" (*sañyoga*) which is the cause of the apprehension of the natures of the two, existing correlated as the knowable and the knower, is the natural condition of the relation of the experience and the experiencer, and no other. Nor is their conjunction of a different character from their respective natures, which are eternal and all pervading. The character of the experience as the experience and of the experiencer as the experiencer is established from time without a beginning, and that is the conjunction.

[The purport of this is that there is an inherent relation between the experience as experienceable, and the experiencer as experiencer from time without a beginning; that is, this relation is not casual or adventitious, produced at particular times by particular causes,

but natural and always existing. This relation of the two is indicated by the term *sañyoga* or conjunction, and this conjunction or the natural relation of the two is the cause of worldliness. As will be explained afterwards, the conjunction is not actual or material, but a mere reflection of the one on the other.]

He now describes its cause

XXIV.

Its cause is ignorance.

That which has been described before (II, IV) as "ignorance" (*avidyá*), having the nature of doubt and delusion, is the cause of the conjunction which has the form of indiscriminateness.

[The object of the text is to say that ignorance is the cause of the conjunction of soul with intellect, and that conjunction produces indiscriminateness, or the want of power on the part of soul to distinguish between itself and intellect, and the failure to do so leads to the feeling of the pleasures and afflictions of the world being borne by it. When the differences of the two are distinguished, the conjunction dissolves, and soul is free. Dr. Ballantyne has been misled by the presence of the word *heya* in the preamble of the following aphorism into the supposition that that word is a part of the aphorism under notice, and having incorporated it he has interpreted it as such. The word, however, has been cited with reference to its use in a preceding aphorism.]

The avoidable (*heya*) is the objective of the verb to avoid (*há*), and to explain what that avoidance is, he says:

XXV.

From its absence there is absence of conjunction, and that is, avoidance. Thereupon results the isolation of the spectator.

"Its," *i. e.*, of ignorance. On its "absence" (*abháva*), *i. e.*, on its being irradicated by perfect knowledge which is its essential

opposite, the effect of the conjunction ceases, or is absent, and this absence is called "avoidance" (*hána*). The meaning is this: it is not, practicable to separate ignorance like an embodied object, but, on discriminative knowledge being produced, this conjunction, which has indiscriminitativeness for its cause, it of itself ceases, and this is its avoidance (*hána*). That which is an avoidance of the conjunction, is assumed to be an "isolation" (*kaivalya*) of the eternally isolated soul. In this way the nature, cause, and effect of the conjunction is explained.

[The meaning is that when ignorance is irradicated by a right apprehension of its relation to soul, its relation with soul ceases, and this surcease makes the solitary eternal soul isolated from ignorance and its consequences, and the soul remains isolated, as is its nature. All my MSS. give the reading "of eternally isolated" (*nityakaivalyasya,*) but Dr. Ballantyne, has found a different version; his text has *nityam kevalasya,* which would give the meaning "there is eternal isolation of the solitary or isolated"—*kevalasya nityam kaivalyam.* The isolation is in either case assumed to be everlasting, and hence this isolation is believed to be final deliverance from bondage.

The word *kaivalya* is derived from *kevala,* "alone," and "isolation" appears to be its most appropriate rendering; but, inasmuch as this isolation takes place by withdrawing or detaching the soul from the phenomeral world, Colebrooke and Wilson use "abstraction." The *Sáñkyatattva-kaumudí* defines it to be "absolute suppression of the three kinds of pain, as a property of sacred writ, holy sages, and inspired teachers or prophets. It must, therefore, be something different from intellect and the rest which are the same thing as pain, and cannot effect a speration form their own essence." (*S'ástráṇám maharshánám divyalochanánám cha kaivalyam chátyantikaduhkha-trayaprasamalakshaṇam na buddhyádinám sambhavati, te hi duhkhátmakáh katham svabhávádibhih mochayitum śakyanti.*) Vijnána Bhikshu defines it in the same way, and calls it absolute extirpation of pain (*duhkhátyantikochchhedah*). Any way, it is the final reward

of the knowledge advocated and the practice of meditation enjoined in this system of philosophy.]

Now, by way of describing the means of avoidance he points out the cause of the acceptable.

XXVI.

The means of avoidance is the manifestation of undisturbed discriminative knowledge.

"Discriminative knowledge" (*viveka*) is the name of the knowledge (which shows) that qualities are distinct from soul. Its "manifestation" (*khyáti*) is the means (*upáya*) or cause of the "avoidance" (*hána*) or rejection of the visible. How should this be? It should be "undisturbed," (*aviplavá*). That which has no interruptions, or breaks or repeated intervals of waking from meditation, is called undisturbed.

The purport of it is this: on the disolution of ignorance, from the contemplation of that which is adverse to it, the cessation of all ideas of relationship, agency, &c., the vanishing of the dirt of foulness and darkness, and the refluent modification of the intellect, the reflection of soul on intellect is called discriminative knowledge. And by the constant or uninterrupted prevalance of it the function of the spectacle ceases, and this is isolation.

[The object of the aphorism is twofold; 1st, to point out the means of avoiding the avoidable, 2nd, to indicate, by implication what should be accepted. The means of avoiding the avoidable, that is ignorance, is the cultivation of discriminative knowledge without any break or interruption. Light and darkness cannot exist conjointly, light must always destroy darkness, and as discriminative knowledge is light, and ignorance darkness, the one disappears on the other becoming manifest. Were, however, the light to be fitful, or interrupted, there would be certain periods of light and others of darkness, and to preclude this the injunction is added that the light "should be undisturbed" or uninterrupted.

The second object is implied, but not pointed out. If continuous light is necessary it follows as a matter of course that that is what should be accepted.]

Having described the enlightenment which takes place in the soul on the taking place of discriminative knowledge, he defines the nature of the discriminative knowledge.

XXVII.

Of that there are, up to its utmost stage, seven kinds of enlightenment.

"Of that," *i. e.*, of the produced discriminative knowledge, the "enlightenment" *(prajṇá)*, with the understanding of what should be known is, to its "utmost stage," *(prántabhúmi)* *i. e.*, to the stage of *Samádhi*, along with all its accessories, of seven kinds.

Thereof four are liberation from work, *viz.*, (1) The knowable has been known by me. (2) There is nothing remaining to be known. (3) My afflictions are overcome, and there is nothing for me to overcome. (4) Knowledge has been acquired by me, discriminative knowledge has been attained by me. Thus, in these states, by rejecting all other conceptions, these kinds of understanding are produced. This understanding, which is pure knowledge regarding work, is called liberation from work.

Intellectual liberation is of three kinds, *viz.*, (1) my intellect has accomplished its purpose. (2) The qualities have finished their domination over me; like stones fallen from the crest of a mountain they cannot go back to their place; for, tending to dissolution in their own cause, and there being a want of the original cause which is ignorance, and in the absence of a motive, how can there be springing up of the evil ones? (3) And my meditation has been identified with my soul. Such being the case I am existing in my real nature. These three kinds are intellectual liberation. Thus, on the springing up of this sevenfold knowledge to the utmost stage (of meditation) the soul is said to be isolated.

[The knowledge which is the aim and object of this system of philosophy is, according to its different states of perfection, classed under two heads; one relating to works, and the other to intellect. The first of these two heads is then divided into four, and the second into three sub-heads, making altogether seven stages. The lowest stage is that in which the Yogí feels that he has known all that has to be known. The next is that in which he, in addition to the first, feels that he has nothing more to learn. In the third there is, in addition to the first two, the conviction, that áll impediments to knowledge have been destroyed, and there is nothing more to destroy. These three lead to the conviction that the full amount of discriminative knowledge has been acquired, and this constitutes the fourth. All these refer to external nature, and since they are connected with the active creation or works, they are called liberation from work. The second group refers exclusively to the intellect or the thinking principle. The convictions, 1st, that the intellect has done its office by pointing out the distinction between soul and nature; 2nd, that the qualities which govern the functions of the intellect have lost their influence; and 3rd, that the intellect has merged in the soul, refer to the relation of the intellect to the soul, and as the conviction is that the intellect has lost its power on the soul, therefore, it is called intellectual liberation. All these, it will be perceived, are dependant upon judgment, or consciousness of the effects of certain actions, and therefore relate to conscious or seeded meditation. (Cf. B. I, A. 17.) The function of deliberation or judgment resulting from ratiocianation is in every instance present, and the ideas of, I, me, and mine, govern the whole. But when the judgment is brought to this final stage there is nothing more to do, and then follows the unconscious condition which is absolute isolation.]

Having described that the cause of discriminative knowledge is the cessation of conjunction, he now explains what are the means of its origin.

XXVIII.

On the decay of impurity through the practice of the accessories of the Yoga, there is an illumination of the understanding till discriminative knowledge (results).

"The accessories of the Yoga" (*Yogáñga*) are what will be presently described, (xxix.) "The practice" (*anushṭhána*) thereof is the intelligent exercise of the same till discriminative knowledge results. "On the decay of impurity," (*aśuddhikshaya*), *i. e.,* on the decline of the impurity which is of the form of afflictions of the character of an envelope to the manifestation of the thinking principle, whatever "Illumination of the understanding" (*jnánadipti*) takes place, greater or less, by the modification of the principle of goodness till the time of the manifestation of the discriminative knowledge, the same becomes the cause of that manifestation: this is the meaning.

[The commentary explains the aphorism in a roundabout way. The purport is that by the practice of certain exercises the impurities which surround the thinking principle are gradually destroyed, and as they are destroyed so there results a gradual enlightenment which culminates, on perfect maturity, in discriminative knowledge.]

The decay of impurity by the practice of the accessories of the Yoga having been thus described, the question arises what are those accessories? (To this question) he replies.

XXIX.

Restraint, obligation, posture, regulation of the breath, abstraction, devotion, contemplation, and meditation are the eight accessories.

Some of these being directly beneficial to profound meditation are intimate accessories, such as devotion, &c. Others subserve profound meditation by eradicating hesitation and adverse

feelings of slaughter, &c., such as restraint, obligation, &c. Among them posture and the rest are successively subservient (to samádhi). Thus on the acquisition of posture there is steadiness in the regulation of breath. The successive ones are to be explained in the same way.

[These eight are classed under two heads, 1st, general or extrinsic, and, 2nd, special or intrinsic. The first two are general, because they are obligatory at all times; the other six are intrinsic, because they subserve the purpose of the Yoga, but are not otherwise necessary. What these eight are will be explained in the following aphorisms.]

He now successively explains their nature.

XXX.

Restraint includes abstinence from slaughter, falsehood, theft, incontinence, and avarice.

"Slaughter" (*hiñs'á*) is work which requires the destruction of life; it is the root of all evils, and its absence is "non-slaughter," (*ahiñsá*). As slaughter should be avoided at all times, its absence implied by non-slaughter is first mentioned.

"Veracity" (*satya*) is confirmity in mind and speech with fact.

"Theft" (*steya*) is forcibly taking another's property; and its absence is "non-theft" (*asteya*).

"Continence" (*brahmacharya*) is subjugation of carnality.

"Non-avarice" (*aparigraha*) is the non-acceptance of objects for the promotion of enjoyment.

These five, non-slaughter, &c., are indicated by the term *yama*, restraints, and reckoned as accessories to Yoga.

[These restraints figure prominently in all Hindu systems, and are by no means peculiar to the Yoga. They obtain equal prominence among the Jains and the Buddhists; the latter call them Páramitás. Using the term restraint, for *Yama,* I have found it necessary for the sake of English idiom and uniformity of expression to use the roundabout form of abstinence from false-

hood, &c., instead of the direct positive terms veracity (*satya*), &c., which the text employs. They form the ground-work without which no religious superstructure is possible.]

He points out a peculiarity of these.

XXXI.

These are the great austerities of all stages, irrespective of kind, locality, time, and compact.

"Kind" (*játi*), such as Bráhmaṇhood (*conf. ante*, p. 71). "Locality" (*deśa*), such as particular sacred pools, &c. "Time" (*kála*), such as the fourteenth lunation and the like. "Compact" (*samaya*), the requirement of a Bráhmaṇa, &c. These are called the great austerities (*mahávratas*). They are imperative in all conditions or stages of the thinking principle, "irrespective" (*anavachchhinna*) of these four conditions of kind, &c., *i. e.*, it does not mean that "I shall not kill a Bráhmaṇa," "I shall not kill any one in a sacred pool," "I shall commit no slaughter on the 14th lunation," "I shall not kill except for gods, Bráhmaṇas, &c.," implying four specific conditions, but that "I shall not for any purpose whatsoever, kill any one at any place, at any time." The others should be explained in the same way. Thus, when these practices are universal, without any qualification, they are called "great austerities." Their interrupted observance is not so.

[The purport is that these restraints should be observed with reference to all kinds of being, at every place, at all times, and under every circumstance, without any qualification whatsoever. The object of adverting to "compact" is to leave no room for religious sacrifices, such as the Vedas enjoin. They are, in the estimation of the Yogi, as objectionable as unauthorised slaughter.]

He next describes obligation.

XXXII.

The obligations are purification, contentment, penance, study, and devotion to the Lord.

"Purification" (*śaucha*) is of two kinds, external and internal. External (*váhya*) means the washing of the body with earth, water, &c. The internal (*antara*) is the washing, by means of friendliness and the like, of all dirt from the thinking principle. "Contentment" (*santosha*) contentedness. The others have already been explained. These, purification and the rest, are indicated by the term *niyama*, "obligation."

[These obligations are common to all persons, whether Yogis or otherwise. They must be attended to very carefully as much to prepare oneself for the performance of the Yoga, as for the well-being of ordinary worldly life.]

How these are accessories to the Yoga, he next explains.

XXXIII.

By the exclusion of the questionable the thought of its opposite (is acquired).

(Those things which) cause doubts or questioning are "questionables" (*Vitarka*), and these, including slaughter and the like, are inimical to the follower of Yoga. When they are obstructed or excluded by the thought of their opposites, then Yoga becomes easily achievable, and the restraints and obligations consequently become accessories to Yoga.

[The restraints keep one from the performance of certain questionable acts, and the obligations train one habitually to avoid the questionables, and thereby the thinking principle is prepared for undisturbed concentration in the performance of the Yoga. The restraints and the obligations necessarily become accessories to the Yoga, and are therefore so called.]

Now he successively describes the natures, the distinctions, the varieties, the causes, and the fruits of the questionables.

XXXIV.

The questionables are slaughter and the rest. (Whether) they are done, caused to be done, or abetted; (whether) preceded by longing, anger or delu-

sion; (whether) slight, moderate or excessive; they have pain and ignorance for their endless fruits. Hence (the necessity) of the thought of opposites.

The aforesaid slaughter and the rest are first divided into three kinds, *viz.*, done, caused to be done, and abetted. Thereof those which are accomplished by oneself are "done" *(kṛita)*. Those which follow from orders to the effect "do them," "they should be done," are caused to be done (*kárita*). Those which, on being accomplished by others, are encouraged by (the saying) "well done, well done," are "abetted" (*anumodita*). These three forms are described to prevent mistakes respecting them; otherwise a dull-witted person might fancy, "the slaughter has not been completed by me, so no fault rests on me."

To indicate their causes he says, "proceeded by longing, anger, or delusion." Although longing and anger are first noticed, yet since delusion, which is characterised by its accepting that to be soul which is not soul, the source of all pains, and since longing and anger arise from distinctions about differences of relation as to one's own or another, delusion should be known to be the root, *i. e.*, all faults proceed from antecedent delusion. "Longing" (*lobha*)) is thirst. "Anger" (*krodha*) is an inflammatory function of the thinking principle, which sets aside all sense of discrimination about what is proper and what is improper. Each of these is threefold, according as it is distinguished by being done, caused to be done, &c., and slaughter and the rest are divisible into these according as they are caused by delusion, &c.

They are again divided into three kinds according as they are "mild, moderate, and excessive." "Mild," (*manda*) are slow, *i. e.*, neither excessive nor moderate. The "moderate" (*madhyama*) are neither mild nor excessive. The "excessive" *(adhimátra)* are ardent, neither mild nor moderate.

Thus there are nine kinds, and these being three-fold the total becomes twenty-seven. Again, of the mild &c., each being divisible according as it is mild, moderate and excessive, becomes

threefold. The combination to be made as it becomes appropriate; thus mildly mild (*mṛidu-mṛidu*) "mildly moderate" (*mṛidu-madhya*), "mildly ardent," (*mṛidu-tivra*).

Their fruits he describes (by the words) "having pain and ignorance for endless fruits." Pain (*duhkha*) is a function of the quality of foulness, manifesting itself in the form of repugnance. "Ignorance" (*ajnána*) is false knowledge in the form of doubt or error. Their fruits are indicated by (the compound term) *duhkhajnánánanta-phaláh*. From such pain and ignorance proceed "endless" (*ananta*) unintermitting fruit. What is enjoined is that these should be overcome by the Yogí, who has known their nature, cause, &c. by thinking on their opposites.

[The works condemned by the restraints and the obligations have been lumped together under the name of questionable (*Vitarka*) for easy treatment, and then their natures, distinctions, varieties and fruits are generally described. They call for no explanatory remark.]

In order to explain how perfections arise successively by ardent exercise of these (duties) he says:

XXXV.

When non-slaughter is confirmed (there is) near him abandonment of enmity.

In the neighbourhood of him who is confirmed in non-slaughter there is "abandonment of enmity" (*vairatyága*), or harmless abidance even on the part of the naturally cruel, such as of serpents and mungooses. The meaning is, those that are addicted to injury, give up their injurious nature.

[The purport is obvious. When the restraint from slaughter has been acquired there cannot exist any feeling of enmity, and, naturally hostile individuals, having acquired it, live in peace and harmony, like serpents and mungooses, which are naturally hostile to each other, and yet under the influence of the virtue may dwell together without injuring each other.]

He next describes what becomes of him who practices veracity.

XXXVI.

In the confirmed in veracity (there is) asylum of the fruit of works.

"Works" (*kṛiyáh*) are the sacrifices, which, when performed, yield the fruits heaven, &c. The Yogí who practices veracity rises to such greatness that he attains the fruits without performing those works, and at his bidding they may be attained by any one soever, without performing those works. Such is the meaning.

[Veracity or abstinence from falsehood is here described to be as meritorious as the sacrificial rites enjoined in the Vedas; *i. e.*, by practising veracity with unswerving faith one acquires the same merit which the sacrifices yield, and that without its being tainted by the cruelty which attends sacrifices. The *P. Bháshya* explains that he becomes virtuous, and as a virtuous person attains heaven (which is the reward of virtuous works), and his speech becomes fruitful. (*Dhármika bhûyá iti bhavati. Dhármikah svargam prapnuhíti svargam prápnoti, amoghásya vág-bhavati.*)]

He now describes the reward of him who abstains from theft.

XXXVII.

Jewels from all sides approach him who is confirmed in abstinence from theft.

When a Yogí practices abstinence from theft, and that abstinence rises to a high pitch, jewels from all sides come to him without his wishing them.

[The object here is to show that what may be acquired with great trouble by theft, may be had unsought by scrupulous abstinence from theft.]

The fruit of continence he next describes.

XXXVIII.

Attainment of vigour in confirmed continence.

Whoever steadfastly practices continence obtains, on its attaining its highest pitch, "vigour" (*vírya*), or manly power comes in him. Conservation of manly vigour is continence, and on its attaining a high degree, vigour comes in plenty in the body, the organs and the mind.

[The meaning is that there is always a loss of vigour by incontinence, and therefore the Yogí should abstain from it in order to conserve his vigour.]

He next points out the fruit of non-covetousness.

XXXIX.

On non-covetousness being confirmed there is conscience of all about births.

The word *kathantá* is the abstract form of *katham* 'what,' or 'what all about,' and *janma-kathantá* means all about births, and the full knowledge thereof is its "conscience" *(sambodha)*. The meaning is that he knows all about the questions, "What was I in a former birth? Who was I? What did I do?"

Covetousness is not confined to objects of enjoyment; it extends to the soul's desire to have a body, for that too is covetousness, since the body is needed for enjoyment. And such being the case, the knowledge of principles cannot prevail, while the inclinations are disposed outwards from the excess of the quality of foulness. Now, when on giving up all desire for the body and the rest, an indifference is attained, then to the indifferent being, devoid of foulness, an acquaintance with all past and future existences becomes a cause of thorough knowledge.

[The reward here spoken of is transcendental; it enables the observer of abstinence from all covetousness to see by his mental eye all that has happened to him in former births, and what will happen hereafter.]

Having thus described the perfections of the restraints, he now describes the obligations.

XL.

From purity (proceed) loathing for one's own members, and non-intercourse with others.

For him who practises purity there is a "loathing" *(jugupsá)* or detestation produced for even the members of his own body from discrimination of their nature and cause. (The idea then is) "This body is impure, no fondness for it should be cherished." And for the same reason there results a "non-intercourse," *(asañsarga)* absence of relationship, or avoidance of mixing with "others," *(paraih)*, *i. e.*, with other embodied persons. This is the meaning. How can he who loaths his own body from perceiving its this or that fault, wish to have intercourse with other bodies of the same description?

[The purity as defined in the commentary on A, XXXII. (p. 94) is obviously confined to contact with dirt and consciousness of the body being naturally impure. Here the latter phase is magnified to the extent of making the embodied loath his own body, and *à fortiorari* all bodies.]

He describes other fruits of purity.

XLI.

Moreover, purification of goodness, complacency, concentration, subjugation of the organs, and fitness for beholding soul.

(The words) "are produced" are required to complete the sentence. "Goodness" *(sattva)* consists of light, joy, &c. Its purification, is its not being oppressed (or overcome) by the qualities of foulness and darkness. "Complacency" *(saumanasya)* is mental satisfaction from non-perception of distress. "Concentration" *(ekágratá)* is fixedness of the thinking principle on any sensuous object to which it may be directed. "Subjugation of the organs" *(indriyajaya)* is the abidance in themselves of the organs diverted from their objects. "Fitness of behold-

ing soul" (*átmadarsanayogyatva*) is the adaptation of the thinking principle to do so on the manifestation of knowledge. To one who is practised in purity these, purification of goodness and the rest, successively manifest themselves. Thus, from purity comes purification of goodness; from purification of goodness, complacency; from complacency, concentration; from concentration, subjugation of the organs; from subjugation of the organs, fitness to behold soul.

[This aphorism is the sequel of the preceding one; it enumerates advantages in addition to those previously described. The advantages noted are of obvious import.]

The fruit of exercising contentment.

XLII.

From contentment, (proceeds) superlative felicity.

From contentment becoming excessive such internal felicity arises for the Yogi, as cannot be equalled by the pleasures of external objects, even to the extent of a hundredth part of it.

[The meaning is obvious.]

The fruit of austerity.

XLIII.

Through austerity results the perfection of the body and the organs, from decay of impurity.

Through the decay of impurity of the form of distress and the like by the exercise of austerity there arises in the mind a "perfection" (*siddhi*) or superiority of the body and the organs. The meaning is this, the afflictions of the thinking principle decay by the performance of Chándráyaṇa and other fasts. From that decay the organs acquire the power of perceiving the minute, the hidden, and the remote, and the body (the power of assuming) at pleasure the form of a molecular, or great magnitude.

[Briefly the purport of the aphorism is that by attaining perfection in austerity, a Yogí acquires transcendental powers; his organs are then able to grasp all kinds of objects, whether they be so minute as not to be ordinarily perceivable by the senses, or so hidden as not to be accessible to the senses, or so remote as to be beyond their range.

The reference to the Chándráyaṇa is a mere illustration, the object is to imply austerity generally, and not to such only as are enjoined as penances. The object is not penance or expiation for sins committed, but the general mortification of the flesh.]

The fruit of muttering.

XLIV.

Through muttering results the cognition of the desiderated deity.

On the perfection of "muttering" (*sádhyáya*) characterised by the repetition or the like of a selected mantra, there results a cognition on the part of the Yogí of the deity desiderated: the meaning is that that deity becomes visible to him.

[The word *svádhyáya* means the study of the Vedas, but here it is used in the technical sense of muttering or inaudibly repeating a great many times any selected mantra. This is closely analogous to the counting of the rosary.]

The fruit of contemplating on the Lord.

XLV.

Meditation is completed through the contemplation of the Lord.

Whoever is thus devoted to the Lord, in him "meditation" (*samádhi*) of the kind described (C I A L.) becomes manifest, because that Divine Lord, being pleased, excites meditation by removing all obstructive afflictions (from the way).

[The theistical character of Patanjali's doctrine is here established by the admission that the divinity may, when contem-

plated, help to promote the object of the Yoga. Kapila repudiates the idea.]

Having described the restrictions and the obligations, he now proceeds to describe posture.

XLVI.

Posture (is that which is) firm and pleasant.

"Posture" (*ásana*) is that whereby one sits, such as Padmásana, Daṇḍásana, Svastikásana, &c. When that seat becomes "firm" (*sthira*) or devoid of agitation, and "pleasant" (*sukha*) or not uncomfortable, then it is reckoned as an accessory of the Yoga.

[The word *ásana* ordinarily implies the material adapted for sitting upon, such as a rug, a mat, a board, a chair, or the like, but here it has been used for particular modes or attitudes of sitting, and therefore I have translated it into posture and not seat. The aphorism recommends such postures as ensure steadiness and comfort; but the postures as described in other works do not convey to a worldly understanding any such idea. Brahmánanda, in his commentary on the *Haṭhapradípiká*, says that Vaśishtha, Yájṉavalkya and other ancient sages had described 84 postures as appropriate for Yogís, and that S'iva, the greatest of Yogís, was their author. He adds that Gorakshanátha, a Yogí of a later date, but of great renown, reckoned the total number of appropriate postures at 84,00,000. (*Chaturasítilakshánṇi cha taduktam Gorakshanáthena.*) Of the 84 some are common, some are more important. Svátmaráma, in the Haṭhapradipiká, describes ten as "more important" for the performance of the Haṭhayoga. These are called, 1, *Svastika*; 2, *Gomukka*; 3, *Víra*; 4, *Kúrma*; 5, *Kukkuṭa*; 6, *Uttána-kúrmaka*; 7, *Dhanuh*; 8, *Matsyanátha*; 9, *Mayúra*; 10, *Sava*. The most important ones are: 1, *Siddha* alias *Mukta* alias *Gupta*; 2, *Padma*; 3, *Siñha*; 4, *Bhadra* alias *Goraksha*. The *P. Bháshya* does not enter into any detail, but names the following as examples, *viz.*, 1, *Padma* or lotus; 2, *Víra* or heroic; 3, *Bhadra* or decent; 4, *Svastika* or the mystic diagram so called; 5, *Daṇḍa* or staff-like; 6, *Sopásraya* or self-reliant; 7, *Paryańka* or bedstead-like; 8, *Krauńcha-nisidana* or like the posture of the seated heron; 9, *Hasti-nishídana* or seated elephant; 10, *Ushṭra-*

nishidana or seated camel; 11, *Samasansthána* or evenly poised. The following are brief accounts of the ways in which the postures are assumed.

1. *Padmásana.* The right foot should be placed on the left thigh, and the left foot on the right thigh; the hands should be crossed, and the two great toes should be firmly held thereby; the chin should be bent down on the chest; and in this posture the eyes should be directed to the tip of the nose. It is called *Padmásana,* and is highly beneficial in overcoming all diseases.*

2. *Vírásana.* Place each foot under the thigh of its side, and it will produce the heroic posture *Vírásana.*†

3. *Bhadrásana.* Place the hands in the form of a tortoise in front of the scrotum, and under the feet and this is *Bhadrásana.*‡

4. *Svastikásana.* Sitting straight with the feet placed under the (opposite) thighs is called Svastikásana.§

5. *Dandásana.* Seated with the fingers grasping the ankles brought together and with feet placed extended on the legs.||

6. *Sinhásana.* Let the ankles be placed under the testes, the left ankle on the right side of the suture (the mesian line) and the right on the left side of the suture; let the hands placed on the knees, and the fingers extended; let the mouth be wide open, and the sight be directed to the tip of the nose while one is in deep contem-

* वामोरूपरि दक्षिणञ्च चरणं संस्थाप्य वामं तथा
दक्षोरूपरि पश्चिमेन विधिना धृत्वा कराभ्यां दृढं ।
अङ्गुष्ठे हृदये निधाय चिबुकं नासाग्रमालोकये-
देतद्व्याधिविनाशकारि यमिनां पद्मासनं प्रोच्यते ॥

† एकपादं तथैकस्मिन् विन्यसेदूरुणि स्थितं ।
इतरस्मिंस्तथा चोरुं वीरासनमितीरितं ॥

‡ गुल्फौ च वृषणस्याधः सीवन्याः पार्श्वयोः क्षिपेत् ।
सव्यगुल्फं तथा सव्ये दक्षगुल्फन्तु दक्षि
पार्श्वपादौ च पाणिभ्यां दृढं बद्ध्वा सुनिश्चलं ।
भद्रासनं भवेदेतत् सर्व्वव्याधिविनाशनं ॥

§ जानूर्व्वोरन्तरे सम्यक् कृत्वा पादतले उभे ।
ऋजुकायः समासीनः स्वस्तिकं तत् प्रचक्षते ॥

|| उपविश्य शिलाङ्गुलिकौ श्लिष्टगुल्फौ भूमिश्लिष्टजङ्घोरुपादौ प्रसार्य्य
दण्डासनमभ्यसेत् ।

plation; and it will produce the lion posture *Siñhásana*, the adored of all Yogís.*

7. Put the right ankle on the left side of the chest, and similarly the left ankle on the right side, and the posture will be *Gomukha*, or of the shape of a cow's mouth.†

8. Closing the anus with the two ankles crossed while the mind is under control, produces, say the knowers of Yoga, the tortoise posture, *Kúrmásana*.‡

9. Having established the lotus posture, if the hands be passed between the thigh and the knees and placed on the earth so as to lift the body aloft, it will produce the Fowl seat, *Kukkuṭásana*.§

10. Having assumed the fowl posture, should the two hands be placed on the sides of the neck it would make the posture like that of the tortoise upset; it is called upset tortoise posture, *Uttánakúrmakásana*.‖

11. Hold the great toes with the hands, and draw them to the ears as in drawing a bowstring, and this is called the bow posture, *Dhanurásana*.¶

12. Place the right foot on the roof of the left thigh, surround the right knee with the left, foot, and sit with the body twisted, and it will result in the *Matsyanáthásana* or posture *Matsyanátha*.**

* गुल्फौ च वृषणस्याधः सीवन्याः पार्श्वयोः क्षिपेत् ।
दक्षिणे सव्यगुल्फन्तु दक्षगुल्फन्तु सव्यके ॥
हस्तौ तु जान्वोः संस्थाप्य स्वाङ्गुलीः संप्रसार्य्य च ।
व्यात्तवक्त्रो निरीक्षेत नासाग्रं सुसमाहितः ।
सिंहासनं भवेदेतत् पूजितं योगिपुङ्गवैः ॥

† सव्ये दक्षिणगुल्फन्तु पृष्ठपार्श्वे नियोजयेत् ।
दक्षिणेऽपि तथा सव्यं गोमुखं गोमुखाकृति ॥

‡ गुदं निरुध्य गुल्फाभ्यां व्युत्क्रमेण समाहितः ।
कूर्म्मासनं भवेदेतदिति योगविदो विदुः ॥

§ पद्मासनन्तु संस्थाप्य जानूर्व्वोरन्तरे करौ ।
निवेश्य भूमौ संस्थाप्य व्योमस्थं कुक्कुटासनं ॥

‖ कुक्कुटासनबन्धस्थो दोर्भ्यां सम्बध्य कन्धरां ।
यस्मिन् कूर्म्मवदुत्तानोभवेदुत्तानकूर्म्मकं ॥

¶ पादाङ्गुष्ठौ तु पाणिभ्यां गृहीत्वा श्रवणावधि ।
धनुराकर्षणं कुर्य्याद्धनुरासनमुच्यते ॥

** वामोरुमूलार्पितदक्षपादं जानोर्व्वहिर्वेष्टितवामपादं ।
प्रगृह्य तिष्ठेत् परिवर्त्तिताङ्गः श्रीमत्स्यनाथोदितमासनं स्यात् ॥

13. *Mayúrásana.* Hold the earth with both hands placing the elbows on the sides of the navel, and keep the body erect like a staff: this is called the *Mayúrásana* or peacock posture.*

14. *Siddhásana.* Place the left ankle on the *membrum virile*, and thereupon put the right ankle, and it completes the *Siddhásana.*†

Besides these *A'sanas*, Yogís have a great many postures or gestures which they reckon under the name of *Mudrá*, to which, however, no mention is made here in the text. In Tántric rituals the technical difference between an *A'sana* and a *Mudrá* depends upon the organs employed. An *A'sana* or seat is by its very nature connected with the disposition of the lower limbs, whereas the *Mudrá* depends upon the motion of the upper limbs; and in the Tantras all symbols produced by twining the fingers or placing the hands in particular positions are recognised as Mudrás. The Yogís have also some Mudrás of the same kind; but in their more important Mudrás the distinction is entirely lost sight of, and hands and feet alike come into play to produce the *A'sanas* as well as the *Mudrás.* The great and most remarkable distinctive character of the Mudrá appears, however, to be its connection with the regulation of breath. The *Gheraṇḍa Sañhitá* describes in all twenty-five Mudrás, and the *Haṭhadípiká* recognises ten of these as the most important "in warding off decay and death," (*jarámaraṇanáśanam.*) These are — 1 Mahámudrá; 2, Mahábandha; 3, Mahávedha; 4, Khecharí; 5, Uḍḍíyána; 6, Múlabandha; 7, Jalandhara; 8, Viparita-karaṇí; 9, Vajroṇí; 10, S'akti-chálana.‡ The following are brief descriptions of these gesticulations and of the advantages to be derived from them:

1. *Mahámudrá.* Pressing the perinæum by the heel of the left foot, the right foot should be extended, and then held fast by the two

* धरामवष्टभ्य करद्वयेन तत्कूर्परस्थापितनाभिपार्श्वः ।
उच्चासनो दण्डवदुत्थितः स्यात् मयूरमेतत् प्रवदन्ति पीठं ॥

† मेढ्रादुपरि विन्यस्य सव्यं गुल्फं तथोपरि ।
गुल्फान्तरञ्च निक्षिप्य सिद्धासनमिदं भवेत् ॥

‡ महामुद्रा महाबन्धो महावेधश्च खेचरी ।
उड्डीयानं मूलबन्धो बन्धो जालन्धराभिधः ॥
करणी विपरीताख्या वज्रोणी शक्तिचालनं ।
इदं हि मुद्रादशकं जरामरणनाशनं ॥

hands. Then closing the throat the wind should be held above. Even as a snake struck by a staff stretches like a staff, so the coiled S'akti (breath) suddenly becomes straight, for then she is in a state of dying in the two nostrils. Then the wind should be discharged steadily, but not forcibly. The wisest of the wise call this *Mahámudrá.**

2. *Mahábandha.* Let the heel of the left foot be put under the perinæum, and the right foot on the left thigh, and, having drawn in breath, let the chin be pressed hard on the chest, and the wind be held fast in the heart. After holding the wind as long as one is able, let it be slowly expired. When the expiration is complete, let the operation be repeated on the right side. (This shows that the breath in the first instance should be drawn by the left nostril.)†

3. *Mahávedha.* While performing the Mahábandha should the Yogí effect the suppression of the breath in the Khecharí style by closing the passage of the wind by the throat Mudrá, and then, putting the hands evenly on the ground, drive the wind slowly towards the buttocks, it is *Mahávedha.*‡

* महामुद्रा । पादमूलेन वामेन योनिं संपीड्य दक्षिणं ।
प्रसारितं पदं कृत्वा कराभ्यां धारयेद्दृढं ॥
कण्ठे बन्धं समारोप्य धारयेद्वायुमूर्द्धतः ।
यथा दण्डहतः सर्पादण्डाकारः प्रजायते ॥
ऋज्वीभूता तथा शक्तिः कुण्डली सहसा भवेत् ।
तदा सा मरणावस्था जायते द्विपुटाश्रया ॥
ततः शनैः शनैरेव रेचयेन्नैव वेगतः ।
महामुद्राञ्च तेनैव वदन्ति विबुधोत्तमाः ॥

† महाबन्धः । पार्ष्णिं वामस्य पादस्य योनिस्थाने नियोजयेत् ।
वामोरूपरि संस्थाप्य दक्षिणं चरणं तथा ॥
पूरयित्वा ततो वायुं हृदये चिबुकं दृढं ।
निष्पीड्य वायुमाकुञ्च्य मनोमध्ये नियोजयेत् ॥
धारयित्वा यथाशक्ति रेचयेदनिलं शनैः ।
सव्याङ्गे तु समभ्यस्य दक्षाङ्गे पुनरभ्यसेत् ॥

‡ महावेधः । महाबन्धस्थितोयोगी कृत्वा पूरकमेकधीः ।
वायूनां गतिमावृत्य निभृतं कण्ठमुद्रया ॥
समहस्तयुगो भूमौ स्फिचौ सन्ताडयेच्छनैः ।
पुटद्वयमतिक्रम्य वायुः स्फुरति मध्यगः ॥

4. *Khechari.* When the tongue is reversed and pressed into the hollow of the head and the sight is fixed at a spot in the middle of the two eyebrows, the posture is called *Khechari.**

5. *Uḍḍiyánabandha* is that posture in which the wind flies upwards by the susumná vessel from the right side of the belly above the navel.†

6. *Múlabandha.* When the heel is pressed against the perinæum, the anus is contracted, and the Apána wind is by force directed upwards, it is *Múlabandha.*‡

7. *Jálandharabandha.* When the throat is contracted and the chin is pressed hard on the chest it is *Jálandhara* posture, the destroyer of decay and death.§

सोमसूर्य्याग्निसम्बन्धोजायते चामृताय वै ।
मृतावस्था समुत्पन्ना ततोवायुं विरेचयेत् ।
महावेधोऽयमभ्यासान्महासिद्धिप्रदायकः ॥

* खेचरी । कपालकुहरे जिह्वा प्रविष्टा विपरीतगा ।
भ्रुवोरन्तर्गता दृष्टिर्मुद्रा भवति खेचरी ॥
छेदनचालनदोहैः कलां क्रमेणाथवर्धयेत्तावत् ।
सा यावत् भ्रूमध्यं स्पृशति तदा खेचरीसिद्धिः ॥
स्नुहीपत्रनिभं शस्त्रं सुतीक्ष्णं स्निग्धनिर्मलं ।

† उड्डीयानबन्धः । बद्धोयेन सुषुम्नायां प्राणस्तूड्डीयते यतः ।
तस्मादुड्डीयनाख्योऽयं योगिभिः समुदाहृतः ॥
उड्डीनं कुरुते यस्मादविश्रान्तं महाखगः ।
उड्डीयानं तदेव स्यात्तत्र बन्धोऽभिधीयते ॥
उदरे पश्चिमं तानं नाभेरूर्द्ध्वं च कारयेत् ।
उड्डीयानोह्यसौ बन्धोमृत्युमातङ्गकेसरी ॥

‡ पार्ष्णिभागेन सम्पीड्य योनिमाकुञ्चयेद्गुदं ।
अपानमूर्द्ध्वमाकृष्य मूलबन्धोऽभिधीयते ॥
अधोगतिमपानं वै ऊर्द्ध्वगं कुरुते बलात् ।
आकुञ्चनेन तं प्राहुर्मूलबन्धं हि योगिनः ॥

§ जालन्धरबन्धः । कण्ठमाकुञ्च्य हृदये स्थापयेच्चिबुकं दृढं ।
बन्धोजालन्धराख्योऽयं जरामृत्युविनाशकः ॥

8. *Viparítakaraṇí.* Place the sun (expiratory air) above, just below the hard palate, and the moon (inspiratory air) below, just above the navel, and the Viparítakaraṇí is completed. It promotes hunger, &c., &c.*

9. *Vajroṇí.* The exercise by which the several secretions are drawn upwards is so called.†

10. *S'aktichálana.* Seated in the Vajrásana posture, let the feet be held firm by the hands and the anus be pressed by the heels, then putting the air in motion by the bellows of the chest, let it be suddenly stopped, and, contracting the forehead, let the wind be

* ऊर्द्ध्वं नाभेरधस्तालोरूर्द्ध्वं भानुरधः शशी।
करणी विपरीताख्या गुरुवाक्येन लभ्यते॥
नित्यमभ्यासयुक्तस्य जठराग्निविवर्द्धिनी।
आहारो बहुलस्तस्य सम्पाद्यः साधकस्य च॥
अल्पाहारो यदि भवेदग्निर्दहति तत्क्षणात्।
अधःशिराश्चोर्द्ध्वपादः क्षणं स्यात् प्रथमे दिने॥
क्षणाच्च किञ्चिदधिकमभ्यसेच्च दिने दिने।
वलितं पलितञ्चैव षण्मासोर्द्ध्वं न दृश्यते।
याममात्रन्तु यो नित्यमभ्यसेत् स तु कालजित्॥

† वज्रोणी। स्वेच्छया वर्त्तमानोऽपि योगोक्तैर्नियमैर्विना।
वज्रोणीं यो विजानाति स योगी सिद्धिभाजनः॥
तत्र वस्तुद्वयं वक्ष्ये दुर्लभं यस्य कस्यचित्।
क्षीरञ्चैकं द्वितीयन्तु नारी च वशवर्त्तिनी॥
मेहनेन शनैः सम्यगूर्द्ध्वाकुञ्चनमभ्यसेत्।
पुरुषोऽप्यथवा नारी वज्रोणीसिद्धिमाप्नुयात्॥
यत्नतः शस्तनालेन फुत्कारं वज्रकन्दरे।
शनैः शनैः प्रकुर्व्वीत वायुसञ्चारकारणात्॥
नारीभगे पतद्बिन्दुमभ्यासेनोर्द्ध्वमाहरेत्।
चलितञ्च निजं बिन्दुमूर्द्ध्वमाकृष्य रक्षयेत्॥
सहजोलिश्चामरोलिर्वज्रोण्या भेद एकतः।
जलेषु भस्म निक्षिप्य दग्धगोमयसम्भवं॥
वज्रोणीमैथुनादूर्द्ध्वं स्त्रीपुंसोः स्वाङ्गलेपनं।
आसीनयोः सुखेनैव मुक्तव्यापारयोः क्षणात्॥

directed that way for two muhúrtas and when it comes to the susumná vessel, stop it and this is *S'aktichálana.* (Loosely translated.)*

According to some the *Bandhas*, on distinct form the Mudrás. (Cf. N. C. Pál's treatise on the Yoga.)

Treating of a system of philosophy Patañjali has not thought proper to enter into details, regarding age, sex, caste, food, dwelling, &c. as bearing upon Yoga, but other works supply information about them to a considerable extent. A few notes derived therefrom may not be unfitly added here. The first question that would arise would be—who are fit to perform the Yoga? On this subject the *Haṭha-pradípiká* fixes no limit. It says, "by the practice of Yoga, every one may attain perfection, whether he be youthful, or old, or very old, or diseased, or decrepit."† The next point is the selection of a proper place. "A small monastery, a dwelling not larger than a cube of six feet, situated in an out-of-the-way place where there is no danger within a circuit of a bow, of hail, fire and water, in a country abounding in food and free from danger of wars and the like, where religion prevails, in a thriving kingdom," is the most appropriate. The cell or *maṭhiká* should have a small door and no window; it should be free from holes, cavities, inequalities, high steps and low descents; it should be smeared with cow-dung, devoid of dirt, not infested by vermin, with a terrace in front, a good well, and the whole surrounded by a wall. Dwelling in such a place, avoiding all anxieties, the Yogí should follow the path pointed out by his teachers in the exercise of

* सति वज्रासने पादौ कराभ्यां धारयेद्दृढं।
गुल्फदेशसमीपे च कन्दं तत्र प्रपीडयेत्॥
वज्रासनेस्थितोयोगी चालयित्वा च कुण्डलीं।
कुर्य्यादनन्तरं भस्त्रां कुण्डलीमाशु बोधयेत्॥
भानोराकुञ्चनं कुर्य्यात् कुण्डलीं चालयेत्ततः।
मृत्युवक्त्रगतस्यापि तस्य मृत्युभयं कुतः॥
मुहूर्त्तद्वयपर्य्यन्तं निर्भयं चालनादसौ।
ऊर्द्धमाकृष्यते किञ्चित् सुषुम्णायां समुद्गता॥
तेन कुण्डलिनी तस्याः सुषुम्णाया मुखं ध्रुवं।
जहाति तस्मात् प्राणोयं सुषुम्णां व्रजति स्वतः॥

† युवा वृद्धोतिवृद्धोवा व्याधितोदुर्ब्बलोऽपि वा।
अभ्यासात् सिद्धिमाप्नोति सर्व्वयोगेषु तन्द्रितं॥

the Yoga.* He should avoid all excess of food, violent exertions, and vain disputations. His food should consist of wheat, sáli rice, barley, śhashṭi rice (or that which matures in six days), the syáma and the nivára grains, milk, clarified butter, coarse or candied sugar, butter, honey, ginger, palval, fruits, five kinds of greens, múng pulse, and water," and all soothing sweet things in a moderate quantity, avoiding flesh-meat and too much salt, acids, and all stale, putrid, decomposed or acrid substances. The quantity of food taken should be such as to leave one-fourth of his appetite unappeased.†

He describes the means of making the seat firm and pleasant.

XLVII.

Through slightness of effort and attainment of the infinite.

The construction of the sentence is that through slightness of effort and through attainment of the infinite the seat becomes firm and pleasant. When the wish is formed, 'I shall adopt this posture,' and that posture is accomplished even with "slightness of effort," *i. e.*, without difficulty, and when the thinking principle is reposited in the infinity of space or the like, and by understanding it becomes of it, then from absence of the body and of egotism the posture does not become painful. When this controul over posture is accomplished agitations of the body and such other obstructives to meditation do not arise.

* सुराज्ये धार्म्मिके देशे सुभिक्षे निरुपद्रवे ।
धनुःप्रमाणपर्य्यन्तं शिलाग्निजलवर्जिते ॥
एकान्ते मठिकामध्ये स्थातव्यं हठयोगिना ।
अल्पद्वारमरंध्रगर्त्तविवरं नात्युच्चनीचं च यत्
सम्यग्गोमयसांद्रलिप्तममलं निःशेषयन्त्रं मितं ।
बाह्ये मंडपवेदिकूपरुचिरं प्राकारसंवेष्टितं
प्रोक्तं योगमठस्य लक्षणमिदं सिद्धैर्हठाभ्यासिभिः ।

† गोधूमशालियवषाष्टिकशोभनान्नं क्षीराज्यखंडनवनीतसितामधूनि ।
शुंठिपटोलकफलादिकपञ्चशाकं मुद्गादिदिव्यमुदकं च यमीन्द्रपथ्यं ॥
सुस्निग्धमधुराहारश्चतुर्थांशविवर्जितः ।
भुज्यते शिवसंप्रीत्यै मिताहारः स उच्यते ॥
कट्वम्लतीक्ष्णलवणोष्णहरीतशाकं सौवीरतैलतिलसर्षपमद्यमत्स्यान् ।
छागादि मांस दधि तक्र कुलत्थ कोल पिण्याकहिंगुल शुनाद्यमपथ्यमाहुः ॥

[The object here is to point out that when by practice one becomes able to assume any position at will, without any difficulty, and, adverting to the dogma that the thinking principle assumes the form of the object it thinks of, when by thinking on any infinite object, such as the sky, it becomes itself infinite, it feels no pain or uneasiness in assuming any posture, however painful it may otherwise be. The means of attaining firmness of seat thus are practice and the contemplation of boundless objects.]

A fruit thereof when accomplished.

XLVIII.

Thereupon non-embarrasment by the pairs.

The meaning is that on the controul of posture being accomplished, the Yogí is no longer oppressed or embarrased by the pairs, *i. e.*, cold and heat, hunger and thirst, and the like.

[This is the ultimate fruit of attaining perfection in assuming the different postures above adverted to.]

Having thus described how to controul the postures he describes regulation of breath.

XLIX.

On its being accomplished the regulation of breath (which is) interruption in the flow of inspiration and expiration.

On posture becoming firm that auxiliary of the Yoga which is regulation of breath and of which firmness of posture is the cause, should be practised.

How is it characterised by the interruption in the flow of inspiration and expiration? Inspiration and expiration have been already defined (B. I. A. XXXIV.) The "interruption" (*vichchheda*) or stoppage of the twofold "flow" (*gati*) or current in places outside and inside produced by means of expelling or filling of the breath is called *Práṇáyáma* or regulation of breath.

[Here the true Práyṇáyáma is accepted to be the interruption or break in the flow of the breath. The inspiration and the expiration are the functions of which the stoppage is the most effectual act for the attainment of perfect meditation. It is called *kumbhaka,* or quiescence, and the longer it is sustained the more proficient becomes the Yogí. When perfect controul has been attained in this respect, the Yogí can live buried under earth for months and years without peforming any organic function whatever.]

For its better understanding, he describes its nature after showing its distinctions.

L.

That, again, is an external, an internal, and a stationary function; it is divided by place, time, and number; it is protracted or subtile.

The "external function" of breath is expiration, or expulsion of the breath outward (*rechaka*). The "internal function" is inspiration or filling in (*púraka*). The function of stoppage inside is *kumbhaka.* Because the vital air at that time remains quiescent or motionless, as water in a jar, (*kumbha*) therefore that condition is called *kumbhaka.*

This regulation of breath is of three kinds, according as it is specialised by space (*des'a*), "time" (*kála*), and "number" (*sañkhyá*). It is also "protracted" (*dírgha*), or "subtile" (*sukhma*). It is especialised by place, as (when we say) "twelve distant from the nose," meaning as far as twelve fingers from the nose. It is specialised by time, as (when we say) "of the duration of thirty-six instants." It is specialised by "number," when (we say) "many times done."

By these inspirations and expirations the first *udgháta* is produced, and to know this a numeral figure has to be used. *Udgháta* is the striking of the head by the wind propelled upward from the navel.

[The object of this aphorism is to describe the **Práṇáyáma.** It is an operation which includes the three functions of inspiration, quiescence, and expiration. The breath must be drawn in first before it can be retained within; the retention cannot last long, and so after a time there must be an expiration. The first and the third, however, are regulated by the capacity of the lungs, and by the time necessary for the expulsion of a given quantity of air, and cannot be much modified, and the second alone, therefore, concerns the Yogí most, for he can controul it to a considerable extent, and hence it is held to be the most important element of the Práṇáyáma; not unoften, as in the last preceding aphorism, it alone is described as *the* Práṇáyáma. The threefold operation is specialized by the time devoted to each operation, by the extent of space from which the breath is drawn, by the number of times it is repeated, by the period for which it has been practised, and by the subtility or grossness of the operation.

The operation of *udgháta* is mysterious. I cannot find out from any work or person how the internal air is made to strike particular internal organs.]

Having described the three members of the regulation of breath, he, with a view to enunciate a fourth, says :—

LI.

The fourth is dependant on the recognition of the outer and the inner spheres.

"The outer sphere" (*váhya-vishaya*) of the breath extends far as twelve (fingers) from the nose. The "inner sphere" (*ábhyantara-vishaya*) is represented by the heart, the navel and the like. That quiescence or stoppage of motion, (which ensues) on recognising or taking into consideration these two is the "fourth" regulation of breath (*práṇáyáma*). Its difference from the third form, called *kumbhaka*, is this : The latter without taking any note of the outer and the inner spheres suddenly assumes quiescence,

like a lotus falling on a hot stone, while this is a stoppage which results from a recognition of the two spheres. This, like the preceding, should be known to be divisible according to place, time and number.

[This is purely intellectual, and involves no change in the order of the operation. It is the same operation, but performed intelligently.]

He now describes the fruit of the fourth kind.

LII.

Thereby is removed the covering of light.

"Thereby," *i. e.*, by that fourth form of regulation of breath, the "covering" (*ávaraṇa*) of the form of afflictions which envelope the "light" (*prakás'a*) which is the thinking principle abiding in the quality of goodness, is destroyed. This is the meaning.

[The purport is that this fourth form of Pránáyáma is specially useful in removing all those ideas of pain and suffering which are ordinarily associated with the thinking principle.]

Another fruit.

LIII.

The mind's fitness for steadiness.

"Steadiness" (*dháraṇá*) will be defined presently (B. III, A. I.) The mind (*manas*), divested of its defects through the instrumentality of these forms of regulation of breath, remains fixed to whatever it is applied, and does not suffer from distractions.

(Here the word *manas* has been used as a synonym of *chitta*, thinking principle).

He gives the definition of abstraction.

LIV.

Abstraction is the assumption by the senses of the original nature of the thinking principle, from want of application to their respective objects.

That by which the senses are abstracted, or from a feeling of opposition, withdrawn from their respective objects, is Abstraction (*pratyáhára*). How that may be effected is thus explained. Of vision and the other senses the respective objects are form and the rest. "Application" (*samprayoga*) to them is advancing towards them. The want of such advance is the forsaking of them and abiding in their original nature. When that forsaking is effected the senses become the imitators of the original nature of the thinking principle. Since the senses follow the thinking principle as do bees their king, they all become of its nature. Thus when the thinking principle is subdued these become abstracted.

[The natural tendency of the senses is outwards, towards the objects which are designed for their entertainment, and the great object of the Yoga is to divert them from those objects, in order to bring them to a focus in the thinking principle. When this is effected they cease to act, and are restored to the natural state of the thinking principle of which they are emanations. That natural state, again, is quiescence, and consequently the senses become quiescent, and this is their abstracted state.]

Having described abstraction, which is the imitation of the nature of the thinking principle by the senses, he now describes the fruit of the act.

LV.

Thence the complete subjugation of the senses.

The meaning is—that by the practice of abstraction the senses come so completely under controul that do not proceed, according to their natures, outwards to their respective objects even when excited thereto.

[The chapter opened by enquiring, what the exercise of the Yoga was, and having described in detail that exercise with all its concomitants, it now closes by describing the fruit of that exercise. The fruit is complete subjugation of the senses.]

Thus then has been described the practical exercise of the Yoga which forms the theme of the first chapter. The practical Yoga is first defined (I), then follow its use (II), in the weakening of the afflictions (III), its origin from ignorance (IV), the definition of ignorance (V), do. of afflictions (VI to IX), means of obviating them (X and XI), works, their sources and fruit (XII to XIV), afflictions, their character and why and how they are to be got rid of (XV to XXVII), discriminative knowledge (XXVIII to XLVI), postures, &c., (XLVII to LII), and the advantages thereof (LIII to LV). [Not literally translated, but only the substance of the commentary is given here for reasons elsewhere assigned, p. 58.]

Now this Yoga, through restraints and obligations, assumes the form of a seed, which sprouts through postures and regulation of breath, flowers through abstraction, and bears fruit through contemplation, retention and meditation, and these are explained in this chapter on exercise.

This is the end of the second quarter, or the quarter on practice, of the commentary entitled *Rájamártaṇḍa* on Patanjali's institutes of the Yoga, by the great king, the superior king, the illustrious Bhojadeva.

ADDENDUM.

The note on Aphorism XXXII on page 94 is calculated to mislead unwary readers. The remark that purification and other obligations are common to all persons, whether Yogís or otherwise, is quite correct with reference to the text. The obligations are as imperative on Yogís as they are on householders, and none should neglect them; but purification is here taken in its ordinary acceptation, and does not refer to certain peculiar acts of washing or *S'aucha* which some Yogís, particularly the followers of the Haṭhayoga, recommend. They hold that ordinary washings &c., are not enough. They have accordingly devised complicated, and in some respects very repulsive, forms of purification, which they regard as absolutely necessary as preparatory steps towards the attainment of fixity of seats. These they describe under the collective name of *Shaṭkarma* or "sixfold work," as they are reckoned under six different names. These names are—I., *Dhauti;* II, *Vasti;* III, *Neti;* IV, *Laukikí;* V, *Tráṭaka*, and VI, *Kapálabháti.** These are variously subdivided by the *Gheraṇḍa Sañhitá*, the *Niruttara Tantra*, the *A'diyámala* the *Brahmayámla*, the *Grahayámala*, the *Rudrayámala*, the *S'ivasañhitá*, and other Tantras. I shall follow the first in the following notes :

I. *Dhauti* means washing, and it is known under four different names according to the parts of the body to which it is applied. These are, 1st, *Antardhauti* or washing of the intestines; 2nd, *Dantadhauti* or washing of the teeth; 3rd, *Hṛiddhauti* or washing of the stomach; and 4th, *Múlaśodhana* or washing of the rectum.†

The first is effected in four different ways, *viz.*, (*a*) by contracting the mouth in the form of a crow's bill, and drawing in a full draft of air into the intestines, where it is retained for a time and

* धौतिर्वस्तिस्तथा नेतिः लौकिकी त्राटकं तथा ।
कपालभातिश्चैतानि षट्कर्माणि समाचरेत् ॥

† अन्तर्धौतिर्दन्तधौतिर्हृद्धौतिर्मूलशोधनम् ।
धौतिं चतुर्विधां कृत्वा घटं कुर्वन्तु निर्मलं ॥

then thrown out.* As wind is the means of washing in this case it is called *Vátasára*. (*b*) By drinking a large quantity of water up to the throat, and then forcing it down so as to expel it by the lower orifice.† This is called *Várisára*. I know not how this can be effected, but to the occultist everything is possible. (*c*) By stopping the breath and then striking the navel a hundred times against the vertibral column.‡ This is called *Agnisára*. (*d*) By taking in air through the mouth contracted into the form of a crow's bill, retaining it in the intestines for an hour and a half, and then expelling it through the lower orifice.§ (*Vahiskaraṇa*.)

2nd. The Dental washing includes the purification of the teeth, the tongue, the two ears, and the foramen on the crown of the head.|| For the teeth a dentrifice of catechu or clean earth is recommended as appropriate.¶ For the tongue scraping with the index, the middle and the ring fingers is held sufficient.** For the ears, rubbing the orifices with the index and the ring fingers,†† and for the foramen

* काकचञ्चुवदास्येन पिवेद्वायुं शनैः शनैः ।
चालयेदुदरं पश्चाद्वर्त्मना रेचयेच्छनैः ॥

† आकण्ठं पूरयेद्वारि वक्त्रेण च पिवेच्छनैः ।
चालयेदुदरेणैव चोदराद्रेचयेदधः ॥

‡ नाभिग्रन्थिं मेरुपृष्ठे शतवारञ्च कारयेत् ।
अग्निसारमेषा धौतिर्योगिनां योगसिद्धिदा ।
उदरामयजं त्यक्त्वा जठराग्निं प्रवर्द्धयेत् ॥

§ काकीमुद्रां शोधयित्वा पूरयेदुदरं मरुत् ।
धारयेदर्द्धयामन्तु चालयेदधोवर्त्मना ।
एषा धौतिः परा गोप्या न प्रकाश्या कदाचन ॥

|| दन्तमूलं जिह्वामूलं रन्ध्रञ्च कर्णयुग्मयोः ।
कपालरन्ध्रं पञ्चैता दन्तधौतिर्विधीयते ॥

¶ खादिरेण रसेनाथ मृत्तिकया च शुद्धया ।
मार्ज्जयेद्दन्तमूलञ्च यावत् किल्विषमाहरेत् ॥

** तर्ज्जनीमध्यमानामा अङ्गुलित्रययोगतः ।
वेशयेद्गलमध्ये तु मार्ज्जयेल्लम्बिकामूलम् ।
शनैः शनैर्मार्ज्जयित्वा कफदोषं निवारयेत् ॥

†† तर्ज्जन्यनामिकायोगान्मार्ज्जयेत् कर्णरन्ध्रयोः ।
नित्यमभ्यासयोगेन नादान्तरं प्रकाशयेत् ॥

on the crown of the head rubbing with the thumb are enough.*

3rd. The purification of the stomach is effected in three ways: 1st, by passing the tender leaf-shoot of a plaintain, or a turmeric plant, or a cane, through the mouth into the stomach, and, after shaking it drawing it out (*Daṇḍadhauti*); 2nd, by drinking a large quantity of water and then vomitting it out (*Vamandhauti*); 3rd, by swallowing a strip of cloth three inches wide and fifteen cubits long and then drawing it out (*Vásadhauti*).†

4th. The purification of the rectum (*múlas'odhana*) is effected by washing the part with water aided by a finger or the stalk of a turmeric plant.‡

II. The purification of the fundament (*Vástiśodhana*) is effected by repeatedly contracting the fundament while seated firmly in water up to the navel (*jalavasti*) or on dry land (*sthalavasti*).§

III. *Neti* is the technical name of thread, a span length of which is passed through the nostrils and drawn out from the mouth with a view to purify the nostrils.||

IV. *Laukikí Yoga* is the practice of shaking or swinging the

* दक्षाङ्गुष्ठेन दक्षेण मार्ज्जयेद्भालरन्ध्रकम् ।

† रम्भादण्डं हरिद्रादण्डं वेत्रदण्डं तथैव च ।
हृन्मध्ये चालयित्वा तु पुनः प्रत्याहरेच्छनैः ॥
भोजनान्ते पिबेद्वारि चाकण्ठपूरितं सुधीः ।
ऊर्द्धदृष्टिं क्षणं कृत्वा तज्जलं वमयेत् पुनः ।
नित्यमभ्यासयोगेऽयं कफपित्तं निवारयेत् ॥
चतुरङ्गुलविस्तारं सूक्ष्मवस्त्रं शनैर्ग्रसेत् ।
पुनः प्रत्याहरेदेतत् प्रोच्यते धौतिकर्म्मकम् ॥

‡ पीतमूलस्य दण्डेन मध्यमाङ्गुलिनापि वा ।
यत्नेन क्षालयेद्गुह्यं वारिणा च पुनः पुनः ॥

§ नाभिमग्नजलेपायुं न्यस्तवानुत्कटासनम् ।
आकुञ्चनं प्रसारञ्च जलवस्तिं समाचरेत् ॥
वस्तिं पश्चिमोत्तानेन चालयित्वा शनैरधः ।
अश्विनीमुद्रया पायुमाकुञ्चयेत् प्रसारयेत् ॥

|| वितस्तिमानं सूक्ष्मसूत्रं नासानले प्रवेशयेत् ।
मुखान्निर्गमयेत् पश्चात् प्रोच्यते नेतिकर्म्मकम् ॥

intestines repeatedly from one side to the other.*

V. For the purification of the eyes, the recommendation is that the eyes should be fixed on one point, the tip of the nose for instance, without permitting any twinkling, until tears flow in abundance. This is called *Tráṭaka*.†

VI. Under the last head of *Kapálabháti*, three practices are recommended: 1st, drawing the air through the left nostril and expelling it by the right, and then reversing the operation, and performing it alternately several times, (*Vátakrama*); 2nd, drawing in water by the nostrils and throwing it out by the mouth, (*Vyutkrama*); 3rd, by sucking up water by the mouth and throwing it out by the nostrils, (*S'ítkrama*).‡

The Tantras describe several other modes of purification, and suggest many variations in the rules above quoted; but it is not worth while to quote them, particularly as first class Yogís denounce all such purifications as quite unnecessary, if not actually futile.

* अमन्दवेगे तुन्दञ्च भ्रामयेदुभपार्श्वतः ।
सर्व्वरोगान्निहन्तीह देहानलविवर्द्धनम् ॥

† निमेषोन्मेषकं त्यक्त्वा सूक्ष्मलक्ष्यं निरीक्षयेत् ।
यावदश्रूणि पतन्ति त्राटकं प्रोच्यते बुधैः ॥

‡ इडया पूरयेद्वायुं रेचयेत् पिङ्गला पुनः ।
पिङ्गलया पूरयित्वा पुनश्चन्द्रेण रेचयेत् ॥
पूरकं रेचकं कृत्वा वेगेन न तु चालयेत् ।
एवमभ्यासयोगेन कफदोषं निवारयेत् ॥
नासाभ्यां जलमाकृष्य पुनर्वक्त्रेण रेचयेत् ।
पायं पायं व्युत्क्रमेण श्लेष्मदोषं निवारयेत् ॥
शीत्कृत्य पीत्वा वक्त्रेण नासानालैर्विरेचयेत् ।
एवमभ्यासयोगेन कामदेवसमो भवेत् ॥
न जायते वार्द्धक्यञ्च जरा नैव प्रजायते ।
भवेत् स्वच्छन्ददेहश्च कफदोषं निवारयेत् ॥

CHAPTER THIRD.

May Bhútanátha, (the lord of elements,) by the thought of whose lotus feet, the occult powers of Animá and the rest are attained by thinkers, be to our prosperity !

With a view to describe the three accessories of the Yoga, Dháraṇá, &c., already referred to, (C. II A. xxix) and to explain the external, the internal, and other Siddhis, Patanjali begins this chapter, adverting first to the explanation of the term Sañyama.

[The occult powers *(vibhútis)* are the following: 1, *aṇimá,* "molicularity," extreme minuteness, or parvitude, or invisibility; 2, *Laghimá,* "extreme lightness," levity, tenuity, or incorporeality; 3, *Prápti,* "accessibility," or touching anything at will, as touching the moon with the tip of one's finger; 4, *Prákámya,* "wilfulness," or irresistibility of will, fulfilment of every wish; 5, *Garimá,* "excessive pondrosity," magnitude, or illimitable bulk; 6, *I'śitá* "sovereignty," or supreme dominion over animate and inanimate nature; 7, *Vaśitá,* "subjugation," the power of changing the course of nature; 8, *Kámávasáyitá,* "self-controul," or the power of suppressing all carnal longings. These are also indicated by the term *ṛiddhi,* and also by *siddhi* or perfections. Inasmuch, however, as *siddhi* is applied to other profections it is sometimes qualified by the term *mahá.* The powers are also indicated by the terms *bhúti* and *aiśvarya.*]

Thereof, he describes the nature of steadfastness.

I.

Steadfastness is the confinement of the thinking principle to one place.

"To one place" *(deśe), i. e.,* in the navel-wheel, the tip of the nose, or the like. "Confinement" (*bandha*) of the thinking

principle is making the thinking principle steady (on one object) by excluding (the thought of) all other objects. This (confinement to one place) is called *Dháraṇá* or the steadfastness of the thinking principle.

The meaning is this:—The Yogí, who has purified his internal organ by benevolence and other acts of refining the thinking principle, who has accomplished the restraints and the obligations, who has acquired mastery over his postures, who has subdued the vital airs, who has abstracted himself from the field of the senses, who has conquered the pairs (*cf.* C. II A. XLVIII), should, in a quiet place, and in an erect posture, by fixing it to one object, such as the tip of the nose, produce steadfastness of the thinking principle for the practice of discriminate meditation.

[The preliminary obligations and restraints having been accomplished, and the habit of assuming the various kinds of seats having been acquired, the Yogí should engage himself in training his thinking principle so as to be able to keep it unswervingly steady to any object to which he may wish to direct it; and this unswerving fixity is called Dháraṇá, or steadfastness. This steadfastness cannot be acquired without a substratum. There must be some object to which the thinking principle can be applied, whether it be the tip of the nose, or a plexus of nerves in the belly, or the crown of the head, or the ether, or the sky, for without it, in the preliminary stage, the thinking principle would be wandering. And inasmuch as there must be a substratum, the steadfastness of thinking produced by it comes under the head of discriminate meditation (*samprajnáta-samádhi*). (C. I A. XVII.) Practically it is a state of steady, immovable abstraction, but the word abstraction would be an indirect and not a direct definition of Dháraṇá, inasmuch as abstraction gives prominence to the act of withdrawing or separating, leaving the result of the act in the background, whereas Dháraṇá gives prominence to the fixation of the thinking principle to one point, leaving the separation or withdrawing from other things to be tacitly implied.

The *P. Bháshya* defines "Dháraṇá to be the fixation of the function of the thinking principle on the navel-wheel, or on the lotus of the heart, or on the light in the head, or on the tip of the nose, or on the point of the tongue, or on such other place, or on some external object." (*Nábhichakre hṛidaya-puṇḍaríke múrdhni jyotishi násikágre jíhvágra-ityádishu des'eshu váhye vá vishaye chittasya vṛittimátreṇa bandha iti bandho dháraṇá.*) The "external object" of the commentator is explained by Vijnána Bhikshu to mean the image of a divinity.]

Having defined steadfastness, with a view to define contemplation he says:

II.

Contemplation is unison there of the understanding.

"There," in that place where the thinking principle is confined. "Of the understanding" (*pratyayasya*) of the knowledge. Whatever unison (or harmonious blending) is obtained through the instrumentality of avoiding untoward modifications, and what knowledge constantly arises through dependance on that on which steadfastness is reposed, is called "contemplation" (*dhyána*).

[The word *dhyána* is usually translated into meditation, for it implies that profound and abstract consideration which brings its object fully and undisturbedly before the mind. Inasmuch, however, as there is deliberation and consideration in this act, contemplation appears to me to be a more appropriate equivalent, the highest state of contemplation, which is Samádhi, being indicated by the term meditation.

The *P. Bháshya* defines Dhyána to be "an even current of thought undisturbed by other thoughts." (*Sadris'a praváha-pratyayántareṇáparámṛishṭo dhyánam.*)]

He now describes meditation, the last or highest member of the Yoga.

III.

When that (contemplation), existing as if without its own identity, enlightens solely one object, it is meditation.

"When that," *i. e.* contemplation as defined above (A. II). When "solely one object" is enlightened, *i. e.*, when the object produced by application to the form of an object, negating all other forms of consideration, and the thought appears as if devoid of its own identity, it is called "meditation" (*samádhi*). That which brings the mind together thoroughly, (*samyag-ádhíyate*), *i. e.*, brings it to one centre by avoiding all disturbing causes, is Samádhi.

[The *P. Bháshya* defines Samádhi to be "that in which contemplation so realizes the form of the object contemplated as to make its own identity, as it were, void from the prevalence of the nature of the contemplated object. (*Dhyánameva dhyeyákára-nirbhásam pratyayátmakena svarúpeṇa sunyamiva yadá bhavati dhyeya-svabháváves'át tadá samádhiri-tyuchyate*). As stated in the foregoing note, Samádhi is only a more advanced state of contemplation than Dhyána. In the latter the ideas of other objects besides the one contemplated are subdued and kept down, but not entirely suppressed; but in the former it is so complete that not only exteraneous ideas are suppressed, but even the distinction between the thinking and the thought are lost, so that the former, as it were, merges into the latter, and nothing but thought remains. Such being the case, the body ceases to be influenced by external stimuli, and a state of catalepsy or trance is produced. Hence it is that Samádhi is not unfrequently translated into trance or catalepsy. Catalepsy, however, takes note of only the cessation of the organic functions, leaving unnoticed the state of the thinking principle, whereas Samádhi brings the intensity of the thinking to the fore, without caring for the organic functions, and the English equivalent used should therefore convey this idea. Medi-

tation it is true does not give the measure of the intensity, but since that intensity varies greatly under different circumstances, meditation is by itself enough for ordinary use.]

In order to supply for use in his work a technical term for the three constituents above described, he says:

IV.

The three together constitute *Sañyama.*

In this S'ástra the application of the three operations of contemplation, (*dhyána*) steadfastness (*dháraṇá*), and meditation (*Samádhi*), to one object is indicated by the use of the term Sañyama.

[The word Sañyama is formed of the intensitive particle *sam* prefixed to *yama* "restraint," and means vow, binding or confinement, and in this work indicates the absolute restriction of one's self to the practice of the three means of accomplishing the Yoga. In connexion with the ceremonial of the Smṛiti, it is used to indicate the day preceding that of the rite itself, because on that day the performer has to place himself under certain restrictions about food, drink, and occupation, the nature of which varies according to the character of the rites. The word is defined with a view to prepare it for subsequent use as a technical term for the three most important acts of Yoga.]

The fruit thereof.

V.

From success thereof comes the light of understanding.

"Thereof," *i. e.*, of Sañyama. "From success" from its becoming similar (*i. e.*, freely blending with each other so as to be the same) by practice. "Understanding" (*prajñá*), *i. e.*, the nature of the object to be known. The "Light" (*áloka*), (understanding) expands. The meaning is—that which has to be known becomes thoroughly manifest.

[The purport is obvious. When a person is proficient in performing the threefold acts of Sañyama, he attains the light of understanding, or the power of knowing thoroughly the nature of the object to which he directs his attention.]

Its application.

VI.

It is to be applied according to its stages.

According to "its," *i. e.*, of the Sañyama, "Stages" (*bhúmi*), it should be applied to the varying conditions of grossness and subtileness of the substratum of the function of the thinking principle. The Sañyama should be practised in a higher stage after subduing or attaining proficiency, or knowing thoroughly, the lower stages of the thinking principle, for the fruition is not effected by practicing the Sañyama in the highest stage without first bringing into controul the lower ones.

[The subject matter of this aphorism is a mere detail: it is the rule that Sañyama should not be attempted for the higher stages of perfection until after it has been practised in the lower stages, *i. e.*, it is to be practised step by step according to the different stages into which the career of the Yogí is divided. See C. II A. xxvii.]

A doubt having arisen why in the chapter on the appliances (C. II) he should have described only five after naming the eight members of the Yoga, and omitted three, the author says:

VII.

The three are more intimate than the former.

"Than the former," *i. e.*, of restrictions and other members of the Yoga, which are the appliances of meditation in a secondary degree. (C. II A. xxix.) The three members, steadfastness, &c., "are intimate" (*antarañga*, lit. akin,) to descriminate meditation, since they establish the true character of meditation.

[In C. II A. xxix. the accessories of the Yoga have been described to be restraint, obligations, postures, regulation of breath, devotion, steadfastness, contemplation, and meditation. Of these the first five are subsidiary or ancillary to, and the last three integral parts, lit. members of the body of, the Yoga, and this idea is developed in the aphorism under notice by the statement that the former are strangers and the latter intimates. The first five only prepare a person for the performance of the Yoga, but the last three constitute the Yoga, for without them there can be no discriminate Yoga having a specific object of thought.]

To point out that it is nevertheless a stranger compared to another, he says:

VIII.

It is still a stranger to the seedless.

"To the seedless" (*nirvíjasya*), *i. e.*, to the meditation which depends on nothing, or carries on pondering with reference to vacuity. To it the threefold members of the Yoga are strangers, (*vahiranga*,) because they are only secondarily subservient.

[Having in the next preceding aphorisms described the last three of the eight members of the Yoga, to be essential to the Yoga, the author makes a distinction, by saying that though they are essential in the case of discriminate meditation, or that in which there is a specific object of thought, they are not so when the Yogí, rising above all specific objects, makes vacuity (*s'únya*) the object of his pondering. This form of meditation is called "seedless" (*cf.* C. I, A. LXI), and it needs no aid and can derive no help from steadfastness, contemplation and objective meditation.]

Having now clearly explained the subject of Sañjama, wishing to disclose the nature of perfection of the different members of Yoga, he describes successively the three modifications.

IX.

The suppressive modification is the moment of conjunction of the thinking principle with suppres-

sion on the overthrow and success of the twofold residua of waking and suppression.

"Waking" (*vyutthána*) includes the three conditions of agitation, bewilderment, and voluptuousness. "Suppression" (*nirodha*) is that modification of the thinking principle in which the quality of goodness becomes a part of it, or retires to it. When successively the "overthrow" (*avibhava*) and success "prevalence" (*prádurbhāva*) of the residua of the two, *i. e.*, of the waking and the suppressive conditions, are produced, then at the moment of "suppression," the conjunction (*anvaya*) which takes place from the thinking principle having then both functions is called "suppressive modification" (*nirodhapariṇāma*). "Overthrow" is the condition of incapacity to perform work, there being a contempt for it. "Prevalence" is the condition of manifestation in the present condition. The meaning is this:—When the residua cognate to waking are pacified, and the residua of suppression are prevailing and the thinking principle appears connected with both from its being the substratum of quality, then that state is indicated by the word suppressive modification (*nirodhapariṇáma*).

Although there is no stillness of the thinking principle when affected by the functions of the qualities, nevertheless this modification is called *still* or *motionless*.

[Having explained the exact position of the threefold exercise of Sañyama, the author now proceeds to describe what follows that exercise, and in doing so first defines three terms, and the first of them is suppressive modification (*nirodhapariṇáma*).. This is defined to be the time when all the residua of the waking state being overthrown, the thinking principle begins to be worked by the residua of the suppressive state; it is the moment of transition from the one condition to the other that the term indicates. The *P. Bháshya* thus defines the term: "the residua of the waking state are the attributes of the thinking principle, but they are not intelligent. The residua of suppression, produced by the intelligence of the suppressive state, are also the

attributes of the thinking principle. On the overthrow and the success of the two, the residua of the waking state are put down, those of the suppressive state rise up, and there is then a correlation of the thinking principle, and the changes, thus constantly occurring in a thinking principle is suppressive modification." (*Vyutthána-sañskáráśchittadharmá na te pratyayátmaká iti, pratyaya-nirodhena niruddhá nirodhasañskárá api chittadharmáh, tayorabhibhava-prádurbhávau vyutthána-sañskárá híyante nirodha-sañskárá ádhíyante, nirodhakshaṇam chittamanveti tad ekasya chittasya pratikshaṇamidam sañskáráṇyathátvam nirodha-pariṇamah.*)

In explaining the text, Bhoja uses a term which, as playing an important part in subsequent explanations, requires a few words of comment. The word is *vartamánádhvan,* a compound of *vartamán* "present" and *adhvan* "a road," but here "time" (*adhvas'abda kálavachanah,*) which I have rendered into "present condition." The theory is that every image, shape, or idea exists from eternity in a latent form; circumstances make it manifest, and when those circumstances are overcome it reverts to its former condition. The first is *anágatádhvan,* or the unmanifest or antecedent condition; the second or what we see is the *vartamánádhvan,* or the present condition; and the third is *atítádhvan,* or the postcedent condition, which is reversion to the first condition. The image existed in the marble in a latent condition; the sculptor brings it to its present condition, and when it is broken it passes on to its postcedent condition. This theory is the same which prevailed in Greece in ancient times. Thus, says Sir William Hamilton: "Plato agreed with the rest of the ancient philosophers in this—that all things consist of matter and form; and that the matter of which all things were made, existed from eternity, without form; but he likewise believed that there are eternal forms of all possible things which exist, without matter; and to those eternal and immaterial forms he gave the name of ideas. In the Platonic sense, then, *ideas* were the patterns according to which the Deity fashioned the

phenomenal or ectypal world." So Tiberghien, (*Essai des Connoissance humane,* p. 207,) "Seneca considered *ideas,* according to Plato, as the *eternal exemplars* of things, Cicero as their *form,* Diogenes Laertius as their *cause* and *principle,* Aristotle as *substances.*"

The word *sañskára,* which, for the sake of uniformity, I have rendered into residua, would have been more pointed here if translated into idea.]

The fruit thereof.

X.

Its tranquil flow from residual habit.

"Its," of the thinking principle, "tranquil flow" (*pras'ánta-váhitá*) is produced by the residua of the suppression aforesaid. The meaning is, from voluptuousness being removed the thinking principle flows in its own modification.

[The advantage derived from the suppressive modification is that, when it is attained, the thinking principle becomes tranquil, and abides in its own nature, that is, it is no longer subject to agitation from the prevalence of the adverse qualities of foulness and bewilderment.]

Having described suppressive modification, he now defines meditative modification.

XI.

The destruction of multifunctionality and enlivenment of concentration of the thinking principle is meditative modification.

"Multifunctionality" (*sarvárthatá*) is the quality of voluptuousness of the thinking principle, which results from its accepting many objects from its versatility. When one object is depended upon there is a similar modification, and it is "concentration," and that too is a quality of the thinking principle. The "destruction" and "enlivenment" (*kshaya* and *udaya*) of the two are successive, *i. e.*, the destruction or extreme overthrow of the quality of multifunctionality and the enlivenment or full mani-

festation of the quality of concentration are successive. The condition in which there is a junction of the two in the thinking principle, when it has the quality of goodness in excess, is called "meditative modification" (*samádhi-pariṇáma*). This is distinct from the former, (*i. e.*, suppressive meditation). In the former there are the overthrow and the prevalence of the two residua, *i. e.*, the contempt for the nature of the former waking residua and the prevalence in an unsubdued state of the latter or the residua of suppression. In this, however, there is destruction and full enlivenment. Destruction is entrance into the condition beyond that of reproduction, of the voluptuousness of multifunctionality, from extreme hatred. Enlivenment of the quality of concentration is its manifestation in the present condition.

[Suppressive modification as defined in A. IX, is confined to the point of time when the waking state passes on to the suppressive state; but in the meditative modification, there is a farther advance. The waking state has then been entirely overcome, and the meditative state is in full prevalence. The one is the commencement, and the other the consummation, of the eondition of meditation. The *P. Bháshya* explains this by saying "multifunctionality is an attribute of the thinking principle, so is concentration; the meaning is there is destruction or disappearance of multifunctionality and the enlivenment or manifestation of concentration." (*Sarvárthatá chittadharmah ekágratá chittadharmah, sarváratáyáh kshayastirobháva ityarthah, ekágratáyá udaya ávirbháva ityarthah.*) Briefly this is a higher state of concentration.]

The third or the concentrative modification.

XII.

The concentrative modification of the thinking principle is that in which both the tranquil and the enlivened conditions are equally recognized.

Unity of idea is a special function of the abstracted thinking principle. "Tranquil" (*śánta*) is that which has entered the postcedent condition. "Enlivened" (*udita*) is manifestation in the present condition. From the thinking principle being in a collected state, the two are equal, and from their object being one, are similar cognitions (*pratyayas*). When the collected thinking principle abides correlated with both it is called concentrative modification.

[In the suppressive modification the worldly state is just passing away, and the meditative state is just commencing, and the thinking principle is becoming tranquil; in the meditative state the first stage is passed, and concentration is in prevalence or fully enlivened; and when the tranquil and the enlivened conditions are in full play, the condition is called the concentrative modification. The *P. Bháshya* explains this by saying, "of the controlled thinking principle, the first cognition is tranquillity, and the next after it is a similar one that of enlivenment, and the thinking principle in meditation is correlated to both, in the same way" (*samáhita-chittasya púrva-pratyayah śánta uttarastat-sadriśa uditah samádhi-chittamubhayo-ranugatam punastathaiva*). As in the last case so here, we have in this an advance over the last preceding condition.]

Having described the forms of the modification of the thinking principle, he assigns them to other subjects.

XIII.

By this the modifications of property, time, and relation in elements and organs have been described.

"By this," *i. e.*, by the threefold exposition of the modifications of the thinking principle (A. IX, XI, XII.). "In elements," (*bhúteshu,*) both the gross and the subtile. "In the organs" existing severally as Intellect, organs of function, and internal organ. It is to be understood that the three modifications of property, time, and relation have been described (by the above aphorisms).

When, on the cessation of a former property, the subject undergoes the modification of another property, even as the subject clay, forsaking the form of an undefined mass, assumes another property, that of a jar, it is called the modification of property (*Dharmapariṇáma*). The "modification of time" (*Lakshaṇa-pariṇáma*) (is thus indicated)—when that jar, giving up its antecedent condition, assumes its present condition, or forsaking it, takes up its postcedent condition. The modification of relation (*Avastháparináma*) is the correlation of the jars, in the first and the second conditions, for the train of the functions of qualities is always moving, and does not remain unchanging for even a moment.

[This aphorism applies the theory of eternity of ideas enunciated in the three preceding aphorisms to things in general. The object is to show that even as in ideas, latency, manifestation, and disappearance follow successively, so in the thinking principle ideas appear and disappear under particular circumstances without radically changing its original nature. Change in matter is not absolute, nor radical conversion of one thing into another, but a modification of property, or of time, or of relation. A mass of clay converted into a jar is a change of property, and not of the radical elements of clay. This change is next altered by time, as the breaking of a jar into potsherds; and there is a further change going on in its condition, and the new jar of yesterday is not the same with the jar we see to day, for there has been some change in it since yesterday, for change is constant and cannot be retarded for a moment. The first change is called *Dharmapariṇáma,* the modification of property. The second is *Lakshaṇapariṇáma,* the modification of time. The word *lakshaṇa* ordinarily means a sign or character, but it has been explained by commentators to mean time (*kálabheda*). The third is *Avastháparinánma* or change of relation.]

Now, a doubt arising as to what the property is, he defines the nature of the propertied, *i. e.,* the subject.

XIV.

The subject is the correlative of the qualities of tranquillity, enlivening, and latency.

"The tranquil" (*śántáh*) (qualities) are those which, having performed their respective functions, have entered the postcedent condition. "The enlivened" (*uditáh*) qualities are those which, forsaking the antecedent condition, perform their functions in the present condition. "The latent," (*avyapadeśyáh*) qualities are those which, abiding potentially, do not produce action. Thus everything is comprised in everything, and so on. By the word property (*dharma*) is implied that simple potentiality which abides distinctly correlated as effect and cause. Whatever proceeds and admits of correlation with that threefold quality is called the "propertied" (*dharmí*) which is the subject of tranquillity, enlivening and latency. Thus gold, giving up the quality of the form of a necklace and assuming that of the form of a svastika cross, still appears as a golden form, *i. e.*, when in these slightly different characters the subject appears as a common property, it is subject, but when it abides as a distinct mode it is a property, and therefore it is described as the correlative of qualities.

[Properties do not always exist in the same form in the same way. Sometimes they are tranquil, at others active, or enlivened, and sometimes latent, and these properties are called *dharma*, and the thing with which they are correlated is the "propertied," or the substratum of qualities, or *Dharmi*—that which has the *Dharma*. A thing cannot be called a subject until it is correlated to a property, and a property ceases to be so when it qualifies nothing. On the other hand, by change of relation a subject may become a property and a property a subject—a subjective law or its objective outcome.]

To remove the doubt as to how a single (propertied) subject undergoes many modifications he says:

XV.

The diversity of succession is the cause of the versatility of modifications.

Krama or "succession" of property as defined above and *anyatva*, "diversity," which is every moment visible, make the compound *Kramányatva*, (which has been rendered into "diversity of succession" in the text). And that is the "cause" (*hetu*), mark, or indicator of the (*anyatva*) or multiplicity or diversity of the modifications aforesaid. The meaning is this: Constant motion or succession, as from powdered earth into clay mass, thence flattened plates, thence a jar, shows the manifest form of the versatility of modifications. And whatever the motion in the subject of the modifications of time and condition, the same should be understood to be the argument in support of the versatility of modification. For certain all conditions appear constantly changing by constant motion, and the versatility of modification from constant mutability is thereby established. Of all mutable objects, like the thinking principle and the rest, some qualities are grasped by perception, such as pleasures, conditions and the like, and some are known by inference, such as fate, residuum, power, &c., and the propertied subject not being distinct from property is to be explained in the same way.

[Both the text and the commentary explain the subject in a very roundabout way. The purport is that the diversity of phenomena in the versatile world, is due to constant motion, or uninterrupted succession of changes. The three qualities are never at rest, they are flowing in a constant round of changes, and every change brings on some change of property, for were not properties to change, there would be no perceivable change. And the thinking principle, associated directly with the functions of the three qualities, must accordingly with these changes, be the agent of a multiplicity of functions, and that is its multifunctionality. The changes under notice are either perceivable

by the senses, organs, or felt by the mind, but in both cases they apply to the thinking principle.]

Now, with a view to describe Siddhi (perfection) by showing the object of the Sañyama already described, he says:

XVI.

The knowledge of the past and the future is acquired by Sañyama over the threefold modification.

The threefold modification resulting from distinctions of attribute, time and relation has been already described. By the Sañyama, *i. e.*, by practising the controuls aforesaid in connexion with this object, Yogís acquire a full knowledge of the past and the future. The purport is this: When a Yogí, knowing that in any given subject this is the attribute, this is the time, this is the relation, and it having performed its work in the present condition has entered the postcedent condition, performs the Sañyama by surmounting the obstructions, he knows everything, all that is passed, or that is to happen, because from the manifestation of the pure quality of goodness in the thinking principle, he then constantly rejects all obstacles caused by ignorance to the power of perceiving the purport of all and everything. When by these means all obstacles have been set aside, then, through concentration, the power of perceiving the property of all and everything becomes manifest as in a stainless mirror.

[Having explained the rationale of the action of the thinking principle on worldly objects, the author now proceeds to describe the effect of Sañyama on that action, and the occult powers which may be derived by that exercise. The first occult power or perfection noticed is the power of knowing the past and the future. This is acquired by directing the Sañyama to the threefold changes described in A. XIII, *i. e.*, by meditating about them till the light of truth rises in the thinking principle of the Yogí and makes everything manifest.]

He describes another kind of perfection.

XVII.

A confused comprehension of word, meaning, and knowledge (arises) from indiscriminate understanding. By Sañyama with due discrimination, (is acquired an understanding) of the cry of all creatures.

A "word" (*śabda*) is a sound formed of letters joined in a fixed order, perceptible by the organ of hearing, and always conveying the same, single, distinct meaning; or it is a mere explosive sound having in it no fixed order, but still intelligible to cultivated understanding. In either case it forms words and sentences, for both are adapted to convey a fixed meaning. "Meaning" (*artha*) implies kind, quality, action, &c. "Understanding" (*pratyaya*) is knowledge, or the function of the intellect in which it assumes the form of the object (implied). By accepting in our intellect these naturally distinct word, meaning and understanding as one, there is confusion. Thus, in saying "bring a cow," the meaning is a cow (*go*), belonging specifically to the species cow, and having dewlap, &c.; the word is the indicator; and the understanding is the appreciation of it; and all these are grasped without any distinction. It is not used with a clear perception of the word cow being the indicator, the meaning being what is indicated by the word, and the understanding that which accepts the two; and if one is asked what is the meaning? what is the word? what is the understanding produced by it? he gives only one answer to all the questions by saying 'a cow.' Were he not to conceive all these to be identical, how could he give the same answer to all the questions? In this state he who makes the "distinction," (*pravibhága*) that the essential nature of a word is that it is the indicator (*váchaka*), that of its meaning is the indicated, and that of the understanding is making it manifest, and, making this distinction, places himself in Sañyama about it, acquires the knowledge of the cry (*ruta*) or word of all creatures, including feral and domestic quadrupeds, birds, reptiles, &c., *i. e.*,

he knows with what particular motive a specific sound has been made by a particular animal.

[Words are correlated with meanings, and meanings with ideas. When sounds are reduced to speech there is a fixed relation between their constituents, and this relation is fixed by orthography and syntax; but when, in the cry of an animal for instance, this relation of sounds does not appear to be so fixed, it is not to be understood that there is no such relation, for without it the sounds could not convey meaning and idea. And the relation being admitted, it must follow that the cry of animals, which are intended to convey ideas, must have some such relation, and this relation can be learnt by directing the Sañyama to it. Ergo when the Sañyama is accomplished, the Yogí who performs it is able to understand the meaning of the cries of animals.]

He describes another form of perfection.

XVIII.

A knowledge of former existence by making the residua apparent.

Twofold are the residual impressions of the thinking principle. Some are simply productive of memory; others are the causes of the deserts, kind, life, and enjoyment, called virtue and vice. When Sañyama is performed in regard to these residua, the performer, enquiring into his former actions to the effect—thus has that object been perceived by me, thus has that act been performed by me, remembers all the past by the mere reflection, the residua being by themselves excited without any separate stimulants, and gradually visibly sees in the self-excited residua the kind, &c., experienced in former existences.

[As explained in A. xviii, C. I., the residual impressions are of a twofold character. One class of them produce memory, that is when excited by a stimulus, the impressions which lie latent in the mind become vivid, even as an action done in childhood and afterwards entirely forgotten, is brought up in the mind many years after by the sight of the locality or other circumstance

connected with it. Involuntary impressions received in dreams and the like are also so produced. The second class of impressions are those which bring on the desert of works; they are perfectly involuntary, and are mostly residua of former existences. By applying Sañyama to these, they are excited and become visible to the Yogí, and thereby he is able to know the events of his former existences.]

Another form of perfection.

XIX.

With reference to cognition, a knowledge of another's thinking principle.

"Cognition" (*pratyaya*) as indicated by some characteristic sign, such as the complexion and the like, of others. When a Yogí has performed the Sañyama with reference to it, he attains a knowledge of another's thinking principle. The meaning is, that one's own thinking principle, by entering the thinking principle of another, comes to know all its attributes, whether it is excited or otherwise.

[The principle explained above applies also to the thinking principles of other persons. The Sañyama applied to them brings them within the range of the understanding of the Yogí. The theory being that the thinking principle which thinks upon a thing assumes the form of that thing, it follows that the mind of the Yogí performing the Sañyama becomes the mind thought of, and thereby knows it.]

He now describes a peculiarity in the knowledge of other thinking principles.

XX.

(But) not along with its object, that not being the object (of the thinker).

But he is not able to know another's thinking principle (in the text represented by the pronoun it) "along with its object" (*sálambana*), *i. e.*, along with the object to which it is directed,

because none of the characteristics of the object is made the subject (of the Sañyama). From the characteristic of the object not being reflected upon the thinking principle alone of another is known, but not that it is blue or yellow, because Sañyama cannot be directed to that which has not been made the object of it, and there can be no recognition where it is not made the object. Hence another thinking principle along with its object is not cognizable, the object not being taken into account. Now, the qualities of the thinking principle will be included. When contemplation is made as to what is the object, then from that Sañyama a knowledge of the whole subject is acquired.

[This aphorism qualifies the sense of the next preceding one. It says that by thinking on the thinking principle of another one can know it, but not its objects, unless those objects are also included. When they are included the knowledge is perfect.]

He describes another perfection.

XXI.

From Sañyama with reference to the shape of the body, the power of vision being benumbed, and the correlation of light and sight being severed, there is disappearance.

The "body" (*káya*) is the human frame, and its shape (*rúpa*) is that quality of it which is perceptible by the eye. The meaning is—of such a body such is the shape. Through Sañyama the power of the eye to perceive things becoming 'benumbed' (*stambha*), *i. e.*, obstructed through contemplation with reference to that shape, and "the correlation of light and sight being severed," *i. e.*, the luminousness of the eye which proceeds from the quality of goodness being "severed," or rendered incapable of performing its function, there is a disappearance of a Yogi, *i. e.*, none can see him. By this it should be known that the disappearance of sounds &c. is also implied, *i. e.*, by this exposition of the means of the

disappearance of shape, &c., the disappearance of sounds, &c., the objects of the ears, &c., is described.

[Objects are perceivable by the light which the quality of goodness throws on them, but if this light be withdrawn by the quality of goodness being confined in the thinking principle, they cease to be so. Accordingly, when a Yogí performs Sañyama with reference to his body or any part of it he withdraws therefrom the quality of goodness, and the body or the part of it so acted upon ceases to have the quality of perceptibility, and the Yogí becomes invisible, inaudible, &c. When an object has no power of visibility in it, it necessarily becomes invisible. This is how the Yogí makes himself invisible.]

He describes another form of perfection.

XXII.

Works are deliberate and non-deliberate, and by Sañyama about them a knowledge of the final end; or by portents.

Life is the consequence of former works. They are of two kinds, "deliberate" and "non-deliberate." Thereof the "deliberate" or anticipatory (*sopakrama*) is that in which there is an anticipation of consequences in the attempt to produce a result, as in the spreading of wet cloth in a hot place in order that it may dry quickly. The reverse of the former is the "non-deliberate" (*nirupakrama*), as the leaving the same cloth in a lump in a cool place where it may dry after a long time. Whoever performs Sañyama with reference to these two kinds of work, (enquiring) 'whether my work will mature quickly or slowly,' in him, through firm contemplation, a knowledge of the final end is produced. "Final end" (*aparánta*) is the separation of the body from the soul, *i. e.*, death. A "knowledge of it," *i. e.*, 'at such a time, at such a place my death shall happen,' he acquires with certainty.

"Or by portents" (*arishṭebhyvas*). Portents are of three kinds, spiritual (*ádhyátmika*), material, (*ádhibhautika*) and supernatural (*ádhidaivika*). The spiritual is that (which is conveyed in a spiritual way, as) when one with the ears closed does not hear the sound of the vital air in the stomach, or such like (the said sound being ordinarily audible). The material is the sudden sight of a frightful human form, or the like. The supernatural is the accidental sight of invisible things, such as paradise, &c. By them one knows the time of death. Although knowledge may be acquired through portents by other than Yogís, it is in their case general and doubtful. In the case of Yogís, on the other hand, the time and place being certain, the perception is as certain as actual sight.

[The efficacy of this Siddhí depends upon the precision with which the events of past existences are realised in the mind by reviving their residua through the power of Sañyama. When their memory is perfect, one can easily calculate which of his former acts will bring on death within a short time, and which are destined to retard it. It will be seen that in the Yoga system residua or deserts play the part of fate, and if the nature of the residua be known, one knows his fate.]

In order to explain the perfection acquired by the purifying processes (Chap. I, A. XXXIII, p. 40) he says:

XXIII.

In friendliness, superhuman powers.

By performing Sañyama in regard to friendliness, mercy, complaisance, and indifference, super-human powers are acquired with reference to them, *i. e.*, in the performer friendliness, mercy, and complaisance attain such great excellence as to enable him to contract friendship with all (persons).

[The sense is obvious, and needs no comment.]

He describes another kind of perfection.

XXIV.

In powers, the powers of the elephant and the like.

By performing Sañyama with reference to the powers of the elephant and the like, powers like those of the elephant, &c., become manifest in the Yogí. The meaning is this: He who performs Sañyama in regard to the power of the elephant, the force of the wind, or the vigour of the lion, wishing it to be in him, becomes possessed of those powers.

[As obvious as the purport of the last preceding aphorism.]

Another perfection.

XXV.

From contemplation of the light of the extremely luminous disposition, a knowledge (is acquired) of the subtile, the intercepted and the remote.

The light of the extremely luminous disposition has already been described. (C. I, A. xxxvi). The "light" is that which expands the manifestation of the quality of goodness. From "contemplation" (*nyása*) of all things appertaining to it, *i. e.*, from thinking of the objects irradiated by it, a knowledge is produced, in one's own internal organ and the organs of sense endowed with special power, of the "subtile" (*súkshma*) such as atoms, &c., of the "intercepted" (*vyavahita*), as mines under the earth, and of the remote (*viprakrishṭa*), as the elixir of life existing on the other side of the Meru mountain.

[The clear light of the quality of goodness is what is meant by "the light of the extremely luminous disposition."]

Another perfection of a similar description.

XXVI.

From Sañyama in the sun, a knowledge of regions.

He who performs Sañyama with reference to the manifest sun, obtains a definite knowledge of whatever regions and towns exist in the seven spheres, including the terrine, the aërial, and the celestial. In the preceding aphorism the subject is the

manifestation of the quality of goodness, here it is material, that is the distinction.

[The *P. Bháshya* gives a long account of the seven principal regions and their subsidiaries, taken from the Puráṇas, but it is not worth quoting. In Wilson's Vishṇu Puráṇa the details are given at length.]

Another perfection by means of reliance on material manifestation.

XXVII.

In the moon, a knowledge of the disposition of the stars.

By performing Sañyama with reference to the moon, a knowledge is derived of the disposition (*vyúha*), or the order of arrangement, of the starry luminaries. As the stars lose their light on the manifestation of the sun, Sañyama with reference to the sun cannot suffice to afford a knowledge of the stars, therefore a different means is (here) ordained.

[The reason given why the Sañyama with reference to the sun does not suffice to give an idea of the arrangement of the stars and planets appears ludicrous. Bhoja cannot have seen a star in day light. The *P. Bháshya* does not refer to it.]

Another perfection.

XXVIII.

In the Polar star, a knowledge of their motion.

A knowledge is produced of the "motion" (*gati*) of the particular time and position of each of the stars by performing Sañyama with reference to the Polar star (*Dhruva*), the chief, the fixed star. This is a star, that is a planet, this is the period within which it will reach a particular constellation,—all these are known. What is said is that this is the fruit of knowing their times.

[The *P. Bháshya* adds that the Sañyama applied to the firmanent above suffices the pupose. (*U'rddha-vímáneshu kṛita-*

sañyamastáni vijáníyát). It is not obvious why Bhoja has omitted this.]

After having described perfections regarding externals, he now attempts to describe internal perfections.

XXIX.

In the navel-wheel, a knowledge of the disposition of the body.

A knowledge is acquired by the Yogí who has performed Sañyama with reference to the "wheel" (*chakra*) of sixteen radii which exists in the middle of the body, and is called "navel" (*nábhi*), of the "disposition" (*vyúha*) obtaining in the body of fluids, excrements, humours, tubes, &c. What is said is this—the navel-wheel, situated in the middle of the body, is the root of all the widespread tubes, therefore by knowing it, one fully understands how they are disposed in the body.

[Down to the last aphorism the effect of Sañyama applied to external objects formed the theme of comment; now the author turns to objects situated within the body. The first is the navel-wheel, which is said to have sixteen radii. How this idea got into currency I cannot make out. Ancient Hindus must have seen the human abdomen dissected, and having seen it, it is impossible to imagine, how they conjured up the idea of a wheel with sixteen radii. There must be some recondite metaphor involved in this, but I know not what it is.]

Another perfection.

XXX.

In the throat-well, the subdual of hunger and thirst.

The well in the throat is "throat-well" (*kaṇṭhakúpa*). It is a pit or well-like place (and therefore called a well) behind and below the tongue and palate. By the contact of the vital airs with it (the sensations of) hunger and thirst are produced. The hunger

and thirst of the Yogí who has performed Sañyama with reference to that well, are subdued. The streams (of the vital airs) being satisfied below the uvula, this kind of perfection is accomplished.

[The throat-well is the pharynx where the air from the mouth and that from the cavity of the nostrils meet.]

Another perfection.

XXXI.

Firmness in the tortoise tube.

Firmness of the mind is acquired by performing Sañyama with reference to the tube, called the "tortoise" (*kúrma*), which is situated below the throat-well. The meaning is—that on the mind entering that spot there happens no vacillation, in other words, such a firmness of the body is produced that no one can cause it to shake.

[The tortoise tube is the lower part of the larynx including the bronchí.]

Another perfection.

XXXII.

In the coronal light, vision of perfected ones.

In the skull there is an aperture called *Brahma-randhra*. It is called "light" (*jyotih*) because it is the site of light. Even as the spreading effulgence of a jewel in a closed room collects at the keyhole, so the light of the quality of goodness in the heart spreading collects at that aperture. And by the performance of Sañyama in it by Yogís, those perfected ones, or celestial beings, who dwell in the space between the earth and the sky and are invisible to ordinary people, become visible, *i. e.*, Yogís see them, and hold converse with them. This is the meaning.

[The point at the crest of the frontal bone remains open in childhood when the parietal bones are not sufficiently developed; at maturity this opening is closed; but, its existence having once been proved, it is believed to exist always, and is called Brahma-

randhra. Life is said to depart through this aperture in certain cases, and spiritually it is reckoned to be the most important part of the body. In the Tantras it is referred to with great reverence.

This is the only aphorism in the Yoga system which may be assumed as recognising the truth of the spiritual manifestations of modern European spiritualists; the *rationale*, however, is entirely different.]

He now describes the means of becoming all-knowing.

XXXIII.

Or from *Prátibha*, everything.

Pratibhá is that knowledge which is independent of cause, produced solely in the mind, uncontradictory, and suddenly evolved. By performing Sañyama with reference to it this *Prátibha* knowledge, called *Táraka* or emancipator, which results before the manifestation of thorough knowledge, arises. Even as the light which becomes apparent before the rising sun, so this *Táraka*, or knowledge of everything before the manifestation of thorough knowledge, becomes apparent. When this is the case, the Yogí can know everything without resource to any particular Sañyama.

[The *P. Bháshya* explains the word *Prátibha* by the phrase *Prátibham náma tárakam*, which may mean the Morning Star, the one which is visible a little before sunrise, or that it is an emancipator. Patanjali, perhaps, referred to the star, as the light of that star prepares the way for the illumination of the universe by the sun; but Bhoja, having set a limit to external objects at the close of the 28th aphorism, is compelled to take the Pratibhá to be something different. According to his definition, it is a sort of instinct, or intuition, "the knowledge which is independant of cause, produced solely in the mind, uncontradictory, and suddenly evolved." He has, nevertheless, been obliged to preserve the relation of the star to the sun by referring to the illumination resulting from sunrise. The

morning star is not, like the Polar star, always the same, different planets serving its place at different times, and this uncertainty must have told against the material meaning being accepted as the right one. Whether the practising Yogí should think on the morning star, or intuition is a question which I cannot decide, but Bhoja has obviously the best of the argument.]

Another perfection.

XXXIV.

In the heart, a consciousness of the thinking principle.

"Heart" (*hṛidaya*) is a particular part of the body. The locale of the internal organ is within a small, inverted lotus placed in that part of the body. By performing Sañyama with reference to it, a knowledge of the thinking principle of one's own and of another person is obtained, *i. e.,* the Yogí comes to know all the residua in his own thinking principle, as well as the passions, &c., in other thinking principles.

[The description of the heart is obviously rhetorical. As the seat of the thinking principle it is described as the must appropriate spot to which attention should be directed to know it thoroughly.]

Another perfection.

XXXV.

Experience is an undefined conception of the quality of goodness and the soul, which are totally unconnected. From Sañyama for its own object, and not for another's object, proceeds a knowledge of the soul.

"The quality of goodness" (*sattva*) is a particular modification of nature (*pradhána*); it is characterised by illumination and joy. 'Soul' (*purusha*) is the experiencer in the form of a ruler. From the distinction of the experiencer and the experience,—

of the rational and the irrational—there is total unconnection between the two, *i. e.,* they are separate. "A conception" of the two without any distinction, not knowing them distinctly, is experience. Hence whatever consciousness of pleasure and pain is felt by the quality of goodness assuming itself to be the master is experience. Goodness having no object of its own, its work is for "another's object," (*parártha*), *i. e.,* for the object of the soul. That which is distinct from it is its "own object," (*svártha*); which is reliance on the true nature of the soul, or the connection of the shadow of the soul with the quality of goodness (*sattva*) devoid of egotism. By the performance of Sañyama in that connection, a knowledge of the object of the soul is derived, *i. e.,* the soul knows reliant perception to be in this way dependant on the quality of goodness. Nor does there arise any difficulty about the soul, the knower, becoming the object of knowledge, for the objection will be met by the argument of knowability (*i. e.,* that which is the knower cannot be the knowable); because the knower and the knowable are quite contrary.

[The soul is the experiencer of joys and sorrows; it experiences them by its being reflected on the intellect, which is the immediate experiencer. The two are essentially different; one is sentient, the other inert; one the enjoyer, the other the enjoyed. An association of the two is brought about by the former being reflected on the latter, and then the former experiences what is produced in the latter. The latter, however, being irradiated by the former, acts the part of the agent or actor, and whatever it thereby feels is called enjoyment. This feeling, however, is for another's purpose, *i. e.,* for the purpose of the soul, its own purpose being the merging in that soul. In the one case it works for another, and falsely imagines itself to be the actor, and in the other it acts with a vew to attain its own end. When Sañyama is performed with this discrimination and with the object of knowing the soul, the knowledge is acquired.]

He now describes the fruits of this Sañyama.

XXXVI.

Thence proceed intuition, audition, taction, vision, gustation and olfaction.

"Thence," from performing Sañyama in the said quality of goodness, or practising it; even in the waking state these faculties are produced. Thereof "intuition" (*Prátibha*) is the knowledge already described (A. xxxiii) on the manifestation of which minute objects become visible.

"Audition" (*S'rávaṇa*) is the knowledge produced in the organ of hearing. Therefrom the highest celestial sound, or that which is produced in the heaven, becomes audible.

"Taction" (*Vedaná*) is the knowledge produced by the organ of touch. That by which is known that a thing exists (*vidyati anayá*) is Vedaná; it is a Tantric term which has been used here. Therefrom proceeds the knowledge of such celestial things as are subjects of touch.

"Vision" (*Ádarśa*) is that knowledge which is produced by the organ of sight. Whereby is seen (*dṛis'yati*) or perceived thoroughly what every form is, is *ádarśa*. When it is in its full development a knowledge of celestial forms is produced by it.

"Gustation" (*Ásváda*) is the knowledge produced by the organ of taste. That by which a thing is tasted (*ásvádati aneneti*) is *ásváda*, and on its full development a perception of celestial taste is produced.

"Olfaction" (*Vártá*) is the sensation of smell. In Tántric terminology the word *vṛitti* means the organ of smelling; that in which resides (*vaṛttate*) the objects of smell (is *vṛitti*) and that which proceeds from that organ of smell is *Vártá*, *i. e.*, the sensation of smell. When that becomes fully developed celestial smells become perceptible.

[This aphorism explains the collateral advantages of performing Sañyama with reference to the soul. These advantages are superior or transcendental powers in the organs of sense. Nor

are those powers confined to the meditative state; when once acquired, they are retained permanently, and even in his ordinary worldly waking state the Yogí can exercise them, so that in his ordinary faculties he becomes infinitely superior to common mortals.]

Of these different fruits he now describes the respective provinces.

XXXVII.

These are obstacles in the meditative condition (but) perfections in the waking state.

"These," the different fruits described above. In the state of meditation they are "obstacles," (*upasargas*,) hindrances, disturbers, because from joy, wonder, &c., resulting thereform, meditation becomes relaxed. In the state of waking (*vyutháṇa*), *i. e.*, in the ordinary state of life, they are, however, perfections (*siddhayah*), because then they yield desirable fruits.

[The perfections described are of the world worldly, required for worldly purposes, but useless for higher meditation, *i. e.*, for meditation having isolation for its aim. Nor are they simply useless, but positively obstructive, for they interfere with the even tenor of calm meditation. In the waking state they may be gratifying, and, indeed, they are useful only in that state, but apart from it they are not wanted.]

He describes another perfection.

XXXVIII.

From slackness of the cause of bondage and from a knowledge of the process, the entrance of the thinking principle into another body.

The consciousness which results of the experiencer and the experience, acting from the constant relation existing between the soul and the intellect residing inside the body and from pervasion, is called corporeal bondage (*s'arírabandha*). When through medita-

tion the cause of bondage, which is work in the twofold form of virtue and vice, becomes slack, or attains attenuity, and when a Yogí knows the process, *i. e.*, the way in which the thinking principle issues from the heart through the organs towards worldly objects, knowing full well this is the tube called *chittavahá* through which the thinking principle circulates, and it differs thus from the tubes through which the vital airs and the rest circulate, and also knows the passages in his own body and that of others, he can enter, by the passage through which the thinking principle circulates, into the body of another, whether it be dead or alive. The thinking principle, after entering another body, follows the bent of the senses even as honey-bees follow the queen bee, (*lit.* king bee). And the Yogí who has entered another body uses it as his own body. Since work is the cause of circumscribing the fruition of the pervading soul and the thinking principle, if that circumscription be weakened or destroyed by meditation, fruition may result everywhere from the independence of the thinking principle.

[The transfer of one's own soul into another body plays a prominent part in the legendary lore of India, and the idea was not unknown at one time in Europe. How this transfer is effected is explained in this aphorism. The bondage of the soul to the body is due to works and their deserts, works having been performed their deserts must be borne by the soul in association with the body; but when through meditation the residua of works are obliterated and the bond is loosened, and the Yogí knows the way in which the soul goes out and comes into a body, he can, at will, make the soul travel by that way and enter another body, whether dead or alive, and again, at will, withdraw it from that body, and bring it back to its own. And wherever the soul rests there it works upon the organs, and enjoys their experiences, or in other words, the organs follow the soul as do working bees their queen.]

Another perfection.

XXXIX.

From subdual of Udána, ascension and detachment from water, mud, thorns, &c.

The simultaneous waking, like the flaming up of burning chaff, of the functions (of the body) is indicated by the phrase vital air, (*Jívana*), and from differences of action, that vital air is indicated severally by the terms Práṇa, Apána, &c. Thereof one form of air is called *Práṇa*, because it passes (*praṇayanát,*) from the heart through the mouth and the nostrils. That air which descends (*apanayanát*) from the navel down to the great toe is called *Apána*. Another is called *Samána*, because, surrounding the navel, it permeates everywhere (*samantánnayanát*). Another is called *Udána*, because it ascends from the back of the neck to the head (*unnayanát*). Another air pervades the whole body, and is called *Vyána*, because it circulates over the whole body, (*vyápya nayanát*). From the subdual of the Udána, through Sañyama, the other airs being suppressed and the tendency being upwards, the Yogí does not suffer from "water," *i. e.*, in large rivers, &c., nor from large collections of "mud," (*kardama,*) bogs, nor from sharp "thorns" (*kaṇṭaka*), *i. e.*, from his lightness he rises, like a floss of cotton, even when drowned in water or the like.

[The body is kept alive by five vital airs, and of these that which is called Udána is characterised by its tendency to rise upwards. Now, by making Sañyama in reference to it the tendency of the other airs are overcome, and the whole body tends upwards, consequently there is no gravitation, and the Yogí is neither drowned in water, nor submerged in a bog. The attenuity of his body at the time is such that it cannot be pierced by a thorn.]

XL.

From subdual of Samána, effulgence.

From the "subdual" (*jayát*) of the air called Samána which surrounds the fire (of the stomach), *i. e.*, by bringing it under

control through Sañyama, that unprotected fire ascends, and the Yogí appears effulgent as if flaming in glory.

[The stomach is the seat of the fire which keeps up the heat of the body and consumes food; and this fire is surrounded and kept in its place by the air called Samána. Such being the theory, it follows that when by Sañyama the air in question is overcome or rendered inapt in its special function, the fire, from its natural tendency upwards, should rise up and escape from the body in lambent flames of glory. The Buddhists, who developed the Yoga system to its utmost limit, declare that the crown of the head, the space between the eyebrows, the mouth and the shoulders are the places whence these flames usually issue. In the Sanskrit Buddhist literature of Nepal these flames are frequently described as issuing from the person of S'ákya Buddha, whenever he immersed himself in a profound meditation, and in ancient sculptures images of Buddha are often represented with these flames occupying the place of halo, nimbus, aureola, or glory of European art. A physical cause for these flames may be found in the electric flames which have been noticed by Reichenbach on the persons of highly electric tendency under certain conditions. Of course it is an open question as to whether Yogís had seen such electric flames and derived their descriptions therefrom, or drawn them from their fancy.]

Another perfection.

XLI.

From Sañyama with reference to the relation between the organ of hearing and ether, a superperfect organ of hearing.

"Organ of hearing" (*S'rotra*) is that organ which perceives sound, and is produced by egotism. "Ether" (*Ákáśa*) is sky, the result of the subtle rudiment of sound (*S'abdatanmátra*). The "relation" (*sambandha*) between the two is that of the site and the situated. The Yogí who has performed Sañyama with reference to it attains a superperfect organ of hearing (*Divyas'rotra*), and

becomes able to hear simultaneously subtile, intercepted, and distant sounds.

[The ether is the product of the rudiment of sound; and the organ of hearing is dependant on it for the performance of its function; and if the relation between the two be brought under control by performing Sañyama with reference to ether, the performer obtains the power of knowing it under all circumstances.]

Another perfection.

XLII.

From Sañyama with reference to the relation between the body and ether, travelling in ether, from acquisition of levity, like that of cotton.

The "body" (*káya*), is the form made of the five elements. By performing Sañyama with reference to the relation which exists between the body and ether which yields space (for objects to abide in) a levity, like that of cotton and the like, is effected, *i. e.*, they become alike. Having effected this and attained the levity, the Yogí, walking at will over water, or on a spider's web, or on the rays of the sun, at his choice travels on ether.

[The *rationale* of the operation in this case is very much the same as in the last; the body is kept down by the ether, and if the ether be under control, the body acquires the power of rising over it.]

Another perfection.

XLIII.

The function independent of external functions is the great incorporeal. Therefrom the destruction of the covering of light.

That mental function which is out of the body, *i. e.*, independent of it, is named the "great incorporeal" (*Mahávideha*), because it is exclusive of the stedfastness of the relation between the body and egotism. "Therefrom," from Sañyama performed with reference to it, the destruction of the covering of light is

effected, *i. e.*, the covering consisting of afflictions, works, &c., which obstruct the light of the thinking principle centered in the quality of goodness alone, is removed. The meaning is this: The external functions of the thinking principle which result from the body and egotism are called factitious (*kalpita*). When, abandoning the feeling of body and egotism, there arises an independent (or self-reliant) mental function it is non-fictitious (*akalpita*). By performing Sañyama with reference to it, all taints in the thinking principle of the Yogí are removed.

[The covering produced by the qualities of foulness and darkness prevent the true light of the quality of goodness from being seen to perfection. If that covering be removed the vision is perfect. When retiring under this covering, which is no other than consciousness under the name of egotism, the mind entertains factitious ideas, and produces factitious works, which are consequently false. Divested of this covering it works differently, and whatever it produces is real. Sañyama performed with reference to the relation existing between the body and egotism removes the covering, and thereby cleanses the thinking principle.]

Having thus described the different forms of perfection, including anterior destruction of objects, posterior destruction of objects, and the middle condition; having also explained the knowledge of the externals, regions, &c., of the internals, the formation of the body, of the powers of friendliness, &c., which effect particular objects; having, further, described the conditions of internal and external organs and such like expedients for meditation, as also the conditions of the vital airs, Práṇa, &c., and other perfections for producing stedfastness in the thinking principle and earnestness in meditation; he now, with a view to point out the various means for the perfection of the seeded and the seedless meditations for the visual inspection of the soul, says,

XLIV.

From Sañyama with reference to grossness, nature, subtlety, concomitance and fruition, conquest of the elements.

By performance of Sañyama with reference to the five specific conditions or qualities, such as grossness, &c., of the five elements, earth, &c., the conquest of the elements is effected, *i. e.*, the elements become subservient. Thereof "grossness" (*sthula*) implies the specific forms in which the elements are perceived. "Nature" (*svarúpa*) implies respectively their effects, such as smell, viscidity, heat, impulsion, and impenetrability. "Subtlety" (*súkshma*) implies successively the subtile conditions which are the causes of the elements: these are the subtile or rudimentary forms of matter (*tanmátra*). "Concomitancy" (*anvaya*) includes the qualities of shape, disposition, and existence, which are everywhere seen to co-exist. "Fruition" (*arthavatva*) is that power in the qualities which lead to enjoyment and emancipation. Thus, by performing Sañyama in regard severally to the five elements, nature and conditions aforesaid, the Yogí conquers the elements. This is to be done in this way,—first in the gross form, next in the subtile form. To the performer of Sañyama in this order, nature and the elements become fulfillers of desires, even as cows follow calves.

[The object of this aphorism is to explain the advantages derivable from the performance of Sañyama with reference to the five elements. The elements brought under control subserve the wants and wishes of the controller, even as cows subserve the acquirements of calves by following them wherever they ramble.]

He now describes the fruit of this conquest over the elements.

XLV.

Therefrom proceed attenuation, &c., as also excellence of body and the indestructibility of its qualities.

(1) "Attenuation" (*animá*) the attainment of the form of atoms (molecularity).

(2) "Levity" (*laghimá*) attainment of lightness like that of a floss of cotton.

(3) "Ponderosity" (*garimá*) attainment of great weight.

(4) "Illimitability," (*mahimá*) attainment of greatness, or the power of touching the moon or the like with the tip of one's finger.

(5) "Irresistible will" (*prákámya*) non-frustration of desires.

(6) "Supremacy" (*is'itva*) highest authority over the body and the internal organ.

(7) "Subjection" (*vas'itva*) prevailing everywhere, *i. e.*, the elements being subservient to him do not disobey his behests.

(8) "Fulfilment of desires," (*kámávasáyitva*) accomplishing one's desire everywhere, *i. e.*, in whatever object a desire is formed, the Yogí becomes accomplished in that, or brings it to fruition by attaining it.

These, attenuations, &c., as accessories to meditation, become pevalent in Yogís on their conquering the elements. Thus by attaining molecularity he can enter into (the substance of) a diamond. The other cases should be explained in the same way. These eight qualities, attenuation, &c., are called great perfections, (*mahásiddhis*). "Excellence of body" (*káyasampat*), which will be presently described, is also obtained. "The indestructibility of its qualities," means that the shape and the other qualities of that body are not liable to destruction by any means. Neither does fire burn its shape, nor wind dry it up, and so on.

[The exact nature of the advantages to be derived from Sañyama with reference to the elements, not having been described in the next preceding aphorism, the author supplies the omission in this aphorism. The advantages are the eight siddhis or perfections an account of which has already been given on page 121. They include many of the perfections described in separate aphorisms. I fail to perceive any marked distinction between the 5th and the 8th. The explanation of the 8th given on p. 121 is Tántric.]

He next explains what excellence of the body is—

XLVI.

Colour, loveliness, might, and adamantine hardness constitute the excellence of the body.

"Colour, loveliness, and might" are well-known. "Adamantine hardness" (*vajrasañhananatva*) means that hardness is produced in one's body like that of the diamond. These are the excellences that become manifest in the body.

[While yearning for the severance of all bondage to worldly objects, the Yogís cannot get over the natural love which ties the mind to the body. The body is one's own, and it is always desirable to have it in a perfect state of beauty, and the means are here provided to give it perfection. Of course it is introduced here as the effect of a particular kind of Sañyama, and not as a thing to be desiderated.]

Having thus explained the excellence of the body, he now describes the conquest of the organs by one who has attained his (proper) stage.

XLVII.

From the performance of Sañyama with reference to perception, nature, egoism, concomitance, and fruition, (proceeds) the conquest of the organs.

"Perception" (*grahaṇa*) is the function of the organs directed to their (respective) objects. "Nature" (*svarúpa*) is ordinary manifesting power. "Egoism" (*asmitá*) is consciousness. "Concomitance" (*anvayatva*) and "fruition" (*arthavatva*) as explained above (A. XLIV, p. 157). By performing Sañyama with reference to these five conditions of these organs the Yogí becomes the conqueror of his organs.

[The five conditions of these organs include 1st, their nature, *i. e.*, their power of making objects manifest; 2nd, their function when in active operation; 3rd, their consciousness of being active; 4th, their concomitance or relation to each other or mutual interdependance; and 5th, their fruition or the result they produce. If all these conditions be brought under control by performing Sañyama with reference to them, the organs necessarily come under complete control.]

The fruit thereof.

XLVIII.

Therefrom proceed quickness as of mind, uninstrumental perception, and the conquest of nature.

"Quickness as of mind" (*manojavitva*) is the attainment by the body of extreme quickness of motion like that of the mind. "Uninstrumental perception" (*vikaraṇa bháva*) is the accomplishment of the functions of the organs without the aid of the body. "Conquest of nature" (*pradhánajaya*) is bringing everything under subjection. These perfections are attained by those who have overcome their organs. In this science these are called honey-drops (*madhupratíka*). Even as every drop of honey has its taste, so each of these is tasteful, and therefore they are honey-drops.

[The advantage of having control over the organs as described in the last preceding aphorism is, that the Yogí is then able to perceive things without the aid of his material organs, and to do so with the quickness of the mind, *i. e.*, instantaneously. He also acquires mastery over nature in every way. The nature here referred to is the *Pradhána* of the Sáṅkhya categories, the highest of the twenty-five, next only to soul.]

Having described the conquest of the (external) organs, he now points out the conquest of the internal organ.

XLIX.

Supremacy over all conditions and omniscience, the moment the distinctive knowledge of the quality of goodness and the soul (is attained).

The knowledge of the distinction between the quality of goodness and the soul which results from performing Sañyama with reference to the modification of pure goodness, is "distinctive knowledge" (*anyatákhyáti*). From the subsidence, through the influence of the Sañyama, of the conception about the qualities being agents the Yogís, who are in that condition, attain in their meditation supremacy over all conditions and omniscience.

"Supremacy over all conditions" (*sarvabhávádhishṭhátritva*) is the attainment of power like a master over all modifications of qualities. "Omniscience" (*sarvajṉatṛitva*) is correct knowledge of those qualities as they exist in calm, (*śánta,*) enlivened, (*udita,*) and latent (*avyapadisya*) conditions. In this science this perfection is called "sorrowless perfection" *vis'okasiddhi,* while those that have been described before are indicated by the term *vas'íkára* (controul).

[The object of this aphorism is to describe the effect of getting controul over the mind or the internal organ. That controul enables the Yogí to perceive the difference between the quality of goodness and the soul, and endows him with absolute mastery over all conditions of existence and thorough omniscience. The omniscience directly refers to the conditions of the three qualities, but indirectly to all and everything in the universe. Everything in the universe depends upon the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, and those qualities are either in a calm state, or in a state of excitement, or latent; and if one comes to know their conditions he necessarily knows all and everything that proceeds from them. This state of supreme knowledge is called *Vis'oka* or sorrowless perfection, for when it is attained there cannot possibly be any cause for pain or sorrow; whereas in the perfections previously described there is always some room for sorrow, or longing of some kind or other. The latter ensure controul over the things they refer to, and the controul is more or less perfect according to circumstances, and they are fitly called *Vas'íkára* or 'controul.' They do not, however, secure absolute immunity from pain, and this necessitates the marked distinction in the designations.]

Next he describes another stage.

L.

From indifference even to this (perfection) through destruction of the seed of evils, (results) isolation.

When the Yogí becomes indifferent even to that sorrowless perfection, then ignorance, the seed of the evils such as passion, &c., being destroyed by the root, "isolation," (*kaivalya*,) absolute cessation of pain, results, *i. e.*, on the termination of the influence of the qualities the soul is restored, placed permanently, in its own state.

[Nor is the sorrowless perfection the ultimatum. When the Sañyama is exercised freely it produces an indifference in the mind in regard to it, and this indifference destroys ignorance, the root of all evil, and leads to isolation, or the detachment of soul from the bondage of worldly ties.]

He now points out the means of remaining in this meditation.

LI.

Avoidance should be made of association with, and encouragement of, celestial temptations, from apprehension of evils recurring.

There are four classes of Yogís; *viz.*, 1st, those practisers of the Yoga on whom the light is just shedding; 2nd, Ritambharas, or those who possess the knowledge which holds to the truth; 3rd, those who have conquered the elements and the organs; 4th, those who have exceeded all objects of contemplation. Thereof, to those who have attained the fourth meditation, when the seven surrounding stages of knowledge have been attained, and the final stage of 'honeyed knowledge' has been interviewed, the celestial (*sthániṇah*) gods become tempters, *i. e.*, they offer presents of handsome women, elixir vitæ, &c. With such temptations no association should be made, nor any encouragement be given to them. From association there is a fall into the enjoyment of worldly pleasures. With regard to them therefore both association and encouragement should be renounced.

[When the Yogí attains the last described sorrowless stage, he is exposed to a great danger. The gods envy his high excellence, but, unable to exercise open enmity, they try to divert him from

his purpose by insidious means. They place temptations in his way, offer him handsome women, inexhaustible wealth, long life, and so forth to bring him back to the ways of the world, and thereby frustrate his purpose of attaining isolation. They act the part of Satan in the Bible and of Mára in the Buddhist system. In Hindu legends Indra is the chief god who envies men who are about to rise superior to carnal weakness, and the means he employs are the courtezans of his court, who descend on earth and tempt all Yogís by their celestial charms. According to the Tantras when such temptations fail, resort is made to fear. Frightful forms of all kinds assail the Yogí when he is engaged in his meditations; venomous serpents hiss around him; tigers prowl about him; ogres come with wide open mouth to devour him. These are, in the technical language of the Yoga system, called *Vibhíshiká*. The lukewarm yield to these, break their meditation, and are lost; the determined take no note of them, and attain their object. It is believed that these frightful forms never do any actual mischief; their object is to frighten, to put to test the determination and firmness of the Yogí, and not to do any positive harm. The advice given in the Tantras is not to give any encouragement to such temptations, nor to be depressed or frightened by the dangers which become manifest. Firmness suffices to overcome them. The text here does not refer to frightening.]

In connexion with the manifestation of this fruitful understanding, he describes a means besides the Sañyamas above described.

LII.

From Sañyama with reference to the course of moments (proceeds) an understanding born of discriminative knowledge.

"Moment" (*kshaṇa*) is the smallest division of time, which can no further be reduced in quantity. "Course" (*krama*) the suc-

cessive modifications of such moments of time. By performing Sañyama with reference to the course of moments, the aforesaid understanding of discriminative knowledge results. The meaning is this: This is a moment of time, it is subsequent to another, therefore the first is antecedent to this. For him who has performed Sañyama with reference to this course, interview with the minutest is effected in the course of a moment, and so is the interview effected of the subtile nature. This is manifestation of discriminative knowledge.

[The next step of the Yogí is to perform Sañyama with reference to the progress of time, and when this is accomplished, discriminative knowledge becomes thoroughly manifest.]

He now applies this Sañyama to a special subject.

LIII.

Therefrom results the knowledge of the difference between two similars when that difference is not marked out by kind, character and habitat.

"Kind, character, and habitat" (*játi, lakshaṇa, des'a*) are the means of differenciation of things. Sometimes "kind" (*játi*) is the cause of distinction; as this is a cow, this is a buffalo. When the kind is the same, "character" (*lakshaṇa*) may be the cause of distinction; as this is spotted, this is tawny. Where kind and character are alike, the cause of distinction may be "habitat," (*des'a*); thus with two emblic fruits of the same size and colour, one may be of one country and the other of another. There are again cases in which distinction cannot be determined, as particles of white earth of one country. When Sañyama is performed to ascertain distinctions in the last class of cases, a knowledge of distinction is produced, and by its exercise distinctions of even the exceedingly subtile categories may be perceived. What is said is this: When distinctions cannot be ascertained by any other means they, including a knowledge of such

distinctions in the subtile categories, may be known through this Sañyama.

[This aphorism explains what is meant by discriminative knowledge. Under ordinary circumstances discrimination is made by attention to kind, character and habitat. But this is not possible in the case of the subtile categories which are not amenable to such tests. For them Sañyama is the only means, and it should be brought to bear upon them. When the Sañyama is accomplished, the power of discriminating them is fully acquired, and this is discriminative knowledge.]

To explain the name, object, and nature of the aforesaid knowledge resulting from discrimination, he says.

LIV.

The knowledge resulting from discrimination is emancipating, omni-objective, semper-objective, instantaneous.

The knowledge which results from the power of the aforesaid Sañyama at the last stage is "emancipating" (*Táraka*). That whereby Yogís are ferried over the unfathomable ocean of the world has the significant name of Táraka, (the emancipating). He describes its object; it is a "omni-objective" (*sarva-vishaya*); all categories from the Mahat downward are its objects, and therefore it is omni-objective. Its characteristic is its semper-objectivity (*sarvathávishayatva*). That which has for its objects the categories in all conditions, whether gross or subtile, in all their modifications, and existing in all forms, is always semper-objective. Another characteristic of it is "instantaneousness" (*akrama*). Being finally modified it has to make no progress in accepting two, three or one form, hence "instantaneous," *i. e.*, (a Yogí in this stage) perceives everything at once, like an emblic fruit in the palm of one's hand.

[The discriminative knowledge aforesaid is here more fully explained. It grasps all the categories and therefore the whole

universe. It makes them its object at all times, and its knowledge is never absent. It acts instantaneously, because it has the whole thing before it, and needs no process of observation and retiociation to come to an understanding. And everything being known by it, it effects emancipation, for emancipation means true knowledge.]

He now says what results from this emancipating knowledge proceeding from discrimination.

LV.

On the purification of the quality of goodness and of soul becoming equal, (there results) isolation.

" The quality of goodness and soul" have already been defined. When their purification becomes equal there is isolation. The "purification" (*s'uddhi*) of the quality of goodness of the thinking principle is effected when, on the cessation of the assumption of agency, it merges into its first cause. The purification of soul is the absence of its factitious enjoyment. When the two are equally purified (in this way), isolation is effected with regard to the soul, *i. e.* it is emancipated.

[The thinking principle ordinarily fancies itself to be the agent of all work, *i. e.*, it is conscious of being the actor in all cases, and this is its natural function; but when this feeling is removed by discriminative knowledge, it reverts to its primary original condition, and ceases to cherish any idea of its being the actor, and this is its purification. Similarly soul, though itself devoid of action, is always engaged in an unnatural factitious enjoyment of the fruits of work by its association with the thinking principle, and when that association is removed it is purified. And this double purification, the cessation of the thinking principle from fancying itself the actor and consequent submersion into its original cause, and the removal of the association between the soul and the thinking principle, effects the isolation or separation of the soul from all attachments, and this is emancipation from the bondage of the world.]

Thus have been described in this chapter the three principal components of the Yoga, (I—III); their collective name Sañyama, (IV); the merits of that Sañyama, (V—X); the three modifications of things, the antecedent, the middle, the postcedent conditions, (XI—XVI); the Siddhis (XVII); the external perfections giving knowledge of regions (XVIII—XXVIII); the internal perfections, giving knowledge of the organization of the body (XXIX—XLI); the organs (XLI); the stages of controul of matter and organizations (XLI—XLVIII); the means of attaining discriminative knowledge, the emancipating knowledge, the highest Samadhi (XLIX—L); the subsidence of the thinking principle in its primary cause and isolation (L—LIV). These are the subjects described in this chapter on perfections. (Condensed as before.)

This is the end of the third quarter, or the quarter on perfections, of the commentary, entitled Rájamártaṇḍa, on Pataṇjali's Institutes of the Yoga, by the great king, the superior king, the illustrious Bhojadeva.

CHAPTER FOURTH.

I adore that solitary, unborn Is'âna who is made up solely of thinking principle and bliss, and by whose fiat isolation is produced without (the aid of) any special means.

Now the author commences the chapter on Isolation with a view to establish by inferential arguments and by refutation of errors resulting from mistaken convictions, the true nature of Isolation. And by showing that the perfections aforesaid result from birth and various other causes, he demonstrates that they appear with the help of the power resulting from the practice of Samâdhi in former births and from causes in this life from the time of birth. Further, with a view to afford assurance that no harm is done to Samâdhi which may be acheived in course of many births, and to prove the preeminence of the completion of Samádhi as also for the consummation of the isolating Yoga, he says :—

I.

The Perfections are produced by birth, herb, incantations, austerity, or Samâdhi.

Some perfections are caused by birth, as the power of flying in the air and the like in birds, or the perfected qualities of knowledge manifesting themselves immediately after birth, as in the great sage Kapila and others. *Perfections from herbs*—as firmness of the boy, &c. produced by the use of elixirs in Pátâla and such like places. *Perfections from incantations*—as ascent in the air by the repetition of particular mantras. *Perfections from austerity*—as in the case of Vis'vámitra and others. *Perfections from Samádhi*—as already described in the preceding chapter.

These perfections result in those persons who have destroyed pain in previous births; hence, as in the case of perfection by Samádhi, so in the case of others, the real cause is the practice of Samádhi in former births; incantations, &c. are merely instruments.

[The word *Siddhi* comes from the root *sish* 'to accomplish,' and means something accomplished. Transcendental powers attainable by the performance of Sañyama, are perfections accomplished by special means and therefore called Siddhis or perfections; and having used that English equivalent elsewere I have thought fit, for the sake of uniformity, to use it in the above aphorism. It is, however, not fully expressive here. Special powers, or faculties would have been much more expressive and to the point, the purport of the aphorism being that some faculties are derived from birth, some from herbs, some from incantations, some from the practice of austerities, and some from Samádhi. This general principle is laid down with a view to prepare the way to what follows.]

It might be contended that since in Nandís'vara and others the change of kind, &c., were effected in this life, how can you then establish the causality of the practice of Samádhi in previous lives? In reply to this, he says:

II.

Change of kind (results) from transmutation of the material cause.

The "change of kind," &c., in Nandís'vara and others in this life (were produced) by "the transmutation of material causes" (*prakṛityápúrát*). Future materials (or materials which are ordinarily produced in a subsequent life, come up and), produce in this life the transmutations, *i. e.*, they change themselves into other kinds.

[The general principle having been laid down in the first aphorism that special faculties are produced by five causes, the question arises, how does the body, which is produced by birth, change even in this life, the material cause remaining unaltered,

and the Samádhi performed in a previous life no thaving effected any change at birth? The reply is that Samádhi is not the material but an instrumental cause, and it prepares the way for he selfmutation of the material cause.

Prakṛiti is here used in the sense of material cause, or the materials of which the body is made up. *Ápúraṇa* is to fill up. The two words together mean "the materials fill up," *i. e.*, they undergo the necessary transmutations to change one kind into another. The purport is that even in this life the materials of the body may so change as to convert a Bráhmaṇ's body into a divine one, as in the case of Nandís'vara, or a Kshatríya body into a Bráhmaṇa one, as in the case of Vis'vámitra, and consequently the exception taken to the argument put forth in the first aphorism to the effect that "birth, &c. are causes of perfection" is not tenable. By the use of the word *páśchátya*, 'future', the commentator means that the changes which in ordinary course would take place in a future life, take place in exceptional cases in this life.]

It may be argued that merits, demerits, &c., are in such cases seen to be resulting (in this life when their fruits would not under the theory be liable to manifestation), how can we then attribute to them causality in the transmutation of the material cause in this life? To this the author says:

III.

In the mutation of the material cause merit is non-efficient: from it proceeds the piercing of the covering, as in the case of the husbandman.

"Merit" (*nimitta*), virtue, &c. In the transformation of the material cause merit is non-efficient, for a cause cannot be set in motion by an effect. Where then is there the operation of virtue, &c.? To this he says: "From it proceeds the piercing of the covering, as in the case of the husbandman." "From it," from the performance of virtuous acts, &c., proceeds "the piercing" (*bheda*) or destruction of whatever "covering" (*varaṇa*) obstruc-

tion, such as vice, &c., exists, the two being mutually antagonistic, and the obstruction being destroyed, the material causes themselves become effective in their desiderated work. This he illustrates by an example. "As in the case of a husbandman." Even as a husbandman or farmer, wishing to carry water from one field to another, pierces only the obstacle to the flow of water, and that being pierced, water itself assumes the modification of expansion, without any exertion on the part of the husbandman to the expansion of water, so should be understood to be the case with regard to virtue, &c.

[Following the line of argument adopted in the preceding aphorism, the author shows that virtue, &c., are not the immediate causes of the change which takes place when a Bráhmaṇ becomes a god, as in the case of Nandís'vara, but that they serve the subsidiary purpose of removing the obstacles which stand in the way of the change, and the change takes place by itself. The illustration given puts this very clearly. The husbandman does not make the water flow, he only removes the obstacles, and then the water flows by itself from its own inherent tendency to follow the law of gravitation.]

When a Yogí, who has a mastery over the cardinal principles, with a view to enjoy at once the fruits of his actions, from the perception of his own superior transcendental powers, wishes to assume many bodies at the same time, whence does he derive many thinking principles (to vitalize those bodies)? In reply to this question the author, says:

IV.

The created thinking principles (proceed) solely from egoism.

The thinking principles which animate the bodies created by a Yogí, proceed through his will solely from their original cause, *i. e.*, from egoism. They emanate at once as sparks from a fire.

[Among the perfections mentioned in chapter III the power of multiplying one's own body, so as to produce many where there is one, is not mentioned, but here it is taken for granted that

an accomplished Yogí possesses this power, and that he does produce them to effect quickly his emancipation by simultaneously performing in many bodies those works which promote his end, and the question is raised as to how does a Yogí, who creates many bodies and himself animates them all, provide a thinking principle for each of them? The answer given is that through his will he makes his egoism send forth the needful, even as a fire sends forth sparks from itself. This multiplication of bodies is called *Káyaryúba Yoga* or the Yoga of many bodies.]

Then, how do numerous thinking principles, having diversity of objects, produce one effect? To this, he replies:

V.

In the diverse tendency of the many the impelling thinking principle is one.

"In the diverse tendency" (*pravṛittibhede*) or multifunctionality of the many thinking principles the one thinking principle of the Yogí is the impelling force or actuator, because it is the ruler, and therefore there is no difference of object. The meaning is—that as in its own body the mind directs the eyes, the hands, &c., according to its will, from its being the ruler, so does it in the other bodies.

[In the preceding aphorism the question having been solved as to how a single individual can provide thinking principles for many bodies, the question arises as to how can many thinking principles act in concert and preserve the unity of the creator? If this unity be not admitted, there would be so many independent individuals, each following the bent of his own mind, and the idea of one individual acting as many without any loss of individuality, would be lost. This doubt is removed by the explanation that the thinking principles provided to the many are in reality one, and entirely controlled by the primary thinking principle, of which they are mere scintillations.]

The thinking principle which belongs to the perfections resulting from birth, &c., are produced by the same five causes,

and yet the thinking principle produced by Samádhi is distinct from the others. To show this he says:

VI.

Thereof the meditation-born one is without any residua.

"The meditation-born" (*dhyánaja*) thinking principle or that which is produced by Samádhi, is, among the five, the one which is "without any residua" (*anáśaya*), *i. e.*, without any residua of (former) work. This is the meaning.

[Thinking principles are said to be of five kinds, because they proceed severally from birth, herbs, incantation, penances, and meditation (A. I). The word used (*ja*), means "born," but the object is not to imply that the thinking principles are actually born of herbs, incantations, &c., but to indicate the training, habit of thought, disposition or impurities which it acquires under the five different circumstances. The first four are said to depend on the residua of former works, and the last to have nothing to rest upon, it being self-supporting, *i. e.*, not resulting from the residua of any former work.]

To show that the thinking principle of the Yogí is distinct in its work, even as it is distinct from other thinking principles in being devoid of pain, &c., he says:

VII.

The work of a Yogí is neither white nor black: those of others are of three kinds.

That work which produces good fruit, such as sacrifices, &c., is "white" (*śukla*). That which produces a bad result, such as Bráhmaṇicide, is "black" (*kṛishṇa*). That which is mixed up of the two, is white-black (*śukla-kṛishṇa*). Thereof, the white work belongs to wise people, to those who are engaged in charity, asceticism, the study of the Vedas, &c.; the black belongs to the vicious; and the white-black (or mixed kind) to ordinary men. As regards Yogís, who have performed the Sañyama, work is of a

different character to these: their work produces no fruit, for they undertake it after renouncing all desire for fruition.

[In the first three kinds of work fruition is inseparable. The wise give alms, perform penances, read the Vedas, display their benevolence, &c. &c. and derive the fruits thereof; the vicious commit wicked actions and suffer for the same; ordinary mortals are sometimes engaged in good actions and sometimes in bad ones, and suffer or enjoy accordingly. The Yogís, who renounce the fruits of all actions, can neither suffer nor enjoy from what they do, and hence their work is declared to be distinct from the works of others. They are, in the language of the Bhagavadgítá, like the lotus-leaf which, lying on water or having water on it, is never wetted.]

Now he describes the fruit of such works.

VIII.

Thence proceeds the manifestation of the residua which are suitable to its fruition.

Now, the residua of works produce two sorts of fruits, one sort being memory only, and the other, kind, age, and experience. Thereof, those residua which have for their fruition kind, age, and experience which are derivable in one or many births, have already been described above (p. 69). Of those the only fruit of which is memory, the manifestation proceeds from the same works. Even as work produces a body, whether as a Deva, or a human being, or a lower animal, so does it by its maturity lead to a corresponding manifestation of residua (*vásaná*). The meaning is this. Should a celestial or other body once acquired by a certain work be acquired even after the interposition of a hundred other births the memorial residua of the former state will manifest themselves again. Their memory revives according to circumstances, even when residing in other regions. In the intermediate states, though existing, they remain in a latent condition. Nor do the residua produced in course of existence in hell and other places become evident then.

[For the sake of verbal fidelity I have used memory as the equivalent of the Sanskrit term *Smṛiti* of the commentary; but the object aimed at is not memory in its ordinary signification, but the remembrance in one life of appetites, desires, and affections of a preceding one. These results manifest themselves in, what in European philosophy is called, instinct. They are remembrances, because they arise without any conscious purpose, though they are not without consciousness. European philosophers, who do not recognise transmigration, finding Instinct to be opposed to Reason, take it to be something distinct from it—a distinct faculty. In its widest signification it extends to living beings in general—to plants as well as to animals,—but for psychological purposes it is limited by Dugald Stewart to Appetites, Desires, and Affections. Butler changes Desires into Passions, but without any material change of purport. Dr. Bain says "Instinct is untaught ability," (*Mental and Moral Science*, Bk. III, *c.* IV), and this is amplified by Hamilton into "an agent which performs blindly and ignorantly a work of intelligence and knowledge." (Reid's *Works*, p. 761*a*.) Paley has "a propensity prior to experience, and independent of instruction." Milton calls it "Reason discursive or intuitive." These definitions have been summed up into "untaught ability," "untaught propensity," "unconscious purpose." It is opposed to Habit, which is the result of tuition and exercise, and distinct from Reason, which presupposes argumentation and deliberation. The memory of our text is Instinct as defined above; but our author does not recognise spontaneity in anything, nor purpose independent of Reason. He attributes the eteology of Instinct to residua left in the thinking principle by rational action, and the said residua lie dormant till they are made vivid in a subsequent life. Habits leave their residua exactly in the same way as other actions, and they not only become manifest in the next life, but also in the progeny, as in the cases of pointers and other animals. In short, according to our author, Reason is one and the sole faculty of all knowing, the only principle of certain-

ty, and it manifests itself as Reason or Instinct differently under different circumstance. Anyhow, the meaning of our author will be best understood by replacing his Memory by Instinct.

The aphorism under notice explains the fruit of work as manifested by Instinct. Having already described that work leads to two kinds of fruit, Instinct and deserts, or in his language memory and kind, age and experience, he now says that Instinct does not manifest itself uniformly at every successive birth, but according to circumstances when it is needed in subsequent lives, even after many interruptions, the residua for it remaining dormant during such interruption. Thus, a man born in the next life as a dog having no occasion for his human instincts, acts as a dog, but twenty or more generations after, when he is again born as a man, his early instincts revive, and he acts according to them. This is the theory which the aphorism explains by saying that residua manifest themselves in conformity to the fruition of work. When a work entails existence as a serpent, those residua become manifest which are appropriate to such an existence, but not those which are appropriate for other forms of life. In other words, residua remain dormant or in a potential state until the necessary excitants are in operation. The *S. P. Bháshya*, explains this by saying, "when a celestial work is in fruition, it does not become the cause of manifestation of the residua of infernal, brutal or human states; it then enlivens only those residua which are conformable to a celestial existence." *(Na hi daivam karma vipachyamánam náraka-tiryañ-manushya-vásanábhivyakti-nimittam bhavati kintu daivánuguṇá evásya vásaná vyajante)*. The purport is that each kind of existence brings to light its own appropriate residua.]

Doubt having been produced of there existing any causal relation in these residua, he establishes it by saying:

IX.

From the uniformity of memory and residua there is uninterruptibility of relation, even after breaks by caste, locality and time.

Of worldly beings transmigrating in diverse forms, when one, after experiencing one form, attains that form again after an interruption of a thousand other births, the residua of impressions appropriate to that state, which had been formed at the first birth and had become latent from want of the necessary conditions, become manifest on the attainment of that suitable state. Thus, there is, notwithstanding breaks caused by caste, locality and time, an "uninterruptibility" (*ánantarya*) or continuity in producing their own necessary fruit of memory. How so? "From the uniformity of memory and residua." Thus, on the performance of a work there is produced a deposit of residuum on the quality of goodness of the thinking principle, and that is the germ of the fruits of heaven, hell, &c.; or it is the residua of works such as sacrifices &c. It exists as a latent power, or as a power of the actor in relation to experience and experiencer. From these residua proceeds memory, from memory the experiencing of pleasure and pain, and from that experience again come residua, memory, &c. It is true that where memory and residua are different there is, from want of uninterruptibility, a difficulty in producing a relation of cause and effect; but in our case here, where impressions become residua, and residua merge into memory, and they reside in concord in one thinking principle, the relation of cause and effect is not difficult or hard of effectuation.

[According to the preceding aphorism the residua of former births are the causes of manifestation of certain effects; but, since concomitancy is necessary between cause and effect while the intervention of many dissimilar births between two similars causes an interruption, it may be argued that residua are not the causes of memory, as alleged. This objection is met by saying that the memory remains, and therefore sequence is obviously not broken. The memory of sucking the teats on the part of an infant returns after many births, whenever that infant is again born as a human being, though it does not manifest itself when the same infant is born as a bird or a serpent, and it shows

that the memory is not lost. Hence the relation of cause and effect is not broken.]

Admitting the uninterruptibility of residua, and their relation as cause and effect, it may be asked when an impression first takes place is it caused by residua, or without a cause? To solve this doubt, he says:

X.

There is no beginning about them, because of the eternity of desire.

"About them," *i. e.*, about or in regard to residua. "No beginning" (*anáditva*), that which has no commencement. The meaning is, these have no beginning. How? "Because of the eternity of desire." This "desire" (*áśisha*) or longing of an intensely delusive character—(manifesting itself in such wishes as) 'may the means of effecting my pleasure be always mine; may there never be a separation between me and them'—is the cause of residua, and that being eternal there is no beginning. This is the meaning. What is meant is this: From the proximity of the cause the tendency of the functions of impressions and residua cannot be checked, and the thinking principle, from its expansible and contractile character, pierced by the impressions, residua and the like, modifies itself when it attains each appropriate existence.

[The theory of Instincts being the result of action in former lives is open to the grave objection that it does not account for Instinct in the first instance. A being born for the first time should have, according to the theory, no Instinct. The initial impression must therefore be causeless, and so there is no reason to admit that residua are the causes of effect, *i. e.*, of birth, age and experience. This objection is met in this aphorism by saying that Desire is eternal, and therefore there is no necessity for a beginning. Desire is essential to existence; there would be no existence if there was no Desire; and that Desire produces residua, and so there is no break in the course of eternity. The

opponent wished to expose the fallacy of the argument regarding residua being the cause of Intuition by showing that there could be no residua at the first start, and the author accepts a *regressus in infinitum* to surmount the difficulty. According to him the universe had no beginning and will never end, and therefore there is no occasion to seek a beginning.]

From their infinity it being doubtful that the residua can ever be destroyed, he points out the means of destroying them.

XI.

Since they are agglomerated by cause, effect, substratum and support, their absence would produce the absence of the others.

Conception (*anubhava*) is the cause of residua; desire, &c., are the causes of conceptions; and of them the cause is ignorance. Thus is (ignorance) both the immediate and the mediate "cause" (*hetu*). "Effect" (*phala*) is body, memory, &c. "Substratum" (*áśraya*) is the intellectual principle. "Support" (*álambana* or object of desire) is the same for both conceptions and residua. Now, since these infinite residua are collected by these cause, effect, substratum and support, when they are absent, *i. e.*, when they may be likened to roasted seeds, on their being burnt by knowledge and Yoga, there being no root left, the residua cannot sprout, nor lead to action, and thus they are destroyed.

[Now the question is raised, how can one undo that which is eternal? and the answer given is—since desires proceed from, or are the sum total of, cause, effect, substratum and support, one has to remove those conditions which produce desires, and that removal *ipso facto* removes desires. The removal is effected by the aid of Yoga. Yoga knowledge parches cause, effect, substratum, and support by exposing their real nature, and when so parched, they become, like roasted seeds, unfit for germination, and their destruction follows as a matter of course. Of course this is limited to the individual who effects the parching, and does not extend to the world at large.]

It may be questioned, that since the thinking principle is being constantly destroyed, and there is a difference in their relation as cause and effect from their want of simultaneity between residua and their effects, how can there be a unity? To prove the unity, he says:

XII.

(The thinking principle) exists in its proper nature; the past and the future (result) from differences in the condition of qualities.

The (possibility of) production of things which are absolutely non-existent is unreasonable, from their want of relation to existence. Nowhere has there been any relation to existence in the horns of a hare.

In the case of a nonentity as an effect, with what design can causes proceed to act? None enters into action for a false object, and it being opposed to entity there is no relation of nonentity to it. When truth attains its own identity, how can it become baseless and untrue? The meaning is, it cannot accept an antagonistic form. Hence from there being no possibility of the destruction of existence, and from the impossibility of the origin of non-existence, the qualified, convertible by qualities, always remains in one form. The qualities, alone, change into their threefold conditions. Attaining each condition, the qualified forsakes its original form, and, remaining in the present condition, attains the state of objects of enjoyment. Hence in this science are established the distinctions of the past and future conditions of qualities, and of their relation to each other as cause and effect. Hence, too, the same thinking principle is made to exist as the qualified until isolation, and none can prevent it.

[The removal suggested in the preceding aphorism suggests the idea of destruction; but that is not possible. Nothing can proceed from non-existence, and no existence can be absolute non-existence, and the difficulty is solved by referring to the

doctrine explained in A. 14 C. III which recognizes a threefold condition of existence, the antecedent, the postcedent, and the present. Matter is eternal, and remains always an existence; but its conditions vary; accordingly when the present condition of a thing is destroyed, the thing reverts to one or other of its two other conditions, and the parching of the seeds implies their resolution into the antecedent condition. This is the theory of Moderate Nominalism or Conceptualism with its threefold condition of *Universalia ante rem,* as thoughts in the mind of God; *Universalia in re,* as the essence (quiddity) of things; and *Universalia post rem,* as concepts. The text looks to thoughts or ideas or plastic types without reference to God.]

He now describes of what forms these qualified and the qualities are.

XIII.

They are individualised or subtile, and consist of qualities.

The qualities and the qualified described above are divided into the individualised and the subtile. The "qualities" (*gunáh*) are of the forms of goodness, foulness, and darkness. "To consist of" (*tadátmánah*) is to be of that nature, or to be modified to that form: this is the meaning. Since there is seen a concomitance in all persons, both externally and internally, through goodness, foulness, and darkness in the forms of pleasure, pain and delusion, of individuals and conceptions, and since it is found that which is concomitant is also its modified form, as in the case of jars which are concomitants of earth are also modified forms of earth, therefore the modification of qualities is evident.

[The simple proposition in this aphorism is that all attributes are mere modifications of the three primary qualities. Circumstances may make them subtile or gross, but, whether one or the other, they consist of nothing but the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness modified in some one form or another. They are mere modes of being, but not radically different beings.]

Apprehending the doubt that if all these three qualities be the chief causes everywhere, how can we talk of one qualified (or one substratum of quality)? he says:

XIV.

From unity of modification (results) unity of a thing.

Although there are three qualities, yet their modification into the member and the membered, (in some cases goodness becoming the membered, in some cases foulness, and in others darkness,) being one, "unity" (*tattva*) or oneness is admitted. Thus, in the examples this is the earth, this is the air, &c., (in which unity is observed, for earth is a modification of darkness, and air of foulness.)

[The purport is that as only one modification can take place of the thinking principle at a time, the unity of a thing is never disturbed. The thinking principle under similar circumstances changes exactly in the same way, and no difference can possibly result. In other words, as the three qualities can be only separately ascendant, one at a time, the simultaneous perception of the effects of all the three cannot be effected; and this meets the objection raised in the preamble.]

Had objects existed distinct from cognition it would be proper to talk of the unity or multiplicity of objects, but when cognition itself from the influence of residua existing in the relation of cause and effect, appears in different shapes, how can you say so? In reply to this question, he says:

XV.

Even in the sameness of object, the course of the two are distinct, from diversity of the thinking prin-ciple.

the ... f the two," of the cognition and the cognizable, the course proce... inct, follow different or separate roads. How so? From non-e... ity of thinking principles even in the sameness of object.

Even in similar things, as the attainment of women and the like, differences of thinking are noticeable in different observers from the resulting sensations of pleasure, pain and delusion. Thus, on beholding a beautiful and attractive woman, pleasure is felt by an amorous person, enmity by her rival, and disgust by an ascetic. And since these different kinds of feeling arise from one object there can be no agency in the thing itself. If it be said that object is the effect of our thinking principle only, the object would appear in one form only. Also, if a thing were an effect of the thinking principle then there would be no other thing extant when that thinking principle would be occupied with one thing. (If it be said) be it so, we deny it. For how could that thing then be beheld by many others? And since it is so beheld, it cannot be an effect of the thinking principle. If it be said that it is created by many at the same time, the reply would be that there would be a difference between a work produced by many, and a work produced by one. And if the difference be not admitted, then there being difference of cause without a difference of effect, the universe would be either causeless, or uniform. What is said is this: should there be no difference of effect when the causes are different, then the whole universe resulting from many causes would either be of one form, or not following the different causes, be causeless from its independence (of the causes). And if it is so (it may be asked) why does it not, being made of the three qualities, produce in the same percipient the sensations (simultaneously) of pleasure, pain and delusion? The case is not so. Even as the object consists of three qualities, so is the thinking principle made up of three qualities, and in its perception of objects, merits and demerits are accessory causes, and from their prevalence or depression results the manifestation of the thinking principle in such and such (varying) forms. Thus in the presence of a woman near an amorous person, his thinking principle, disposed towards merit through the influence of the quality of goodness, becomes full of pleasure. From the co-operation of the quality of foulness, which is auxiliary to vice,

for all rival wives, it becomes painful. Similarly from the co-operation of the quality of darkness, which is attended by ardent vice, it becomes to angry rival wives the cause of delusion. Hence the cognizable object is independent of cognition, and consequently cognizable and cognition, being contradictory in their natures, cannot bear the relation of cause and effect. Thus it being possible without any difference in the cause for the existence of a difference in effect from their relation, the independence of cognition from the object is established.

[The question discussed in the preceding aphorism raises a doubt as to whether perception is due to objects or to the cognitive power. It cannot be said that objects produce perception, for in that case a given object would always and everywhere produce the same sensation, as a given cause cannot produce dissimilar effects. A handsome woman should be a handsome woman to all beholders, without a distinction. In the world this is, however, not the case. A woman produces very dissimilar feelings in different beholders, and she, as the object, cannot therefore be said to be the cause of perception. On the other hand, the thinking principle cannot be the cause, for if you accept it to be one in all persons, it, as a cause, cannot produce different effects; and if you accept it to be different in different individuals, dissimilar causes would lead to one uniform result, which is impossible. The solution offered is that thinking principle and object are different, but inasmuch as both are governed by the three qualities, the prevalence of a particular quality at a particular time in the thinking principle produces a difference in the perception of an object. The "diversity of the thinking principle" in the text implies a diversity in its condition as regards the state of the qualities working within it. The argument here is the same which European philosophers discuss with reference to sensations and sensibles; and the optional use of *jnána* and *vijnána* by our author shows that he means cognition or sensation and perception, and not the higher knowledge elsewhere indicated by the

word *jnána*. I have used for it cognition after Mr. Jardine, who defines it as "a general name which we may apply to all those mental states in which there is made known in consciousness either some affection or activity of the mind itself, or some external quality or object." ('The Elements of the Psychology of Cognition,' p. 1). The object to which this *jnána* or cognition is applied is *jneya* or cognizable, which is just the same with *idea* as used by Locke, who says, "it is the term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks; I have used it to express whatever is meant by *phenomena, notion, species,* or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking." Idea, however, has been used in so many varying senses by European metaphysicians that I have thought it safe to confine myself to *cognizable* or *object,* as least likely to cause misconceptions. The theory of eternity of matter is here made the basis of the argument.]

Since a cognition, being an illuminator, is by nature perceptive, and the object, being susceptible of illumination, is by nature perceivable, why should cognition not perceive and recollect all things simultaneously? With a view to remove such doubt, he says:

XVI.

A thing is known or unknown from its dependence on its change of form in the thinking principle.

"Its" of the object. "From its change of form" (*uparágát*). From its producing forms in the thinking principle, an external object becomes known or unknown. The meaning is this: in the attainment of their production all things depend on the conjunction of their causes. The production of the cognition of a blue or other colour depends on the accessory cause of the form being brought forward as an object through the passage of the organs of sensation; perception being impossible without the object, since there is no correlation. Hence, by whatever object is the form of cognition modified, that object is brought

into cognition, *i. e.*, that object becomes known. That which does not give its shape (to the thinking principle) is held to be unknown. Similarly, recollection is produced of that object which, having been known before, has left residua in the mind, and which residua, excited by a similar object, acting as the accessory cause, brings it to our knowledge. Hence, neither cognition, nor memory is constant everywhere, nor is there any inconsistency.

[The argument mooted in the last aphorism is further developed by saying that the effect of the qualities is transmitted to the thinking principle through the object seen, and the thinking principle is thereby modified differently under different circumstances. The qualities act from two different directions, first in the thinking principle apart from the object, and next in the object, and through it in the thinking principle. A man in a passion has the quality of foulness prevalent in him, and then that foulness affects everything he sees, though it is not foul; and when all the qualities are calm in him, he sees a foul action, and the foulness of that action enters within him and tinges his thinking principle from without.]

To remove the doubt that since the perceiving soul does not perceive a yellow colour when it perceives a blue, there is liability of its assuming, like the thinking principle, different shapes, or being modified from its being at times the perceiver, he says:

XVII.

The functions of the thinking principle are always known, for its presiding soul is unmodifiable.

All the functions of the thinking principle—characterised as they are by proofs, misconceptions, &c.,—are "always," *i. e.*, at all times, known to its percipient soul, since it is unmodifiable, or wanting in liability to change from its being of the form of the intellect (*chidrúpa*). Were it mutable, the constant perceptibility of those functions would not follow, the mutability

being (necessarily) occasional. The meaning is this. The soul of the form of intellect always remaining as the presiding principle, and its intimate associate, the pure element, the thinking principle, being also always present, by whatever object it (the latter) is modified in shape there is the probability of that object being always brought into contact with the shadow of the former (soul, *chit*); and such being the case it is established that there is constant perceptibility, and never can there be any apprehension of change.

[Having explained the relation of cognition to cognizables, and the *rationale* of the process by which things become known or unknown, the author proceeds to explain how it is that the thinking principle, which, under the circumstances alleged, is always changing and assuming new forms, should still be able to know different objects, or have the power of understanding. The thinking principle is admitted to be *in se* unconscious, and is itself undergoing constant modifications, and cannot therefore exercise intelligence, and be itself the cause of knowledge. But, says the author, its presiding soul is constant and immutable, and associated with that soul it derives reflected intelligence, and by its aid it is always able to know whatever external object casts its shadow on it. In other words, though the thinking principle is itself unconscious, it derives intelligence from the soul which is pure intelligence and absolutely immutable. The *P. Bháshya* explains the aphorism by saying, "had the presiding soul been liable, like the thinking principle, to constant mutation, then objects or the functions of the thinking principle would have become, like sounds and other objects, sometimes known and sometimes unknown to it; but constant consciousness (*lit.* perceptibility) of the mind is indicated by the immutability of its presiding soul." (*Yadi chittavat prabhurapi purushah pariṇameta tatastadvishayá chittavṛittayah śabdádivishayavat jṇátájṇátáh syuh, sadájṇátatvantu manasastatprabhoh purushasyápariṇámitvamanumápayati.*) This idea is further developed in other commentaries.]

Now it may be said that since the thinking principle itself,

from excess of the quality of goodness, is the illuminant, it can from its self-illumination, illuminate both itself and the object, and the act of perception can thereby be completed, what is the use of the assumption of a separate percipient? To allay this doubt, he says:

XVIII.

It is not self-illuminative, since it is perceptible.

"It," the thinking principle, is not "self-illuminative" (*svábhása*), expositor of itself, but it is perceptible by the soul. How so? Because it is "perceptible." A perceptible is known by a percepient, as in the case of a water-jar or the like. The thinking principle is an object of perception, and therefore it is not self-illuminative.

[The argument in the next preceding aphorism would suggest the idea that the thinking principle, whether directly or indirectly, was itself the perceiver, and that being the case there is no necessity for assuming a separate perceiver. Where one assumption is sufficient, two are not needed. This objection of the opponent is refuted in the aphorism under notice, by saying that the thinking principle cannot be the percipient, or self-illuminattve, because it is itself an object of perception. That which is an object of perception cannot itself be percipient; and the commentator illustrates this by citing the example of a water-jar, which, as an object of perception, cannot know itself. The *P. Bháshya* elaborates the argument by saying, "Even as the other organs and their objects, such as audition, &c., cannot be self-illuminative from the circumstance of their being perceivables, the mind should be so known. Nor can fire be an example in this instance; for even fire cannot make its own hidden identity visible. Manifestation is seen to result from the conjunction of a manifestator with a manifestable, and such conjunction cannot take place with one's own identity. Besides if the theory of self-illuminativeness of the thinking principle be admitted, it would not be perceptible to any body else." (*Yathetaráṇíndriyá*-

ṇi śabdádayaścha dṛiśyatvánna svábhásáni tathá manopi pratyetavyam. Na chágniratra dṛishṭántam. Nahyagnirátmasvarúpamaprakáśam prakáśayati. Prakáśaścháyam prakáśya-prakáśaka sañyoge dṛishṭah, na cha svarúpamátresti sañyoyah kiṇcha svábhásam chittamityagráhyameva kasyachiditi.) The illustration of fire becomes appropriate on the assumption that it owes its luminosity to itself. But the luminosity contemplated by the term *svábhása* is knowledge, and not light. In fact, the *light* of the text can be understood only by substituting for it the word *knowledge,* throughout the discussion.]

It may be said that the argument here has accepted the proposition, (*i. e.,* it involves a *petitio principii*), for the perceptibility of the thinking principle has not yet been established. Besides, in men the functions of accepting that which is good and rejecting that which is injurious are made manifest through the consciousness of one's own intellect; and such feelings as "I am angry," "I am afraid," "I have no desire," cannot be produced without the consciousness of the intellect (and since they are, the agency of the soul is not needed.) To meet this argument, he says:

XIX.

Attention cannot be directed to both at the same time.

The understanding of an object is the establishment of its usefulness by (knowing it to be) this—this is the object which is the cause of pleasure or pain. The understanding of the intellect is the establishment of the use of that object through pleasure or pain in the form of I (or the ego). In the perception of an object two such kinds of understanding cannot be effected at the same time, for there is a contradiction. There is no possibility of effecting two contradictory actions simultaneously, and therefore it is not possible to perceive "both," *i. e.,* cognition and cognizable at the same time. Hence, it is laid down that the thinking principle is not self-illuminative. Further, even if

two such actions could be accomplished, their fruits could not result, for there cannot be an apprehension of the two fruits, because the thinking principle being directed outwards to grasp an object cannot know itself. The result is confined only to the object, and not to itself. This is the meaning.

[The opponent again comes to the charge, and says that the intellect or understanding may supply the place of the soul, for the thinking principle may see, and the intellect may decide about the nature of the sight. The author demurs to this by saying two such functions cannot take place simultaneously, or the thinking principle cannot see and argue at the same time. The sensation of hunger is first felt, and then its nature discussed. The thinking principle must undergo two modifications, once to feel, and then to consider, and these it cannot undergo at once; so these two acts can never take place simultaneously, and consequently it cannot be said that the thinking principle is alone sufficient to account for consciousness and knowledge: a separate cause must be assigned for these two feelings, and that cause is the soul. The *P. Bháshya* pithily disposes of the question by saying, "It is not possible to behold one's own self and another at the same time, for it leads to the theory of the momentarists who hold action, effect and cause to be the same." (*Na chaikasmin kshaṇe svapararúpávadháraṇam yuktam, kshaṇikavádino yad bhavanam saiva kriyá tadeva cha kárakamityabhyupagamah.*) The meaning of the aphorism is simply that the thinking principle cannot perform the two acts of perception and self-knowing at the same time, and therefore it is obvious that it cannot by itself be the cause of intelligence.]

Let it be admitted that a cognition cannot be self-perceptive, still may it not be perceived by another cognition? Assuming such a question, he says:

XX.

If one cognition be the perceptible of another, there would be an excessiveness of cognitions to

cognitions, and also a confusion of memory.

If one cognition could cognize another, then that cognition being itself unintelligent and unable to illuminate another, we must assume a third cognition and for it another, and so on and a thing could not be perceived in the whole lifetime of a man. Nor can an object be known when the cognition remains unknown.

It leads also to "confusion of memory." On a particular colour or a taste being produced in a cognition there would arise an endless series of cognitions to perceive it, and when the residua left by a former cognition would attempt to recall it to memory there would arise, from there being no break in the ideas of cognitions and objects, cognitions and memories simultaneously, and hence, it being impossible to make out with reference to what object the recollection has arisen, there would be a confusion of memory, *i. e.*, it would not be known that this is the memory of colour and this is the memory of taste.

[The explanation above given leaves the door open to the assumption that one cognition may perceive another, and thus obviate the necessity of assuming the agency of the soul, *i. e.*, each individual may have many cognitions which co-operate with each other in producing knowledge of a particular object. To preclude this theory, the author brings forward the argument of *regressus in infinitum*. If one cognition could perceive another, we would require a third to perceive the second, and so on, and there would be no end to the chain. It would, he urges, also lead to a confusion of memory, for on one idea being called to memory all its attendant ideas would arise to infinity, and it would be impossible to determine which is the particular idea that has been revived.]

The question may then be asked, if, in the absence of self-perceptive power in cognitions *(buddhi)*, one cognition cannot be known by another, how do we use the idea this is the perception of an object? To remove this doubt, he expounds his conclusion.

XXI.

The intellection of its own cognition takes place when it takes its form through the non-transitional soul.

"Soul" (*purusha*), being of the form of intelligence, is called *chiti* (intellect). It is "non-transitional" (*apratisaṅkramá*), that which has no transition or passing into another place is so called: by this is meant that it does not mix with anything. In the modification of the member and the membered, the (three) qualities, (as members) in passing into the qualified or membered, assume their forms, and in the world atoms, moving on, produce the forms of objects; but the power of intellection (*i. e.*, soul) does not do so, because it always retains its own form, inasmuch as it exists in itself. Hence when the thinking principle, being near it, assumes its shape, intellection takes place; and when the soul, by its contact with the function of the thinking principle being endowed with understanding, cognizes, then the knowing of the thinking principle of its own self takes place.

[The soul never undergoes any modification, but by its reflection on the thinking principle that principle derives its intelligence, and that intelligent state is therefore said to be attained through the non-transitional soul. It is then *chiti* or intelligence, because for the time being it has intelligence in it, and this is explained by the commentator. When the thinking principle in its intelligent state assumes the form of an object, it is able to know its own notions. The *P. Bháshya* explains the text by saying, "unmodifiable is the power of experiencing; it is also non-transitional. On its reflection falling on the excessibly modifiable (the thinking principle) the functions of the latter reflect on it. Thereupon people call it the function of understanding from its imitating the function of the thinking principle enlivened by intelligence, though it is devoid of the function of understanding." (The force of the argument here depends upon the distinction made between intelligence and the function of understanding, for the soul, though intelligence itself, does not exercise any

function.) (*Apariṇámini hi bhoktṛiśaktirapratisañkramá cha pariṇáminyatyarthe pratisañkránteva tadvṛittimanupatati, tasyáś-cha práptachaitanyopagraharupáyá baddhivṛitteranukárimátra-tayá buddhivṛityaviśishṭá hi jnánavṛittirákhyáyate*).

Paṇḍit Govindadeva S'ástrí, following some later commentators, explains the text so as to mean that the soul itself undergoes the modification. The earlier and more reliable commentators, however, do not accept that meaning, and as the sequel shows them to be right I have accepted their interpretation.]

To show that thus the self-perceptive thinking principle, being able to perceive all objects, becomes fit for all purposes, he says:

XXII.

The thinking principle, modified by the knower and the knowable, is (able to perceive) all objects.

"The knower" (*drashṭá*) is soul. To be modified by it is to seem to be of its form from its propinquity. To be modified by the knowable, is to undergo the modification of assuming the form of the (object) perceived. When this (double modification) takes place, then it becomes able to perceive all objects. Even as a transparent crystal, or a mirror, or the like is fit to receive the reflection of all images, so the quality of goodness, unstained by foulness and darkness, is able, from its purity, to receive the reflection of the soul (*chit*). Not so foulness and darkness, owing to their want of purity. The quality of goodness, divested of all association with foulness and darkness, from its being liable to only one modification, and being able to receive the reflection of the intelligent soul, remains like a steady lamp-flame till the attainment of emancipation (*moksha*). Even as in the vicinity of a loadstone motion is produced in iron, so in the vicinity of the intelligent soul manifestible intelligence is reflected on the quality of goodness. Accordingly, in this system of philosophy two powers of intelligence are recognized, the eternally present (*nityoditá*) and the manifestible (*abhivyañgá*). The eternally

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present power of intelligence is soul. The manifestible power of intelligence is the quality of goodness, which derives its power by its contiguity to the former. From extreme propinquity, it, as an intimate friend, effectuates the experiencership of the soul. And as that quality is the resting place of *Purusha,* the supreme soul, the Sáñkhyas, who recognise an actionless Brahma, attribute to it the experience of pleasure, pain and delusion. (The epithets "supreme" and "Brahma" are meaningless here, for the human soul is all that is meant: God as Brahma is not indicated).

Now, though from the extreme abeyance of some one quality and of its prevalence at certain times and in some cases, all the three qualities are constantly modifying in the forms of pleasure, pain, and delusion, and the thinking principle is not pure, yet when that principle modifies its form into that pure quality of goodness, which is the essence of work, it attains its perceptibility. The pure primary quality of goodness of the thinking principle, on the one side reflected upon by intelligence or the soul, and on the other covered by the thinking principle modified into the forms of external objects, and becoming conscious from the effect of the reflection of the soul, becomes able to feel pleasure, pain and delusion, though it is devoid of intelligence. Thus the experience, from its extreme propinquity to soul and from want of due discrimination, is said to be of soul, though it is unexperiencing. To this effect has Vindhyavásí said: "the sufferingness of the quality of goodness is the sufferingness of soul." Elsewhere it is said. "Even as an image produced by the reflection of a reflected image on a mirror is called a reflection, so the manifestation of the shadow of intelligence, like the intelligence of soul, is implied by the word *pratisañkránti* or contact."

It might be argued that, though the reflection of the ever-modifying may be seen in a transparent body, as a human face in a looking-glass, how can there arise the reflection of the absolutely transparent, all-pervading, unmodifying soul in the comparatively untransparent quality of goodness? To this the reply is—Not knowing the true nature of reflection you

have said this. The display of the manifestible power of intelligence in the quality of goodness, by the propinquity of the soul, is called reflection. Even as is that sentient power, abiding in the soul, so does its reflection appear in the quality of goodness.

Again, since it has been said that soul is absolutely pure, how can it be in contact with the (comparatively) untransparent quality of goodness? This argument is not correct, for the contact of the sun and the like (which are highly transparent) is seen in water and the like which are less transparent. If it be said that there can be no contact of that which is undefined, that too would be inconsistent, because we see the all-pervading sky (*ákáśa*) reflected in a looking-glass, or the like. And such being the case, there can be no objection to the effectuation of the reflection (under notice).

It may be argued that what has been said about there being an apparent or external contact by propinquity of the sentient power with the quality of goodness of the thinking principle, there should be the experience of pain and pleasure on the part of soul, is inconsistent, for how can the quality of goodness of the thinking principle be produced without a modification of Prakṛiti? and for what object should there be a modification of Prakṛiti? To this it is replied, that Prákṛiti has to effectuate soul's experience of the objects of mundane existence, and, its duty being to effectuate the object of soul, the modification is proper.

It may be urged that this is not proved, for the effectuation of the soul's object is impossible. The duty of effectuating soul's object implies the consciousness on the part of Prakṛiti that "it is my duty to effectuate soul's object;" but how can there be such a consciousness on the part of the unsentient Prakṛiti? If you admit the consciousness, how will you maintain its unsentience or inertness? The reply to this is that in the two forms of progressive and regressive modification there are the two natural powers (of progression and regression), and they are called the duty of effectuating soul's purpose. Those powers are natural to the unsentient Prakṛiti. Its progressive modification (*anu-*

loma-pariṇáma) is the outward one, extending from the intellect to gross matter; while entering through its cause and ending with the annihilation of egoism is its regressive modification, (*pratiloma pariṇáma*). Hence on the completion of soul's experience, the two natural powers being destroyed, Prakṛiti, having achieved its object, ceases to modify. In performing such duty for soul on the part of the unsentient Prakṛiti, there is no inconsistency.

Again, it may be argued, if there be two such powers naturally possessed by Prakṛiti, then why is exertion made for salvation (*moksha*) by those who long for it? and if salvation be no object the science of those who advise it is worthless. The answer is, the relation of soul and Prakṛiti as experiencer and experience is from time without a beginning, and that being the case, when pain is felt on the part of Prakṛiti in action, from the assumption of its being the agent or actor, there arises the desire—"how can there be absolute stoppage of my suffering?" and hence there is a necessity on the part of Prakṛiti for the advice of the science which points out the means of stopping the pain. The substance of the advice of the science is the quality of goodness of the thinking principle as governed by work. In other works on philosophy this has been accepted to be the nature of ignorance (*avidyá*.) That nature, exerting for salvation, relying on the help of the advice of such sciences, obtain the reward called salvation. All works influenced by the (necessary) conjunction of causes attain their own selves, and it is established by proof that of the work called *moksha*, which is acquired by regressive modification, this is the conjunction of causes, because it cannot be attained by any other method. Hence without that cause how can it be effected? It follows, therefore, that the quality of goodness of the thinking principle modified by worldly objects in contact and enlightened by the shadow of soul, conducts, through the conviction of (the reality of) those objects, all worldly affairs. Deluded people, looking at such thinking principle, imagine it and all such thinking principles to be the world. They should be enlightened.

[Having met all the principal objections to the theory of the thinking principle being sensitized into intelligence by a reflection of soul which is intelligence, the author enunciates that the thinking principle, modified on the one hand by the soul and on the other by external objects, is brought into play in every case of sensation. The word used in the text for the double transformation is *uparakta,* which is a compound of *upa* 'excess' and *ranja* 'to colour' or 'tinge,' meaning that the thinking principle is doubly 'tinged or influenced; and this conveys the true meaning of the text. The *P. Bháshya* accordingly cites the example of the crystal vase tinged by the coloured object put in it. Inasmuch as the theory, however, is that the thinking principle assumes the shape of the object in every instance of cognition, and the same epithet is used for the double tinging, it is necessary, for the sake of consistency, to adopt the same phraseology everywhere; I have accordingly used the word modified.

Bhoja, after explaining the text, enters into a long dissertation on the various objections that may be started to the doctrine, and refutes them *seriatim.* The first and most obvious objection is—how can a shadow of soul produce in an object on which it falls the quality of the original? Soul may be intelligence, but its shadow cannot reasonably be said to convey that intelligence on the object on which it falls. The commentator sees no harm in this, for, says he, such action is manifest in the motion produced in iron by the propinquity of a loadstone. He describes soul's intelligence to be two-fold; one is *Nityoditá* or always and eternally present, and the other *Abhivyañgá* or manifestible, and it is the latter that sensitizes the thinking principle.

The next argument is, if it be the thinking principle that is sensitized, how can soul be said to be the experiencer? The reply is—that soul is really not the experiencer, but since experience is felt by the agency of its shadow it is in an indiscriminate way called experiencer. ..., yet the

Then the question arises how can reflection ...y of darkness, ...ns. The organs

a perfectly transparent object like soul, on a comparatively untransparent object like the thinking principle with the quality of goodness prevalent in it? This is met by saying that the word reflection here simply is the technical name of the influence of soul on the thinking principle.

An argument like the last is raised with reference to the contact of the absolutely pure soul with a comparatively impure thinking principle. This, however, is held possible, as we see the sun reflected in foul water. The contact of that which is illimitable with a finite object is also possible, as in the case of the sky reflected in a mirror.

The objection next urged is that why should Prakṛiti or nature change to produce effects? The answer is, it subserves the purposes of soul. This answer is, however, not enough, for Prakṛiti or nature being unintelligent, cannot have such a consciousness of duty, and act up to it. The reply is that Prakṛiti has two inherent powers in it, that of progression and of regression, and acting under their impulses it subserves the purposes of soul, and therefore there is no inconsistency.

The admission of the two powers aforesaid suggests the objection that, if they be natural they will run their course of their own accord, and there is no use in controlling them. The effect of the regressive action is salvation, and that must come of itself; none needs try for it, and, if so, what is the use of Yoga as a means of salvation? This is met by saying that it is Prakṛiti when in action that feels pain and, wishing to put a stop to that pain, wants to know how to do so, and hence arises the desire for salvation, and the Yoga points out the means of doing so. Without such advice Prakṛiti would go on working for ever.

The *P. Bháshya* has not noticed these discussions.]

Suspecting that it may be argued that if all purposes are accomplished by a thinking principle of this kind, why should we acknowledge an experiencer of which there is no proof, he gives the proofs (in support of the existence) of the spectator.

XXIII.

It exists for another's purpose, though coloured by uncountable residua, because it operates by association.

"It," the thinking principle, "coloured," *i. e.*, assuming many forms, through the influence of an uncountable number of "residua" (*vásaná*) (existing in it), effectuates for "another's," *i. e.*, a master's, "purpose" (*artha*) the work of experience and final reward. How so? "Because it operates by association." "Association" (*sañhatya*), *i. e.*, by fully joining together, operates to accomplish a purpose. We see that works performed jointly are for another, as in the case of a bed or a chair. The co-operators (in this case) are the qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, which, modifying in the form of the thinking principle, jointly work for another, and that "another" is soul.

It may be urged that through the force of the example by which the subservience of another's purpose by an embodied stranger, as a bed or a chair or the like, is established, a similar (embodied) stranger may be proved, but you contemplate an unembodied "another," and, the opposite being proved, your argument becomes destructive of the object. The reply is thus given: Although in the example pervasion of the premiss has been accepted as general in regard to effectuating another's purpose, yet on consideration of the specific distinctions of goodness in the qualified, the distinction will be evident, and the position that the experiencer is another is established. Thus, as in inferring the existence of fire in a mountain covered with fuel of a particular kind from the smoke seen there, the inference that fire is produced by fuel and is distinct from other fires is taken for granted, so here in inferring that the specific experience called goodness is for another's purpose. In the same way the experiencing superior is proved to be another of the form of intelligence and isolated. Although he appears as the other and the noblest of all, yet the body is superior to objects resulting from the quality of darkness, because it is manifest, and the asylum of the organs. The organs

are superior to the body; to them the illuminating quality of goodness is superior; and he who is the illuminator is distinct from illumination and of the form of intelligence. How can then there arise this conjunction? (*i. e.*, there is no actual conjunction but a mere shadow).

[The explanations given in previous aphorisms still leave the door-open to the argument that the agency of the soul is redundant and not wanted. If the thinking principle doubly modified as above stated is sufficient for conception, why make the soul the experiencer of worldly joys and sorrows? To this question the reply given is that, though the thinking principle is actuated by innumerable desires resulting from the residua of former works, it nevertheless acts for another's purpose, and not for itself, since it acts by the co-operation of many causes, and not of its own motion. Though there are innumerable residua in it, they cannot work until external agencies are brought to bear upon them, and that shows that the thinking principle has no power of action *suo motu*. It is unconscious too, so that it can have no will of its own. It acts only when it is worked upon, and this is indicated by the phrase "operates by association." Inasmuch, however, as its action may tend to bring on liberation which is for the good of the soul, it is to be inferred that in its other actions it subserves the gratification of that soul. No line can be drawn between what actions are for the soul and what are not, and logically what is true for a part, *i. e.*, for liberation, must be true for the whole. This idea is expressed in the Sáñkhya-káriká by the verse "generous nature, endued with qualities, does by manifold means accomplish, without benefit (to herself), the wish of ungrateful soul, devoid as he is of qualities," (LX). It should be noticed, however, that the functions which are usually attributed to nature or Prakṛiti in the Sáñkhya are invariably assigned to the thinking principle (*chitta*) in the Yoga of Patanjali. In fact, in the Yoga system, chitta plays a more important part than the Buddhi of Kapila, and appertains to itself the character both of Buddhi and Prakṛiti, but the commentator does not mark this distinction. In

his works Kapila frequently refers to Prakṛiti where Pātanjali confines himself to Chitta. The action of the unconscious thinking principle for another's purpose is usually explained by the illustration of the saffron cart, which, unconscious as it is, subserves the purpose of man by bringing him a desirable condiment.]

He now proceeds to show by ten aphorisms that the fruit of this philosophy is isolation.

XXIV.

For the knower of the difference there is a cessation of the idea of self in the thinking principle.

Thus the quality of goodness and soul being proved to be distinct, whatever idea exists of his self being the thinking principle, in him who knows them to be distinct, that is the one is different from the other, the same surceases, *i. e.*, the idea ceases of the thinking principle being the actor, knower, and experiencer.

[Having disposed of all metaphysical questions bearing on the subject-matter of his work, the author now reverts to the thesis, how isolation is effected. The metaphysical questions above set forth, when thoroughly understood, enable a person to divest himself of the idea that his self or ego is his thinking principle, and to believe that his soul is the real self. He knows that the thinking principle is unconscious and not his self. The idea, in fact, is altogether set at rest, and his soul is so far freed from the natural wrong belief that the thinking principle is the ego.]

(To the question) what happens when this takes place, he says:

XXV.

Then the thinking principle is turned towards discriminative knowledge, and bowed down by the weight of commencing isolation.

The thinking principle, which was turned outwards by igno-

rance, to derive the fruit of experiencing worldly objects, deflects now towards "discriminative knowledge," (*viveka*) *i. e.,* turns inward towards the path of discriminative knowledge, and is "bowed down by the weight of coming isolation," (*kaivalya-prágbhára*) *i. e.,* the fruit of isolation, or the commencement of isolation.

[When the belief aforesaid is effected, the thinking principle drops the cosmos, and turns inward to the cultivation of discriminative knowledge, and is overpowered by the sense of isolation which begins to sprout in him.]

Now, by describing the causes of the impediments which occur in the thinking principle flowing towards discrimination, he points out the means of overcoming them.

XXVI.

In the intervals thereof other impressions arise from residua.

"Thereof," *i. e.,* of the thinking principle engaged in meditation. In the "intervals" (*chhidreshu*), in the void spaces of the thinking principle, whatever "impressions" (*jnánáni*) or ideas of the waking (or worldly) state arise, the same proceed from the now-fading residua of the former waking state, in the forms of "I," "mine," and the like. What is said is that by means of extirpating the internal organ their avoidance should be effected.

[While isolation is progressing there are opportunities when a person is not actually engaged in meditation, *i. e.,* during the breaks in his meditation, for worldly ideas to sprout from the residua of former existences still clinging to the mind. These are calculated to disturb the process of isolation, and are so far impediments, which should be destroyed.]

He now says that the means of avoidance has already been explained.

XXVII.

The avoidance of these should be (the same) as already described in the case of afflictions.

The avoidance of these should be effected in the same way in which the avoidance of afflictions, ignorance, &c., has been already pointed out (C. II. x—xi). Even as they, scorched by the fire of knowledge, do not, like roasted seeds, sprout in the field of the thinking principle, so are the residua, (rendered infructuose).

[The ideas should be destroyed in the same way as afflictions, for which provision has been made in a previous part of the work, (C. II. x—xi).]

He now describes the means by which a Yógí, on his meditation becoming steady by the non-production of other thoughts in the way aforesaid, may attain excellence.

XXVIII.

On the completion of the series there is produced the meditation (called) the Cloud of Virtue, even in the case of the non-aspirant, from the appearance of constant discrimination.

"On the completion of the series" (*prasañkhyáne*), *i. e.*, after careful contemplation of the nature and respective peculiarities of all the categories arranged in due order. On that being accomplished even in the case of the "non-aspirant" (*akusída*), or one who does not wish for any fruition, there is produced from the appearance of constant discrimination, on the cessation of all foreign thoughts in his thinking principle, the meditation called the Cloud of Virtue. That which showers (*mehati*) or irrigates profusely the virtue (*dharma*) which is neither black nor white, (*cf.* IV, vii,) and which is subservient to the attainment of the *summum bonum* is the "Cloud of Virtue" (*Dharmamegha*) By this is shown that the highest virtue is the cause of knowledge.

[When the series of works enjoined above for the perfection of Yoga meditation have been completed, then there arises in the mind of the performer a meditation called Cloud of Virtue, which means that all virtues are showered on it, even when

it does not wish for them. The sense is that though the Yogi may not wish for any reward, still the reward comes. The word in the text is *akusída,* from *a* meaning negation and *kusída* interest, that is disinterestedly. The theory is that the perfection of virtue results spontaneously in a person who completes his Yoga duties as described in the text.]

He explains next what results from that Cloud of Virtue.

XXIX.

Thence follows the cessation of afflictions and works.

The meaning is, that on the manifestation of knowledge, their antecedent causes being removed, there is a cessation of the afflictions resulting from ignorance, and of all the works which are, according as they are white, &c., of three kinds. (VII).

[The object of the cloud is now described. On its appearance there results a complete cessation of all afflictions and all works; there is no longer any sense of affliction left in the mind of the Yogí, and he has neither any desire for work, nor any residua of former works left in his mind.]

He next explains what happens on this cessation.

XXX.

Then the knowable becomes small from the infiniteness of the knowledge free from all coverings and impurities.

"Coverings" (*ávaraṇáni*), are those whereby the thinking principle is covered; they are the afflictions; they are also impurities. Free from them, means devoid of them. From the knowledge (*jnána*) becoming free, like the sky bereft of cloud, and "from its infiniteness" (*ánantyát*), *i. e.,* from its being without a break, or all-pervading, "the knowable" (*jneya*) becomes "small" (*alpa*), or fit to be counted or grasped. The meaning is, that the Yogí can easily know everything.

[The next advantage is that the objects of sense are reduced to a minimum. Knowledge then becomes limitless and free from all impurities and coverings or interruptions; and placed against such knowledge, knowables or cognizables become insignificant, *i. e.*, that knowledge which can grasp everything, finds no difficulty in understanding small matters. Not that there is a reduction in the number or quantity of cognizables, but, placed besides limitless knowledge, they, by comparison, become insignificant.]

He then states what takes place after this:

XXXI.

Thereupon takes place the termination of the succession of the modifications of the qualities which have accomplished their end.

Those which have "accomplished" (*kṛita*), completed, soul's purpose or object in the form of experience and emancipation are called *kritárthâh*, or those which have accomplished their end. The "qualities" (*guṇáh*) are goodness, foulness, and darkness. "Their modifications" (*pariṇáma*) are their conditions of existence in relation to each other as members and membered, in a progressive or a regressive state to the time of the completion of the purpose of soul. Their "succession" (*krama*) is to be presently described. Its "termination" (*parisamápti*) is its finality, *i. e.*, it does not arise or happen again.

[Proceeding onwards, the next effect of the Yoga is a cessation of the tendency on the part of the qualities to undergo change. The qualities are the most active agents in worldly life, and it is their modifications that produce the various impressions of life, and when they cease to change, there is *ipso facto* a cessation of worldly impressions. It is the duty of Prakṛiti to minister to the purposes of soul, and as the qualities are inherent in Prakṛiti, the qualities may be taken as synonymous with Prakṛiti, and those qualities, having done their work, cease

from labour. The work of the qualities is said to be two-fold; they have to minister to soul's experience of the world, and then to bring on its emancipation; and when the state above described is attained, the qualities have already accomplished both these works, and, having nothing else left to do, stop work *in re* the soul concerned.]

He now describes the succession above referred to.

XXXII.

The succession is the counterpart of the moment perceptible at the end of the modification.

"Moment" (*kshaṇa*) is a short amount of time. Its "counterpart" (*pratiyogi*) is another distinct moment. "Perceptible at the end of the modification" means that which is accepted as the totality after perceiving a number of moments, and this is called the "succession" of moments, for no succession can be perceived in unperceived succession of moments.

[The word "succession" (*krama*) used in A. xxxi, is explained in this aphorism to mean the following of one moment after another. The object is to say that the lapse of time is reckoned by the succession of one moment after another, though there is no break between them; one totality is divided into many parts only for facility of reckoning.]

He now defines the specific nature of isolation, which is the result.

XXXIII.

Isolation is the regression of the qualities devoid of the purpose of soul, or it is the abidance of the thinking power in its own nature.

"The regression" (*pratiprasava*) or the non-production of change on the completion of the regressive (or refluent) modification of the (three) qualities, on the accomplishment of soul's (two-fold) purpose of experience and emancipation is called "isolation" (*kaivalya*); or, it is the abidance of the thinking

power (soul) solely in its own proper nature, on the cessation of its identification with intellectual functions (or objects).

[Having described the Yoga in all its details, the author concludes the work by announcing the ultimatum to which it leads. This ultimatum is *kaivalya,* and it is defined to result on the reabsorption of the triad of qualities in their original cause, on their having done their duty to soul, or on the abidance of the soul in its own nature without any association with the qualities; that is to say, when it has no longer the thinking principle near it to cause its shadow to fall thereon.

The commentator does not explain the word *kaivalya.* The *P. Bháshya,* suggests its meaning by saying "when the power of intelligence becomes alone, and remains always after in that state it is *kaivalya,*" (*chiti-śaktireva kevalá tasyáh sadá tathaivávasthánam kaivalamiti*). It is the same goal which the Sáñkhya assigns to its votaries, but it uses, instead of *kaivalya,* the word *apavarga* which, though not radically synonymous, conveys the same idea, that of liberation from the trammels of nature. The *Sáñkhya-káriká* adopts the term *kaivalya,* and says, "when separation of the informed soul from its corporeal frame at length takes place, and nature in respect of it ceases, then is absolute and final *kaivalya* accomplished," (v. LXVIII). Gauḍapáda contents himself by saying, "*kaivalya* is the abstract form of *kevala,*" (*kevalabhávát kaivalyam*). Váchaspati Mis'ra and Náráyaṇa take it to mean "exemption from the three kinds of pain," (*duhkhatraya-vigamam duhkhavinásam*). The lexicographical meaning of *kevala* is 'one,' 'alone,' 'only,' and in the derivative form it means, 'oneness,' 'singleness,' 'solitariness,' 'exclusiveness,' or 'individuality,' *i. e.,* deliverance from the association of nature. Colebrooke translates it into 'deliverance,' and Wilson adds 'liberation.' Mr. Davies, in his translation, prefers 'abstraction.' All these may be resolved into *isolation,* the word used in my version, the idea being that the soul is freed from all association, material, phenomenal, or noumenal.

The epithets 'absolute' (*aikántika*) and 'final' (*átyantika*) used in the *Sáñkhya-káriká,* and the word 'always,' (*sadá*) in *P. Bháshya* show that this isolation is to last for ever, and no future association of any kind is possible. To quote Mr. Davies, "the soul's perfect and final deliverance from the bondage of matter has been gained. No new character can be assumed; no birth into any kind of bodily state, even that of the gods, can follow. The drama of life is ended, and the actors retire from the stage for ever."

This eternal quietude of the soul after isolation amounts, in the opinion of M. Cousin, to "nihilisme absolu, dernier fruit du scepticisme;" but where existence forms the primary condition of the theory, nihilism cannot logically and fairly be predicated. The question is, does the soul exist or not after salvation? and since the Yoga, like many other schools of philosophy, both Indian and European, insists that it does, (*cf.* Sáñkhya-sútra I, 45, 46, 47), there is no room left for a charge of negation against it. Professor Wilson, following the Indian exegetes, more correctly explains the case by saying, "it is merely intended as a negation of the soul's having any active participation, any individual interest or property, in human pains, possessions, or feelings." Professor Weber, in his 'History of Indian literature,' (pp. 238-9), has entirely misrepresented the case. He says, "one very peculiar side of the Yoga doctrine—and one which was more and more exclusively developed as time went on—is the Yoga practice, that is, the outward means, such as penances, mortifications, and the like, whereby this absorption into the supreme Godhead is sought to be attained." To those who have attentively read the preceding pages, it will be obvious, that the idea of absorption into the Godhead forms no part of the Yoga theory. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive how so well-read a scholar, as the learned professor, could have formed this opinion, unless we believe that he has not read the Yoga, and has borrowed his theory from the Bhagavadgítá, and Puráṇic and Tántric modifications of Yoga.

Patanjali, like Kapila, rests satisfied with this isolation of the soul. He does not pry into the how and the where the soul abides after the separation. This condition of philosophic abstraction, however, not being satisfactory to worldly-minded people longing for a peaceful hereafter, a necessity arose for the elaboration of a more concretely blissful scheme, and the modifications above noticed were offerred by the Puráṇics to meet the requirement. They devised other forms, but those require no description here.

This completes the work; but Bhoja takes this opportunity to compare the condition of the soul as described in the Yoga with what other systems propose, and thereby to demonstrate its superiority. The first is the Buddhist doctrine of momentary existence.]

Nor is it only in our philosophy that the knower of the field [of action] in its isolated condition is recognised to exist in this form of intelligence; on reflection it will be seen that in other systems of philosophy also it remains in the same form. Now, in the worldly condition soul appears as full of agency, experiencership, and inquisitiveness; if this one soul, the knower of the field, be not admitted to be so, then in the absence of all antecedent and postcedent enquiry in momentary consciousness, (*i. e.*, believing consciousness to be existent only for the time being, which cannot look into the past or the future,) there would be no constant relation between soul and the fruits of works, and the objection would arise of the destruction of that which has been done, and the coming into existence of that which has not been done, (*i. e.*, no desert would follow works done, and desert would result from undone work). Acknowledge him to be the experiencer (of deserts) by whom an act enjoined by the S'ástras is performed, and there will be an inclination on the part of all to perform works for the acceptance or avoidance of good or evil. Since all actions characterised by the desire of avoidance or acceptance are subject to enquiry; since there would be an impossibility for enquiry in the case of mutually distinct moments; (*i. e.*, the

moment when one action is done being distinct from that in which another action is performed); and since in the absence of enquiry there would arise an impossibility for any kind of action to take place, it is established that that which is the agent, experiencer, and enquirer is the soul. In the condition of liberation, there being an absence of all actions characterised by the idea of the acceptable and the acceptor, sentience alone remains behind. That sentience is apparent only as sentience, and not by knowing itself, since the nature of sentience is to perceive objects, and not to perceive itself. Further, when an object is perceived by the thinking power, the idea is "this" (*ayam*), and when the identity of that power is to be implied, the idea is "I" (*aham*). Two such mutually discordant actions, characterised as the profluent and the refluent are, cannot be achieved simultaneously, and since the two actions cannot be performed at the same time, soul remains as sentience only. Hence it is reasonable (to believe) that in the liberated condition, when the qualities are defunct, soul remains solely as sentience. In the mundane condition agency, percipiency, inquisitiveness arise in regard to that soul. Besides, there is a relation between Prakṛiti and soul, which is that of experience and experiencer; it is natural, and exists from time without a beginning. It is due to the prevalence of want of right notion. And that being the case, in the presence of the two powers for the advancement of the object of soul, (*cf.* IV, XXII), all modifications in the form of Mahat and others take place. And since the power of the soul as the supreme agent, and of casting its quality of sentience on the thinking principle, and that of experiencing the result of the conjunction of that reflection, proceed from conjunction (with Mahat), and since the consciousness of agency and experiencership of the intellect proceeds from the influence of sentience on the intellect, and consequently of the conduct of all enquirable actions, what use is there in other unprofitable agglomeration of fallacies?

[Bhoja does not say that the theory he combats is due to the

Buddhists, but the dogma of momentary consciousness was prevalent among the Mádhyamíkas, and hence I infer that he means the Buddhists. The theory is, that all things are momentary, and their cognition is also momentary, produced by the concatenation of complements of unconscious causes, without a permanent intellectual back-ground, (*cf.* Cowell and Gough's *Sarvadarsana-sañgraha*, p. 15). It is refuted by the allegation, that such consciousness could not be made subject to moral responsibility. The consciousness that would perform an action now, would have no relation to the one that had acted before, or to that which would act in the future, and the responsibility of the one could not be transferred to another. There could be no such idea as ego, for the ego of one cognition would not be the ego of another, and yet as ego is the basis of cognition and consciousness, no theory can be valid which repudiates that. There could be under such circumstance no incentive to, nor necessity for, moral action. A permanent individual consciousness is unavoidable, and that is found in the thinking principle enlivened by a reflection of soul.]

Again, if, rejecting this course, it be accepted that agency is soul's essential attribute, then arises the admission of its being subject to modifications, and as modifications are non-eternal or temporal, its character as soul is destroyed. Nor can perception of mutually different conditions be effected in one form at the same time; and accordingly, in the condition in which soul is perceived associated with some produced pleasure, can the condition of pain be perceived. Thus the conditions being various, the conditioned must likewise be various, and from variety and modificability there can be neither spirituality nor eternity, (*i. e.*, that which is modifiable cannot also be eternal or spiritual, and eternity and spirituality are essential attributes of soul). Hence it is that those Sáñkhyas who believe in a peaceful Brahma, acknowledge soul to remain in the same form both in the mundane and the liberated conditions.

[This is apparently the theory of the Vais'eshikas, who believe

soul to be the real actor. The objection to this theory is that action implies change, and if soul be the real actor, it would be subject to change. The idea of change, however, is, in the opinion of Patanjali, incompatible with the spirituality and eternity of soul; it would cease to be soul if it were changeable like material objects, and therefore this theory is not tenable.]

The theory of the Vedantists, who believe liberation to be that condition of soul in which it is solely sentience and joy, is not correct. Joy being the identity of pleasure, and pleasure being manifested by perceptables, and perceptibility not being produced without perception, the doctrine of unity is destroyed by the admission of the two, the perceptible and the perception. Again, their saying of cognition itself being the joyous soul would be prejudiced by the incompatibility of two antagonistic qualities abiding together. Perception and perceptable cannot fitly be called one. Again, soul is said by the non-dualists to be of two kinds, the working or conditioned and the unconditioned or supreme. But if you admit that form in which the working soul becomes the experiencer of pleasure and pain, to be also the form in which it exists as the supreme soul, then the supreme soul becomes, like the working soul, subject to modifications, and pertain, the nature of ignorance. If it be said that the experiencership is not direct, but accepted as a present (by the soul) while remaining as a neutral superior, the case would be the same as in our system of philosophy.

The assumption about the joyous form (of soul) has already been refuted. It may be added that if soul be admitted to be of the character of ignorance, there would be no seperate existence left for working souls, and which should then be the object of philosophy? Certainly not the unconditioned soul, for it is eternally free; nor the working soul, for it is (admitted to be) of the character of ignorance, and thus will result the falsification of all systems of philosophy. If the creation be admitted to consist of ignorance, the question would arise, whose ignorance is it? It cannot be that of the supreme soul, for it is

eternally free, and of the form of knowledge. It cannot be of the working soul, for that being without a seperate existence, how can it be connected with ignorance? It would be like the admission of horns of a hare (a mere fiction). It might be said that the ignorance of ignorance consists in its not being the subject of demonstration by argument. It may, like the dew on the earth with the rays of the sun (playing on it), melt away under ratiocination, and yet it may be ignorance. This, however, cannot be. Whatever does something must be distinct from, or identical with, something else, and since the agency of ignorance in the development of the universe must be admitted, and admitting it, if ignorance be indeterminate, then nothing whatever will be determinate; even Brahma itself will be liable to be put down as indeterminate, (but if it be described to be determinate, it will cease to be ignorance). It follows then that the form of soul cannot be other than that of a supervisor. This supervisorship is mere sentience only, for there is no evidence of its having any other quality.

[The Vedantic doctrine is refuted on two grounds; 1st, because it involves a duality which the Vedantists themselves repudiate; 2nd, it makes soul liable to be affected by ignorance, thereby destroying its absolute purity, and if we admit that soul may be involved in ignorance then it will become indeterminate, and there would be no certainty about anything.]

It is alleged by the Naiyáyikas and others that soul is sentient, because it becomes so by contact with sentience, and that sentience is produced by the union of soul with its mind. They say that desire, knowledge, exertion and other attributes are produced by the contact of soul during its working condition with mind, and through those qualities, the soul knows itself to be the knower, the agent, and the experiencer. In the state of liberation (*moksha*), when false notions are suppressed on the suppression of the residua (*dosha*) which are produced by them, there results an absolute annihilation of the specific attributes, know-

ledge, &c., and soul is acknowledged to reside in its own essential form. This, however, is not a correct assumption, for what would you accept to be the peculiar soulness of the soul in that condition? (You cannot urge that pervasion, immensity, and eternity are its constituents, for) the qualities of pervasion and the rest pertain to ether and others, and to differentiate it from them, some determinate form must have to be admitted. You may say that the specific character of soul is its own speciality (or kind to which it belongs). But this cannot be urged, for such speciality exists in all things, (*i. e.*, everything has its specific distinction as a particular kind). It is necessary, therefore, to admit some other differentiation of the soul, apart from speciality, and this can be effected by admitting its supervisorship, from its being of the form of sentience, and in no other way.

As to what is believed by the Mímáñsakas about soul being both worker and work, the position is not tenable. They believe that soul is indicated by the use of the word I, and by the use of I, both the agency and the objectivity of soul are included, (*i. e.*, soul is the ego, and nothing else can be ego, and the soul being the ego, the ego must include both soul and work, for in knowing the soul work must appear to be soul and no other). But this cannot result, because they are of contradictory natures. Agency implies him who measures, while work means that which is to be measured or proved, and the assumption of these two antagonistic qualities cannot be effected in one at the same time. When two antagonistic qualities are assumed, then there can be no unity, as positive and negative, and so are agency and objectivity antagonistic. Should it be said there is no antagonism between agency and objectivity, but there is between agency and instrumentality, we deny it, because the assumption of antagonistic qualities is the same (in either case). Rejecting then the theory of perceivable by the use of I, we hold the soul's supervisorship as proved, and thence its sentienceness.

The theory of those who hold soul to be finite, defined by the body, and mutable, because it is reckoned among matter, tumbles down as soon as it is started. By the admission of mutability, the sentience form of soul is destroyed, and in the absence of its sentience form, how can there be any spirituality in soul? Hence those who desire to uphold the spirituality of soul must admit its sentience form, and that is its supervisorship.

[This is the theory of the Arhatas or Jains. (*Cf.* Cowell and Gough's *Sarvadarsana-sangraha.*)]

Some fancy soul to be of the form of the actor. They believe that the action of knowing, which results in the presence of a perceptible object, has for its fruit the cognition of that object; and in that cognition as the fruit, the true form of soul, being of the form of illumination, becomes manifest; and objects being perceptible, the soul becomes the perceptor; for it is produced in some such form as "I know the pot," (in which "I" is the perceptor, "know" is the cognition of the form of illumination, and the "pot" is the perceptible object). The cause of action is for certain the actor, and therefore actorship and experiencership constitute the form of soul. This, however, is inconsistent. (If cognitions be the root),—the question arises, Does the actorship of those cognitions arise simultaneously, or successively? If you say, that the actorship is simultaneous, then its actorship shall cease a moment after. If you say, it happens successively, it cannot be predicated of that which is uniform, (*i. e.*, soul). If you say the actorship of soul is effected always in one or the same form, then that one form being always present, all fruits would become of one form. If the actorship be multiform, then there would be mutability, and there being mutability, there can be no form of sentienceness. It follows that those who believe in soul's sentienceness, should not maintain its direct actorship. The way in which the actorship of the uniform, eternal, sentient soul is proved by us, is the most consistent.

Those who by such arguments maintain that the self-manifest soul becomes the perceptor through the cognition of objects, will find their refutation by the same line of argument.

Some hold that the reasoning (*vimarsa*) form of soul is its sentience form, (*i. e.*, its sentience is no other than its reasoning power). They say that the sentience form of soul cannot be ascertained without reasoning; the sentience form is said to be distinct from the inert, and without reasoning it cannot be defined, and without reasoning, there is nothing left behind. This is, however, untenable. Reasoning is the discussion which has the form of "this, thus, and so," (*i. e.*, every process of ratiocination involves the assumption of something like this, this is, this is not, thus it is, thus it is not, it is so, it is not so, and without them there can be no reasoning,) and that cannot arise without egoism (or consciousness), and when reasoning is brought to bear on soul it is brought into cognition in the form "I am of this form," and thus the soul, the subject of discussion, being brought to light by the word I, no advance is made beyond a fancy, and fancy is a form of conviction, which is the function of the intellect, and not of sentience. But as sentience, uniform and eternal, remains always in one shape, there can be no entrance of egotism into it. It follows then, that this assumption of reasoning in the soul is a mistaken assumption of the intellect for soul, and not a knowledge of the identity of the self-manifest soul, the great soul.

Thus in no system of philosophy can the form of soul be ascertained by any means, without admitting its supervisorship. Supervisorship implies sentience form, which is distinct from inertness. Because it exists supervising in the form of sentience, therefore it derives the quality of experience (in objects), and that which is supervised by sentience becomes fit for worldly usage. And such being the case, other systems of philosophy, if they decline to accept what we have said about the isolation of soul as resulting on the cessation of the functions of Prakṛiti after it has accomplished its duty have no

resource. It has, therefore, rightly been said that isolation is the abidance of the sentient power in its own form after withdrawing its shadow from all functions.

The sources of perfections, (I); the manner in which the transmutation of material causes are effected, (II); the mode in which merit cooperates in this process, (III); the origin of created thinking principles, (IV); their relation to their original source, (V); the superiority of Samádhi-born thinking principle, (VI); the nature of various kinds of work, (VII); the conformity of works to residua, (VIII); their invariable relation, (IX); the eternity of desires, (X); their nature and susceptibility to destruction, (XI); the relation of the thinking principle to works, (XII); the natures of the qualities and the qualified, (XIII); unity of things proceeding from unity of modification, (XIV); the relation of cognition to cognizables, (XV); the process of cognition, (XVI); its permanence, (XVII); thinking principle not self-illuminative, (XVIII); it cannot be directed to two things at the same time, (XIX); multiplicity of cognitive power not admissable, (XX); how it perceives its self, (XXI); how it is made fit for all purposes, (XXII); its subserviency to another's purpose, (XXIII); progress of isolation, (XXIV—XXXII); nature of isolation, (XXXIII)—these are the subjects treated of in this chapter on isolation. [Only the substance of the commentary has been given here, for reasons explained before.]

He, who is the asylum of fame and majesty, whose orders are received on the crowns of their diadems, by kings prostrate at his feet in acts of service and salutation, the lotus of whose mouth having been attained by the goddess of speech, she became uncommonly proud, even he, the auspicious Bhoja, lord of the earth, composed these notes on the aphorisms of the lord of serpents.

This is the end of the fourth quarter, or the quarter on isolation, of the commentary entitled Rájamártaṇḍa, on Pataṉjali's Institutes of the Yoga, by the great king, the superior king, the illustrious Bhojadeva.

APPENDIX.

A DESCRIPTIVE LIST OF WORKS EXTANT ON THE YOGA SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY.

Abbreviations.

B. G. C.	Bühler's Guzarat Catalogue.
Bh. D. M. C.	Catalogue of the Bháü Dáji Memorial.
Bh. R.	Bhandárkar's Report, 1881-2.
H. C.	Hall's Contributions towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems.
K. C. P. C.	Kielhorn's Central Provinces Catalogue.
K. P. R.	Kunte's Punjab Report, 1881.
M. N.	Mitra's Notices of Sanskrit MSS.
N. W. P. C.	North Western Provinces Catalogue.
N. W. P. & O. C.	" " " and Oudh Catalogue.
O. C.	Oudh Catalogue.
Op. C.	Oppert's Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS. in Southern India.

1. A'chárapaddhati. Duties and exercises of Yogís. By Basudevendra. B. G. C. IV.

2. Ajapágáyatrí-puráscharana-paddhati. Use of the Gáyatrí in Yoga meditation. By S'áñkara A'chárya. H. C.

3. Amanaska. On steadfastness of the mind. N. W. P. C. V.

4. A'sanádhyáya. On postures appropriate for Yogís. Op. C. I.

5. Ashṭáñga-hṛidaya-sañhitá. Meditation on eight particular parts of the body. B. G. C. IV.

6. Ashṭáñga-yoga. Meditation on eight particular parts of the body. By S'añkara A'chárya. B. G. C. IV.

7. Cháyápurushávabodhana. Knowledge of souls. Op. C. I.

8. Dattatreya sañhitá *alias* Dattátreya-yoga, or Dattátreya S'ástra. A Tantra on the performance of Yoga. By Dattátreya. M. N. I, Op. C. I., B. G. C. IV.

9. Gheraṇḍa Sañhitá. A Tantra on the mode of performing the Yoga form of S'ákta worship. By Gheraṇḍa. M. N. I., N. W. P. C. I., N. W. P. C. IV.

10. Goraksha-s'ataka *alias* Jnána-s'ataka. A century of verses on the performance of Yoga. By Gorakshanátha. N. W. P. C. I., M. N. I., H. C., B. G. C. IV., K. C. P. C.

11. Goraksha-s'ataka-ṭíká. A commentary on the Goraksha-s'ataka. By S'añkara. N. W. P. C. I.

12. Goraksha-s'ataka-ṭippana. Notes on the Goraksha-s'ataka. By Mathuránátha S'ukla. N. W. P. C. I.

13. Haṭha-dípiká *alias* Haṭha-pradípiká. On Haṭha and Rája Yogas. by S'átmaráma *alias* Atmaráma. M. N. I and II., N. W. P. C. I., H. C., K. C. P. C.

14. Haṭha-pradípiká. On Haṭha-yoga. By Chintámaṇi. B. G. C. IV.

15. Haṭha-pradípiká-ṭíká. A commentary on the Haṭha-pradípiká which treats on the Ashṭáñga-yoga. By Vrajabhúshaṇa. N. W. P. C. I.

16. Haṭha-pradípiká-ṭíká. A commentary on the Haṭha-pradípiká. By Mahádeva. N. W. P. C. I.

17. Haṭha-pradípiká-ṭíká. A commentary on the Haṭha-pradípiká No. 13. By Rámánanda Tírtha. N. W. P. C. I.

18. Haṭha-pradípiká-ṭippana. Notes on Haṭha-pradípiká, describing, Yama, Niyama, Dháraṇá, Dhyána, and Samádhi. By Umápati. N. W. P. C. I.

19. Haṭha-ratnávalí. On the suppression of the breath as a Yoga exercise. N. W. P. C. V.

20. Haṭha-sañketa-chandriká. On the performance of the Haṭha-yoga. By Sundaradeva. N. W. P. C. V., H. C.

21. Haṭha-yoga. On the performance of Haṭha-yoga. By Ádinátha. B. G. C. IV., K. C. P. C.

22. Haṭha-yoga-dhirája. On the exercises necessary for Haṭha-yoga. By S'iva. N. W. P. C. I.

23. Haṭha-yoga-dhirája-ṭíká. A commentary on the Haṭha-yoga-dhirája. By Rámánanda Tírtha. N. W. P. C. I.

24. **Haṭha-yoga-viveka.** On the performance of the Haṭha-yoga. By Vámadeva. N. W. P. C. I.

25. **Haṭha-yoga-saṅgraha.** The elements of the Haṭha-yoga. By Mathuránátha S'ukla. N. W. P. C. I.

26. **Jnánámṛita.** A poem on the duties of Yogís. By Gorakshanátha, disciple of Mínanátha. H. C.

27. **Jnánámṛita-ṭippana.** Notes on the Jnánámṛita. By Sadánanda. N. W. P. C. I.

28. **Jnána-yoga-khaṇḍa.** Knowledge as an element of Yoga exercise. Op. C. I.

29. **Jívanmukti-viveka** *alias* **Jívanmukti-prakaraṇa.** Emancipation during terrestrial existence. By Vidyáraṇya Svámí. M. N. IV.

30. **Jyotsná** *alias* **Haṭha-dípiká-ṭíká.** A commentary on the Haṭha-dípiká of Svátmaráma. By Brahmánanda. M. N. IV.

31. **Kapila-gitá.** Dissertations on the importance of Yoga meditations and the mode of performing them. by Kapila. M. N. IV.

32. **Kedára-kalpa.** Yoga practices. K. C. P. C.

33. **Khechari-vidyá.** Yoga exercises for attaining occult powers. By S'iva. B. G. C. IV.

34. **Laya-yoga.** Yoga emancipation. B. G. C. IV.

35. **Mahá-rámáyaṇa** *alias* **Vaśishṭha-rámáyaṇa.** A version of the history of Ráma distinct from that of Válmíki and designed especially to expound the principles of the Yoga doctrine. M. N. VI.

36. **Mahes'a-saṅhitá.** By Mahes'a. K. P. R. 1881.

37. **Mudrá-prakáśa.** A treatise on Haṭha-yoga, describes Mahámudrá, Nabhomudrá, Uḍḍiyana, &c. By Kṛipáráma. N. W. P. C. I.

38. **Náḍi-jnána-dípiká.** On the knowledge of the arteries or nerves bearing on the Yoga. M. N. I.

39. **Nava-ratnákara** *alias* **Nava-yoga-kallola.** A treatise explanatory of Yoga-sútra. By Kshemánanda Díkshita. H. C.

Pátanjala-sútra *vide* **Yoga-sútra.**

40. **Pátanjala-bháshya** *alias* **Sáñkhya-pravachana-bháshya.** A well-known exegesis on the Yoga-sútra. By Vyása. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.

41. **Pátanjala-bháshya-vártika.** A commentary on the Pátanjala-bhásya. By Vijnána Bhikshu. N. W P. C. I., H. C.

42. **Pátanjalíyábhinava-bháshya.** Commentary on the Pátanjala-sútra. By Bhavadeva Mis'ra. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.

43. **Pátanjala-rahashya.** Notes on parts of the Pátanjala-sútra-bháshya. By S'rídharánanda Yati. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.

44. **Pátanjala-rahashya.** A commentary on the Yoga-sútra. By Rághavánanda. K. C. P. C.

45. **Pátanjala-sútra-bháshya.** A commentary on Patanjali's Yoga-sútra. By Bhavadeva Mis'ra, Mahámahopádhyáya. Probably the same with No. 42. M. N. V, and VI.

46. **Pátanjala-sútra-bháshya-vyákhyá.** A commentary on the Pátanjala-sútra-bháshya. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.

47. **Pátanjala-sútra-ṭíká.** A short commentary on the Pátanjala-sútra. By Rámánanda Tírtha. N. W. P. C. I.

48. **Pátanjala-sútra-vṛitti.** A commentary on the Yoga-sútra. By Náráyaṇa Tírtha. K. C. P. C.

49. **Pátanjala-sútra-vṛitti** *alias* **Pátanjala-vṛitti-bháshya-chháyá-vyákhyá.** A commentary on the Yoga-sútra. By Nágojí Bhaṭṭa. K. C. P. C., H. C.

50. **Pátanjala-vṛitti.** A commentary on the Yoga-sútra. By Umápati Tripáṭhi. O. C. XIII.

Pátanjala-yoga-sútra *vide* Yogánuśásana. Op. C. I.

51. **Pavana-vijaya.** On the nature of Pránáyáma (suppression of breath) and rules how to perform it. By S'iva. N. W. P. C. I., H. C., M. N. I., B. G. C. IV.

52. **Rájamártaṇḍa** *alias* **Yoga-sútra-vṛitti.** A commentary on the Yoga-sútra. By Bhojadeva. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.

53. **Rája-yoga.** On the performance of the Rája-yoga. By Rámachandra Paramahañsa. B. G. C. IV.

54. **Rámastavarája.** Describes Yoga meditation in the course of a hymn to Ráma. Op. C. I.

55. Sadáchára-prakaraṇa. Duties of Yogís. By S'aṅkara Áchárya. M. N. II.

56. Samádhi-prakaraṇa. On Yoga meditation. Op. C. I.

57. Samarasára-s'varodaya. On the regulation of breath and divination from the flow of breath. By Ráma. B. G. C. IV.

Sáṅkhya-pravachana, *vide* Yoga-sútra.

S'áṅkhya-pravachana-bháshya. Vide Pátanjala-bháshya.

58. S'áṅkhya-yoga-dípiká. On the performance of the Yoga. Op. C. I.

59. Saptabhúmiká-vichára. The seven stages of perfection of Yogís. B. G. C. IV.

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61. Sárasamúchchaya *alias* Yoga-sárasaṅgraha. The leading tenets of the Yoga. By Harisevaka Mis'ra. M. N. II.

62. Shaṭchakra. The six principal parts of the body which should be meditated upon. B. G. C. IV.

63. Saṭchakra-dhyána-paddhati. Meditation on six particular parts of the body. By Bráhmachaitanya Yati. K. P. R. 1881.

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65. Siddha-siddhánta-paddhati. On metempsychosis according to the Yoga doctrine. By Nityánanda Siddha. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.

66. Siddha-khaṇḍa. Occult powers. By Rámachandra Siddha. B. G. C. IV.

67. S'iva-saṅhitá. On the Yama, Niyama and other observances of the Yoga system; alleged to be an extract from the Skanda-puráṇa. By S'iva. N. W. P. C. I., N. W. P. and O. C. VI., B. G. C. IV., H. C.

68. S'iva-saṅhitá-ṭíká. Notes on the S'íva-saṅhitá. By Sadánanda. N. W. P. C. I.

69. Svarodaya. Yoga breathing. (Probably only on divination from the flow of breath). By Vyása. B. G. C. IV.

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71. Tattvárnava-ṭíká. Short commentary on the Tattvárnava. By Rámánanda Tírtha. N. W. P. C. I.

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77. Vás'ishṭhiya-guḍhártha. A commentary on the Vás'ishṭhasára. By Ditto. M. N. III.

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79. Vivekamártaṇḍa. Eight couplets on the primary doctrine of the Yoga. By Rámes'vara Bhaṭṭa. N. W. P. H. C.

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83. Yoga-chandra-ṭíká. A commentary on the Yoga-chandra. By Rámánanda Tírtha. N. W. P. C. I., M. N. I.

84. Yoga-chandriká. By Ananta S'armá. M. N. Vol. II.

85. Yoga-chintámaṇi. On Rája-yoga. By Bálasástrí Gadge. O. P. C. I., N. W. P. C. I., N. W. P. and O. C. VI.

86. Yoga-chintámaṇi. On Rája-yoga. By S'ivánanda Sarasvati. B. G. C. IV., H. C.

87. **Yoga-chintámaṇi.** On Haṭha-yoga. By Godávara Mis'ra. N. W. P. C. V., K. P. R., 1881.

88. **Yoga-chintámaṇi-ṭippaṇa.** Notes on the Yoga-chintámaṇi. By Bhaváni-saháya. N. W. P. C. I.

89. **Yoga-darpana-ṭíká.** Notes on the Yoga-darpana. By Bhavadeva. N. W. P. C. I.

90. **Yoga-darpana-ṭíká.** A commentary on the Yoga-darpana. By Kṛishṇanátha. N. W. P. C. I.

91. **Yoga-dṛishṭi-svádhyáya.** (Contents not known). Bh. D. M. C.

92. **Yoga-grantha.** A treatise on Yoga with a commentary. By Vyaṅkaṭácharya. N. W. P. C. V.

93. **Yoga-grantha-ṭíká.** A treatise on the Yoga-grantha, with a commentary. By Guṇákara Mis'ra. N. W. P. C. V.

94. **Yoga-kalpadruma.** Instructions for performing Yoga. By Kulamani S'ukla. N. W. P. C I.

95. **Yoga-kalpalatá.** Explanations of various Yoga tenets. By Mathuránátha S'ukla. N. W. P. C. I.

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116. Yoga-sástra. Notes on the Yoga-sútra. M. N. VI.

117. Yoga-sútra *alias* Yogánusásana or Sáñkhya-pravachana. Original text of the Yoga doctrine. By Patanjali. N. W. P. C. I.

118. Yoga sástra-sútra-páṭha. "A set of aphorisms on theocracy." By S'ukra. H. C.

119. Yoga-sástrávachúri. (In Prákṛit). Bh. D. M. C.

120. Yoga-siddhánta-paddhati. On the practice of Yoga. By Gorakshanátha. B. G. C. IV.

121. Yoga-s'ikhopanishad. A Upanishad on Yoga. Op. C. I.

122. Yoga-s'ikshá. By Harichara. B. G. C. IV.

123. Yoga-sútrártha-dípiká or Chandrika. A commentary on the Yog-sútra. By Ananta. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.

124. Yoga-sútra-ṭíká. By S'añkara. N. W. P. C. I.

125. Yoga-sútra-ṭíká. By Mahádeva. N. W. P. C. I.

126. Yoga-sútra-ṭippana. Notes on the Yoga-sútra. By Vrindávana S'ukla. N. W. P. C. I.

127. **Yoga-sútra-ṭippana.** Ditto. By Jnánánanda. N. W. P. C. I.

128. **Yoga-sútra-ṭippana.** Ditto. By Ramánanda Tírtha. N. W. P. C. I.

129. **Yoga-sútra-vṛitti.** By Sadás'iva N. W. P. C. I.

130. **Yoga-sútra-vṛitti-guḍhártha-dyotaka.** By Náráyaṇa Bhikshu. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.

131. **Yoga-sútra-vṛitti-ṭippana.** Notes on the Yoga-sútra-vṛitti. By Bhavadeva. N. W. P. C. I.

132. **Yoga-taraṅga.** Practice of Yoga meditation. By Vis'ves'varadatta. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.

133. **Yoga-taraṅga.** Practice of Yoga meditation. By Ramás'aṅkara. N. W. P. C. I.

134. **Yoga-táràvalí.** On the practice of Rája-yoga. By Sáṅkara Áchárya. M. N. Vol. IV.

135. **Yoga-táràvalí.** On the practice of Rája-yoga. By S'uka. B. G. C. IV.

136. **Yoga-tattva.** The principles of the Yoga doctrine. B. G. C. IV.

137. **Yoga-varṇana.** On the practice of the Haṭha-yoga. By Mathuránátha-S'ukla. N. W. P. C. I.

138. **Yoga-várṭiká.** A commentary on Vyása's Yoga-bháshya. By Vijnána Bhikshu. N. W. P. and O. C. VI.

Yoga-vásishṭha. Vide No. 35.

139. **Yoga-vásishṭha-ṭíká.** A commentary on the Yoga-vásishṭha. Op. C. I.

140. **Yoga-vichára.** The nature of the Yoga doctrine. An extract from the Kás'íkhanda. B. G. C. IV.

141. **Yoga-víja.** The essence of Yoga practices. By S'iva N. W. P. C. I., H. C.

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146. Yoga-viveka. An account of Yoga. By Vṛindávana S'ukla. N. W. P. C. I.

147. Yoga-viveka-ṭíká. A commentary on the Yoga-viveka of Harisáñkara. By Rámánanda Tírtha. N. W. P. C. I.

148. Yoga-vṛitti-sáñgraha. An abstract of the Vṛitti of Bhojarája. By Udayañkara. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.

149. Yoges'árṇava. On the practice of Yoga. Op. C. I.

150. Yoginí-hṛidaya. Tántric Yoga. Op. C. I.

दुर्बोधं यदतीव तद्विजहति स्पष्टार्थमित्युक्तिभिः
स्पष्टार्थेष्वतिविस्तृतिं विदधति व्यर्थैः समासादिकैः ।
अस्थानेऽनुपयोगिभिश्च बहुभिर्जल्पैर्भ्रमं तन्वते
श्रोतॄणामिति वस्तुविप्लवकृतः सर्व्वेऽपि टीकाकृतः ॥ ६ ॥

उत्सृज्य विस्तरमुदस्य विकल्पजालं
*फल्गुप्रकाशमवधार्य्य च सम्यगर्थान् ।
सन्तः पतञ्जलिमुने†र्विवृतिर्मयेय-
मातन्यते बुधजनप्रतिबोधहेतुः‡ ॥ ७ ॥

अथ योगानुशासनम् ॥ १ ॥

अनेन सूत्रेण शास्त्रस्य सम्बन्धाभिधेयप्रयोजनान्याख्यायन्ते । §'अथ'शब्दोऽधिकारद्योतको मङ्गलार्थश्च । युक्तिः 'योगः' समाधानं, युज समाधौ । अनुशिष्यते व्याख्यायते लक्षणस्वरूपभेदोपायफलैर्येन॥ तत् 'अनुशासनं' । योगस्यानुशासनं 'योगानुशासनं' । तत् आशास्त्रपरिसमाप्तेरधिकृतं बोद्धव्यमित्यर्थः । तत्र शास्त्रस्य व्युत्पादकतया योगः ससाधनः सफलोऽभिधेयः, तद्व्युत्पादनञ्च फलं, व्युत्पादि-

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* फल्गुप्रकाममिति A फल्गुप्रकारमिति B चिह्नितपुस्तकपाठः ।
† सन्तः पतञ्जलिमते इति C पुस्तकपाठः ।
‡ बुधजनप्रतिपत्तिहेतुरिति B चिह्नितपुस्तकपाठः ।
§ मूलप्रकृतशब्दः वक्रचिह्नविशेषाभ्यां क्रोडीकृतः सर्व्वत्र । स च समस्तोऽसमस्तश्च गृहीतः ।
|| लक्षणभेदोपायफलैर्येनेति नानापुस्तकपाठः । लक्षणभेदोपायैर्येनेति C चिह्नितपुस्तकपाठः ।

तस्य योगस्य कैवल्यं फलं। शास्त्राभिधेययोः प्रतिपाद्यप्रतिपादक-भावलक्षणः सम्बन्धः, अभिधेयस्य योगस्य तत्फलस्य च कैवल्यस्य साध्यसाधनभावः। एतदुक्तं भवति, व्युत्पाद्यस्य योगस्य साधनानि शास्त्रेण प्रदर्श्यन्ते, तत्साधनसिद्धो योगः कैवल्याख्यं फलमुत्पादयतीति ॥ १ ॥

तत्र को योग इत्यत आह।

योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः ॥ २ ॥

'चित्तस्य' निर्म्मलसत्त्वपरिणामरूपस्य याः 'वृत्तयः' अङ्गाङ्गिभावपरिणामरूपास्तासां* 'निरोधः' बहिर्मुखपरिणतिविच्छेदादन्तर्मुखतया प्रतिलोमपरिणामेन स्वस्वकारणे† लयः 'योगः', इत्याख्यायते। स च निरोधः सर्व्वासां चित्तस्य भूमीनां‡ सर्व्वप्राणिनां धर्म्मः कदाचित् कस्याञ्चिद्भूमावाविर्भवति। तत्र क्षिप्तं, मूढं, विक्षिप्तं, एकाग्रं, निरुद्धम् इति चित्तस्य भूमयः चित्तस्यावस्थाविशेषाः। तत्र क्षिप्तं, रजस उद्रेकादस्थिरं; बहिर्मुखतया सुखदुःखादिविषयेषु कल्पितेषु व्यवहितेषु सन्निहितेषु वा रजसा प्रेरितं। तच्च सदैव दैत्यदानवादीनाम्। मूढं, तमस उद्रेकात् कृत्याकृत्यविभागमन्तरेण क्रोधादिभिर्विरुद्धकृत्येष्वेव नियमितं। तच्च सदैव रक्षःपिशाचादीनाम्। विक्षिप्तं, सत्त्वोद्रेकाद्वैशिष्ट्येन परिहृतदुःख-

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* वृत्तयो निर्म्मलसत्त्वपरिणामरूपास्तासामिति षड्पुस्तकसम्मतः पाठः।

† स्वकारणे इति A चिह्नितपुस्तकपाठः।

‡ वृत्तीनामिति C चिह्नितपुस्तकपाठः।

दुर्बोधं यदतीव तद्विजहति स्पष्टार्थमत्युक्तिभिः
स्पष्टार्थेष्वतिविस्तृतिं विदधति व्यर्थैः समासादिकैः ।
अस्थानेऽनुपयोगिभिश्च बहुभिर्जल्पैर्भ्रमन्तन्वते
श्रोतॄणामिति वस्तुविप्लवकृतः सर्व्वेऽपि टीकाकृतः ॥ ६ ॥

उत्सृज्य विस्तरमुदस्य विकल्पजालं
*फल्गुप्रकाशमवधार्य्य च सम्यगर्थान् ।
सन्तः पतञ्जलिमुने†र्विवृतिर्मयेय-
मातन्यते बुधजनप्रतिबोधहेतुः ‡ ॥ ७ ॥

अथ योगानुशासनम् ॥ १ ॥

अनेन सूत्रेण शास्त्रस्य सम्बन्धाभिधेयप्रयोजनान्याख्यायन्ते । §'अथ'शब्दोऽधिकारद्योतको मङ्गलार्थश्च । युक्तिः 'योगः' समाधानं, युजसमाधौ । अनुशिष्यते व्याख्यायते लक्षणस्वरूपभेदोपायफलैर्येन|| तत् 'अनुशासनं' । योगस्यानुशासनं 'योगानुशासनं' । तत् आशास्त्रपरिसमाप्तेरधिकृतं बोद्धव्यमित्यर्थः । तत्र शास्त्रस्य व्युत्पादकतया योगः ससाधनः सफलोऽभिधेयः, तद्व्युत्पादनञ्च फलं, व्युत्पादि-

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* फल्गुप्रकाशमिति A फल्गुप्रकारमिति B चिह्नितपुस्तकपाठः ।

† सन्तः पतञ्जलिमते इति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ बुधजनप्रतिपत्तिहेतुरिति B चिह्नितपुस्तकपाठः ।

§ मूलप्रकृतशब्दः वक्रचिह्नविशेषाभ्यां क्रोडीकृतः सर्व्वत्र । स च समस्तो-ऽसमस्तश्च गृहीतः ।

|| लक्षणभेदोपायफलैर्येनेति नानापुस्तकपाठः । लक्षणभेदोपायैर्येनेति C चिह्नितपुस्तकपाठः ।

तस्य योगस्य कैवल्यं फलं। शास्त्राभिधेययोः प्रतिपाद्यप्रतिपादक-भावलक्षणः सम्बन्धः, अभिधेयस्य योगस्य तत्फलस्य च कैवल्यस्य साध्यसाधनभावः। एतदुक्तं भवति, व्युत्पाद्यस्य योगस्य साधनानि शास्त्रेण प्रदर्श्यन्ते, तत्साधनसिद्धो योगः कैवल्याख्यं फलमुत्पाद-यतीति ॥ १ ॥

तत्र को योग इत्यत आह।

योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः ॥ २ ॥

'चित्तस्य' निर्म्मलसत्त्वपरिणामरूपस्य याः 'वृत्तयः' अङ्गाङ्गि-भावपरिणामरूपास्तासां* 'निरोधः' बहिर्मुखपरिणतिविच्छेदादन्त-र्मुखतया प्रतिलोमपरिणामेन स्वकारणे† लयः 'योगः', इत्या-ख्यायते। स च निरोधः सर्व्वासां चित्तस्य भूमीनां‡ सर्व्वप्राणिनां धर्म्मः कदाचित् कस्याञ्चिद्भूमावाविर्भवति। तत्र क्षिप्तं, मूढं, विक्षिप्तं, एकाग्रं, निरुद्धम् इति चित्तस्य भूमयः चित्तस्यावस्था-विशेषाः। तत्र क्षिप्तं, रजस उद्रेकादस्थिरं; बहिर्मुखतया सुखदुः-खादिविषयेषु कल्पितेषु व्यवहितेषु सन्निहितेषु वा रजसा प्रेरितं। तच्च सदैव दैत्यदानवादीनाम्। मूढं, तमस उद्रेकात् कृत्याकृत्य-विभागमन्तरेण क्रोधादिभिर्विरुद्धकृत्येष्वेव नियमितं। तच्च सदैव रक्षःपिशाचादीनाम्। विक्षिप्तं, सत्त्वोद्रेकाद्वैशिष्ट्येन परिहृतदुःख-

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* वृत्तयो निर्मलसत्त्वपरिणामरूपास्तासामिति बङ्गपुस्तकसम्मतः पाठः।
† स्वकारणे इति A चिह्नितपुस्तकपाठः।
‡ वृत्तीनामिति C चिह्नितपुस्तकपाठः।

साधनं* सुखसाधनेष्वेव शब्दादिषु प्रवृत्तं। तच सदैव देवानाम्। एतदुक्तं भवति, रजसा प्रवृत्तिरूपं, तमसा परापकारनिरतं, सत्त्वेन सुखमयं चित्तं भवतीति। एतास्तिस्रश्चित्तावस्था न समाधावुपयोगिन्यः। एकाग्रनिरुद्धरूपे† द्वे च सत्त्वोत्कर्षाद्यथोत्तरमवस्थितत्वात् समाधावुपयोगं भजेते। सत्त्वादिक्रमव्युत्क्रमे त्वयमभिप्रायः, द्वयोरपि रजस्तमसोरत्यन्तहेयत्वं तदर्थं रजसः प्रथममुपादानं। यावन्न प्रवृत्तिर्दर्शिता तावन्निवृत्तिर्न शक्यते दर्शयितुमिति द्वयोर्व्यत्ययेन प्रदर्शनं। सत्त्वस्य त्वेतदर्थं पश्चात् प्रदर्शनं। यत् तस्योत्कर्षेणोत्तरे द्वे भूमी योगोपयोगिन्याविति अनयोर्द्वयोरेकाग्रनिरुद्धयोर्भूमिकयोर्यश्चित्तस्यैकाग्रतारूपः परिणामः स योगः। किमुक्तं भवति, एकाग्रे बहिर्वृत्तेर्निरोधः, निरुद्धे सर्व्वासां वृत्तीनां ससंस्काराणां प्रविलय इति। अनयोरेव भूम्योर्योगस्य सम्भवः॥ २॥

इदानीं सूत्रकारश्चित्त-वृत्ति-निरोधपदानि व्याख्यातुकामः प्रथमं चित्तपदं व्याचष्टे।

तदा द्रष्टुः स्वरूपेऽवस्थानम्॥ ३॥

'द्रष्टुः' पुरुषस्य, तस्मिन् काले, 'स्वरूपे' चिन्मात्ररूपतायाम्, 'अवस्थानं' स्थितिः भवति। अयमर्थः, उत्पन्नविवेकख्यातेश्चित्तद्र-

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* परिहृतदुःखसाधनेष्वेव इति F चिह्नितपुस्तकपाठः।

† एकाग्रनिरुद्धे त्वेवमिति B चिह्नितपुस्तकपाठः।

माभावात् कर्तृत्वाभिमाननिवृत्तौ प्रोन्मुक्तपरिणामाय, बुद्धावात्मनः स्वरूपेणावस्थानं स्थितिर्भवतीति ॥ ३ ॥

व्युत्थानदशायां तस्य किं स्वरूपमित्याह ।

वृत्तिसारूप्यमितरत्र ॥ ४ ॥

'इतरत्र' योगादन्यस्मिन् काले, वृत्तयो या वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणाः, ताभिः 'सारूप्यं' तद्रूपत्वं। अयमर्थः, यादृश्यो वृत्तयः सुख-दुःख-मोहात्मिकाः प्रादुर्भवन्ति, तादृग्रूप एव संवेद्यते व्यवहर्तृभिः पुरुषः। प्रतीयते* तदेवं, यस्मिन्नेकाग्रतया परिणते वस्तुनि चित्तेः† स्वस्मिन् रूपे प्रतिष्ठानं भवति, यस्मिंश्चेन्द्रियवृत्तिद्वारेण विषयाकारेण परिणते पुरुषस्तदाकार इव परिभाव्यते, यथा जलतरङ्गेषु चलत्सु चन्द्रश्चलन्निव प्रतिभासते, तच्चित्तं॥ ४ ॥

वृत्तिपदं व्याख्यातुमाह ।

वृत्तयः पञ्चतय्यः क्लिष्टाऽक्लिष्टाः‡ ॥ ५ ॥

'वृत्तयः' चित्तस्य परिणामविशेषाः। वृत्तिसमुदायरूपस्यावयविनो या अवयवरूपा वृत्तयस्तदपेक्षया तयप्प्रत्ययः। एतदुक्तं भवति। पञ्च वृत्तयः। कीदृश्यः। 'क्लिष्टाऽक्लिष्टाः'। क्लेशैर्वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणैराक्रान्ताः 'क्लिष्टाः', तद्विपरीताः 'अक्लिष्टाः', ॥ ५ ॥

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* प्रतीयते इतिपाठः B चिह्नितपुस्तके नास्ति।

† विविक्तचित्ते इति B चिह्नितपुस्तकपाठः।

‡ क्लिष्टा अक्लिष्टा इति B चिह्नितपुस्तकपाठः। क्लिष्टा अक्लिष्टाश्च इति F चिह्नितपुस्तकपाठः।

ता एव पञ्च वृत्तयः समुद्दिश्य व्याख्यायन्ते* ।

प्रमाण-विपर्य्यय-विकल्प-निद्रा-स्मृतयः ॥ ६ ॥

आसां क्रमेण लक्षणमाह ।

प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमाः प्रमाणानि ॥ ७ ॥

अत्यातिप्रसिद्धत्वात् प्रमाणानां† शास्त्रकारेण भेदनिरूपणेनैवावगतत्वाल्लक्षणस्य,‡ न पृथक् तल्लक्षणं कृतम् । प्रमालक्षणन्तु अविसंवादिज्ञानं, तत्करणं प्रमाणमिति । इन्द्रियद्वारेण बाह्यवस्तूपरागात् चित्तस्य तद्विषया सामान्यविशेषात्मनोऽर्थस्य विशेषावधारणप्रधाना वृत्तिः 'प्रत्यक्षं' । गृहीतसम्बन्धाल्लिङ्गात् लिङ्गिनः सामान्यात्मनाध्यवसायः 'अनुमानं' । आप्तवचनम् 'आगमः' ॥ ७ ॥

एवं प्रमाणरूपां वृत्तिं व्याख्याय विपर्य्ययरूपामाह ।

विपर्य्ययो मिथ्याज्ञानमतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठम् ॥ ८ ॥

अतथाभूतेऽर्थे तथोत्पद्यमानं ज्ञानं 'विपर्य्ययः', यथा शुक्तिकायां रजतज्ञानं । 'अतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठम्' इति । तस्यार्थस्य यद्रूपं न तस्मिन् रूपे प्रतिष्ठते, तस्यार्थस्य यत् पारमार्थिकं रूपं न तत् प्रतिभासयतीति यावत् । संशयोऽप्यतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठत्वात् 'मिथ्याज्ञानं', यथा स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेति ॥ ८ ॥

विकल्पवृत्तिं व्याख्यातुमाह ।

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* वृत्तयः समुपदर्श्यन्ते इति B चिह्नितपुस्तकपाठः ।

† उपरक्तवस्तुविषयप्रमाणानामिति F चिह्नितपुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ प्रमाणलक्षणस्येति F चिह्नितपुस्तकपाठः ।

शब्दज्ञानानुपाती वस्तुशून्यो विकल्पः ॥ ९ ॥

शब्दजनितं ज्ञानं 'शब्दज्ञानं', तदनुपतितुं शीलं यस्य स 'शब्दज्ञानानुपाती', 'वस्तुनः', तथात्वमनपेक्षमाणो योऽध्यवसायः सः 'विकल्पः', इत्युच्यते। यथा पुरुषस्य चैतन्यं स्वरूपमित्यत्र देवदत्तस्य कम्बल इतिवत्शब्दजनिते ज्ञाने षष्ठ्या योऽध्यवसितो भेदस्तमिहाविद्यमानमपि समारोप्य वर्त्ततेऽध्यवसायः* । वस्तुतस्तु चैतन्यमेव पुरुषः ॥ ९ ॥

निद्रां व्याख्यातुमाह।

अभावप्रत्ययालम्बना वृत्तिर्निद्रा ॥ १० ॥

'अभावप्रत्ययः' 'आलम्बनं' यस्या वृत्तेः सा तथोक्ता। एतदुक्तं भवति, या सन्ततमुद्रिक्तत्वात्तमसः† समस्तविषयपरित्यागेन प्रवर्त्तते 'वृत्तिः' सा 'निद्रा'। अस्याश्च‡ सुखमहमस्वाप्समिति स्मृतिनिदर्शनात् स्मृतेश्चानुभवव्यतिरेकेणानुपपत्तेर्वृत्तित्वं ॥ १० ॥

स्मृतिं व्याख्यातुमाह।

अनुभूतविषयासम्प्रमोषः स्मृतिः ॥ ११ ॥

प्रमाणेन 'अनुभूतस्य' 'विषयस्य' योऽयं 'असम्प्रमोषः' संस्कार-

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* समारोप्याध्यवसाय इति F चिह्नितपुस्तकपाठः।

† समन्ततः समुद्रिक्तत्वात्तमसः इति G चिह्नितपुस्तकपाठः।

‡ चास्याश्चेति G चिह्नितपुस्तकपाठः।

द्वारेण बुद्ध्युपारोहः, सः 'स्मृतिः'। तत्र* प्रमाणविपर्य्ययविकल्पा जाग्रदवस्थाः। त एव यदानुभवबलात् प्रत्यक्षायमाणास्तदा† स्वप्नः। निद्रा त्वसंवेद्यमानविषया। स्मृतिश्च प्रमाणविपर्य्ययविकल्पनिद्रानिमित्ता ॥ ११ ॥

एवं वृत्तीर्व्याख्याय सोपायं निरोधं व्याख्यातुमाह।

अभ्यासवैराग्याभ्यां तन्निरोधः ॥ १२ ॥

‡'अभ्यासवैराग्ये' वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणे। ताभ्यां तासां प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमरूपाणां§ चित्तवृत्तीनां,यत् प्रतिहननं सः 'निरोधः'। किमुक्तं भवति, तासां विनिवृत्तबाह्याभिनिवेशानामन्तर्मुखतया स्वकारण एव चित्ते शक्तिरूपतयावस्थानम्। तत्र विषयदोषदर्शनजेन वैराग्येण तद्वैमुख्यमुत्पाद्यते। अभ्यासेन च सुखजनकशान्तप्रवाहप्रदर्शनद्वारेण|| दृढं स्थैर्य्यमुत्पाद्यते इत्याभ्यां भवति चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः ॥ १२ ॥

अभ्यासं व्याख्यातुमाह।

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* तदत्रेति A, D चिह्नितपुस्तकद्वयपाठः।

† प्रत्यक्षोपमान इति B चिह्नितपुस्तकपाठः।

‡ चित्तनदीनामोभयतो वाहिनी वहति कल्याणाय वहति पापाय च। या तु कैवल्यप्राग्भाराविवेकविषयनिम्ना सा कल्याणवहा। संसारप्राग्भाराविवेकविषयनिम्ना पापावहा। तत्र वैराग्येण विषयस्रोतस्विनी क्रियते, विवेकदर्शनाभ्यासेन कल्याणस्रोत उत्पाद्यते, इत्युभयाधीनश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः। अभ्यासवैराग्ये इत्यादि B चिह्नितपुस्तकपाठः। एष तु साङ्ख्यप्रवचनभाष्यपाठः लेखकप्रमादादादर्शपुस्तके नीतः।

§ प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिप्रशमनरूपाणामिति B चिह्नितपुस्तकपाठः।

|| सुखजनकशान्तप्रत्ययप्रवाहप्रदर्शनद्वारेणेति F पुस्तकपाठः।

तत्र स्थितौ यत्नोऽभ्यासः ॥ १३ ॥

वृत्तिरहितस्य चित्तस्य स्वरूपनिष्ठः परिणामः 'स्थितिः' तस्यां 'यत्नः' उत्साहः, पुनःपुनस्तथात्वेन चेतसि विनिवेशनम् 'अभ्यासः', इत्युच्यते ॥ १३ ॥

तस्यैव विशेषमाह ।

स तु दीर्घकालनैरन्तर्य्यसत्कारसेवितो दृढभूमिः ॥ ॥ १४ ॥

बहुकालं 'नैरन्तर्य्येण' आदरातिशयेन च सेव्यमानः 'दृढभूमिः' स्थिरो भवति, दार्ढ्याय प्रभवतीत्यर्थः ॥ १४ ॥

वैराग्यस्य लक्षणमाह ।

दृष्टानुश्रविकविषयवितृष्णस्य वशीकारसञ्ज्ञा वैराग्यम् ॥ १५ ॥

द्विविधो विषयो दृष्ट आनुश्रविकश्च । 'दृष्टः' इहैवोपलभ्यमानः शब्दादिः । देवलोकादौ* 'आनुश्रविकः' । अनुश्रूयते गुरुमुखादित्यनुश्रवो वेदः तत आगतः† 'आनुश्रविकः' । तयोर्द्वयोरपि 'विषययोः' परिणामविरसत्वदर्शनात् विगतगर्द्धस्य,‡ या 'वशीकारसञ्ज्ञा' ममैते

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* देवलोके इति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

† ततोऽधिगत इति B, C चिह्नितपुस्तकद्वयपाठः । तत आगतः स्वात इति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ विगतरागस्येति B, D चिह्नितपुस्तकद्वयपाठः ।

वशा* नाहमेषां वश्य इति योऽयं विमर्शः,† तत् 'वैराग्यम्' उच्यते ॥ १५ ॥

तस्यैव विशेषमाह ।

तत् परं पुरुषख्यातेर्गुणवैतृष्ण्यम् ॥ १६ ॥

'तत्' वैराग्यं, 'परं' उत्कृष्टं। प्रथमं वैराग्यं विषयविषयं,द्वितीयन्तु गुणविषयमुत्पन्नगुणपुरुषविवेकख्यातेरेव‡ भवति निरोधसमाधेरत्यन्तानुकूलत्वात् ॥ १६ ॥

एवं योगस्य स्वरूपमुक्त्वा सम्प्रज्ञातासम्प्रज्ञातरूपभेदमाह§ ।

वितर्कविचारानन्दास्मितानुगमात् सम्प्रज्ञातः ॥१७॥

समाधिरिति शेषः। सम्यक् संशयविपर्य्ययरहितत्वेन प्रज्ञायते प्रकर्षेण ज्ञायते भाव्यस्य स्वरूपं येन स 'सम्प्रज्ञातः'। समाधिर्भावनाविशेषः। ध्येयातिरिक्तसकलवृत्तिनिरोधः सम्प्रज्ञातः सवीजसमाधिरिति यावत्। स वितर्कादिभेदात् चतुर्विधः। सवितर्कः, सविचारः, सानन्दः, सास्मितश्च। भावना च भाव्यस्य|| विषयान्तरपरिहारेण

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* वशीकारसंज्ञा मेते वश्या इति F पुस्तकपाठः।

† विभाग इति F पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ उत्पन्नपुरुषख्यातेरेव भवतीति B चिह्नितपुस्तकपाठः। उत्पन्नगुणपुरुषविवेकख्यातेस्तद्भवतीति D पुस्तकपाठः। उत्पन्नगुणविवेकख्यातेरेव भवतीति F पुस्तकपाठः।

§ सम्प्रज्ञातभेदरूपमाहेति B चिह्नितपुस्तकपाठः।

|| आत्मन इति D पुस्तकपाठः।

चेतसि पुनः पुनर्निवेशनं। भाव्यञ्च द्विधा। ईश्वरस्तत्त्वानि च। तान्यपि च द्विधा जड़ाजड़भेदात्। जडानि चतुर्विंशतिः। अजडः पुरुषः*। तत्र† यदा महाभूतेन्द्रियाणि स्थूलानि विषयत्वेनादाय पूर्व्वापरानुसन्धानेन शब्दार्थोल्लेखसम्भेदेन‡ च भावना प्रवर्त्तते, तदा सवितर्कः समाधिः। अस्मिन्नेवावलम्बने पूर्व्वापरानुसन्धानशब्दार्थोल्लेखशून्यत्वेन§ यदा भावना प्रवर्त्तते, तदा निर्वितर्कः। तन्मात्रान्तःकरणलक्षणं सूक्ष्मं विषयमालम्ब्य तस्य देशकालधर्म्मावच्छेदेन|| यदा भावना प्रवर्त्तते, तदा सविचारः। तस्मिन्नेवावलम्बने देशकालधर्म्मावच्छेदं विना धर्म्मिमात्रावभासित्वेन भावना क्रियमाणा निर्विचार इत्युच्यते। एवं पर्य्यन्तः समाधिर्ग्राह्यसमापत्तिरिति व्यपदिश्यते¶। यदा तु रजस्तमोलेशानुविद्धमन्तःकरणसत्त्वं भाव्यते, तदा गुणभावात् चिच्छक्तेः सुखप्रकाशमयस्य सत्त्वस्य भाव्यमानस्योद्रेकात् सानन्दः समाधिर्भवति। अस्मिन्नेव समाधौ ये बद्धधृतयस्तत्त्वान्तरं प्रधानपुरुषरूपं न पश्यन्ति, ते विगतदेहाहङ्कारत्वात् विदेहशब्दवाच्याः। इयं ग्रहणसमापत्तिः। ततः परं रजस्तमोलेशानभिभूतं शुद्धं सत्त्वमालम्बनीकृत्य या प्रवर्त्तते भावना, तस्यां ग्राह्यस्य सत्त्वस्य न्यग्भावाच्चितिशक्तेरुद्रेकात् सत्तामा-

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* अजड़ः पुरुष इति A पुस्तकपाठः परन्त्वयं न समीचीनः।

† यत्रेति F पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ शब्दार्थोल्लेखसम्भेदेनेति C पुस्तकपाठः। शब्दार्थोल्लेखसम्भेदेन यदेति F पुस्तकपाठः।

§ शब्दोल्लेखशून्यत्वेनेति C पुस्तकपाठः।

|| सर्व्वदेशकालधर्म्मावच्छेदेनेति F पुस्तकपाठः।

¶ ग्राह्यसमापत्तिरित्युच्यत इति E चिह्नितपुस्तकपाठः।

चावशेषत्वेन समाधिः सास्मित इत्युच्यते। न च अहङ्कारास्मितयो-रभेदः शङ्कनीयः, यतो यत्रान्तःकरणमहमित्युल्लेखेन विषयान् वेदयते सोऽहङ्कारः, यत्रान्तर्मुखतया प्रतिलोमपरिणामेन प्रकृतिलीने चेतसि सत्तामात्रमवभाति साऽस्मिता। अस्मिन्नेव समाधौ ये कृतपरितोषाः परमात्मानं पुरुषं न पश्यन्ति तेषां चेतसि स्वकारणे लयमुपगते ते प्रकृतिलया इत्युच्यन्ते। ये परं पुरुषं ज्ञात्वा भावनायां प्रवर्त्तन्ते तेषामियं विवेकख्यातिर्ग्रहीतृसमापत्तिरित्युच्यते। तत्र सवितर्कसमाधौ चतस्रोऽप्यवस्थाः शक्तिरूपतयावतिष्ठन्ते, तत एकैकस्यास्त्यागे उत्तरो-त्तरा इति चतुरवस्थोयम् सम्प्रज्ञातः समाधिः ॥ १७ ॥

असम्प्रज्ञातमाह।

विरामप्रत्ययाभ्यासपूर्व्वकः संस्कारशेषोऽन्यः* ॥ १८ ॥

विरम्यतेऽनेनेति 'विरामः' वितर्कादिचिन्तात्यागः। विरामश्चासौ प्रत्ययश्चेति 'विरामप्रत्ययः', तस्य 'अभ्यासः' पौनः पुन्येन चेतसि विनिवेशनं, तत्र या काचित् वृत्तिरुल्लसति तस्यां नेति नेतीति नैरन्तर्य्येण पर्य्युदसनं तत्पूर्व्वकोऽसम्प्रज्ञातसमाधिः† 'संस्कारशेषः',‡ 'अन्यः' तद्विलक्षणः, असम्प्रज्ञात इत्यर्थः। न तत्र किञ्चिद्वेद्यं सम्प्र-ज्ञायते इत्यसम्प्रज्ञातो निर्व्बीजः समाधिः। इह§ चतुर्विधश्चित्तस्य परिणामः। व्युत्थानं, समाधिप्रारम्भः, एकाग्रता, निरोधश्च। तत्र

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* संस्कारविशेषोन्य इति E पुस्तकपाठः।

† तत्पूर्व्वकः सम्प्रज्ञातसमाधिरिति B पुस्तकपाठः परन्त्वयं न समीचीनः।

‡ संस्कारविशेष इति E पुस्तकपाठः।

§ समाधाविहेति D पुस्तकपाठः।

क्षिप्तमूढे चित्तभूमी व्युत्थानं। विक्षिप्तभूमिः सत्त्वोद्रेकात् समाधिप्रारम्भः। एकाग्रतानिरुद्धे तु पर्य्यन्तभूमी। प्रतिपरिणामश्च संस्काराः। तत्र व्युत्थानजनिताः संस्काराः समाधिप्रारम्भजैः संस्कारैर्हन्यन्ते। तज्जाश्चैकाग्रताजैः। निरोधजनितैरेकाग्रताजाः संस्काराः स्वरूपञ्च हन्यते। यथा सुवर्णसम्वलितं ध्मायमानं सीसकमात्मानं* सुवर्णमलञ्च निर्द्दहति, एवमेकाग्रताजनितान् संस्कारान् निरोधजाः स्वात्मानञ्च निर्द्दहन्ति॥ १८॥

तदेवं योगस्य स्वरूपभेदं सङ्क्षेपेणोपायञ्चाभिधाय विस्तरेणोपायं योगाभ्यासप्रदर्शनपूर्व्वकं वक्तुमुपक्रमते।

भवप्रत्ययो विदेहप्रकृतिलयानाम्॥ १९॥

'विदेहाः', 'प्रकृतिलयाः', च वितर्कादिभूमिकास्तत्र ये व्याख्याताः। तेषां समाधिः 'भवप्रत्ययः', भवः संसारः स एव प्रत्ययः कारणं यस्य स 'भवप्रत्ययः'। अयमर्थः। आविर्भूतमात्रे† एव संसारे ते तथाविधसमाधिभाजो भवन्ति। तेषां परतत्त्वादर्शनात् योगाभ्यासोऽयं। अतः परतत्त्वज्ञाने तद्भावनायाञ्च मुक्तिकामेन यत्नः‡ विधेय इत्येतदर्थमुपदिष्टम्॥ १९॥

तदन्येषान्तु।

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* सीसकं स्वमात्मानमिति F पुस्तकपाठः।

† आविर्भूताधिमात्र इति E, G पुस्तकद्वयपाठः।

‡ महान् यत्न इति D, G पुस्तकपाठः।

श्रद्धावीर्य्यस्मृतिसमाधिप्रज्ञापूर्व्वक इतरेषाम् ॥ २० ॥

विदेहप्रकृतिलयव्यतिरिक्तानां योगिनां, श्रद्धादिपूर्व्वकः, श्रद्धादयः पूर्व्वे उपाया यस्य स श्रद्धादिपूर्व्वकः। ते च श्रद्धादयः क्रमादुपायोपेयभावेन प्रवर्त्तमानाः सम्प्रज्ञातस्य समाधेरुपायतां प्रतिपद्यन्ते। तत्र 'श्रद्धा' योगविषये चेतसः प्रसादः। 'वीर्य्यं' उत्साहः। 'स्मृतिः' अनुभूतासम्प्रमोषः। 'समाधिः' एकाग्रता। 'प्रज्ञा' प्रज्ञातव्यविवेकः। तत्र श्रद्धावतो वीर्य्यं जायते, योगविषये उत्साहवान् भवति। सोत्साहस्य पाश्चात्यासु भूमिषु स्मृतिरुपजायते। तत्स्मरणात् चेतः समाधीयते। समाहितचित्तस्य भाव्यं सम्यग्विजानाति। त एते सम्प्रज्ञातसमाधेरुपायाः। तस्याभ्यासात् पराच्च वैराग्याद्भवत्यसम्प्रज्ञातः॥ २० ॥

उक्तोपायवतां योगिनामुपायभेदात् भेदानाह।

तीव्रसंवेगानामासन्नः* ॥ २१ ॥

समाधिलाभ इतिशेषः। 'संवेगः' क्रियाहेतुर्दृढतरः संस्कारः, सः 'तीव्रः', येषामधिमात्रोपायानां, तेषां 'आसन्नः,' समाधिलाभः,† समाधिफलञ्चासन्नं भवति, शीघ्रमेव निष्पद्यत इत्यर्थः॥ २१ ॥

के ते तीव्रसंवेगा इत्यत आह।

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* समाधिलाभ इति C, F, G पुस्तकत्रयेषु पाठः। यत्र सूत्रे समाधिलाभ इति पाठस्तत्र टीकायां समाधिलाभ इति शेष इति पाठो नास्ति। तथा च समाधिलाभशब्देन अन्यतरस्यांशस्य यत्र कुत्राप्यवश्यमेव भवितव्यमिति निश्चीयते।

† तेषां समाधिर्भवति लाभ इति D पुस्तकपाठः।

मृदुमध्याधिमात्रत्वात् ततोपि विशेषः ॥ २२ ॥

तेभ्यः उपायेभ्यो मृद्वादिभेदभिन्नेभ्य उपायवतां 'विशेषः', भवति । 'मृदुर्मध्योऽधिमात्रः', इत्युपायभेदाः । ते प्रत्येकं मृदुसंवेग-मध्यसंवेग-तीव्रसंवेगभेदात् त्रिविधाः । तद्भेदेन च नव योगिनो भवन्ति । मृदूपायः, मृदुसंवेगः, मध्यसंवेगः, तीव्रसंवेगश्च । मध्योपायः, मृदुसंवेगः, मध्यसंवेगः, तीव्रसंवेगश्च । अधिमात्रोपायः, मृदुसंवेगः, मध्यसंवेगः, तीव्रसंवेगश्च । अधिमात्रोपाये तीव्रे च संवेगे महान् यत्नः कर्त्तव्य इति भेदोपदेशः ॥ २२ ॥

इदानीमेतदुपायविलक्षणं सुगममुपायान्तरमाह ।

ईश्वरप्रणिधानाद्वा ॥ २३ ॥

'ईश्वरः' वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणः, 'प्रणिधानं' तत्र भक्तिविशेषः । विशिष्ट-मुपासनं सर्व्वक्रियाणामपि तत्रार्पणं । विषयसुखादिकं फलमनिच्छन्* सर्व्वाः क्रियास्तस्मिन् परमगुरावर्पयति, तत् 'प्रणिधानं' । समाधेस्तत्-फललाभस्य च प्रकृष्ट उपायः ॥ २३ ॥

ईश्वरस्य प्रणिधानात् समाधिलाभ इत्युक्तं । तत्रेश्वरस्य स्वरूपं, प्रमाणं, प्रभावं, वाचकं, उपासनाक्रमं, तत्फलञ्च क्रमेण वक्तुमाह ।

क्लेशकर्म्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टः पुरुषविशेष ईश्वरः ॥ ॥ २४ ॥

क्लिश्यन्तीति 'क्लेशाः' अविद्यादयो वक्ष्यमाणाः । विहित-प्रतिषिद्ध-व्यामिश्ररूपाणि 'कर्म्माणि' । विपच्यन्त इति 'विपाकाः' कर्म्मफलानि

* फलमनिच्छुरिति C, F पुस्तकद्वयपाठः ।

जात्यायुर्भोगाः। आफलविपाकात् चित्तभूमौ शेरत इति 'आशयाः' वासनाख्याः संस्काराः। तैः 'अपरामृष्टः' त्रिष्वपि कालेषु न संस्पृष्टः। 'पुरुषविशेषः' अन्येभ्यः पुरुषेभ्यो विशिष्यत इति विशेषः। 'ईश्वरः' ईशनशीलः*, इच्छामात्रेण सकलजगदुद्धरणक्षमः। यद्यपि सर्व्वेषामात्मनां क्लेशादिस्पर्शो नास्ति तथापि चित्तगतस्तेषामुपदिश्यते। यथा योद्धृगतौ जयपराजयौ स्वामिनः। अस्य तु त्रिष्वपि कालेषु तथाविधोऽपि क्लेशादिपरामर्शो नास्तीत्यतः स विलक्षण एव भगवानीश्वरः। तस्य च तथाविधमैश्वर्यमनादेः सत्त्वोत्कर्षात्। सत्त्वोत्कर्षश्चास्य प्रकृष्टज्ञानादेव। न चानयोः† ज्ञानैश्वर्य्ययोरितरेतराश्रयत्वं, परस्परानपेक्षत्वात्। ते द्वे ज्ञानैश्वर्य्ये ईश्वरसत्त्वे वर्त्तमाने अनादिभूते। तथाविधेन सत्त्वेन तस्यानादिरेव सम्बन्धः, प्रकृतिपुरुषसंयोगवियोगयोरीश्वरेच्छाव्यतिरेकेणानुपपत्तेः। यथेतरेषां प्राणिनां सुखदुःखमोहतया विपरिणतं चित्तं निर्म्मले सात्त्विके धर्म्मात्मप्रख्ये योगिशरीरे प्रतिसंक्रान्तं चिच्छायासंक्रान्तेः संवेद्यं भवति, नैवमीश्वरस्य। तस्य केवल एव सात्त्विकः परिणाम उत्कर्षवाननादिसम्बन्धेन भोग्यतया व्यवस्थितः। अतः पुरुषान्तरविलक्षणतया स एवेश्वरः। मुक्तात्मनः पुनः क्लेशादिसंयोगस्तैस्तैः शास्त्रोक्तैरुपायैर्निवर्त्तितः, अस्य पुनः सर्व्वदैव तथाविधत्वान्न मुक्तात्मतुल्यत्वं। न चेश्वराणामनेकत्वं, तेषां तुल्यत्वेपि भिन्नाभिप्रायत्वात् कार्य्यस्यैवानुपपत्तेः। उत्कर्षापकर्षयुक्तत्वे य एव उत्कृष्टः स एव ईश्वरः तत्रैव काष्ठाप्राप्तत्वादैश्वर्य्यस्य ॥ २४ ॥

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* ईशानशील इति A पुस्तकपाठः परन्त्वयं न समीचीनः।

† न च तयोरिति C, F पुस्तकद्वयपाठः।

एवमीश्वरस्य स्वरूपमभिधाय प्रमाणमाह ।

तत्र निरतिशयं सर्व्वज्ञवीजं ॥ २५ ॥

तस्मिन् भगवति, सर्व्वज्ञत्वस्य यत् 'वीजं' अतीतानागतादिग्रहणस्याणुत्वं* महत्त्वञ्च, मूलत्वाद्बीजमिव वीजं, तत् 'तत्र', 'निरतिशयं' काष्ठां प्राप्तं। दृष्टा हि अणुत्वमहत्त्वादीनां† धर्म्माणां सातिशयानां काष्ठाप्राप्तिः। यथा परमाणावणुत्वस्याकाशे च परममहत्त्वस्य। एवं ज्ञानादयोऽपि चित्तधर्म्मास्तारतम्येन परिदृश्यमानाः कचिन्निरतिशयतामापादयन्ति‡ यत्र चैते निरतिशयाः स ईश्वरः। यद्यपि सामान्यमात्रेऽनुमानस्य पर्य्यवसितत्वान्न विशेषावगतिः सम्भवति, तथापि शास्त्रादस्य सर्व्वज्ञत्वादयो विशेषा अवगन्तव्याः। स च स्वप्रयोजनाभावे कथं प्रकृतिपुरुषयोः संयोगवियोगावापादयतीति नाशङ्कनीयं। तस्य कारुणिकत्वाद्भूतानुग्रह एव प्रयोजनं। कल्पप्रलयमहाप्रलयेषु निःशेषान् संसारिण उद्धरिष्यामीति तस्याध्यवसायः। यद्यस्येष्टं तत्तस्य प्रयोजनमिति॥ २५ ॥

एवमीश्वरस्य स्वरूपं प्रमाणञ्चाभिधाय प्रभावमाह ।

स एष पूर्व्वेषामपि गुरुः कालेनानवच्छेदात् ॥ २६ ॥

आद्यानां स्रष्टॄणां ब्रह्मादीनामपि, 'गुरुः' उपदेष्टा, यतः 'सः',

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* अतीतानागतादिग्रहणस्याल्पत्वमिति B, C, D, E पुस्तकानां पाठः।—

† अल्पत्वमहत्त्वादीनामिति A, E पुस्तकपाठः। एवमत्र सर्व्वत्र अणुशब्दस्थाने अल्पशब्दव्यवहारः।

‡ निरतिशयतामासादयन्तीति D पुस्तकपाठः।

'कालेन', नावच्छिद्यते अनादित्वात्। तेषां पुनरादिमत्त्वादस्ति कालेनावच्छेदः॥ २६ ॥

एवं प्रभावमुक्त्वा उपासनोपयोगाय वाचकमाह।

तस्य वाचकः प्रणवः॥ २७॥

इत्यमुक्तस्वरूपस्य ईश्वरस्य, 'वाचकः' अभिधायकः।* प्रकर्षेण नूयते स्तूयतेऽनेनेति नौति स्तौतीति वा 'प्रणवः' ओङ्कारः। तयोश्च वाच्यवाचकभावलक्षणसम्बन्धो नित्यः सङ्केतेन प्रकाश्यते, न तु केनचित् क्रियते, यथा पितृपुत्रयोर्विद्यमानः सम्बन्धोऽस्यायं पिता अस्यायं पुत्र इति केनचित् प्रकाश्यते॥ २७॥

उपासनमाह।

तज्जपस्तदर्थभावनम्॥ २८॥

'तस्य' सार्द्धत्रिमात्रस्य प्रणवस्य, 'जपः' यथावदुच्चारणं, तद्वाच्यस्येश्वरस्य 'भावनं' पुनः पुनश्चेतसि विनिवेशनं, एकाग्रताया उपायः। अतः समाधिसिद्धये योगिना प्रणवो जप्यः, तदर्थश्च भावनीयः† इत्युक्तं भवति॥ २८॥

उपासनायाः फलमाह।

ततः प्रत्यक्चेतनाधिगमोऽप्यन्तरायाभावश्च‡॥ २९॥

तस्माज्जपात् तदर्थभावनात् च योगिनः 'प्रत्यक्चेतनाधि-

* वाचकोऽभिधायकः प्रणव ओङ्कार इति A, D पुस्तकद्वयपाठः।
† तदर्थं ईश्वरश्च भावनीय इति B, D पुस्तकद्वयपाठः।
‡ चेतनागमोऽन्तराया भाव इति A, C, D, F पुस्तकचतुष्टयपाठः।

गमः',* भवति। विषयप्रातिकूल्येन स्वान्तःकरणाभिमुखमञ्चति, या 'चेतना' दृक्शक्तिः,† सा 'प्रत्यक्चेतना', तस्याः 'अधिगमः' ज्ञानं, भवति। 'अन्तरायाः' वक्ष्यमाणाः, तेषां 'अभावः' शक्तिप्रतिबन्धः, भवति॥ २९॥

अथ के अन्तरायाः‡ इत्याशङ्कायामाह।

व्याधि-स्त्यान-संशय-प्रमादालस्याविरति-भ्रान्तिदर्शनालब्धभूमिकत्वानवस्थितत्वानि चित्तविक्षेपास्तेऽन्तरायाः॥ ३०॥

नवैते रजस्तमोबलात् प्रवर्त्तमानाः 'चित्तविक्षेपाः',§ भवन्ति, तैरेकाग्रविरोधिभिश्चित्तं विक्षिप्यते इत्यर्थः। तत्र 'व्याधिः' धातुवैषम्यनिमित्तो ज्वरादिः। 'स्त्यानं' अकर्मण्यता चित्तस्य। उभयकोट्यालम्बनं|| विज्ञानं 'संशयः', योगः साध्यो वा न वेति¶। 'प्रमादः' अननुष्ठानशीलता, समाधिसाधने औदासीन्यं। 'आलस्यं' कायचित्तयोर्गुरुत्वं, योगविषये प्रवृत्त्यभावे हेतुः। 'अविरतिः' चित्तस्य

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* प्रत्यक्चेतनागम इति C, D पुस्तकद्वयपाठः।

† स्वान्तःकरणाभिमुखमञ्चति या दृक्शक्तिरिति B पुस्तकपाठः। स्वान्तःकरणाभिमुखमञ्चतीति या चेतना दृक्शक्तिरिति A, C पुस्तकद्वयपाठः। स्वान्तःकरणाभिमुखमञ्चति प्रत्यक् चेतना दृक्चेतना तस्याधिगम इति D पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ अथ के तेऽन्तराया इति C, E पुस्तकद्वयपाठः।

§ चित्तस्य विक्षेपा इति A, C पुस्तकद्वयपाठः।

|| उभयकोट्यालम्बनमिति C पुस्तकपाठः। परन्त्वयं न समीचीनः।

¶ योगः साध्यः स्याद्वा न वेति A, C पुस्तकद्वयपाठः।

विषयसम्प्रयोगात्मा गर्द्धः*। 'भ्रान्तिदर्शनं' शुक्तिकायां रजतवदिति† विपर्य्ययज्ञानं। 'अलब्धभूमिकत्वं' कुतश्चित् निमित्तात् समाधिभूमेरलाभोऽसम्प्राप्तिः। 'अनवस्थितत्वं' लब्धावस्थायामपि‡ समाधिभूमौ चित्तस्य तत्राप्रतिष्ठा। त-एते समाधेरेकाग्रतायाः यथायोगं प्रतिपक्षत्वात् 'अन्तरायाः', इति उच्यते॥ ३०॥

चित्तविक्षेपकारकानन्यानप्यन्तरायान् प्रतिपादयितुमाह।

दुःख-दौर्मनस्याङ्गमेजयत्व-श्वास-प्रश्वासा विक्षेपसहभुवः॥ ३१॥

कुतश्चिन्निमित्तादुत्पन्नेषु विक्षेपेष्वेतेे§ दुःखादयः प्रवर्त्तन्ते। तत्र 'दुःखं' चित्तस्य राजसः‖ परिणामः बाधनालक्षणः, यद्बाधात् प्राणिनस्तदुपघाताय प्रवर्त्तन्ते। 'दौर्मनस्यं' वाह्याभ्यन्तरैः कारणैर्मनसो दौस्थ्यं। 'अङ्गमेजयत्वं' सर्व्वाङ्गीनो वेपथुः आसनस्थैर्य्यस्य¶ बाधकः। प्राणो यद्वाह्यं वायुमाचामति सः 'श्वासः'**। यत्कौष्ठ्यं वायुं निःसारयति†† स 'प्रश्वासः'। त एते विक्षेपैः‡‡ सह वर्त्तमाना

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* विषयसम्प्रयोगार्थो गर्द्ध इति C पुस्तकपाठः।

† रजतवदितीति A पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ लब्धायामपीति E पुस्तकपाठः।

§ विक्षेपेष्वेतेषु इति C, E, F पुस्तकत्रयपाठः।

‖ चित्तस्य रजस इति A पुस्तकपाठः।

¶ आसनमनस्थैर्य्ययोरिति A पुस्तकपाठः।

** प्राणो यद्वाह्यं वायुमाश्वसिति स श्वास इति B पुस्तकपाठः।

†† निश्वसितीति A, B, D पुस्तकत्रयपाठः।

‡‡ ते एतैर्विक्षेपैरिति A, F पुस्तकद्वयपाठः। एतैर्विक्षेपैरिति B, E, D पुस्तकत्रयपाठः।

यथोदिताभ्यामभ्यास-वैराग्याभ्यां निरोद्धव्या इत्येषामुपदेशः॥ ३१॥

क्षेपद्रवविक्षेपप्रतिषेधार्थमुपायान्तरमाह ।

तत्प्रतिषेधार्थमेकतत्त्वाभ्यासः ॥ ३२ ॥

तेषां विक्षेपाणां 'प्रतिषेधार्थं' निषेधार्थं, 'एकस्मिन् कस्मिंश्चिदभिमते, 'तत्त्वे', 'अभ्यासः', चेतसः पुनः पुनर्व्विनिवेशनं कुर्य्यात्। यद्बलात् प्रत्युदितायामेकाग्रतायां प्रशममुपयान्ति विक्षेपाः ॥ ३२॥

इदानीं चित्तसंस्कारापादकपरिकर्म्मकथनपूर्व्वकमुपायान्तरमाह* ।

मैत्री-करुणा-मुदितोपेक्षाणां सुखदुःखपुण्यापुण्यविषयाणां भावनातश्चित्तप्रसादनम् ॥ ३३ ॥

'मैत्री' सौहार्द्दं। 'करुणा' कृपा। 'मुदिता' हर्षः। 'उपेक्षा' औदासीन्यं। एता यथाक्रमं सुखितेषु, दुःखितेषु, पुण्यवत्सु, अपुण्यवत्सु च भावयेत्। तथाहि सुखितेषु साध्वेषां सुखित्वमिति मैत्रीं कुर्य्यान्न त्वीर्ष्यां। दुःखितेषु कथं नु नामैषां दुःखित्वविमुक्तिः स्यादिति कृपामेव कुर्य्यात् न ताटस्थ्यं। पुण्यवत्सु पुण्यानुमोदनेन हर्षं कुर्य्यात् न तु किमेते पुण्यवन्त इति विद्वेषं। अपुण्यवत्सु चौदासीन्यमेव भावयेत् नानुमोदनं न द्वेषं। सूत्रे सुखदुःखादिशब्दैस्तद्वन्तः प्रतिपादिताः। तदेवं मैत्र्यादिपरिकर्म्मणा चित्तं† प्रसीदति‡ सुखेन समाधेराविर्भावो भवति। परिकर्म्म चैतद्बाह्यं

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* चित्तसंस्कारापादकं परिकर्म्मकथनमुपायान्तरमाहेति C, E पुस्तकद्वयपाठः।

† परिकर्म्मणा प्रसादोपायेन चित्त इति E, D पुस्तकद्वयपाठः।

‡ चित्तप्रसादे सतीति D पुस्तकपाठः॥

कर्म्म। यथा गणिते मिश्रकादिव्यवहारगणितनिष्पत्तये सङ्कलितादि-कर्म्म, उपकारकत्वेन प्रधानकर्म्मनिष्पत्तये प्रभवति, एवं द्वेषरागादि-प्रतिपक्षभूतमैत्र्यादिभावनया समुत्पादितप्रसादं चित्तं सम्प्रज्ञात-समाधियोग्यं सम्पद्यते। रागद्वेषावेव मुख्यतया भेदमुत्पादयतः*। तौ चेत् समूलमुन्मूलितौ स्यातां तदा प्रसन्नत्वात् मनसो भवत्येवै-काग्रता ॥ ३३ ॥

उपायान्तरमाह।

प्रच्छर्द्दन-विधारणाभ्यां वा प्राणस्य ॥ ३४ ॥

'प्रच्छर्द्दनं' यत् कौष्ठस्य वायोः प्रयत्नविशेषान्मात्राप्रमाणेन बहि-र्निःसारणं। 'विधारणं' मात्राप्रमाणेनैव प्राणस्यायामः गतिविच्छेदः। स च द्वाभ्यां प्रकाराभ्यां, वाह्यस्याभ्यन्तरापूरणेन, पूरितस्य वायोस्तत्रैव निरोधेन। तदेवं रेचकपूरककुम्भकभेदेन त्रिविधः प्राणायामः चित्तस्य स्थितिमेकाग्रतायां निबध्नाति। सर्व्वासामिन्द्रियवृत्तीनां प्राणप्रवृत्तिपूर्व्वकत्वात् मनःप्राणयोः स्वस्वव्यापारे परस्परमेकयोग-क्षेमत्वाज्जीयमाणः प्राणः समस्तेन्द्रियवृत्तिनिरोधद्वारेण चित्तस्यैका-ग्रतायां प्रभवति। समस्तदोषक्षयकारित्वं चास्यागमे श्रूयते, दोष-कृताश्च सर्वा विक्षेपवृत्तयः। अतो दोषनिर्हरणद्वारेणास्यैकाग्रतायां सामर्थ्यं ॥ ३४ ॥

इदानीमुपायान्तरदर्शनोपक्षेपेण सम्प्रज्ञातस्य समाधेः पूर्व्वरङ्गं करोति†।

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* विक्षेपमुत्पादयत इति A, D पुस्तकद्वयपाठः।

† पूर्व्वाङ्गं करोतीति B पुस्तकपाठः।

विषयवती वा प्रवृत्तिरुत्पन्ना स्थितिनिबन्धनी ॥३५॥

मनस इति वाक्यशेषः। विषया गन्ध-रस-रूप-स्पर्श-शब्दाः ते विद्यन्ते फलत्वेन यस्याः सा 'विषयवती', 'प्रवृत्तिः', मनसः स्थैर्य्यं करोति। तथा हि नासाग्रे चित्तं धारयतो दिव्यगन्धसम्विदुपजायते। तादृश्येव जिह्वाग्रे रससम्वित्। ताल्वग्रे रूपसम्वित्। जिह्वामध्ये स्पर्श-सम्वित्। जिह्वामूले शब्दसम्वित्। तदेवं तत्तदिन्द्रियद्वारेण तस्मिं-स्तस्मिन् दिव्ये विषये जायमाना सम्वित् चित्तस्यैकाग्रतायां हेतु-र्भवति, अस्ति योगस्य फलमिति योगिनां समाश्वासोत्पादनात् ॥ ॥ ३५ ॥

एवंविधमेवोपायान्तरमाह।

विशोका वा ज्योतिष्मती ॥ ३६ ॥

प्रवृत्तिरुत्पन्ना चित्तस्य स्थितिनिबन्धिनीति वाक्यशेषः। ज्योतिः-शब्देन सात्त्विकः प्रकाश उच्यते, स प्रशस्तो भूयानतिशयवांश्च विद्यते यस्याः सा 'ज्योतिष्मती', प्रवृत्तिः। 'विशोका' विगतः सुखमय-सत्त्वाभ्यासवशाच्छोको रजःपरिणामो यस्याः सा, चेतसः स्थिति-निबन्धिनी। अयमर्थः हृत्पद्मसम्पुटमध्ये प्रशान्तकल्लोलक्षीरोदधिप्रख्यं चित्तसत्त्वं सम्भावयतः प्रज्ञालोकात् सर्व्ववृत्तिपरिक्षये चेतसः स्थैर्य्य-मुत्पद्यते ॥ ३६ ॥

उपायान्तरप्रदर्शनद्वारेण सम्प्रज्ञातस्य समाधेर्व्विषयं दर्शयति।

वीतरागविषयं वा चित्तं ॥ ३७ ॥

मनसः स्थितिनिबन्धनं भवतीति वाक्यशेषः। 'वीतरागः'

परित्यक्तविषयाभिलाषः, तस्य यत् 'चित्तं,' परिहृतक्लेशं तदालम्बनी-कृतं, चेतसः स्थितिहेतुर्भवति ॥ ३७ ॥

एवंविधमेवोपायान्तरमाह ।

स्वप्न-निद्रा-ज्ञानावलम्बनं वा ॥ ३८ ॥

प्रत्यस्तमितवाह्येन्द्रियवृत्तेर्मनोमात्रेणैव यत्र भोक्तृत्वमात्मनः सः 'स्वप्नः'। 'निद्रा' पूर्व्वोक्तलक्षणा* । तदालम्बनं स्वप्नालम्बनं, निद्रा-लम्बनं वा 'ज्ञानं', आलम्ब्यमानं, चेतसः स्थितिं करोति ॥ ३८ ॥

नानारुचित्वात् प्राणिनां यस्मिन् कस्मिंश्चिद्वस्तुनि योगिनः श्रद्धा भवति । तस्य ध्यानेनापि भवतीष्टसिद्धिरिति प्रतिपादयितुमाह ।

यथाभिमतध्यानाद्वा ॥ ३९ ॥

यथाभिमते वस्तुनि वाह्ये चन्द्रादौ, अभ्यन्तरे नाड़ीचक्रादौ वा भाव्यमाने चेतः स्थिरं भवति† ॥ ३९ ॥

एवमुपायान् प्रदर्श्य फलप्रदर्शनार्थमाह ।

परमाणु-परममहत्त्वान्तो ऽस्य वशीकारः ॥ ४० ॥

एभिरुपायैश्चित्तस्य स्थैर्य्यं भावयतो योगिनः सूक्ष्मविषयभावना-द्वारेण परमाण्वन्तः 'वशीकारः' अप्रतिघातरूपः, जायते, क्वचित् परमाणुपर्य्यन्ते सूक्ष्मे विषयेऽस्य मनो न प्रतिहन्यत इत्यर्थः । एवं स्थूलमाकाशादिपरममहत्त्वपर्य्यन्तं भावयतो न क्वचित् चेतसः प्रतिघात उत्पद्यते सर्व्वत्र स्वातन्त्र्यं भवतीत्यर्थः ॥ ४० ॥

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* पूर्व्वमेवोक्तलक्षणेति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

† स्थिरीभवतीति E पुस्तकपाठः । चेतःस्थितिर्भवतीति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

एवमेभिरुपायैः संस्कृतस्य चेतसः कीदृग्रूपं भवतीत्याह ।

क्षीणवृत्तेरभिजातस्येव मणेर्ग्रहीतृ-ग्रहण-ग्राह्येषु तत्स्थ-तदञ्जनतासमापत्तिः ॥ ४१ ॥

क्षीणा वृत्तयो यस्य सः 'क्षीणवृत्तिः', तस्य, 'ग्रहीतृ-ग्रहण-ग्राह्येषु' आत्मेन्द्रिय-विषयेषु, 'तत्स्थ-तदञ्जनतासमापत्तिः', भवति । 'तत्स्थत्वं' तत्रैकाग्रता । 'तदञ्जनत्वं' तन्मयत्वं, न्यग्भूते चित्ते विषयस्य भाव्यमानस्यैवोत्कर्षः। तथाविधा 'समापत्तिः' तद्रूपपरिणामो भवतीत्यर्थः। दृष्टान्तमाह। 'अभिजातस्येव मणेः', इति यथा 'अभिजातस्य' निर्मलस्य, स्फटिकमणेः, तत्तद्रूपाश्रयवशात्तत्तद्रूपतापत्तिः। एवं अभिजातस्य निर्मलस्य चित्तस्य तत्तद्भावनीयवस्तूपरागात्तत्तद्रूपतापत्तिः। यद्यपि ग्रहीतृ-ग्रहण-ग्राह्येष्वित्युक्तं, तथापि भूमिकाक्रमवशात् ग्राह्य-ग्रहण-ग्रहीतृष्विति बोद्धव्यं। यतः प्रथमं ग्राह्यनिष्ठ एव समाधिस्ततो ग्रहणनिष्ठस्ततोऽस्मितामात्ररूपो ग्रहीतृनिष्ठः, केवलस्य पुरुषस्य ग्रहीतुर्भाव्यत्वासम्भवात्। ततश्च स्थूलसूक्ष्मग्राह्योपरक्तं चित्तं तत्र समापन्नं भवति। एवं ग्रहणे ग्रहीतरि च समापन्नं बोद्धव्यं ॥ ४१ ॥

इदानीमुक्ताया एव समापत्तेश्चतुर्व्विधभेदमाह* ।

शब्दार्थ-ज्ञान-विकल्पैः सङ्कीर्णा सवितर्का ॥ ४२ ॥

श्रोत्रेन्द्रियग्राह्यः स्फोटरूपो वा 'शब्दः'। 'अर्थः' जात्यादिः। 'ज्ञानं' सत्त्वप्रधाना बुद्धिवृत्तिः। 'विकल्पः' उक्तलक्षणः। तैः 'सङ्कीर्णा',

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* चतुर्विधत्वमाहेति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

यस्यामेते शब्दादयस्त्रयः परस्पराध्यासेन विकल्परूपेण प्रतिभासन्ते, गौरितिशब्दः, गौरित्यर्थः, गौरितिज्ञानं, इत्यनेनाकारेण सा 'सवितर्का', समापत्तिरित्युच्यते* ॥ ४२ ॥

उक्तलक्षणविपरीतां निर्वितर्कामाह ।

स्मृतिपरिशुद्धौ स्वरूपशून्येवार्थमात्रनिर्भासा निर्व्वितर्का ॥ ४३ ॥

शब्दार्थस्मृतिप्रविलये, प्रत्युदितस्पष्टयाग्राकारप्रतिभासितया न्यग्भूतज्ञानसत्त्वेन† 'स्वरूपशून्या इव', 'निर्व्वितर्का', समापत्तिः ॥४३॥

भेदान्तरं प्रतिपादयितुमाह ।

एतयैव सविचारा निर्व्विचारा च सूक्ष्मविषया व्याख्याता ॥ ४४ ॥

'एतयैव' सवितर्कया निर्व्वितर्कया च समापत्त्या, 'सविचारा निर्व्विचारा च व्याख्याता'। कीदृशी 'सूक्ष्मविषया' सूक्ष्मस्तन्मात्रेन्द्रियादिः‡ विषयो यस्या सा तथोक्ता । एतेन पूर्व्वस्याः स्थूलविषयत्वं प्रतिपादितं भवति, सा हि महाभूतालम्बना शब्दार्थ-ज्ञान-विकल्पसहितत्वेन तद्रहितत्वेन च§ । देशकालधर्माद्यवच्छिन्नः सूक्ष्मोऽर्थः प्रतिभाति यस्यां सा 'सविचारा' । देशकालधर्मादिरहितो धर्म्मिमात्रतया

* समापत्तिरुच्यत इति E पुस्तकपाठः ।

† ज्ञानांशत्वेनेति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ तन्मात्रान्तःकरणमिति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ शब्दार्थ-विकल्पविषयत्वेन शब्दार्थ-विकल्परहितत्वेनेति H पुस्तकपाठः।

सूक्ष्मोऽर्थस्तन्मात्रेन्द्रियरूपः प्रतिभाति यस्यां सा 'निर्व्विचारा'।

अस्या एव सूक्ष्मविषयाः॥ ४४॥

किं पर्य्यन्तः सूक्ष्मो विषय इत्याह।

सूक्ष्मविषयत्वञ्चालिङ्गपर्य्यवसानं॥ ४५॥

सविचार-निर्विचारयोः समापत्त्योर्यत् 'सूक्ष्मविषयत्वं', उक्तं। न क्वचिल्लीयते न वा किञ्चिल्लिङ्गयति गमयतीति 'अलिङ्गं' प्रधानं, तत्पर्य्यन्तं सूक्ष्मविषयत्वं। तथा हि गुणानां परिणामे चत्वारि पर्व्वाणि, विशिष्टलिङ्गं, अविशिष्टलिङ्गं, लिङ्गमात्रं, अलिङ्गञ्चेति। विशिष्टलिङ्गं भूतानि। अविशिष्टलिङ्गं तन्मात्रेन्द्रियाणि। लिङ्गमात्रं बुद्धिः। अलिङ्गं प्रधानमिति। नातः परं सूक्ष्ममस्तीत्युक्तं भवति॥ ४५॥

एतासां समापत्तीनां प्रकृते प्रयोजनमाह।

ता एव* सवीजः समाधिः॥ ४६॥

'ता एव' उक्तलक्षणाः समापत्तयः, सह वीजेन आलम्बनेन वर्त्तत इति 'सवीजः' सम्प्रज्ञातः समाधिः, इत्युच्यते, सर्व्वासां सालम्बनत्वात्॥ ४६॥

अथेतरासां समापत्तीनां निर्व्विचारफलकत्वात्† निर्व्विचारायाः फलमाह।

निर्व्विचारवैशारद्ये अध्यात्मप्रसादः॥ ४७॥

'निर्व्विचारत्वं व्याख्यातं। 'वैशारद्यं' नैर्म्मल्यं। सवितर्का स्थूल-

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* सूत्रे टीकायाञ्च एता एवेति E पुस्तकपाठः।

† निर्विचारायाः फलत्वादिति E पुस्तकपाठः।

विषयामपेक्ष्य निर्व्वितर्कायाः प्राधान्यं। ततोऽपि सूक्ष्मविषयायाः सविचारायाः। ततोऽपि निर्व्विकल्परूपाया निर्व्विचारायाः। तस्यास्तु* निर्व्विचारायाः प्रकृष्टाभ्यासवशात्† 'वैशारद्ये' नैर्मल्ये सति, 'अध्यात्म-प्रसादः', समुपजायते, चित्तं क्लेशवासनारहितं स्थिरप्रवाहयोग्यं भवति। एतदेव चित्तस्य वैशारद्यं, यत्स्थितौ दार्ढ्यं ॥ ४७ ॥

तस्मिन् सति किं भवतीत्याह।

ऋतम्भरा तत्र प्रज्ञा ॥ ४८ ॥

"ऋतं" सत्यं बिभर्त्ति कदाचिदपि न विपर्ययेणाच्छाद्यते, सा 'ऋतम्भरा', 'प्रज्ञा', तस्मिन् सति, भवतीत्यर्थः। तस्माच्च प्रज्ञालोकात्‡ सर्व्वं यथावत् पश्यन् योगी प्रकृष्टं योगं प्राप्नोति ॥ ४८ ॥

अस्याः प्रज्ञान्तराद् वैलक्षण्यमाह।

श्रुतानुमानप्रज्ञाभ्यामन्यविषया§ विशेषार्थत्वात् ॥ ॥ ४९ ॥

'श्रुतं' आगमज्ञानं, 'अनुमानं' उक्तलक्षणं, ताभ्यां या जायते प्रज्ञा सा सामान्यविषया। न हि शब्दलिङ्गयोरिन्द्रियवद्विशेषप्रतिपत्तौ सामर्थ्यं। इयं पुनर्निर्व्विचारवैशारद्यसमुपेता‖ प्रज्ञा ताभ्यां विलक्षणा

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* तस्या अपीति B पुस्तकपाठः।

† प्रकृष्टाभ्यासबलादिति B पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ तस्याश्च प्रज्ञाया इति F पुस्तकपाठः।

§ श्रौतानुमानप्रज्ञाभ्यां सामान्यविषया इति H पुस्तकपाठः। परन्त्वयं न समीचीनः।

‖ निर्विचारवैशारद्यसमुद्भवेति B, E पुस्तकपाठः।

विशेषविषयत्वात् । अस्यां हि प्रज्ञायां सूक्ष्म-व्यवहित-विप्रकृष्टानामपि विशेषः स्फुटेनैव रूपेण प्रतिभासते । अतस्तस्यां हि प्रज्ञायां योगिना परः प्रयत्नः कर्त्तव्य इत्युपदिष्टं भवति ॥ ४९ ॥

अस्याः प्रज्ञायाः फलमाह ।

तज्जः संस्कारोऽन्यसंस्कारप्रतिबन्धी ॥ ५० ॥

तया प्रज्ञया जनितः यः 'संस्कारः,' सोऽन्यान् व्युत्थानजान् समाधिजांश्च* संस्कारान् प्रतिबध्नाति, स्वकार्य्यकरणाक्षमान् करोतीत्यर्थः। यतस्तत्त्वरूपतया तया जनिताः संस्कारा बलवत्त्वात् अतत्त्वरूपप्रज्ञाजनितान् संस्कारान् बाधितुं शक्नुवन्ति । अतस्तामेव प्रज्ञामभ्यसेदित्युक्तं भवति ॥ ५० ॥

एवं सम्प्रज्ञातसमाधिमभिधायासम्प्रज्ञातं वक्तुमाह ।

तस्यापि निरोधे सर्व्वनिरोधान्निर्व्वीजः समाधिः ॥ ॥ ५१ ॥

'तस्यापि' सम्प्रज्ञातस्यापि, 'निरोधे' प्रविलये, सति, 'सर्व्वासां' चित्तवृत्तीनां, स्वकारणे प्रविलयाद्या या संस्कारमात्रा वृत्तिरुदेति, तस्यां तस्यां नेति नेति केवलं पर्य्युदसनात्† 'निर्व्वीजः समाधिः', आविर्भवति। यस्मिन् सति पुरुषः स्वरूपमात्रनिष्ठः‡ शुद्धो भवति॥

तदत्राधिकृतस्य योगस्य लक्षणं, चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधपदानाञ्च व्या-

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* तत्त्वज्ञानसमाधिजांश्चेति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

† पर्य्यदर्शनादिति B पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ स्वरूपमात्रप्रतिष्ठ इति B पुस्तकपाठः ।

त्यागं, अभ्यास-वैराग्यलक्षणं, नस्योपायद्वयस्य*, स्वरूपं भेदञ्चाभिधाय सम्प्रज्ञातासम्प्रज्ञातभेदेन योगस्य मुख्यामुख्यभेदमुक्त्वा योगाभ्यास-प्रदर्शनपूर्व्वकान् विस्तरेणोपायान् प्रदर्श्य सुगमोपायप्रदर्शनपरतया ईश्वरस्य स्वरूप-प्रमाण-प्रभाव-वाचकोपासनाक्रम-तत्फलानि निर्णीय चित्तस्य विक्षेपांस्तत्सहभुवश्च दुःखादीन् विस्तरेण च तत्प्रतिषेधोपायानेकतत्त्वाभ्यासमैत्र्यादीन् प्राणायामादीन् सम्प्रज्ञातासम्प्रज्ञातपूर्व्वाङ्गभूतविषयवतीप्रवृत्तिरित्यादीनाख्यायोपसंहारद्वारेण समापत्तीः सलक्षणाः फलसहिताः† स्वस्वविषयसहितास्चोक्त्वा सम्प्रज्ञातासम्प्रज्ञातयोरुपसंहारमभिधाय सवीजपूर्व्वको निर्व्वीजः समाधिरभिहित इति व्याकृतो योगपादः‡ ॥ ५१ ॥

इति श्रीमहाराजाधिराजश्रीभोजदेवविरचितायां राजमार्त्तण्डाभिधायां पातञ्जलयोगशास्त्रवृत्तौ योगपादः प्रथमः ॥ ० ॥

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* अभ्यास-वैराग्योपायद्वयस्येति B पुस्तकपाठः ।

† लक्षणफलसहिता इति B पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ व्याख्यातो योगपाद इति E पुस्तकपाठः ।

अथ द्वितीयः पादः।

ते ते दुष्प्रापयोगर्द्धिसिद्धये येन दर्शिताः।
उपायाः स जगन्नाथस्त्र्यक्षोऽस्तु प्रार्थितातये॥ १॥

तदेवं प्रथमे पादे समाहितचित्तस्य सोपायं योगमभिधाय व्युत्थितचित्तस्यापि कथमुपायाभ्यासपूर्व्वको योगः साध्यतामुपयातीति तत्साधनानुष्ठानप्रतिपादनाय क्रियायोगमाह।

तपः-स्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानानि क्रियायोगः॥ १॥

'तपः' शास्त्रान्तरोपदिष्टं कृच्छ्रं चान्द्रायणादि। 'स्वाध्यायः' प्रणवपूर्व्वाणां मन्त्राणां जपः। 'ईश्वरप्रणिधानं' सर्व्वक्रियाणां तस्मिन् परमगुरौ फलनिरपेक्षतया समर्पणं। एतानि क्रियायोग इत्युच्यते॥१॥

स किमर्थ इत्यत आह।

समाधिभावनार्थः क्लेशतनूकरणार्थश्च॥ २॥

'क्लेशाः' वक्ष्यमाणाः। तेषां 'तनूकरणं' स्वकार्य्यकरणप्रतिबन्धः। 'समाधिः' उक्तलक्षणः। तस्य 'भावना' चेतसि पुनःपुनर्निवेशनं। सः 'अर्थः' प्रयोजनं यस्य स तथोक्तः॥ एतदुक्तं भवति। एते तपः-प्रभृतयोऽभ्यस्यमानाश्चित्तगतानविद्यादीन् क्लेशान् शिथिलीकुर्व्वन्तः समाधेरुपकारकतां भजन्ते। तस्मात् प्रथमतः क्रियायोगावधानपरेण योगिना भवितव्यमित्युपदिष्टं॥ २॥

क्लेशतनूकरणार्थमित्युक्तं तत्र के क्लेशा इत्यत आह।

अविद्याऽस्मिता-राग-द्वेषाभिनिवेशाः पञ्च क्लेशाः॥
॥ ३ ॥

'क्लेशाः' अविद्यादयो वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणाः पञ्च। ते बाधनालक्षणं परितापमुपजनयन्तः क्लेशशब्दवाच्या भवन्ति। ते हि चेतसि प्रवर्त्तमानाः संसारलक्षणं* गुणपरिणामं द्रढयन्ति ॥ ३ ॥

सत्यपि सर्व्वेषां तुल्ये क्लेशत्वे मूलभूतत्वादविद्यायाः प्राधान्यं प्रतिपादयितुमाह।

अविद्या क्षेत्रमुत्तरेषां प्रसुप्त-तनु-विच्छिन्नोदाराणां॥
॥ ४ ॥

'अविद्या' मोहः, अनात्मन्यात्माभिमान इति यावत्। सा 'क्षेत्रं' प्रसवभूमिः, 'उत्तरेषां' अस्मितादीनां प्रत्येकं प्रसुप्तादिभेदेन चतुर्विधानां। अतो यत्राविद्या विपर्य्ययज्ञानरूपा शिथिली भवति, तत्र क्लेशानां अस्मितादीनां नोद्भवो दृश्यते, विपर्य्ययज्ञानसद्भावे च तेषामुद्भवदर्शनात् स्थितमेव मूलत्वमविद्यायाः†। 'प्रसुप्त-तनु-विच्छिन्नोदाराणां', इति तत्र ये क्लेशाश्चित्तभूमौ स्थिताः प्रबोधकाभावे स्वकार्य्यं नारभन्ते, ते 'प्रसुप्ताः', इत्युच्यते। यथा बाल्यावस्थायां। बालस्य हि वासनारूपेण स्थिता अपि क्लेशाः प्रबोधकसहकार्य्यभावेन‡ नाभिव्यज्यन्ते। ते 'तनवः', ये स्वस्वप्रतिपक्षभावनया शिथिलीकृतकार्य्यसम्पादनशक्तयो वासनाविशेषतया चेतस्यवस्थिताः प्रभूतां सामग्रीमन्तरेण

* संस्कारलक्षणमिति B पुस्तकपाठः।

† स्थितमेवं मूलमविद्याया इति B पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ स्वबोधकसहकार्य्यभावेनेति B, C पुस्तकपाठः।

न स्वकार्य्यमारब्धुं क्षमाः। यथाभ्यासवतो हि योगिनः। ते 'विच्छिन्नाः', ये केनचिद् बलवता क्लेशेनाभिभूतशक्तयस्तिष्ठन्ति। यथा द्वेषावस्थायां रागः, रागावस्थायां वा द्वेषः। न ह्यनयोः परस्परविरुद्धयोर्युगपत् सम्भवोऽस्ति। ते 'उदाराः', ये प्राप्तसहकारिसन्निधयः स्वं स्वं कार्य्यमभिनिर्वर्त्तयन्ति। यथा सर्व्वदैव योगपरिपन्थिनो व्युत्थानदशायां*। एषां प्रत्येकं चतुर्व्विधानामपि मूलभूतत्वेन स्थिताप्यविद्याऽन्वयित्वेन प्रतीयते। न हि कश्चिदपि क्लेशानां विपर्य्ययान्वयनिरपेक्षरूपाणां† स्वरूपमुपलभ्यते। तस्याञ्च मिथ्याभूतायामविद्यायां‡ सम्यक्ज्ञानेन निवर्त्तितायां दग्धबीजकल्पानां एषां न क्वचित् प्ररोहोऽस्तीति अविद्यानिमित्तत्वमविद्यान्वयश्चैषां निश्चीयते। अतः सर्व्वेऽप्यविद्याव्यपदेशभाजः। सर्व्वेषाञ्च क्लेशानां चित्तविक्षेपकारित्वात् योगिना प्रथममेव तदुच्छेदे यत्नः कर्त्तव्य इति ॥ ४ ॥

अविद्याया लक्षणमाह।

अनित्याशुचि-दुःखानात्मसु नित्य-शुचि-सुखात्मख्यातिरविद्या ॥ ५ ॥

अतस्मिंस्तत्प्रतिभासः§ 'अविद्या', इति अविद्यायाः सामान्यलक्षणं। तस्या एव भेदप्रतिपादनं। 'अनित्येषु' घटादिषु, नित्यत्वाभिमानः

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* व्युत्पादनदशायामिति B पुस्तकपाठः।

† विपर्य्ययान्वयनिरपेक्षाणामिति B, E। विपर्य्यासान्वयनिरपेक्षाणामिति F पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ मिथ्याज्ञानरूपायामविद्यायामिति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः।

§ अतस्मिंस्तदिति प्रतिभास इति A पुस्तकपाठः।

अविद्येत्युच्यते । एवम् 'अशुचिषु' कायादिषु, शुचित्वाभिमानः । 'दुःखेषु' च विषयेषु, सुखत्वाभिमानः* । 'अनात्मनि' शरीरे, आत्मत्वाभिमानः† । एतेनापुण्ये पुण्यभ्रमोऽनर्थे चार्थभ्रमो व्याख्यातः ॥ ५ ॥

अस्मितां व्याख्यातुमाह ।

दृग्दर्शनशक्त्योरेकात्मतेवास्मिता ॥ ६ ॥

'दृक्शक्तिः' पुरुषः । 'दर्शनशक्तिः' रजस्तमोभ्यामनभिभूतः‡ सात्त्विकः परिणामोऽन्तःकरणरूपः । तयोर्भोग्यभोक्तृत्वेन जडाजडत्वेन-चात्यन्तं भिन्नयोः 'एकताभिमानः 'अस्मिता', इत्युच्यते । यथा प्रकृतिर्वस्तुतः कर्त्तृत्व-भोक्तृत्वरहितापि कर्त्र्यहं भोक्त्र्यहमित्यभिमन्यते, सोऽयमस्मिताख्यो विपर्य्यासः क्लेशः ॥ ६ ॥

रागस्य लक्षणमाह ।

सुखानुशयी रागः§ ॥ ७ ॥

सुखमनुशेते इति 'सुखानुशयी', सुखज्ञस्य सुखानुस्मृतिपूर्व्वकः सुख-साधनेषु तृष्णारूपो गर्द्धः 'रागसंज्ञः‖ क्लेशः ॥ ७ ॥

द्वेषस्य लक्षणमाह ।

दुःखानुशयी द्वेषः¶ ॥ ८ ॥

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* सुखाभिमान इति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

† आत्माभिमान इति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ रजस्तमोभ्यामनभिधान इति B, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ सुखानुशयो राग इति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

‖ गर्व्वो रागसंज्ञक इति B, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

¶ दुःखानुशयो द्वेष इति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

'दुःखं' लक्षणं ।* तदभिज्ञस्य तदनुस्मृतिपूर्व्वकः तत्साधनेष्वन-भिमतो योऽयं निन्दात्मकः† सः 'द्वेषलक्षणः क्लेशः ॥ ८ ॥

अभिनिवेशस्य लक्षणमाह‡ ।

स्वरसवाही विदुषोऽपि तथानुबन्धोऽभिनिवेशः§ ॥ ९ ॥

पूर्व्वजन्मानुभूतमरणदुःखानुभववासनाबलात्|| भयरूपः समुपजा-यमानः शरीरविषयादिभिर्मम वियोगो माभूदित्यन्वहं शरीरानुबन्ध-रूपः सर्व्वस्यैवाक्रमेर्ब्रह्मपर्य्यन्तं¶ निमित्तं विना प्रवर्त्तमानः 'अभिनि-वेशाख्यः क्लेशः । तदेवं व्युत्थानस्य क्लेशात्मकत्वात् एकाग्रताभ्यासेन** प्रयत्नं क्लेशाः परिहर्त्तव्याः ॥ ९ ॥

न चाज्ञातानां तेषां परिहारः शक्यः कर्त्तुमिति तज्ज्ञानाय तेषां उद्देशं चैवं विभागं लक्षणं†† चाभिधाय स्थूलसूक्ष्मभेदभिन्नानां तेषां प्रहाणोपायविभागमाह‡‡ ।

ते प्रतिप्रसवहेयाः सूक्ष्माः ॥ १० ॥

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* प्रतिकूललक्षणमिति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

† अनभिमतो या निन्दा इति E पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ अभिनिवेशमाहेति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ तथा रूढोऽभिनिवेश इति C पुस्तकपाठः । अयमेव पाठो भाष्य-कारेण धृतः ।

|| पूर्व्वजन्मानुभवमरणदुःखानुभववासनाबलादिति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

¶ सर्व्वस्यैवाकृतेर्ब्रह्मपर्य्यन्तमिति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

** एकाग्रताभ्यासकामेनेति C, E, पुस्तकपाठः ।

†† विभागलक्षणमिति E पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡‡ प्रहरणोपायमाहेति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

ते 'सूक्ष्माः', क्लेशाः, ये वासनारूपेणावस्थिता न वृत्तिरूपं* परिणाममारभन्ते। 'ते', 'प्रतिप्रसवेन' प्रतिलोमपरिणामेन, 'हेयाः' त्यक्तव्याः। स्वकारणास्मितायां कृतार्थं सवासनं चित्तं यदा प्रविष्टं भवति, तदा कुतस्तेषां निर्मूलानां सम्भवः॥ १०॥

स्थूलानां हानोपायमाह।

ध्यानहेयास्तद्वृत्तयः॥ ११॥

तेषां क्लेशानामारब्धकार्य्याणां याः सुखदुःखमोहात्मिकाः 'वृत्तयः', ताः, 'ध्यानेनैव चित्तैकाग्रतालक्षणेन, 'हेयाः' हातव्या इत्यर्थः। चित्तपरिकर्म्माभ्यासमात्रेणैव स्थूलत्वात् तासां निवृत्तिर्भवति, यथा वस्त्रादौ घनः स्थूलो मलः प्रक्षालनमात्रेणैव निवर्त्तते। यस्तु तत्र सूक्ष्मः स तैस्तैरुपायैरुत्तापनप्रभृतिभिरेव निवर्त्तयितुं शक्यते॥ ११॥

एवं क्लेशानां तत्त्वमभिधाय कर्म्माशयस्याभिधातुमाह†।

क्लेशमूलः कर्म्माशयो दृष्टादृष्टजन्मवेदनीयः॥ १२॥

'कर्म्माशयः', इत्यनेन तस्य स्वरूपमभिहितं, यतो वासनारूपाण्येव कर्म्माणि। 'क्लेशमूलः', इत्यनेन कारणमभिहितं, यतः कर्म्मणां शुभाशुभानां क्लेशा एव निमित्तं। 'दृष्टादृष्टजन्मवेदनीयः',‡ इत्यनेन फलमुक्तं। अस्मिन्नेव जन्मनि अनुभवनीयः 'दृष्टजन्मवेदनीयः'§।

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* स्वप्रवृत्तिरूपमिति B, E पुस्तकपाठः।

† कर्म्माशयमभिधातुमाहेति H पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ दृष्टवेदनीय इति B, E पुस्तकपाठः। जन्मवेदनीय इति C पुस्तकपाठः।

§ दृष्टवेदनीय इति E पुस्तकपाठः। जन्मवेदनीय इति C पुस्तकपाठः।

जन्मान्तरानुभवनीयः 'अदृष्टजन्मवेदनीयः'। तथाहि कानिचित् पुण्यानि कर्म्माणि देवताराधनादीनि तीव्रसंवेगेनैव कृतानि इहैव जन्मनि फलं जात्यायुर्भोगलक्षणं प्रयच्छन्ति, यथा नन्दीश्वरस्य भगवन्महेश्वराराधनबलादिहैव जन्मनि जात्यादयो विशिष्टाः* प्रादुर्भूताः। एवमन्येषां विश्वामित्रादीनां तपःप्रभावाज्जात्यायुषी। केषाञ्चिज्जातिरेव, यथा तीव्रसंवेगेन दुष्टकर्म्मकृतां नहुषादीनां जात्यन्तरपरिणामः, उर्व्वश्याश्च कार्त्तिकेयवने लतारूपतया†। एवं व्यस्तसमस्तरूपत्वेन‡ यथायोगं योज्यं ॥ १२ ॥

इदानीं कर्म्माशयस्य स्वभेदभिन्नं फलमाह।

सति मूले तद्विपाको जात्यायुर्भोगाः ॥ १३ ॥

'मूलं उक्तलक्षणाः क्लेशाः, तेष्वनभिभूतेषु' सत्सु, कर्म्मणां कुशलाकुशलरूपाणां 'विपाकः' फलं, 'जात्यायुर्भोगाः' भवन्ति। 'जातिः' मनुष्यत्वादिः। 'आयुः' चिरकालं शरीरसम्बन्धः। 'भोगाः' विषयाः इन्द्रियाणि सुखदुःखसंवित्च, कर्म्मकरणभावसाधनव्युत्पत्त्या§ भोगशब्दस्य। इदमत्र तात्पर्य्यं चित्तभूमौ अनादिकालसञ्चिताः कर्म्मवासना यथा यथा पाकमुपयान्ति, तथा तथा गुणप्रधानभावेन स्थिता जात्यायुर्भोगलक्षणं स्वकार्य्यमारभन्ते ॥ १३ ॥

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* जात्यायुर्भोगविशिष्टा इति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः।

† लताख्या तयेति B, E पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ व्यस्तसमस्तत्वेनेति B, E पुस्तकपाठः।

§ कर्म्मकरणभावव्युत्पत्त्येति H पुस्तकपाठः।

उक्तानां कर्म्मफलत्वे जात्यादीनां स्वकारणकर्म्मानुसारेण कार्य्य-कर्तृत्वमाह ।

ते ह्लाद-परितापफलाः पुण्यापुण्यहेतुत्वात्* ॥ १४ ॥

'ह्लादः' सुखं, 'परितापः' दुःखं, ह्लाद-परितापौ फले येषां 'ते' तथोक्ताः। 'पुण्यं' कुशलं कर्म्म, तद्विपरीतं 'अपुण्यं', ते पुण्यापुण्ये कारणे येषां तेषां भावस्तस्मात् । एतदुक्तं भवति, पुण्यकर्म्मारब्धा जात्यायुर्भोगा ह्लादफलाः। अपुण्यकर्म्मारब्धाः परितापफलाः॥ १४ ॥

एतच्च प्राणिमात्रापेक्षया द्वैविध्यं, योगिनस्तु सर्व्वं दुःखमित्याह ।

परिणाम-ताप-संस्कारदुःखैर्गुणवृत्तिविरोधाच्च सर्व्वं दुःखमेव† विवेकिनः ॥ १५ ॥

परिज्ञातक्लेशादिविवेकस्य परिदृश्यमानं सकलमेव भोगसाधनं सविषस्वान्नवत्‡ 'दुःखमेव' प्रतिकूलवेदनीयमेवेत्यर्थः। यस्मादत्यन्ता-भिजातः§ योगी दुःखलेशेनाप्युद्विजते‖ । यथाऽक्षिपात्रमूर्णातन्तुस्पर्श-मात्रेणैव महतीं पीडामनुभवति नेतरदङ्गं, तथा विवेकी स्वल्पदुःखा-नुषङ्गेणाऽपि¶ त्रिरज्यते। कथमित्याह 'परिणाम-ताप-संस्कार-

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* पुण्यापुण्यहेतुफलत्वादिति E पुस्तकपाठः ।
† दुःखमेव सर्व्वं विवेकिन इति E पुस्तकपाठः ।
‡ सविषान्नवदिति H पुस्तकपाठः ।
§ यस्मादत्यन्ताभिज्ञात इति H पुस्तकपाठः ।
‖ दुःखलेशेनाप्युद्विजत इति B, E पुस्तकपाठः ।
¶ स्वल्पदुःखानुसम्बन्धेनापीति C पुस्तकपाठः । सुखदुःखानुबन्धेनापीति B, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

दुःखैः'। विषयाणामुपभुज्यमानानां यथायथं गर्द्धाभिवृद्धेस्तदप्राप्तिकृतस्य दुःखस्यापरिहार्य्यत्वात् दुःखान्तरसाधनत्वाच्चास्त्येव दुःखरूपतेति 'परिणामदुःखत्वं'। उपभुज्यमानेषु सुखसाधनेषु तत्प्रतिपन्थिनं* प्रति द्वेषस्य सर्व्वदैवावस्थितत्वात् सुखानुभवकालेऽपि तापदुःखं दुष्परिहारमिति 'तापदुःखता'। 'संस्कारदुःखत्वं' स्वाभिमतानभिमतविषयसन्निधाने सुखसंवित् दुःखसंविच्चोपजायमाना तथाविधमेव स्वक्षेत्रे संस्कारमारभते, संस्काराच्च पुनस्तथाविधसंविदनुभव इत्यपरिमितसंस्कारोत्पत्तिद्वारेण संसारानुच्छेदात् सर्व्वस्यैव दुःखत्वं। 'गुणवृत्तिविरोधाच्च' इति, गुणानां सत्वरजस्तमसां या वृत्तयः सुखदुःखमोहरूपाः परस्परमभिभाव्याभिभावकत्वेन विरुद्धा जायन्ते, तासां सर्व्वत्रैव दुःखानुबन्धाद् दुःखत्वं। एतदुक्तं भवति। ऐकान्तिकीं आत्यन्तिकीञ्च दुःखनिवृत्तिमिच्छतो विवेकिन उक्तरूपकारणचतुष्टयं यावत् सर्व्वे विषया दुःखरूपतया प्रतिभान्ति। तस्मात् सर्व्वकर्म्मविपाको दुःखरूप एवेत्युक्तं भवति ॥ १५ ॥

तदेवमुक्त† क्लेश-कर्म्माशय-विपाकराशेरविद्याप्रभवत्वात् अविद्यायाश्च मिथ्याज्ञानरूपतया सम्यग्ज्ञानोच्छेद्यत्वात् सम्यग्ज्ञानस्य च ससाधनहेयोपादेयावधारणरूपत्वात्तदभिधानायाह।

हेयं दुःखमनागतं ॥ १६ ॥

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* तत्प्रतिबन्धनं इति E पुस्तकपाठः। तत्परिपन्थिनमिति C पुस्तकपाठः।
† तदेवमुक्तस्येति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः। एतदेवमुक्तस्य G पुस्तकपाठः।

भूतस्यातिक्रान्तत्वात्* अनुभूयमानस्य च त्यक्तुमशक्यत्वात् अनागतमेव संसारदुःखं हातव्यमित्युक्तं भवति† ॥ १६ ॥

हेयहेतुमाह ।

द्रष्टृ-दृश्ययोः संयोगो हेयहेतुः ॥ १७ ॥

'द्रष्टा' चिद्रूपः पुरुषः । 'दृश्यं' बुद्धितत्त्वं । तयोरविवेकख्यातिपूर्व्वको योऽसौ 'संयोगः' भोग्यभोक्तृत्वेन सन्निधानं, सः, 'हेयस्य' दुःखस्य गुणपरिणामरूपस्य संसारस्य, 'हेतुः' कारणं, तन्निवृत्त्या संसारनिवृत्तिर्भवतीत्यर्थः ॥ १७ ॥

द्रष्टृ-दृश्ययोः संयोग इत्युक्तं, तत्र दृश्यस्य स्वरूपं कार्य्यं प्रयोजनञ्चाह ।

प्रकाश-क्रिया-स्थितिशीलं भूतेन्द्रियात्मकं भोगापवर्गार्थं दृश्यं ॥ १८ ॥

'प्रकाशः' सत्त्वस्य धर्म्मः । 'क्रिया' प्रवृत्तिरूपा रजसः । 'स्थितिः' नियमरूपा तमसः । ताः प्रकाशक्रियास्थितयः 'शीलं' स्वाभाविकं रूपं, यस्य तत् तथाविधं, इति स्वरूपमस्य निर्द्दिष्टं । 'भूतेन्द्रियात्मकं', इति । 'भूतानि' स्थूलसूक्ष्मभेदेन पृथिव्यादीनि गन्धतन्मात्रादीनि च । 'इन्द्रियाणि' बुद्धीन्द्रिय-कर्म्मान्तःकरणभेदेन त्रिविधानि । उभयमेतद् ग्राह्य-ग्रहणरूपं 'आत्मा' स्वरूपाभिन्नः परिणामः, यस्य तत्

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* व्यतिक्रान्तत्वादिति H पुस्तकपाठः । निष्क्रान्तत्वादिति E, C, ञ पुस्तकपाठः ।

† इत्युक्तमितीति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

तथाविधं, इत्यनेन कार्य्यमस्योक्तं । 'भोगः' कथितलक्षणः । 'अपवर्गः' विवेकख्यातिपूर्व्विका संसारनिवृत्तिः । तौ भोगापवर्गौ 'अर्थः' प्रयोजनं, यस्य तत् तथाविधं 'दृश्यं', इत्यर्थः ॥ १८ ॥

तस्य च दृश्यस्य नानावस्थारूपपरिणामात्मकस्य हेयत्वेन ज्ञातव्यत्वात् अवस्थाः कथयितुमाह ।

विशेषाविशेष-लिङ्गमात्रालिङ्गानि गुणपर्व्वाणि ॥ ॥ १९ ॥

'गुणानां', 'पर्व्वाणि' अवस्थाविशेषाश्चत्वारः, ज्ञातव्याः, इत्युपदिष्टं भवति । तत्र 'विशेषाः' महाभूतेन्द्रियाणि । 'अविशेषाः' तन्मात्रान्तःकरणे । 'लिङ्गमात्रं' बुद्धिः । 'अलिङ्गं' अव्यक्तं, इत्युक्तं* । सर्व्वत्र त्रिगुणरूपस्याव्यक्तस्यान्वयित्वेन प्रत्यभिज्ञानादवश्यं ज्ञातव्यत्वेन योगकाले चत्वारि पर्व्वाणि निर्द्दिष्टानि ॥ १९ ॥

एवं हेयत्वेन दृश्यस्य प्रथमं ज्ञातव्यत्वात् तदवस्थासहितं व्याख्यायोपादेयं द्रष्टारं व्याकर्त्तुमाह† ।

द्रष्टा दृशिमात्रः शुद्धोऽपि प्रत्ययानुपश्यः ॥ २० ॥

'द्रष्टा' पुरुषः । 'दृशिमात्रः' चेतनामात्रः‡ । मात्रग्रहणं धर्म्मिधर्म्मनिरासार्थं । केचिद्धि चेतनामात्मनो धर्म्ममिच्छन्ति । सः 'शुद्धो-

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* इत्युक्तं भवतीति B, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

† वक्तुमाहेति C, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ चेतनमात्र इति E पुस्तकपाठः ।

ऽपि' परिणामित्वाद्यभावेन ख्यप्रतिष्ठोऽपि, 'प्रत्ययानुपश्यः'। 'प्रत्ययाः' विषयोपरक्तानि ज्ञानानि, तानि 'अनु' अव्यवधानेन प्रतिसंक्रमाद्य-भावेन, पश्यति। एतदुक्तं भवति। जातविषयोपरागायामेव बुद्धौ सन्निधानमात्रेणैव पुरुषस्य द्रष्टृत्वमिति॥ २० ॥

स एव च भोक्तेत्याह।

तदर्थ एव* दृश्यस्यात्मा ॥ २१ ॥

'दृश्यस्य' प्रागुक्तलक्षणस्य, 'आत्मा' यत् स्वरूपं, सः 'तदर्थः' तस्य पुरुषस्य भोक्तृत्वसम्पादनं नाम स्वार्थपरिहारेण प्रयोजनं। न हि प्रधानं प्रवर्त्तमानमात्मनः किञ्चित् प्रयोजनमपेक्ष्य प्रवर्त्तते, किन्तु पुरुषस्य भोक्तृत्वसम्पादनायेति† ॥ २१ ॥

यद्येवं पुरुषस्य भोगसम्पादनमेव प्रयोजनं‡, तदा§ सम्पादिते तस्मिंस्तन्निष्प्रयोजनं विरतव्यापारं स्यात्, तस्मिंश्च परिणामशून्ये शुद्धत्वात् सर्व्वे द्रष्टारो बन्धरहिताः स्युः। ततश्च संसारोच्छेद इत्याशङ्क्याह।

कृतार्थं प्रति नष्टमप्यनष्टं तदन्यसर्व्वसाधारणत्वात् ॥ २२ ॥

यद्यपि विवेकख्यातिपर्य्यन्तात् भोगसम्पादनात् कमपि 'कृतार्थं', पुरुषं, 'प्रति', 'तत्', 'नष्टं' विरतव्यापारं, तथापि 'सर्व्वपुरुषसाधा-

* स तदर्थ एवेति B, E पुस्तकपाठः।
† भोगं सम्पादयामीतीति G, H पुस्तकपाठः।
‡ यदिदं पुरुषस्य भोगसम्पादनं तदेव प्रयोजनमिति B, E पुस्तकपाठः।
§ तदानीमिति B, E पुस्तकपाठः।

रकत्वात् अन्यान् प्रति 'अनष्टव्यापारं अवतिष्ठते*'। अतः प्रधानस्य सकलभोक्तृसाधारणत्वात् न कदाचनापि† विनाशः, एकमुक्तौ वा न सर्व्वमुक्तिप्रसङ्ग इत्युक्तं भवति॥ २२ ॥

दृश्य-द्रष्टारौ व्याख्याय संयोगं व्याख्यातुमाह।

स्व-स्वामिशक्त्योः स्वरूपोपलब्धिहेतुः संयोगः॥२३॥

कार्य्यद्वारेणास्य लक्षणं करोति। 'स्वशक्तिः' दृश्यस्य स्वभावः। 'स्वामिशक्तिः' द्रष्टुः स्वरूपं। तयोर्द्वयोरपि संवेद्य-संवेदकत्वेन व्यवस्थितयोर्या 'स्वरूपोपलब्धिः', तस्याः कारणं यः 'संयोगः', स च सहजभोग्य-भोक्तृभावस्वरूपान्नान्यः। न हि तयोर्नित्ययोर्व्यापकयोश्च स्वस्वरूपादतिरिक्तः कश्चित् संयोगः। यदेव भोग्यस्य भोग्यत्वं, भोक्तुश्च भोक्तृत्वं अनादिसिद्धं स एव संयोगः॥ २३॥

तस्यापि कारणमाह।

तस्य हेतुरविद्या‡॥ २४॥

या पूर्व्वं विपर्य्यासात्मिका मोहरूपा 'अविद्या', व्याख्याता, सा 'तस्य' अविवेकख्यातिरूपस्य संयोगस्य, कारणं॥ २४॥

हेयं हानक्रियाकर्म्मोच्यते किम्पुनस्तद्धानमित्याह§।

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* अनष्टमव्यापारमवतिष्ठत इति A पुस्तकपाठः।

† न कदाचिदपीति B, E पुस्तकपाठः। न कथचिदपीति C पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ अस्य हेतुरविद्येति B, E पुस्तकपाठः। तस्य हेतुर्द्वयमविद्येति G पुस्तकपाठः। परन्त्वीदृशपाठस्य समस्तादर्शपुस्तकेष्वसत्त्वात् भाष्यकृदनुद्धृतत्वाच्च न समीचीनत्वं।

§ किं पुनर्हानमित्याहेति B, E पुस्तकपाठः।

तदभावात् संयोगाभावो हानं तद्दृशेः कैवल्यं ॥ ॥ २५ ॥

'तस्याः' अविद्यायाः स्वरूपविरुद्धेन सम्यग् ज्ञानेनोन्मूलितायाः, योऽयं 'अभावः', तस्मिन् सति, तत्कार्य्यस्य 'संयोगस्य', अपि 'अभावः', तत् 'हानं' इत्युच्यते। अयमर्थः नैतस्य मूर्त्तद्रव्यवत् परित्यागो युज्यते, किन्तु जातायां विवेकख्यातावविवेकख्यातिनिमित्तः* संयोगः स्वयमेव निवर्त्तत इति तस्य हानं। यदेव च संयोगस्य हानं 'तत्', एव नित्यकैवल्यस्यापि† पुरुषस्य 'कैवल्यं', व्यपदिश्यते। तदेवं संयोगस्य स्वरूपं‡ कारणं कार्य्यञ्चाभिहितं ॥ २५ ॥

अथ हानोपायकथनद्वारेण उपादेयकारणमाह।

विवेकख्यातिरविप्लवा हानोपायः ॥ २६ ॥

अन्ये गुणाः अन्यः पुरुष इत्येवंविधस्य 'विवेकस्य', 'ख्यातिः' प्रख्या, सा 'हानस्य' दृश्यपरित्यागस्य, 'उपायः'§ कारणं। कीदृशी 'अविप्लवा' न विद्यते विप्लवो विच्छेदोऽन्तरान्तरा‖ व्युत्थानरूपो यस्याः सा 'अविप्लवा'।

इदमत्र तात्पर्य्यं। प्रतिपक्षभावनाबलात् अविद्याप्रविलये विनि-

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* अविवेकनिमित्त इति B, G पुस्तकपाठः।
† नित्यं कैवल्यस्येति H पुस्तकपाठः।
‡ तदेवं दृश्यस्य संयोगस्वरूपमिति B, E पुस्तकपाठः।
§ दुःखपरित्यागस्योपाय इति B, E पुस्तकपाठः।
‖ अन्तरात्मनेति E पुस्तकपाठः।

वृत्तत्वादहं-कर्तृत्वाद्यभिमानाया रजस्तमोमलानभिभूताया बुद्धेरन्त-र्मुखाया या चिच्छायासंक्रान्तिः सा विवेकख्यातिरित्युच्यते। तस्याश्च सन्ततमविच्छेदेन प्रवृत्तायां* दृश्यस्याधिकारनिवृत्तेर्भवत्येव कैवल्यं॥ ॥ २६ ॥

उत्पन्नविवेकख्यातेः† पुरुषस्य यादृशी प्रज्ञा भवति, तां कथयन् विवेकख्यातेरेव स्वरूपमाह।

तस्य सप्तधा प्रान्तभूमौ प्रज्ञा॥ २७॥

'तस्य' उत्पन्नविवेकज्ञानस्य, ज्ञातव्यविवेकरूपा 'प्रज्ञा', 'प्रान्तभूमौ' सकलसालम्बनसमाधिभूमिपर्य्यन्तं, सप्तप्रकारा भवति।

तत्र कार्य्यविमुक्तिरूपा चतुःप्रकारा। ज्ञातं मया ज्ञेयं। न ज्ञातव्यं किञ्चिदस्ति। क्षीणा मे क्लेशा, न मे किञ्चित् क्षेतव्यमस्ति। अधिगतं मया ज्ञानं, प्राप्ता मया विवेकख्यातिः। इतिप्रत्ययान्तर-परिहारेण तस्यामवस्थायामीदृश्येव प्रज्ञा जायते। ईदृशी प्रज्ञा कार्य्यविषयं निर्मलं ज्ञानं कार्य्यविमुक्तिरित्युच्यते।

चित्तविमुक्तिस्त्रिविधा। चरितार्था मे बुद्धिः। गुणाश्च हृता-धिकाराः गिरिशिखरनिपतिता इव ग्रावाणो न पुनः स्थितिं यास्यन्ति, स्वकारणे प्रलयाभिमुखानां मोहाभिधानमूलकारणा-भावान्निष्प्रयोजनत्वाच्चामीषां कुतः प्ररोहः। सात्मीभूतश्च मे समाधिः। तस्मिन् सति स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठोऽहमिति। ईदृशी त्रिःप्रकारा चित्तविमुक्तिः।

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* सन्ततत्वेन प्रवृत्तायामिति H, C पुस्तकपाठः।

† उद्भूतविवेकख्यातेरिति C, E पुस्तकपाठः।

तदेवमीदृश्यां सप्तविधायां प्रान्तभूमिप्रज्ञायामुपजातायां पुरुषः केवल इत्युच्यते ॥ २७ ॥

विवेकख्यातिः संयोगाभावे हेतुरित्युक्तं* । तस्यास्तूत्पत्तौ किं निमित्तमित्यत आह ।

योगाङ्गानुष्ठानादशुद्धिक्षये ज्ञानदीप्तिराविवेक-ख्यातेः ॥ २८ ॥

'योगाङ्गानि वक्ष्यमाणानि । तेषां 'अनुष्ठानात्' ज्ञानपूर्व्वकाद्-भ्यासात्, 'आविवेकख्यातेः', 'अशुद्धिक्षये' चित्तसत्त्वस्य प्रकाशाव-रणलक्षणक्लेशरूपाशुद्धिक्षये,† या 'ज्ञानदीप्तिं' तारतम्येन सात्त्विकः परिणामः, विवेकख्यातिपर्य्यन्तः‡ स तस्याः ख्यातेर्हेतुरित्यर्थः ॥ ॥ २८ ॥

योगाङ्गानुष्ठानादशुद्धिक्षय इत्युक्तं, कानि पुनस्तानि योगाङ्गा-नीति तेषां उद्देशमाह ।

यम-नियमासन-प्राणायाम-प्रत्याहार-धारणा-ध्यान-समाधयोऽष्टावङ्गानि ॥ २९ ॥

इह कानिचित्समाधेः साक्षादुपकारकत्वेनान्तराण्यङ्गानि§ यथा 'धारणादीनि । कानिचित् प्रतिपक्षभूतहिंसादिवितर्कोन्मूलनद्वारेण

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* इत्युक्तं भवतीति B, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

† क्लेशस्याशुद्धिक्षय इति B, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ विवेकख्यातिपूर्व्वक इति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ अन्तरङ्गाणीति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

समाधेरुपकुर्व्वन्ति, यथा 'यम-नियमादयः'। तचासनादीनामुत्तरोत्तरमुपकारकत्वं यथा सत्यासनजये प्राणायामस्थैर्य्यं। एवमुत्तरत्रापि योज्यं* ॥ २९ ॥

क्रमेण एषां स्वरूपमाह।

अहिंसा-सत्यास्तेय-ब्रह्मचर्य्यापरिग्रहा यमाः ॥ ३० ॥

तत्र प्राणवियोगप्रयोजनव्यापारो हिंसा। सा च सर्व्वानर्थहेतुः। तदभावः 'अहिंसा'। हिंसायाः सर्व्वकालमेव† परिहार्य्यत्वात् प्रथमं तदभावरूपाया अहिंसाया निर्द्देशः। 'सत्यं' वाङ्मनसयोर्यथार्थत्वं‡। स्तेयं परस्वापहरणं। तदभावः 'अस्तेयं'। 'ब्रह्मचर्य्यं' उपस्थसंयमः। 'अपरिग्रहः' भोगसाधनानामस्वीकरणं§। त एते|| अहिंसादयः पञ्च 'यम'शब्दवाच्याः योगाङ्गत्वेन निर्द्दिष्टाः ॥ ३० ॥

एषां विशेषमाह।

एते¶ जाति-देश-काल-समयानवच्छिन्नाः सार्व्वभौममहाव्रतम् ॥ ३१ ॥

'जातिः' ब्राह्मणत्वादिः। 'देशः' तीर्थादिः। 'कालः' चतुर्द्दश्यादिः।

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* न्याय्यमिति G पुस्तकपाठः।

† सर्व्वप्रकारेणैवेति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ वाङ्मनसोर्यथार्थत्वमिति B, E पुस्तकपाठः।

§ अस्वीकार इति C, E पुस्तकपाठः।

|| तत्र ते अहिंसादय इति B, E पुस्तकपाठः।

¶ एते त्विति B, E पुस्तकपाठः।

'समय:' ब्राह्मणप्रयोजनादिः। एतैश्चतुर्भिः 'अनवच्छिन्नाः', पूर्व्वोक्ता अहिंसादयो यमाः सर्व्वासु क्षित्यादिषु चित्तभूमिषु भवाः 'महाव्रतं' इत्युच्यते। तद् यथा ब्राह्मणं न हनिष्यामि, तीर्थे कंचन न हनिष्यामि, चतुर्द्दश्यां न हनिष्यामि, देव-ब्राह्मणाद्यर्थव्यतिरेकेण* न हनिष्यामीत्येवं चतुर्विधावच्छेदव्यतिरेकेण कश्चित् क्वचित् कदाचित् कस्मिंश्चिदर्थे न हनिष्यामीत्यनवच्छिन्नाः। एवं सत्यादिषु यथायोगं योज्यं। इत्यमनियतीभूताः† सामान्येनैव प्रवृत्ताः महाव्रतमित्युच्यते, न पुनः परिच्छिन्नावधारणं‡ ॥ ३१ ॥

नियममाह§।

शौच-सन्तोष-तपः-स्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रनिधानानि नियमाः ॥ ३२ ॥

'शौचं', द्विविधं वाह्यमान्तरञ्च। वाह्यं मृज्जलादिभिः कायादिप्रक्षालनं। आन्तरं मैत्र्यादिभिश्चित्तमलानां प्रक्षालनं। 'सन्तोषः' तुष्टिः। शेषाः प्रागेव कृतव्याख्यानाः‖। एते शौचादयः 'नियमशब्द-वाच्याः ॥ ३२ ॥

कथमेषां योगाङ्गत्वमित्यत आह।

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* देवब्राह्मणप्रयोजनव्यतिरेकेण कमपीति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः।

† इत्यमनियतीकृता इति H पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ न पुनः परकीयास्त्र्यादिधारणमिति A पुस्तकपाठः।

§ नियमानाहेति A पुस्तकपाठः।

‖ प्रागेव व्याख्याता इति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः। भूतव्याख्याना इति H पुस्तकपाठः।

वितर्कबाधने प्रतिपक्षभावनं ॥ ३३ ॥

वितर्क्यन्त इति 'वितर्काः' योगपरिपन्थिनो हिंसादयः। तेषां 'प्रतिपक्षभावने सति, यदा बाधा भवति,'* तदा योगः सुकरो भवतीति भवत्येव यमनियमानां योगाङ्गत्वं ॥ ३३ ॥

इदानीं वितर्काणां स्वरूपं भेदं प्रकारं कारणं फलञ्च क्रमेणाह।

वितर्का हिंसादयः कृत-कारितानुमोदिता लोभ-क्रोध-मोहपूर्व्वका मृदु-मध्याधिमात्रा दुःखाज्ञानानन्तफला इति प्रतिपक्षभावनम् ॥ ३४ ॥

एते पूर्व्वोक्ताः 'हिंसादयः', प्रथमं त्रिधा भिद्यन्ते 'कृत-कारितानुमोदितभेदेन। तत्र स्वयं निष्पादिताः 'कृताः'। कुरु कुर्व्विति प्रयोजकव्यापारेण समुत्पादिताः 'कारिताः'। अन्येन क्रियमाणाः साधु साध्वित्यङ्गीकृताः† 'अनुमोदिताः'। एतच्च त्रैविध्यं परस्परव्यामोहनिवारणायोच्यते‡। अन्यथा मन्दमतिरेवं मन्येत न मया स्वयं हिंसा कृतेति नास्ति मे दोष इति। एतेषां कारण-प्रतिपादनायाह, 'लोभ-क्रोध-मोहपूर्व्वकाः', इति। यद्यपि लोभः क्रोधः प्रथमं निर्द्दिष्टः§ तथापि सर्व्वक्लेशानां मोहस्यानात्मन्यात्मा-

* यदि बाधा भवतीति E, A, D, F पुस्तकपाठः। यथा बाधा भवतीति C पुस्तकपाठः।

† साध्वित्यङ्गीकृता इति A पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ मोहनिवारणायोच्यत इति B, E पुस्तकपाठः।

§ लोभः प्रथमं निर्द्दिष्ट इति G पुस्तकपाठः।

भिमानलक्षणस्य निदानत्वात् तस्मिन् सति स्वपरविभागपूर्व्वकत्वेन लोभ-क्रोधादीनामुद्भवात्* मूलत्वमवसेयं। मोहपूर्व्विका सर्व्वा दोषजातिरित्यर्थः। 'लोभः' तृष्णा। 'क्रोधः' कृत्याकृत्यविवेकोन्मूलकः प्रज्वलनात्मकश्चित्तधर्म्मः। प्रत्येकं कृतादिभेदेन त्रिप्रकारा अपि हिंसादयो मोहादिकारणत्वेन त्रिधा भिद्यन्ते। तेषामेव पुनरवस्थाभेदेन त्रैविध्यमाह 'मृदु-मध्याधिमात्राः'। 'मृदवः' मन्दा न तीव्राः नापि मध्यमाः। 'मध्याः' न मन्दा नापि तीव्राः। 'अधिमात्राः' तीव्राः, न मध्या नापि मन्दाः। इति नव भेदाः†। इत्थं त्रैविध्ये सति सप्तविंशतिर्भवति। मृद्वादीनामपि प्रत्येकं मृदु-मध्याधिमात्रभेदात् त्रैविध्यं सम्भवति। तत् यथायोगं योज्यं। तद् यथा मृदुमृदुः मृदुमध्यो मृदुतीव्र इति। एषां फलमाह 'दुःखाज्ञानानन्तफलाः', इति। 'दुःखं' प्रतिकूलतयावभासमानो राजसश्चित्तधर्म्मः। 'अज्ञानं' मिथ्याज्ञानं संशयविपर्य्यासरूपं‡। ते दुःखाज्ञाने 'अनन्तं' अपरिच्छिन्नं, 'फलं', येषां ते तथोक्ताः। इत्थं तेषां स्वरूप-कारणादिभेदेन§ ज्ञातानां प्रतिपक्षभावनया योगिना परिहारः कर्त्तव्य इत्युपदिष्टं भवति॥ ३४॥

एषामभ्यासात् प्रकर्षं गच्छतामनु निष्पादिन्यः सिद्धयो यथा भवन्ति, तथा क्रमेण प्रतिपादयितुमाह।

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* समुद्भवादिति B, E पुस्तकपाठः।

† इत्येवं नव भेदा इति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ संशयविपर्य्ययरूपमिति G पुस्तकपाठः।

§ स्वरूपादिभेदेनेति H पुस्तकपाठः।

अहिंसाप्रतिष्ठायां* तत्सन्निधौ वैरत्यागः॥ ३५ ॥

'तस्याहिंसां भावयतः, 'सन्निधौ',† सहजविरोधिनामप्यहिनकुलादीनां 'वैरत्यागः' निर्मत्सरतयावस्थानं भवति। हिंसारता हिंस्रत्वं परित्यजन्तीत्यर्थः ॥ ३५॥

सत्याभ्यासवतः किं भवतीत्याह।

सत्यप्रतिष्ठायां क्रियाफलाश्रयत्वम्॥ ३६ ॥

क्रियमाणा हि 'क्रियाः' यागादिकाः, 'फलं' स्वर्गादिकं, प्रयच्छन्ति। तस्य तु सत्याभ्यासवतो योगिनः तथा सत्यं प्रकृष्यते, यथा अकृतायामपि क्रियायां योगी फलमाप्नोति‡। तद्वचनाद् यस्य कस्यचित् क्रियामकुर्व्वतोऽपि क्रियाफलं भवतीत्यर्थः॥ ३६ ॥

अस्तेयाभ्यासवतः फलमाह।

अस्तेयप्रतिष्ठायां सर्व्वरत्नोपस्थानम्॥ ३७ ॥

'अस्तेयं', यदाऽभ्यस्यति योगी तदा तस्य प्रकर्षात् निरभिलाषस्यापि 'सर्व्वतोदिग्भ्यः§ 'रत्नान्युपतिष्ठन्ते॥ ३७ ॥

ब्रह्मचर्य्याभ्यासस्यापि फलमाह।

ब्रह्मचर्य्यप्रतिष्ठायां वीर्य्यलाभः॥ ३८ ॥

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* सूत्रे, अहिंसाप्रतिष्ठायामितिपाठः G पुस्तके नास्ति।

† वृत्तौ, सन्निधावितिपाठः G पुस्तके नास्ति।

‡ फलमाश्रयतीति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः।

§ सर्व्वतो दिक्स्थानीति G पुस्तकपाठः।

यः किल 'ब्रह्मचर्य्यं', अभ्यस्यति, तस्य तत्प्रकर्षान्निरतिशयं 'वीर्य्यं' सामर्थ्यं आविर्भवति। वीर्य्यनिरोधो हि ब्रह्मचर्य्यं तस्य प्राकर्षाच्छरीरेन्द्रियमनःसु वीर्य्यं प्रकर्षमागच्छति ॥ ३८ ॥

अपरिग्रहाभ्यासस्य फलमाह।

अपरिग्रहस्थैर्य्ये जन्मकथन्तासम्बोधः ॥ ३९ ॥

कथमित्यस्य भावः 'कथन्ता'। जन्मनः कथन्ता 'जन्मकथन्ता'। तस्याः 'सम्बोधः' सम्यग्ज्ञानं। जन्मान्तरे कोऽहमासं कीदृशः किं कार्य्यकारीति जिज्ञासायां सर्व्वमेव सम्यग्जानातीत्यर्थः।

न केवलं भोगसाधनपरिग्रह एव परिग्रहः। किन्तु यावदात्मनः शरीरपरिग्रहोऽपि परिग्रहः भोगसाधनत्वाच्छरीरस्य। तस्मिन् सति रागानुबन्धात्* वहिर्मुखायामेव प्रवृत्तौ न तात्त्विकज्ञानप्रादुर्भावः। यदा पुनः शरीरादिपरिग्रहनैरपेक्ष्येण माध्यस्थ्यमवलम्बते तदा मध्यस्थस्य रागादित्यागात् सम्यग्ज्ञानहेतुर्भवत्येव पूर्व्वापरजन्मसम्बोधः ॥ ॥ ३९ ॥

उक्ता यमानां सिद्धयः। अथ नियमानाह।

शौचात् स्वाङ्गजुगुप्सा परैरसंसर्गः ॥ ४० ॥

यः 'शौचं भावयति, तस्य 'स्वाङ्गेष्वपि कारणस्वरूपपर्य्यालोचनद्वारेण 'जुगुप्सा' घृणा, समुपजायते। अशुचिरयं कायः नात्राग्रहः† कर्त्तव्य इत्यमुनैव हेतुना 'परैः' अन्यैश्च कायवद्भिः, 'असंसर्गः' सम्पर्का-

* रागानुसन्धादिति H पुस्तकपाठः।

† मास्य सङ्ग्रह इति E पुस्तकपाठः।

भावः* संसर्गपरिवर्जनमित्यर्थः। यः किल स्वमेव कायं जुगुप्सते तत्मद-वद्यदर्शनात् स कथं परकीयैस्तथाभूतैः कायैः संसर्गमनुभवति ॥ ४० ॥

शौचस्यैव फलान्तरमाह।

किञ्च† सत्त्वशुद्धि-सौमनस्यैकाग्रतेन्द्रियजयात्मदर्शन-योग्यत्वानि च ॥ ४१ ॥

भवन्तीति‡ वाक्यशेषः। 'सत्त्वं' प्रकाशसुखाद्यात्मकं§। तस्य 'शुद्धिः' रजस्तमोभ्यामनभिभवः। 'सौमनस्यं' खेदाननुभवेन मानसी प्रीतिः। 'एकाग्रता' नियतेन्द्रियविषये‖ चेतसः स्थैर्यं। 'इन्द्रिय-जयः' विषयपराङ्मुखानामिन्द्रियाणां स्वात्मन्यवस्थानं। 'आत्मदर्शने' विवेकख्यातिरूपे, चित्तस्य 'योग्यत्वं'। शौचाभ्यासवत एते सत्त्वशुद्ध्या-दयः क्रमेण प्रादुर्भवन्ति। तथा हि शौचात् सत्त्वशुद्धिः¶। सत्त्वशुद्धेः सौमनस्यं। सौमनस्यादेकाग्रता**। एकाग्रतायाः†† इन्द्रियजयः। इन्द्रियजयादात्मदर्शनयोग्यतेति ॥ ४१ ॥

सन्तोषाभ्यासस्य फलमाह।

सन्तोषादनुत्तमः सुखलाभः ॥ ४२ ॥

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* संसर्गाभाव इति H पुस्तकपाठः।

† किञ्चेतिपाठः सवस्वादर्शपुस्तकेषु नास्ति, परन्तु भाष्यकारेण धृतः।

‡ सम्भवन्तीतीति H पुस्तकपाठः।

§ प्रकाशसुखाद्यात्मकत्वमिति B, E, C पुस्तकपाठः।

‖ नियतविषये इति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः।

¶ शौचात् सत्त्वशुद्धिरितिपाठः A, B, C, D, E, H पुस्तकेषु नास्ति।

** सौमनस्यादैकाग्र्यमिति G पुस्तकपाठः।

†† ऐकाग्र्यादिति G पुस्तकपाठः।

'सन्तोषप्रकर्षेण'* योगिनस्तथाविधमान्तरं सुखमाविर्भवति यस्य बाह्यं विषयसुखं शतांशेनापि न समानं† भवति‡ ॥ ४२ ॥

तपसः फलमाह ।

कायेन्द्रियसिद्धिरशुद्धिक्षयात्तपसः ॥ ४३ ॥

'तपः समभ्यस्यमानं चेतसः क्लेशादिलक्षणाशुद्धिक्षयद्वारेण§ 'कायेन्द्रियाणां', 'सिद्धिं उत्कर्षं आदधाति|| ।

अयमर्थः । चान्द्रायणादिना चित्तक्लेशक्षयः । तत्क्षयादिन्द्रियाणां सूक्ष्म-व्यवहित-विप्रकृष्टदर्शनादिसामर्थ्यमाविर्भवति,कायस्य यथेच्छम-णुमहत्त्वादीनि ॥ ४३ ॥

स्वाध्यायस्य फलमाह ।

स्वाध्यायादिष्टदेवतासम्प्रयोगः ॥ ४४ ॥

अभिप्रेतमन्त्रजपादिलक्षणे 'स्वाध्याये प्रकृष्यमाणे, योगिनः 'इष्टया अभिप्रेतया, 'देवतया, 'सम्प्रयोगः', भवति । सा देवता प्रत्यक्षीभवतीत्यर्थः ॥ ४४ ॥

ईश्वरप्रणिधानस्य फलमाह ।

समाधिसिद्धिरीश्वरप्रणिधानात् ॥ ४५ ॥

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* सन्तोषप्रकर्षे इति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

† सममिति H, G पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ भवतीत्ययं पाठः G पुस्तके नास्ति ।

§ क्लेशादिलक्षणाशुद्धिक्षयद्वारेणेति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

|| आपादयतीति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

'ईश्वरे योऽयं भक्तिविशेषस्तस्मात् 'समाधेः' उक्तलक्षणस्य, आविर्भावो भवति। यस्मात् स भगवानीश्वरः प्रसन्नः सन्नन्तरायरूपान् क्लेशान् परिहृत्य* समाधिमुद्बोधयति ॥ ४५ ॥

यम-नियमानुक्ता आसनमाह ।

तत्र† स्थिरसुखमासनम् ॥ ४६ ॥

आस्यते अनेनेति 'आसनं' पद्मासन-दण्डासन-स्वस्तिकासनादि । तद् यदा 'स्थिरं' निष्कम्पं, 'सुखं' अनुद्वेजकं‡ भवति, तदा योगाङ्गतां भजते ॥ ४६ ॥

तस्यैव स्थिरसुखत्वापत्त्यर्थमुपायमाह ।

प्रयत्नशैथिल्यानन्त्यसमापत्तिभ्याम् ॥ ४७ ॥

तदासनं 'प्रयत्नशैथिल्येन', 'आनन्त्यसमापत्त्या', च स्थिरं सुखं भवतीति सम्बन्धः ।

यदा यदासनं बध्नामीति इच्छां करोति तदा प्रयत्नशैथिल्येऽप्यक्लेशेनैव तदासनं निष्पद्यते । यदा आकाशादिगते आनन्त्ये चेतसः समापत्तिः क्रियते अवधानेन तादात्म्यमापद्यते, तदा देहाहङ्काराभावान्नासनं दुःखजनकं भवति। अस्मिंश्चासनजये सति समाध्यन्तरायभूता न प्रभवन्त्यङ्गमेजयत्वादयः ॥ ४७ ॥

तस्यैवानुनिष्पादितस्य फलमाह ।

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* अपहृत्येति G पुस्तकपाठः ।

† तत्रेति शब्दः A, B, C, D, E, F, G पुस्तकेषु नास्ति । परन्तु भाष्यकारेण धृतः ।

‡ अनुद्वेजनीयमिति G पुस्तकपाठः ।

ततो द्वन्द्वानभिघातः ॥ ४८ ॥

तस्मिन्नासनजये सति 'द्वन्द्वैः' शीतोष्ण-क्षुत्तृष्णादिभिः, योगी नाभिहन्यत इत्यर्थः ॥ ४८ ॥

आसनजयानन्तरं* प्राणायाममाह।

तस्मिन् सति श्वास-प्रश्वासयोर्गतिविच्छेदः प्राणायामः ॥ ४९ ॥

आसनस्थैर्य्ये 'सति', तन्निमित्तकः प्राणायामलक्षणो योगाङ्गविशेषः अनुष्ठेयो भवति। कीदृशः 'श्वासप्रश्वासयोर्गतिविच्छेदलक्षणः'। श्वास-प्रश्वासौ उक्तलक्षणौ। तयोर्द्वेधा रेचक-पूरकद्वारेण† वाह्याभ्यन्तरेषु स्थानेषु 'गतेः' प्रवाहस्य, 'विच्छेदः' धारणं, 'प्राणायामः', उच्यते ॥ ४९ ॥

तस्यैव सुखावगमाय विभज्य स्वरूपं कथयति‡।

स तु वाह्याभ्यन्तरस्तम्भवृत्तिर्देशकालसङ्ख्याभिः परिदृष्टो दीर्घसूक्ष्मः ॥ ५० ॥

'वाह्यवृत्तिः श्वासो रेचकः। अन्तरवृत्तिः प्रश्वासः पूरकः। अन्तस्तम्भवृत्तिः कुम्भकः। तस्मिन् जलमिव कुम्भे निश्चलतया प्राणाः अवस्थाप्यन्ते§ इति कुम्भकः।

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* आसनजयादनन्तरमिति G पुस्तकपाठः।

† तयोस्त्रिधा रेचक-पूरककुम्भकद्वारेणेति A, D, F, G पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ दर्शयतीति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः।

§ प्राणोऽवस्थाप्यत इति C पुस्तकपाठः।

त्रिविधोऽयं प्राणायामः 'देशेन, 'कालेन, 'सङ्ख्यया चोपलक्षितः 'दीर्घसूक्ष्मसंज्ञको भवति। देशेनोपलक्षितो यथा नासाद्वादशान्तादौ नासामारभ्य द्वादशाङ्गुलिपर्य्यन्तमित्यर्थः। कालेनोपलक्षितो यथा षट्-त्रिंशन्मात्रादिप्रमाणः*। सङ्ख्यया उपलक्षितो यथा इयतो वारान् कृतः†। एतावद्भिः श्वासप्रश्वासैः प्रथम उद्घातः‡भवति। एतज्ज्ञानाय सङ्ख्याग्रहण-मुपात्तं। उद्घातो नाभिमूलात् प्रेरितस्य वायोः शिरस्यभिहननं॥५०॥

त्रीन् प्राणायामानभिधाय चतुर्थमभिधातुमाह।

वाह्याभ्यन्तरविषयाक्षेपी चतुर्थः॥५१॥

प्राणस्य 'वाह्यो विषयः' नासाद्वादशान्तादिः। 'आभ्यन्तरो विषयः' हृदयनाभिचक्रादिः। तौ द्वौ विषयौ 'आक्षिप्य' पर्य्यालोच्य यः स्तम्भ-रूपो गतिविच्छेदः स 'चतुर्थः', प्राणायामः। तृतीयस्मात् कुम्भ-काख्यादयमस्य विशेषः। स वाह्याभ्यन्तरविषयावपर्य्यालोच्य सहसा तप्तोपलनिपतितजलन्यायेन युगपत् स्तम्भवृत्त्या निष्पद्यते। अस्य तु विषयद्वयाक्षेपको निरोधः। अयमपि पूर्व्ववत् देश-काल-सङ्ख्याभि-रुपलक्षितो द्रष्टव्यः॥ ५१॥

चतुर्विधस्यास्य फलमाह।

ततः क्षीयते प्रकाशावरणम्॥५२॥

'ततः' तस्मात् प्राणायामात्, 'प्रकाशस्य' चित्तसत्त्वगतस्य, यत् 'आवरणं' क्लेशरूपं, तत् 'क्षीयते' विनश्यतीत्यर्थः॥ ५२॥

फलान्तरमाह।

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* षड्विंशतिमात्रादिप्रमाण इति B पुस्तकपाठः।

† एतान् वारान् कृत इति B पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ G पुस्तके सर्व्वत्र उद्घात इत्यत्र उद्धात इति पाठः।

धारणासु च योग्यता मनसः ॥ ५३ ॥

'धारणाः' वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणाः* । तासु प्राणायामैः क्षीणदोषं† मनो यत्र यत्र धार्य्यते, तत्र तत्र स्थिरं भवति‡ न विक्षेपं भजते ॥ ५३ ॥

प्रत्याहारस्य लक्षणमाह ।

स्वस्वविषयसम्प्रयोगाभावे§ चित्तस्य स्वरूपानुकार इवेन्द्रियाणां प्रत्याहारः ॥ ५४ ॥

इन्द्रियाणि स्वस्वविषयेभ्यः प्रत्याह्रियन्ते प्रतिकूलतया आह्रियन्तेऽस्मिन् इति 'प्रत्याहारः' । स च कथं निष्पद्यत इत्याह । चक्षुरादीनां इन्द्रियाणां स्वः स्वो विषयः रूपादिः । तेन 'सम्प्रयोगः' तदाभिमुख्येन प्रवर्त्तनं । तदभावस्तदाभिमुख्यं परित्यज्य स्वरूपमात्रेऽवस्थानं । तस्मिन् सति चित्तस्वरूपमात्रानुकारीणीन्द्रियाणि भवन्ति, यतश्चित्तमनुवर्त्तमानानि मधुकरराजमिव मधुमक्षिकाः॥, सर्व्वाणीन्द्रियाणि प्रतीयन्ते । अतश्चित्तनिरोधे तानि प्रत्याहृतानि भवन्ति ॥ ५४ ॥

तेषां तत्स्वरूपानुकारः प्रत्याहार उक्तः । फलमाह ।

ततः परमा वश्यतेन्द्रियाणाम् ॥ ५५ ॥

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* वक्ष्यमाणा इति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

† क्षीणक्षोभमिति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ स्थिरीभवतीति B, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ स्वविषयासम्प्रयोगे इति B, E पुस्तकपाठः । स्वस्वविषयासम्प्रयोगे इति B पुस्तकपाठः ।

|| मधुकरराजमिव मक्षिका इति B, E पुस्तकपाठः । मधुकरराजमिव मधुकरमक्षिका इति G पुस्तकपाठः

अभ्यस्यमाने हि प्रत्याहारे तथा 'वश्यान्यायत्तानि 'इन्द्रियाणि सम्प-द्यन्ते, यथा वाह्यविषयाभिमुखतां नीयमानान्यपि न यान्तीत्यर्थः॥ ५५॥

तदेवं प्रथमपादोक्तलक्षणस्य योगस्याङ्गभूतं क्लेशतनूकरणफलं क्रि-यायोगमभिधाय क्लेशानामुद्देशं कारणं क्षेत्रं स्वरूपं फलञ्चोक्त्वा कर्मणा-मपि भेदं कारणं स्वरूपं फलञ्चाभिधाय विपाकस्य स्वरूपं कारणञ्चा-भिहितं। ततस्त्याज्यत्वात् क्लेशादीनां, ज्ञानव्यतिरेकेन त्यागस्याशक्यत्वात्, ज्ञानस्य च शास्त्रायत्तत्वात्, शास्त्रस्य च हेयाहेयकारणोपादेयोपा-दानकारणत्वेन चतुर्व्यूहत्वात्, हेयस्य च हानव्यतिरेकेण स्वरूपानि-ष्पत्तेर्हानसहितं चतुर्व्यूहं स्वस्वकारणसहितमभिधायोपादानकारण-भूताया विवेकख्यातेः कारणभूतानामन्तरङ्गवहिरङ्गभावेन स्थितानां योगाङ्गानां* यमादीनां स्वरूपं फलसहितं व्याहृत्य धारणापर्य्य-न्तानां चासनादीनां परस्परमुपकार्य्योपकारकभावेनावस्थितानां उद्दे-शमभिधाय परस्परलक्षणकारणपूर्व्वकं† फलमभिहितं।

तदयं योगी यमनियमादिभिः प्राप्तवीजभावः। आसनप्राणा-यामैरङ्कुरितः। प्रत्याहारेण पुष्पितः‡। ध्यानधारणासमाधिभिः§ फलिष्यतीति व्याख्यातः साधनपादः।

इति महाराजाधिराजश्रीभोजदेवविरचितायां राजमार्त्तण्डाभि-धायां पातञ्जलयोगशास्त्रसूत्रवृत्तौ द्वितीयः साधनपादः॥२॥

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* योगानामिति G पुस्तकपाठः।

† प्रत्येकलक्षणकारणपूर्व्वमिति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः। परस्परलक्षण-पूर्व्वकमिति G पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ कुसुमित इति G पुस्तकपाठः।

§ चित्तधारणासमाधिभिरिति H पुस्तकपाठः।

अथ तृतीयः पादः ।

यत्पादपद्मस्मरणादणिमादिविभूतयः ।
भवन्ति भाविनामस्तु भूतनाथः स भूतये ॥

तदेवं पूर्व्वोद्दिष्टं धारणाद्यङ्गत्रयं निर्णेतुं संयमसंज्ञाभिधानपूर्व्वकं बाह्याभ्यन्तरादिसिद्धिप्रतिपादनाय लक्षयितुमुपक्रमते ।

तत्र धारणायाः स्वरूपमाह ।

देशबन्धश्चित्तस्य धारणा* ॥ १ ॥

'देशे' नाभिचक्रनासाग्रादौ । चित्तस्य 'बन्धः' विषयान्तरपरिहारेण यत् चित्तस्य स्थिरीकरणं । सा 'चित्तस्य धारणा', उच्यते ।

अयमर्थः । मैत्र्यादिचित्तपरिकर्म्मवासितान्तःकरणेन यमनियमवता जितासनेन परिहृतप्राणविक्षेपेण प्रत्याहृतेन्द्रियग्रामेण निर्व्वाधे प्रदेशे ऋजुकायेन जितद्वन्द्वेन योगिना नासाग्रादौ सम्प्रज्ञातस्य समाधेरभ्यासाय चेतसः स्थिरीकरणं कर्त्तव्यमिति ॥ १ ॥

धारणामभिधाय ध्यानमभिधातुमाह ।

तत्र प्रत्ययैकतानता ध्यानं ॥ २ ॥

'तत्र' तस्मिन् देशे† यत्र चित्तं धृतं तत्र । 'प्रत्ययस्य' ज्ञानस्य ।

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* चित्तधारणेति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

† तस्मिन्नर्थे इति B, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

या 'एकतानता' विसदृशपरिणामपरिहारद्वारेण यदेव धारणाया-मालम्बनीकृतं तदालम्बनतयैव निरन्तरमुत्पत्तिः, सा 'ध्यानं', उच्यते ॥
॥ २ ॥

चरमं योगाङ्गं समाधिमाह।

तदेवार्थमात्रनिर्भासं स्वरूपशून्यमिव समाधिः ॥
॥ ३ ॥

'तदेव' उक्तलक्षणं ध्यानं। यत्र 'अर्थमात्रनिर्भासं' अर्थाकारसमावेशादुद्भूतार्थरूपं, न्यग्भूतज्ञानरूपत्वेन 'स्वरूपशून्यमिव',* आपद्यते, स 'समाधिः', इत्युच्यते। सम्यगाधीयते एकाग्रीक्रियते विक्षेपान् परिहृत्य यत्र मनः स 'समाधिः' ॥ ३ ॥

उक्तलक्षणस्य योगाङ्गत्रयस्य व्यवहाराय स्वशास्त्रे तान्त्रिकीं संज्ञां कर्त्तुमाह।

त्रयमेकत्र संयमः ॥ ४ ॥

एकस्मिन् विषये ध्यान-धारणा-समाधित्रयं चितयं प्रवर्त्तमानं 'संयमसंज्ञया† शास्त्रे व्यवह्रियते ॥ ४ ॥

तस्य फलमाह।

तज्जयात् प्रज्ञालोकः ॥ ५ ॥

'तस्य संयमस्य। 'जयात्' अभ्यासेन सात्म्योत्पादनात्‡। 'प्रज्ञायाः'

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* स्वरूपशून्यतामिवेति H पुस्तकपाठः।

† संयमसंज्ञ इति B, E पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ सात्मोत्पादनादिति H पुस्तकपाठः।

ज्ञातव्यविवेकस्वरूपायाः । 'आलोकः' प्रसरो भवति* । प्रज्ञा ज्ञेयं सम्यगवभासयतीत्यर्थः ॥ ५ ॥

तस्योपयोगमाह ।

तस्य भूमिषु विनियोगः ॥ ६ ॥

'तस्य' संयमस्य, 'भूमिषु' स्थूलसूक्ष्मालम्बनभेदेन स्थितासु† चित्तवृत्तिषु, 'विनियोगः', कर्त्तव्यः । अधरामधरां चित्तभूमिं जितां जितां ज्ञात्वोत्तरस्यां भूमौ संयमः कार्य्यः । न ह्ययमनात्मी-कृताधरभूमिः उत्तरस्यां भूमौ संयमं कुर्व्वाणः फलभाग् भवति ॥ ६ ॥

साधनपादे योगाङ्गान्यष्टावुद्दिश्य पञ्चानां लक्षणं विधाय त्रयाणां कथं न कृतमित्याशङ्क्याह ।

त्रयमन्तरङ्गं पूर्व्वेभ्यः ॥ ७ ॥

'पूर्व्वेभ्यः' यमादिभ्यो योगाङ्गेभ्यः पारम्पर्य्येण समाधेरुपकार-केभ्यः । धारणादियोगाङ्गत्रयं सम्प्रज्ञातस्य समाधेः 'अन्तरङ्गं', समा-धिस्वरूपनिष्पादनात् ॥ ७ ॥

तस्यापि समाध्यन्तरापेक्षया वहिरङ्गत्वमाह ।

तदपि वहिरङ्गं निर्व्वीजस्य ॥ ८ ॥

'निर्व्वीजस्य' निरालम्बनस्य शून्यभावनापरपर्य्यायस्य समाधेः । एतदपि योगाङ्गत्रयं, 'वहिरङ्गं', पारम्पर्य्येणोपकारकत्वात् ॥ ८ ॥

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* प्रसादो भवतीति D पुस्तकपाठः ।

† अवस्थितास्विति E पुस्तकपाठः ।

इदानीं योगाङ्गसिद्धीराख्यातुकामः* संयमस्य विषयपरिशुद्धिं कर्तुं क्रमेण परिणामत्रयमाह।

व्युत्थान-निरोधसंस्कारयोरभिभव-प्रादुर्भावौ नि-रोधक्षणचित्तान्वयो निरोधपरिणामः॥ ९॥

'व्युत्थानं' क्षिप्त-मूढ-विक्षिप्ताख्यं भूमित्रयं। 'निरोधः' प्रकृष्ट-सत्त्वस्याङ्गितया चेतसः परिणामः। ताभ्यां व्युत्थान-निरोधाभ्यां यौ जनितौ 'संस्कारौ तयोर्यथाक्रमं 'अभिभव—प्रादुर्भावौ', यदा भवतः। 'अभिभवः' न्यग्भूततया कार्य्यकरणासामर्थ्येनावस्थानं। 'प्रादुर्भावः' वर्त्तमानेऽध्वनि अभिव्यक्तरूपतयावस्थानं। तदा 'निरोधक्षणे', 'चित्तस्योभयवृत्तित्वात् 'अन्वयः', यः सः 'निरोधपरिणामः', इत्युच्यते।

अयमर्थः। यदा व्युत्थानसंस्काररूपो धर्म्मः तिरोभूतो भवति, निरोधसंस्काररूपश्चाविर्भवति, धर्म्मिरूपतया च चित्तमुभयत्रान्वयित्वेनावस्थितं प्रतीयते, तदा स निरोधपरिणामशब्देन व्यवह्रियते। यद्यपि चलत्वाद्गुणवृत्तस्य चेतसो निश्चलत्वं नास्ति, तथाप्येवम्भूतपरिणामः स्थैर्य्यमुच्यते॥ ९॥

अस्यैव फलमाह।

तस्य प्रशान्तवाहिता संस्कारात्॥ १०॥

'तस्य' चेतसः, उक्तान्निरोधसंस्कारात्', 'प्रशान्तवाहिता', भवति। परिहृतविक्षेपतया सदृशप्रवाहपरिणामि चित्तं भवतीत्यर्थः॥ १०॥

निरोधपरिणाममभिधाय समाधिपरिणाममाह।

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* सिद्धीराख्यातुकाम इति D पुस्तकपाठः

सर्व्वार्थतैकाग्रतयोः क्षयोदयौ चित्तस्य समाधिपरिणामः ॥ ११ ॥

'सर्व्वार्थता' चलत्वान्नानाविधाऽर्थग्रहणं, चित्तस्य विक्षेपो धर्म्मः । एकस्मिन्नेवावलम्बने सदृशपरिणामिता 'एकाग्रता',* सापि† चित्तस्य धर्म्मः । तयोर्यथाक्रमं 'क्षयोदयौ' । 'सर्व्वार्थतालक्षणस्य धर्म्मस्य 'क्षयः' अत्यन्तमभिभवः । 'एकाग्रतालक्षणस्य धर्म्मस्य प्रादुर्भावोऽभिव्यक्तिः । 'चित्तस्य' उद्रिक्तसत्त्वस्य, अन्वयितयाऽवस्थानं 'समाधिपरिणामः', इत्युच्यते ।

पूर्व्वस्मात् परिणामादयं विशेषः । तत्र संस्कारलक्षणयोर्धर्म्मयोरभिभव—प्रादुर्भावौ । पूर्व्वस्य व्युत्थानसंस्काररूपस्य धर्म्मस्य‡ न्यग्भावः । उत्तरस्य निरोधसंस्काररूपस्योद्भवोऽनभिभूतत्वेनावस्थानं । इह तु क्षयोदयाविति । सर्व्वार्थतारूपविक्षेपस्यात्यन्ततिरस्कारादनुत्पत्तिरतीताध्वनि प्रवेशः क्षयः । एकाग्रतालक्षणस्य धर्म्मस्योद्भवो वर्त्तमानेऽध्वनि प्रकटत्वं ॥ ११ ॥

तृतीयमेकाग्रतापरिणाममाह ।

शान्तोदितौ तुल्यप्रत्ययौ चित्तस्यैकाग्रतापरिणामः ॥ ॥ १२ ॥

समाहितस्यैव 'चित्तस्य', एकप्रत्ययो वृत्तिविशेषः । 'शान्तः'

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* एकाग्रत्वमिति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

† तदपीति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ व्युत्थानसंस्कारस्येति H, C पुस्तकपाठः ।

अतीतमध्वानं प्रविष्टः। अपरस्तु उदितः' वर्त्तमानेऽध्वनि स्फुरितः। द्वावपि समाहितचित्तत्वेन 'तुल्यौ' एकरूपालम्बनत्वेन सदृशौ, 'प्रत्ययौ'। उभयत्रापि समाहितस्यैव चित्तस्यान्वयित्वेनावस्थानं यत् सः 'एकाग्रतापरिणामः', इत्युच्यते॥ १२॥

चित्तपरिणामोक्तरूपमन्यत्रातिदिशन्नाह।

एतेन भूतेन्द्रियेषु धर्म्म-लक्षणावस्थापरिणामा व्याख्याताः* ॥ १३ ॥

'एतेन' त्रिविधोक्तेन चित्तपरिणामेन। 'भूतेषु' स्थूल-सूक्ष्मेषु। 'इन्द्रियेषु' बुद्धिकर्म्मान्तःकरणभेदेनावस्थितेषु† । 'धर्म्म-लक्षणावस्था-भेदेन त्रिविधः परिणामो व्याख्यातोऽवगन्तव्यः।

अवस्थितस्य धर्म्मिणः पूर्व्वधर्म्मनिवृत्तौ धर्म्मान्तरापत्तिर्धर्म्मपरि-णामः‡, यथा मृल्लक्षणस्य धर्म्मिणः पिण्डरूपधर्म्मपरित्यागेन घटरूप-धर्म्मान्तरस्वीकारः§, 'धर्म्मपरिणामः' इत्युच्यते। 'लक्षणपरिणामः,' यथा तस्यैव घटस्यानागताध्वपरित्यागेन वर्त्तमानाध्वस्वीकारः, तत्परित्यागेन चातीताध्वपरिग्रहः। 'अवस्थापरिणामः', यथा तस्यैव घटस्य प्रथमद्वितीययोः सदृशयोर्धर्म्मलक्षणयोरन्वयित्वेन। यतश्चलं गुणवृत्तं नापरिणममानं क्षणमप्यास्ते ॥ १३ ॥

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* धर्म्मलक्षणावस्थापरिणामो व्याख्यात इति C पुस्तकपाठः।

† बुद्धिकर्म्मभेदेनावस्थितेष्विति E पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ परिणाम इति H पुस्तकपाठः।

§ घटरूपधर्म्मान्तराङ्गीकार इति C पुस्तकपाठः।

ननु कोऽयं धर्म्मीत्याशङ्क्य धर्म्मिणो लक्षणमाह।

तत्र* शान्तोदिताव्यपदेश्यधर्म्मानुपाती धर्म्मी† ॥१४॥

'शान्ताः' ये कृतस्वस्वव्यापारा अतीतेऽध्वन्यनुप्रविष्टाः। 'उदिताः' ये अनागतमध्वानं परित्यज्य वर्त्तमानेऽध्वनि स्वस्वव्यापारं कुर्व्वन्ति। 'अव्यपदेश्याः' ये शक्तिरूपेण स्थिता व्यपदेष्टुं न शक्यन्ते। यथा सर्व्वं सर्व्वात्मकमित्येवमादयः‡। नियतकार्य्यकारणरूपतया योग्यतयाऽवच्छिन्ना शक्तिरेवेह धर्म्मशब्देनाभिधीयते। तं त्रिविधमपि धर्म्मं योऽनुपतत्यनुवर्त्तते अन्वयित्वेन स्वीकरोति, सः 'शान्तोदिताव्यपदेश्यधर्म्मानुपाती धर्म्मी', इत्युच्यते, यथा सुवर्णं रुचकरूपधर्म्मपरित्यागेन§ स्वस्तिकधर्म्मान्तरपरिग्रहे सुवर्णरूपतयाऽनुवर्त्तमानं। तेषु धर्म्मेषु कथञ्चिद्भिन्नेषु धर्म्मिरूपतया सामान्यात्मना धर्म्मरूपतया विशेषात्मनाऽवस्थितमनुपातित्वेनावभासते ॥ १४ ॥

एकस्य धर्म्मिणः कथमनेके परिणामा इत्याशङ्कामपनेतुमाह।

क्रमान्यत्वं परिणामान्यत्वे हेतुः ॥ १५ ॥

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* तत्रेतिपदं अस्मल्लब्धषड़ादर्शपुस्तकेषु नास्ति। परन्तु भाष्यकारेण सूत्रान्तर्गतत्वेन परिगृहीतत्वात् अस्माभिरपि तथैव व्यवस्थापितं।

† "योग्यतावच्छिन्ना धर्म्मिणः शक्तिरेव धर्म्मः" इत्ययं भाष्यपाठः काश्यां मुद्रितयोगभाष्यपुस्तके सूत्रान्तर्गत एव मुद्रितः। परन्त्वयं न समीचीनः वार्त्तिककारेण उक्तपाठस्य भाष्यमध्ये परिगणितत्वात्।

‡ तेषां यथा स्वं सर्व्वात्मकमित्येवमादय इति H पुस्तकपाठः। तेषां यथा सर्व्वं सर्व्वात्मकमित्येवमादय इति C पुस्तकपाठः।

§ मुद्रिकारूपधर्म्मपरित्यागेनेति C पुस्तकपाठः।

धर्म्माणामुक्तलक्षणानां यः 'क्रमः,' तस्य यत् प्रतिक्षणं 'अन्यत्वं', परिदृश्यमानं, 'परिणामस्य' उक्तलक्षणस्य, 'अन्यत्वे' नानाविधत्वे, 'हेतुः' लिङ्गं ज्ञापकं भवति। अयमर्थः। योऽयं नियतक्रमः, मृच्चूर्णात् मृत्पिण्डस्ततः कपालानि तैश्च घट इत्येवं रूपः परिदृश्यमानः परिणामस्यान्यत्वमावेदयति। तस्मिन् एव धर्म्मिणि यो लक्षणपरिणामस्यावस्थापरिणामस्य च क्रमः सोऽप्यनेनैव न्यायेन परिणामान्यत्वे गमकोऽवगन्तव्यः। सर्व्व एव च* भावा नियतेनैव क्रमेण प्रतिक्षणं परिणममानाः परिदृश्यन्ते अतः सिद्धं क्रमान्यत्वात् परिणामान्यत्वं†। चित्तादीनां सर्व्वेषां‡ परिणममानानां केचित् धर्म्माः प्रत्यक्षेणैवोपलभ्यन्ते, यथा सुखादयः संस्थानादयश्च। केचिदेकान्तेनानुमानगम्याः, यथा धर्म्म-संस्कार-शक्तिप्रभृतयः§। धर्म्मिणश्चाभिन्नरूपतया|| सर्व्वत्रानुगमः॥ १५॥

इदानीमुक्तस्य संयमस्य विषयप्रदर्शनद्वारेण सिद्धीः प्रतिपादयितुमाह¶।

परिणामत्रयसंयमादतीतानागतज्ञानं॥ १६॥

धर्म्म-लक्षणावस्थाभेदेन यत् 'परिणामत्रयं उक्तं। तत्र 'संयमात्'

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* पूर्व्व एव चेति H पुस्तकपाठः।

† अतः सिद्धं क्रमान्यत्वं क्रमान्यत्वात् परिणामान्यत्वमिति H पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ विषयादीनामिति H पुस्तकपाठः।

§ कर्म्म-संस्कार-शक्तिप्रभृतय इति B, E पुस्तकद्वयपाठः।

|| धर्म्मिणश्च भिन्नाभिन्नरूपतयेति H पुस्तकपाठः।

¶ प्रदर्शयितुमाहेति B, C, E पुस्तकेषु पाठः।

तस्मिन् विषये पूर्व्वोक्तस्य संयमस्य करणात्, 'अतीतानागतज्ञानं', योगिनः सम्यगाविर्भवति। इदमत्र तात्पर्य्यं। अस्मिन् धर्म्मिणि अयं धर्म्मः, इदं लक्षणं, इयमवस्था चानागतादध्वनः समेत्य वर्त्तमाने ऽध्वनि स्वं व्यापारं विधायातीतमध्वानं प्रविशतीत्येवं परिहृतविक्षेपतया यदा संयमं करोति, तदा यत् किञ्चिदतिक्रान्तमनुत्पन्नं वा तत्सर्व्वं योगी जानाति। यतश्चित्तस्य शुद्धसत्त्वप्रकाशरूपत्वात् सर्व्वार्थग्रहणसामर्थ्यमविद्यादिभिर्व्विक्षेपैरजस्रं परिछ्रियते। यदा तु तैस्तैरुपायैर्व्विक्षेपाः परिछ्रियन्ते, तदा निवृत्तमलस्येवादर्शस्य सर्व्वार्थग्रहणसामर्थ्यमेकाग्रतावशादाविर्भवति ॥ १६ ॥

सिद्ध्यन्तरमाह।

शब्दार्थ-प्रत्ययानामितरेतराध्यासात् सङ्करस्तत्प्रविभागसंयमात् सर्व्वभूतरुतज्ञानं ॥ १७ ॥

'शब्दः' श्रोत्रेन्द्रियग्राह्यो नियतक्रमवर्णात्मा नियतैकार्थप्रतिपत्त्यवच्छिन्नः। यदि वा क्रमरहितः स्फोटात्मा ध्वनिः शास्त्रसंस्कृतबुद्धिग्राह्यः, उभयथापि पदरूपो वाक्यरूपश्च। तयोरेकार्थप्रतिपत्तौ सामर्थ्यात्। 'अर्थः' जाति-गुण-क्रियादिः। 'प्रत्ययः' ज्ञानं विषयाकारा बुद्धिवृत्तिः। एषां शब्दार्थज्ञानानां व्यवहारे 'इतरेतराध्यासात्' भिन्नानामपि बुद्ध्येकरूपतासम्पादनात् सङ्कीर्णत्वं। तथाहि गामानयेत्युक्तः कश्चिद्गोलक्षणमर्थं गोत्वजात्यवच्छिन्नं सास्नादिमत्पिण्डरूपं, शब्दं तद्वाचकं, ज्ञानञ्च तद्ग्राहकमभेदेनैवाध्यवस्यति। न त्वस्य गोशब्दो वाचकः, अयं गोशब्दस्य वाच्यः, तयोरिदं ग्राहकं ज्ञानमिति भेदेन व्यवहरति।

यथा हि कोऽयमर्थः, कोऽयं शब्दः, किमिदं ज्ञानमिति पृष्टः सर्व्वैकरूपमेवोत्तरं* ददाति† गौरिति। स यद्येकरूपतां न प्रतिपद्यते कथमेकरूपमुत्तरं प्रयच्छति। एतस्मिन्नवस्थिते‡ योऽयं 'प्रविभागः', इदं शब्दस्य तत्त्वं यद्वाचकत्वं नाम। इदमर्थस्य यद्वाच्यत्वं। इदं ज्ञानस्य यत् प्रकाशत्वं। इति प्रविभागं विधाय तस्मिन् प्रविभागे यः 'संयमङ्करोति, तस्य 'सर्व्वेषां भूतानां मृग-पशु-पक्षि-सरीसृपादीनां यत् 'रुतं' यः शब्दः। तत्र 'ज्ञानं', उत्पद्यते। अनेनाभिप्रायेणैतेन प्राणिनाऽयं शब्दः समुच्चारित इति सर्व्वं जानाति॥ १७॥

सिद्ध्यन्तरमाह।

संस्कारसाक्षात्करणात् पूर्व्वजातिज्ञानं॥ १८॥

द्विविधाश्चित्तस्य§ वासनारूपाः 'संस्काराः। केचित् स्मृतिमात्रोत्पादनफलाः। केचिज्जात्यायुर्भोगलक्षणविपाकहेतवः यथा धर्म्माधर्म्माख्याः। तेषु संस्कारेषु यदा संयमं करोति, एवं मया सोऽर्थोऽनुभूतः, एवं मया सा क्रिया निष्पादितेति पूर्व्ववृत्तं सर्व्वमनुसन्दधानो भावनयैव प्रबोधकमन्तरेण उद्बुद्धसंस्कारः सर्व्वमतीतं स्मरति। क्रमेण साक्षात्कृतेषूद्बुद्धेषु संस्कारेषु|| 'पूर्व्वजन्मानुभूतानपि जात्यादीन् प्रत्यक्षेण पश्यति॥ १८॥

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* सर्व्वत्रैकमेवोत्तरमिति E पुस्तकपाठः।

† वदतीति H पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ एतस्मिन् स्थिते इति H पुस्तकपाठः।

§ द्विविधास्तस्येति E पुस्तकपाठः।

|| साक्षात्कृतेषु संस्कारेष्विति B, C, E पुस्तकेषु पाठः।

सिद्ध्यन्तरमाह ।

प्रत्ययस्य* परचित्तज्ञानं† ॥ १९ ॥

'प्रत्ययस्य' परचित्तस्य‡ केनचिन्मुखरागादिना लिङ्गेन गृहीतस्य । यदा संयमं करोति तदा 'परकीयस्य चित्तस्य 'ज्ञानं', उत्पद्यते । सरागमस्य चित्तं वीतरागं वेति परचित्तगतानपि सर्व्वानेव धर्म्मान् जानातीत्यर्थः ॥ १९ ॥

अस्यैव परचित्तज्ञानस्य विशेषमाह ।

न तत् सालम्बनं तस्याविषयीभूतत्वात्§ ॥ २० ॥

'तस्य' परस्य, यच्चित्तं 'तत्', 'सालम्बनं' स्वकीयालम्बनेन सहितं, 'न', शक्यते ज्ञातुं । आलम्बनस्य केनचिल्लिङ्गेनाविषयीकृतत्वात् । लिङ्गाच्चित्तमात्रं परस्यावगतं, न तु नीलविषयमस्य चित्तं, पीतविषयमिति वा । यच्च न गृहीतं तत्र संयमस्य कर्त्तुमशक्यत्वात् । न भवति परचित्तस्य यो विषयस्तत्र ज्ञानं । तस्मात् परकीयचित्तं नालम्बनसहितं गृह्यते । तस्यालम्बनस्यागृहीतत्वात् । चित्तधर्म्माः पुनर्गृह्यन्ते एव । यदा तु किमनेनालम्बितमिति प्रणिधानं करोति तदा तत्संयमात् तद्विषयमपि ज्ञानं उत्पद्यते एव ॥ २० ॥

सिद्ध्यन्तरमाह ।

कायरूपसंयमात्तद्ग्राह्यशक्तिस्तम्भे चक्षुःप्रकाशासंयोगेऽन्तर्द्धानं ॥ २१ ॥

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* प्रथमस्येति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

† एतत्सूत्रं काश्याम्मुद्रितयोगभाष्यपुस्तके नास्ति ।

‡ प्रथमं यस्य परचित्तस्येति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ प्रत्ययस्येत्यादिसूत्रं, न तत्सालम्बनमित्यादिसूत्रञ्च काश्याम्मुद्रितयोगभाष्यपुस्तके नास्ति ।

'कायः' शरीरं । तस्य 'रूपं' चक्षुर्ग्राह्यो गुणः । तस्मिन् काये इदं रूपमिति* 'संयमात्', तस्य रूपस्य चक्षुर्ग्राह्यत्वरूपा या 'शक्तिः', तस्याः 'स्तम्भे' भावनावशात् प्रतिबन्धे । 'चक्षुःप्रकाशासंयोगे', 'चक्षुषः,' 'प्रकाशः' सत्त्वधर्म्मः, तस्य 'असंयोगे' तद्ग्रहणस्य व्यापाराभावे । योगिनः 'अन्तर्द्धानं', भवति । न केनचिदसौ दृश्यत इत्यर्थः । एतेन शब्दाद्यन्तर्द्धानमुक्तं वेदितव्यं† । एतेन रूपाद्यन्तर्द्धानोपायप्रदर्शनेनैव शब्दादीनां श्रोत्रादिग्राह्याणामन्तर्द्धानं उक्तं भवति ॥ ॥ २१ ॥

सिद्ध्यन्तरमाह ।

सोपक्रमं निरुपक्रमञ्च कर्म्म तत्संयमादपरान्तज्ञानमरिष्टेभ्यो वा ॥ २२ ॥

आयुर्व्विपाकं यत् पूर्व्वकृतं 'कर्म्म', तद्द्विप्रकारं, 'सोपक्रमं' 'निरुपक्रमञ्च' । तत्र 'सोपक्रमं' यत् फलजननाय सहोपक्रमेण कार्य्यकारणाभिमुख्येन वर्त्तते । यथा उष्णप्रदेशे प्रसारितार्द्रवासः शीघ्रमेव शुष्यति । उक्तविपरीतं 'निरुपक्रमं' । यथा तदेवार्द्रवासः संवर्त्तित-

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* तस्मिन्नास्त्यस्मिन् काये रूपमितीति F चिह्नितपुस्तकपाठः । तस्मिन्नस्त्यस्मिन् काये रूपमितीति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

† H चिह्नितपुस्तके 'एतेन शब्दाद्यन्तर्धानमुक्तं' इत्ययं पाठः सूत्राकारेण व्यवस्थापितः । परन्त्वयं न समीचीनः, उक्तपाठस्य काश्याम्मुद्रितयोगभाष्यपुस्तके भाष्यान्तर्गतत्वात् । तत्र वाचस्पतिमिश्रेण 'एतेनेति' इति भाष्यपाठं विवृत्य कायशब्दस्पर्शरसगन्धसंयमात् तद्ग्राह्यशक्तिस्तम्भे श्रोत्रत्वग्रसनघ्राणप्रकाशासंयोगे तदन्तर्धानमिति सूत्रमूहनीयं इति भाष्याभिप्रायस्य व्यञ्जितत्वात् । अस्मल्लब्धषट्सु पुस्तकेषु वृत्त्यन्तर्गतत्वाच्च ।

मनुष्यदेशे चिरेण भोक्ष्यते इति । अस्मिन् द्विविधे कर्मणि यः 'संयमं करोति, किं मम कर्म शीघ्रविपाकं किं चिरविपाकमित्येवं ध्यानदा-र्ढ्यात् 'अपरान्तज्ञानं', अस्योत्पद्यते। 'अपरान्तः' शरीरवियोगः। तस्मिन् 'ज्ञानं'। अमुष्मिन् काले अमुष्मिन् देशे मम शरीरवियोगो भविष्यतीति निःसंशयं जानाति। 'अरिष्टेभ्यो वा'। अरिष्टानि त्रि-विधानि आध्यात्मिकाधिदैविकाधिभौतिकभेदेन। तत्राध्यात्मिकानि पिहितकर्णः कौष्ठस्य वायोर्घोषं न शृणोति इत्येवमादीनि। आधि-भौतिकानि अकस्मात् विकृतपुरुषदर्शनादीनि । आधिदैविकानि अकाल एव* द्रष्टुमशक्यस्वर्गादिपदार्थदर्शनादीनि। तेभ्यः शरीर-वियोगकालं जानाति। यद्यप्ययोगिनामप्यरिष्टेभ्यः प्रायेण ज्ञानमु-त्पद्यते, तथापि तेषां सामान्याकारेण तत् संशयरूपं। योगिनां पुनर्नियतकालदेशतया प्रत्यक्षवदव्यभिचारि ॥ २२ ॥

परिकर्मनिष्पादिताः सिद्धीः† प्रतिपादयितुमाह ।

मैत्र्यादिषु बलानि ॥ २३ ॥

'मैत्री-करुणा-मुदितोपेक्षासु यो विहितः संयमः तस्य 'बलानि', तासां मैत्र्यादीनां सम्बन्धीनि प्रादुर्भवन्ति । मैत्री-करुणा-मुदिता-स्तथाऽस्य प्रकर्षं गच्छन्ति, यथाऽसौ सर्व्वस्य मित्रत्वादिकं सम्प्रति-पद्यते ॥ २३ ॥

सिद्ध्यन्तरमाह ।

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* अकाल एवेति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

† परिकर्म्मनिष्पन्दभूताः सिद्धीरिति E, C पुस्तकद्वयपाठः ।

बलेषु हस्तिबलादीनि ॥ २४ ॥

हस्त्यादिसम्बन्धिषु 'बलेषु', कृतसंयमस्य हस्त्यादिवद्बलानि आविर्भवन्ति। तदयमर्थः। यस्मिन् हस्तिबले वायुवेगे सिंहवीर्य्ये वा तन्मयभावेन* संयमं करोति, तत्तत्सर्व्वसामर्थ्ययुक्तं सत्त्वमस्य प्रादुर्भवतीत्यर्थः ॥ २४ ॥

सिद्ध्यन्तरमाह।

प्रवृत्त्यालोकन्यासात् सूक्ष्म-व्यवहित-विप्रकृष्टज्ञानं† ॥ २५ ॥

'प्रवृत्तिर्व्विषयवती ज्योतिष्मती च प्रागुक्ता। तस्या योऽसौ 'आलोकः' सात्त्विकप्रकाशप्रसरः,‡ तस्य निखिलेषु विषयेषु 'न्यासात्' तद्वासितानां विषयाणां भावनातः,§ स्वान्तःकरणेष्विन्द्रियेषु च प्रकृष्ट-शक्तिमापन्नेषु|| 'सूक्ष्मस्य' परमाण्वादेः, 'व्यवहितस्य' भूम्यन्तर्गतस्य निध्यादेः,¶ 'विप्रकृष्टस्य' मेर्व्वपरपार्श्ववर्त्तिनो रसायनादेः, 'ज्ञानं', उत्पद्यते ॥ २५ ॥

एतत्समानवृत्तान्तं सिद्ध्यन्तरमाह।

भुवनज्ञानं सूर्य्ये संयमात् ॥ २६ ॥

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* तन्मयीभावेनेति H पुस्तकपाठः।

† सूक्ष्म-व्यवहित-विप्रकृष्टार्थज्ञानमिति E पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ सात्त्विकप्रकाश इति E पुस्तकपाठः।

§ भावनादिति H पुस्तकपाठः।

|| प्रकृष्टशक्तितामापन्नेष्विति H पुस्तकपाठः।

¶ निधानादेरिति H पुस्तकपाठः।

'सूर्य्ये' प्रकाशमये, यः संयमं करोति, तस्य सप्तसु भूर्भुवःस्वः-प्रभृतिषु लोकेषु यानि 'भुवनानि तत्सन्निवेशभाञ्जि पुराणि, तेषु यथावदस्य 'ज्ञानं', उत्पद्यते। पूर्व्वस्मिन् सूत्रे सात्त्विकप्रकाश आलम्बनतयोक्त इह तु भौतिक इति विशेषः ॥ २६ ॥

भौतिकप्रकाशान्तरालम्बनद्वारेणैव सिद्ध्यन्तरमाह।

चन्द्रे ताराव्यूहज्ञानं ॥ २७ ॥

'ताराणां' ज्योतिषां, यः 'व्यूहः' विशिष्टसन्निवेशः, तस्मिन् 'चन्द्रे', कृतसंयमस्य 'ज्ञानं', उत्पद्यते। सूर्य्यप्रकाशेन हततेजस्कत्वात् ताराणां, सूर्य्यसंयमात्तज्ज्ञानं न शक्नोति भवितुमिति पृथगुपायोऽभिहितः ॥ २७ ॥

सिद्ध्यन्तरमाह।

ध्रुवे तद्गतिज्ञानं ॥ २८ ॥

'ध्रुवे' निश्चले ज्योतिषां प्रधाने, कृतसंयमस्य तासां ताराणां या 'गतिः', प्रत्येकं नियतकाला नियतदेशा च तस्याः 'ज्ञानं', उत्पद्यते। इयं तारा अयं ग्रहः इयता कालेन इमं राशिमिदं नक्षत्रं यास्यति इति सर्व्वं जानातीत्यर्थः। इदं कालज्ञानफलमित्युक्तं भवति ॥ २८ ॥

बाह्याः सिद्धीः प्रतिपाद्यान्तराः सिद्धीः प्रतिपादयितुमुपक्रमते।

नाभिचक्रे कायव्यूहज्ञानं ॥ २९ ॥

शरीरमध्यवर्त्ति 'नाभिसंज्ञकं यत् षोड़शारं 'चक्रं', तस्मिन् कृत-

संयमस्य योगिनः, 'कायगतो योऽसौ 'व्यूहः' विशिष्टं रस-मल-धातु-नाड्यादीनामवस्थानं, तच्च 'ज्ञानं', उत्पद्यते । इदमुक्तं भवति । नाभिचक्रं शरीरस्य मध्यवर्त्ति सर्व्वतः प्रसृतानां नाड्यादीनां मूलभूतं । अतस्तत्र कृतावधानस्य समग्रः सन्निवेशो यथावदाभाति* ॥ २९ ॥

सिद्ध्यन्तरमाह ।

कण्ठकूपे क्षुत्पिपासानिवृत्तिः ॥ ३० ॥

कण्ठे गले कूपः 'कण्ठकूपः' जिह्वा-तन्त्वोरधस्तात्† कूपइव कूपो गर्त्ताकारप्रदेशः । प्राणादेर्यत्सम्पर्कात् क्षुत्पिपासादयः प्रादुर्भवन्ति । तस्मिन् कृतसंयमस्य योगिनः 'क्षुत्पिपासादयो निवर्त्तन्ते । घण्टिकाधस्तात् स्रोतसाप्याय्यमाने‡ तस्मिन् भाविते भवत्येवंविधा सिद्धिः ॥ ३० ॥

सिद्ध्यन्तरमाह ।

कूर्म्मनाड्यां स्थैर्य्यं ॥ ३१ ॥

कण्ठकूपस्याधस्तात् या 'कूर्म्माख्या नाड़ी, तस्यां कृतसंयमस्य, चेतसः 'स्थैर्य्यं', उत्पद्यते । तत्स्थानमनुप्रविष्टस्य चपलता§ न भवतीत्यर्थः । यदि वा कायस्य स्थैर्य्यमुत्पद्यते, न केनचित् स्पन्दयितुं शक्यत इत्यर्थः ॥ ३१ ॥

सिद्ध्यन्तरमाह ।

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* यथावदाविर्भवतीति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः

† जिह्वाचक्षोरधस्तादिति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ स्रोतसा धार्य्यमाणे इति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ चलतेति C पुस्तकपाठः । चञ्चलतेति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

मूर्द्धज्योतिषि सिद्धदर्शनं ॥ ३२ ॥

शिरःकपाले ब्रह्मरन्ध्राख्यं छिद्रं प्रकाशाधारत्वात् 'ज्योतिः'। यथा गृहाभ्यन्तरस्थस्य मणेः प्रसरन्ती प्रभा कुञ्चिकाविवरप्रदेशे संहन्यते*, तथा हृदयस्थः सात्त्विकः प्रकाशः प्रसृतस्तत्र सम्पिण्डितत्वं भजते। तत्र कृतसंयमस्य, ये द्यावा-पृथिव्योरन्तरालवर्त्तिनः 'सिद्धाः' दिव्याः पुरुषाः, तेषामितरप्राण्यदृश्यानां तस्य दर्शनं भवति। तान् पश्यति, तैश्च सम्भाष्यत इत्यर्थः ॥ ३२ ॥

सर्व्वज्ञत्वे उपायमाह।

प्रातिभाद्वा सर्व्वं ॥ ३३ ॥

निमित्तानपेक्षं† मनोमात्रजन्यमविसंवादकं द्रागुत्पद्यमानं‡ ज्ञानं प्रतिभा। तस्यां संयमे क्रियमाणे 'प्रातिभं' विवेकख्यातेः पूर्व्वभावि तारकं ज्ञानं, उदेति§। यथोदेष्यतः सवितुः|| पूर्व्वं प्रभा प्रादुर्भवति। तद्वद्विवेकख्यातेः पूर्व्वं तारकं 'सर्व्वविषयं ज्ञानमाविर्भवति। तस्मिन् सति संयमान्तरानपेक्षः सर्व्वं जानातीत्यर्थः ॥ ३३ ॥

सिद्ध्यन्तरमाह।

हृदये चित्तसंवित् ॥ ३४ ॥

'हृदयं' शरीरस्य प्रदेशविशेषः। तस्मिन्नधोमुखस्वल्पपुण्डरीकाभ्यन्तरे

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* कुञ्चिताकारेव सर्व्वप्रदेशे संस्फुटत इति पा०।

† सर्व्वनिमित्तानपेक्षमिति H पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ झटित्युत्पद्यमानमिति D पुस्तकपाठः।

§ उत्पद्यत इति E पुस्तकपाठः।

|| यथोदेष्यति सवितरीति D पुस्तकपाठः।

अन्तःकरणसत्त्वस्य* स्थानं। तत्र कृतसंयमस्य स्व-परचित्तज्ञानमुत्पद्यते। स्वचित्तगताः सर्व्वा वासनाः परचित्तगतांश्च रागादीन् जानातीत्यर्थः॥ ३४॥

सिद्ध्यन्तरमाह।

सत्त्वपुरुषयोरत्यन्तासङ्कीर्णयोः प्रत्ययाविशेषो भोगः† परार्थान्यस्वार्थसंयमात् पुरुषज्ञानं॥ ३५॥

'सत्त्वं' प्रकाशसुखात्मकः प्राधानिकः परिणामविशेषः। 'पुरुषः' भोक्ता अधिष्ठातृरूपः‡। तयोर्भोग्य-भोक्तृत्वरूपत्वात् चेतनाचेतनत्वाच्च अत्यन्तासङ्कीर्णत्वं भिन्नत्वमित्यर्थः। तयोर्यः 'प्रत्ययस्याविशेषः' भेदेनाप्रतिभासनं,§ स भोगः। तस्मात् सत्त्वस्यैव कर्तृताप्रत्ययेन या सुख-दुःखसंवित् स 'भोगः' सत्त्वस्य स्वार्थनैरपेक्ष्येण 'परार्थः' पुरुषार्थः‖। तस्मादन्यो यः 'स्वार्थः' पुरुषस्वरूपमात्रालम्बनः, परित्यक्ताहङ्कारे सत्त्वे या चिच्छायासंक्रान्तिः, तत्र कृतसंयमस्य 'पुरुषविषयं 'ज्ञानं', उत्पद्यते। तदेवं रूपं स्वालम्बनं ज्ञानं सत्त्वनिष्ठं पुरुषो जानाति। न पुनः पुरुषो ज्ञाता ज्ञानस्य विषयभावमापद्यते, ज्ञेयत्वापत्तेः। ज्ञातृत्वज्ञेयत्वयोरत्यन्तविरोधात्॥ ३५॥

अस्यैव संयमस्य फलमाह।

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* अन्तःकरणस्येति H पुस्तकपाठः।

† प्रत्ययाविशेषाद् भोग इति H, B, C चिह्नितपुस्तकपाठः। पण्डित-नामकपत्रे मुद्रितयोगसूत्रे पुरुषसत्त्वयोः इति पाठो दृश्यते।

‡ भोक्त्रधिष्ठातृरूप इति H पुस्तकपाठः।

§ अभेदेन प्रतिभासनमिति D पुस्तकपाठः।

‖ पुरुषार्थनिमित्त इति H पुस्तकपाठः।

ततः प्रातिभ-श्रावण-वेदनादर्शास्वादवार्त्ता जायन्ते ॥ ३६ ॥

'ततः' पुरुषसंयमादभ्यस्यमानात्, व्युत्थितस्यापि ज्ञानानि जायन्ते। तत्र 'प्रातिभं' पूर्वोक्तं ज्ञानं, तस्याविर्भवनात्* सूक्ष्मादिकमर्थं पश्यति । 'श्रावणं' श्रोत्रेन्द्रियजं ज्ञानं, तस्माच्च प्रकृष्टं दिव्यं दिवि भवं शब्दं जानाति । 'वेदना' स्पर्शेन्द्रियजं ज्ञानं, विद्यतेऽनयेति कृत्वा तान्त्रिक्या संज्ञया व्यवह्रियते। तस्मात् दिव्यस्पर्शविषयं ज्ञानं उपजायते। 'आदर्शः' चक्षुरिन्द्रियजं ज्ञानं, आसमन्तात् दृश्यते ऽनुभूयते रूपमनेनेति कृत्वा, तस्य प्रकर्षाद्दिव्यरूपज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । 'आस्वादः' रसनेन्द्रियजं ज्ञानं, आस्वाद्यते ऽनेनेति कृत्वा, तस्मिन् प्रकृष्टे दिव्यरससंविदुपजायते । 'वार्त्ता' गन्धसंवित्,† वृत्तिशब्देन तान्त्रिक्या परिभाषया घ्राणेन्द्रियमुच्यते, वर्त्तते गन्धविषय इति कृत्वा वृत्तेर्घ्राणेन्द्रियाज्जाता वार्त्ता गन्धसंवित्, तस्यां प्रकृष्यमाणायां दिव्यगन्धोऽनुभूयते ॥ ३६ ॥

एतेषां फलविशेषाणां विषयविभागमाह‡ ।

ते समाधावुपसर्गा व्युत्थाने सिद्धयः ॥ ३७ ॥

'ते' प्राक्प्रतिपादिताः फलविशेषाः, 'समाधेः प्रकर्षं गच्छतः§

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* तस्याविर्भवादिति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

† गन्धसंवित्तिरिति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ विशेषविभागमाहेति D पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ समाधौ प्रकर्षं गच्छतीति D पुस्तकपाठः ।

'उपसर्गाः' उपद्रवा विघ्नाः* । तत्र हर्ष-विस्मयादिकारणेन समाधिः शिथिलीभवति । 'व्युत्थाने' पुनर्व्यवहारदशायां, विशिष्टफलदायकत्वात् 'सिद्धयः', भवन्ति ॥ ३७ ॥

सिद्ध्यन्तरमाह ।

बन्धकारणशैथिल्यात् प्रचारसंवेदनाच्च चित्तस्य परशरीरावेशः† ॥ ३८ ॥

व्यापकत्वादात्मचित्तयोर्नियतकर्म्मवशादेव शरीरान्तर्गतयोरेव भोक्तृ-भोग्यभावेन यत् संवेदनमुपजायते, स एव शरीरबन्ध इत्युच्यते। तत् यदा समाधिवशात् 'बन्धकारणं धर्म्माधर्म्माख्यं कर्म्म शिथिलीभवति, तानवमापद्यते । चित्तस्य च योऽसौ 'प्रचारः' हृदयप्रदेशादिन्द्रियद्वारेण विषयाभिमुख्येन प्रसरः, तस्य 'संवेदनं' ज्ञानं इयं चित्तवहा नाड़ी, अनया चित्तं वहति, इयञ्च प्राणादिवहाभ्यो नाड़ीभ्यो विलक्षणा इति स्वपरशरीरयोर्यदा सञ्चारं जानाति, तदा परकीयं शरीरं मृतं जीवच्छरीरं वा चित्तं सञ्चारद्वारेण प्रविशति। चित्तञ्च परशरीरे प्रविशत् इन्द्रियाण्यनुवर्त्तन्ते, मधुकरराजमिव मधुमक्षिकाः‡ । अतः परशरीरप्रविष्टो योगी स्वशरीरेणेव तेन§ व्यवहरति, यतो व्यापकयोश्चित्तपुरुषयोर्भोगसङ्कोचकारणं कर्म्म, तच्चेत् समाधिना क्षिप्तं तदा स्वातन्त्र्यात् सर्व्वत्रैव भोगनिष्पत्तिः ॥ ३८ ॥

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* विघ्नकारिण इति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

† परशरीरप्रवेश इति D पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ मक्षिका इति D पुस्तकपाठः ।

§ स्वशरीरवत्तेनेति "पण्डित"नामकपत्रपाठः ।

सिद्ध्यन्तरमाह ।

उदानजयाज्जल-पङ्क-कण्टकादिष्वसङ्ग उत्क्रान्तिश्च ॥ ३९ ॥

समस्तानामिन्द्रियाणां तुषज्वालावद् या युगपदुत्थिता वृत्तिः सा जीवनशब्दवाच्या । तस्याः क्रियाभेदात् प्राणापानादिसंज्ञाभिर्व्यपदेशः । तत्र हृदयान्मुखनासिकाद्वारेण वायोः प्रणयनात् प्राण इत्युच्यते । नाभिप्रदेशात् पादाङ्गुष्ठपर्य्यन्तमपनयनादपानः । नाभिप्रदेशं परिवेष्ट्य समन्तान्नयनात् समानः । कृकाटिकादेशादाशिरोवृत्तेरुन्नयनादुदानः । व्याप्य नयनात् सर्व्वशरीरव्यापी व्यानः । 'उदानस्य', संयमद्वारेण 'जयात्', इतरेषां वायूनां निरोधादूर्द्ध्वगामित्वेन 'जले' महानद्यादौ, महति वा कर्द्दमे, तीक्ष्णेषु कण्टकेषु वा न मज्जति इति । लघुत्वात्तूलपिण्डवज्जलादौ निमज्जन्नपि* उद्गच्छतीत्यर्थः† ॥ ३९ ॥

सिद्ध्यन्तरमाह ।

समानजयात् प्रज्वलनं‡ ॥ ४० ॥

अग्निमावेष्ट्य व्यवस्थितस्य 'समानाख्यस्य वायोः 'जयात्' संयमेन वशीकारात्, निरावरणस्याग्नेरूर्द्ध्वत्वात्तेजसा ज्वलन्निव योगी प्रतिभाति ॥ ४० ॥

सिद्ध्यन्तरमाह ।

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* मज्जित्वापीति D पुस्तकपाठः ।

† उपरिगच्छतीत्यर्थ इति E पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ समानजयाज्ज्वलनमिति पाठः C चिह्नितपुस्तके काश्यां मुद्रितयोगभाष्यपुस्तके च वर्त्तते ।

श्रोत्राकाशयोः सम्बन्धसंयमाद्दिव्यं श्रोत्रं ॥ ४१ ॥

'श्रोत्रं' शब्दग्राहकमाहङ्कारिकमिन्द्रियं। 'आकाशं' व्योम शब्द-तन्मात्रकार्य्यं। तयोः 'सम्बन्धः' देश-देशिभावलक्षणः। तस्मिन् कृतसंय-मस्य योगिनः 'दिव्यं श्रोत्रं' प्रवर्त्तते, युगपत् सूक्ष्म-व्यवहित-विप्रकृष्ट-शब्दग्रहणसमर्थं भवतीत्यर्थः ॥ ४१ ॥

सिद्ध्यन्तरमाह ॥

कायाकाशयोः सम्बन्धसंयमाल्लघुतूलसमापत्तेश्चा-काशगमनं ॥ ४२ ॥

'कायः' पाञ्चभौतिकं शरीरं। तस्य 'आकाशेन अवकाशदायकेन* यः 'सम्बन्धः', तत्र संयमं विधाय 'लघुनि 'तूलादौ वा 'समापत्तिः तन्मयीभावलक्षणा, तां विधाय प्राप्तात्यन्तलघुभावो योगी प्रथमं यथारुचि जले† सञ्चरन् क्रमेणोर्णनाभतन्तुजालेन सञ्चरमाण आदि-त्यरश्मिभिश्च विहरन् यथेष्टमाकाशे गच्छति ॥ ४२ ॥

सिद्ध्यन्तरमाह।

बहिरकल्पिता वृत्तिर्महाविदेहा ततः प्रकाशाव-रणक्षयः ॥ ४३ ॥

शरीरात् 'बहिः', या मनसः शरीरनैरपेक्ष्येण 'वृत्तिः', सा 'महा-विदेहा', नाम विगतशरीराहङ्कारदार्ढ्यद्वारेणोच्यते। 'ततः' तस्यां

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* अवकाशदानादिति H पुस्तकपाठः।

† भुवीति H पुस्तकपाठः।

कृतात् संयमात्, 'प्रकाशावरणक्षयः' सात्विकस्य चित्तस्य यः प्रकाशस्तस्य यदावरणं क्लेशकर्म्मादि तस्य क्षयः प्रविलयो भवति। अयमर्थः। शरीराहङ्कारे सति या मनसो बहिर्वृत्तिः सा कल्पितेत्युच्यते। यदा पुनः शरीराहङ्कारभावं* परित्यज्य स्वातन्त्र्येण मनसो वृत्तिः सा अकल्पिता, तस्यां संयमात् योगिनः सर्व्वे चित्तमलाः क्षीयन्ते ॥४३॥

तदेवं पूर्व्वान्तविषया अपरान्तविषया मध्यभवाश्च सिद्धीः प्रतिपाद्यानन्तरं भुवनज्ञानादिरूपा बाह्याः, कायव्यूहादिरूपा आभ्यन्तराः, परिकर्म्मनिष्पन्नभूताश्च 'मैत्र्यादिषु बलानि' इत्येवमाद्याः समाध्युपयोगिनीश्चान्तःकरणबहिःकरणलक्षणेन्द्रियभावाः, प्राणादिवायुभावाश्च सिद्धीश्चित्तदार्ढ्याय समाधेः समाश्वासोत्पत्तये प्रतिपाद्य इदानीं स्वदर्शनोपयोगिसबीज-निर्व्वीजसमाधिसिद्धये विविधोपायप्रदर्शनायाह।

स्थूल-स्वरूप-सूक्ष्मान्वयार्थवत्त्वसंयमाद्भूतजयः ॥४४॥

पञ्चानां पृथिव्यादीनां भूतानां ये पञ्चावस्थाविशेषरूपा धर्म्माः स्थूलत्वादयः, तत्र कृतसंयमस्य 'भूतजयः', भवति, भूतानि वश्यान्यस्य भवन्तीत्यर्थः†। तथाहि भूतानां परिदृश्यमानं विशिष्टाकारवद्रूपं 'स्थूलं' 'स्वरूपं' चैषां यथाक्रमं कार्य्यं गन्ध-स्नेहोष्णता-प्रेरणावकाशदानलक्षणं। 'सूक्ष्मं' तु यथाक्रमं भूतानां कारणत्वेन‡ व्यवस्थितानि गन्धादितन्मात्राणि। 'अन्वयिनो गुणाः प्रकाश-प्रवृत्ति-स्थितिरूपतया

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* शरीरादहंभावमिति C पुस्तकपाठः।

† भूतान्यवश्यं वश्यानीत्यर्थ इति H पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ कारणभेदेनेति C, H, B पुस्तकपाठः।

सर्व्वेष्वेवान्वयित्वेन समुपलभ्यन्ते। 'अर्थवत्त्वं' तेष्वेव गुणेषु भोगापवर्गसम्पादनाख्या शक्तिः। तदेवं भूतेषु पञ्चसु उक्तलक्षणावस्थापन्नेषु* प्रत्यवस्थं संयमं कुर्व्वन् योगी भूतजयी भवति। तद्यथा, प्रथमं स्थूलरूपे संयमं विधाय तदनु सूक्ष्मरूपे इत्येवं क्रमेण तस्य कृतसंयमस्य सङ्कल्पानुविधायिन्यो वत्सानुसारिण्य इव गावो भूतप्रकृतयो भवन्ति ॥ ४४ ॥

तस्यैव भूतजयस्य फलमाह।

ततोऽणिमादिप्रादुर्भावः कायसम्पत्तद्धर्म्मानभिघातश्च ॥ ४५ ॥

'अणिमा' परमाणुरूपतापत्तिः। लघिमा तूलपिण्डवल्लघुत्वप्राप्तिः। गरिमा गुरुत्वप्राप्तिः। महिमा महत्त्वप्राप्तिः अङ्गुल्यग्रेण चन्द्रादिस्पर्शनशक्तिः। प्राकाम्यं इच्छानभिघातः। शरीरान्तःकरणेश्वरत्वं ईशित्वं। सर्व्वत्र प्रभविष्णुता वशित्वं, सर्व्वाण्येव भूतानि अनुरागित्वात्† तदुक्तं नातिक्रामन्ति। कामावसायित्वं सर्व्वत्र कामावसायः, यस्मिन् विषयेऽस्य कामः इच्छा भवति, तस्मिन् विषये योगिनोऽवसायो भवति, तं विषयं स्वीकारद्वारेणाभिलाषसमाप्तिपर्य्यन्तं नयतीत्यर्थः। तत्र ते अणिमाद्याः समाध्युपयोगिनो भूतजयात् योगिनः प्रादुर्भवन्ति। यथा परमाणुत्वं प्राप्तो

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* उक्तलक्षणावस्थावच्छिन्नेष्विति H पुस्तकपाठः। उक्तलक्षणावस्थाभिन्नेष्विति F पुस्तकपाठः।

† अनुगामित्वादिति H पुस्तकपाठः।

वज्रादीनामप्यन्तः प्रविशति । एवं सर्व्वत्र योज्यं । एतेऽणिमा-द्योऽष्टौ गुणा महासिद्धय इत्युच्यन्ते । 'कायसम्पत्' वक्ष्यमाणा, तां प्राप्नोति । 'तद्धर्म्मानभिघातश्च' तस्य कायस्य ये धर्म्मा रूपादयस्तेषा-मभिघातो नाशो नास्य कुतश्चिदपि भवति । नास्य रूपमग्निर्दहति न च वायुः शोषयति इत्यादि योज्यं ॥ ४५ ॥

कायसम्पदमाह ।

रूप-लावण्य-बल-वज्रसंहननत्वानि कायसम्पत् ॥ ४६ ॥

'रूप-लावण्य-बलानि' प्रसिद्धानि । 'वज्रसंहननं' वज्रवत् कठिना संहतिरस्य शरीरे भवतीत्यर्थः । इति कायस्याविर्भूतगुणसम्पत् ॥ ४६ ॥

एवं भूतजयमभिधाय प्राप्तभूमिकस्येन्द्रियजयमाह ।

ग्रहण-स्वरूपास्मितान्वयार्थवत्त्वसंयमादिन्द्रियजयः ॥ ४७ ॥

'ग्रहणं' इन्द्रियाणां विषयाभिमुखी वृत्तिः । 'स्वरूपं' सामान्येन प्रकाशकत्वं । 'अस्मिता' अहङ्कारानुगमः । 'अन्वयार्थवत्त्वे' पूर्व्ववत् । एतेषामिन्द्रियाणामवस्थापञ्चके पूर्व्ववत् संयमं कृत्वा 'इन्द्रियजयी भवति ॥ ४७ ॥

तस्य फलमाह ।

ततो मनोजवित्वं विकरणभावः प्रधानजयश्च ॥४८॥

शरीरस्य मनोवदनुत्तमगतिलाभः* 'मनोजवित्वं' । कायनिरपे-

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* मनोवदुत्तमगतिलाभ इति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

णानामिन्द्रियाणां वृत्तिलाभः 'विकरणभावः'। सर्व्ववशित्वं 'प्रधानजयः'। एताः सिद्धयो जितेन्द्रियस्य प्रादुर्भवन्ति। ताश्च अस्मिन्शास्त्रे मधुप्रतीका इत्युच्यन्ते। यथा मधुन एकदेशोऽपि स्वदते, एवं प्रत्येकमेताः सिद्धयः स्वदन्त इति मधुप्रतीकाः॥ ४८॥

इन्द्रियजयमभिधायान्तःकरणजयमाह।

सत्त्व-पुरुषान्यताख्यातिमात्रस्य सर्व्वभावाधिष्ठातृत्वं सर्व्वज्ञातृत्वञ्च॥ ४९॥

तस्मिन् शुद्धे सात्त्विके परिणामे कृतसंयमस्य या सत्त्व-पुरुषयोरुत्पद्यते विवेकख्यातिः सा 'अन्यताख्यातिः',। गुणानां कर्तृत्वाभिमानशिथिलीभावस्वरूपात्तन्माहात्म्यात्* तत्रैव स्थितस्य योगिनः 'सर्व्वभावाधिष्ठातृत्वं', 'सर्व्वज्ञातृत्वञ्च', समाधेर्भवति। सर्व्वेषां गुणपरिणामानां भावानां स्वामिवदाक्रमणं 'सर्व्वभावाधिष्ठातृत्वं'। तेषामेव शान्तोदिताव्यपदेश्यधर्म्मित्वेन स्थितानां यथावद्विवेकज्ञानं 'सर्व्वज्ञातृत्वं'। एषा च अस्मिन् शास्त्रे परस्यां वशीकारसंज्ञायां प्राप्तायां विशोका नाम सिद्धिरित्युच्यते॥ ४९॥

क्रमेण भूमिकान्तरमाह।

तद्वैराग्यादपि दोषवीजक्षये कैवल्यं॥ ५०॥

तस्यामपि विशोकायां सिद्धौ यदा वैराग्यमुत्पद्यते योगिनः, तदा तस्मात् 'दोषाणां' रागादीनां, यत् 'वीजं' अविद्या, 'तस्याः'

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* कर्तृत्वाभिमानशिथिलीभावस्वरूपया तन्मयतयेति C पुस्तकपाठः।

'क्षये' निर्मूलने, 'कैवल्यं' आत्यन्तिकी दुःखनिवृत्तिः। पुरुषस्य गुणानामधिकारपरिसमाप्तेः* स्वरूपनिष्ठत्वं ॥ ५० ॥

अस्मिन्नेव समाधौ स्थित्युपायमाह।

स्थान्युपनिमन्त्रणे‡ सङ्ग-स्मयाकरणं पुनरनिष्टप्रसङ्गात् ॥ ५१ ॥

चत्वारो योगिनो भवन्ति। तत्राभ्यासवान्प्रवृत्तमात्रज्योतिः प्रथमः। ऋतम्भरप्रज्ञः§ द्वितीयः। भूतेन्द्रियजयी तृतीयः। अतिक्रान्तभावनीयश्चतुर्थः। तत्र चतुर्थस्य समाधेः प्राप्तसप्तविधप्रान्तभूमिप्रज्ञस्य|| अन्यां मधुमतीसंज्ञां¶ भूमिं साक्षात्कुर्वतः 'स्थानिनो' देवा उपनिमन्त्रयितारो भवन्ति, दिव्यस्त्रीरसायनादिकमुपढौकयन्ति। तस्मिन् 'उपनिमन्त्रणे', नानेन 'सङ्गः', कर्त्तव्यः, नापि 'स्मयः',। सङ्गकरणे पुनर्विषयभोगे निपतति। स्मयकरणे कृतकृत्यमात्मानं मन्यमानो न समाधावुत्सहते। अतः सङ्ग-स्मययोस्तेन वर्ज्जनं कर्त्तव्यं ॥ ५१ ॥

अस्यामेव फलभूतायां विवेकख्यातौ पूर्व्वोक्तसंयमव्यतिरिक्तमुपायान्तरमाह।

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* अधिकारसमाप्तेरिति B, C पुस्तकपाठः।

† स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठत्वमिति B, C पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ स्थान्युपनिमन्त्रणे इति H पुस्तकपाठः।

§ ऋताम्बरप्रज्ञ इति H पुस्तकपाठः।

|| प्राप्तसप्तविधभूमिप्रज्ञस्येति H पुस्तकपाठः।

¶ मधुमतीं प्रज्ञामिति H पुस्तकपाठः।

क्षणतत्क्रमयोः* संयमाद्विवेकजं ज्ञानं† ॥५२॥

'क्षणः' सर्व्वान्त्यः कालावयवः। यस्य कला प्रविभक्तुं न शक्यते। तथाविधानां कालक्षणानां यः 'क्रमः' पौर्व्वापर्य्येण परिणामः, तत्र 'संयमात्' प्रागुक्तं 'विवेकजं ज्ञानं', उत्पद्यते। अयमर्थः। अयं कालक्षणोऽस्मात् कालक्षणादुत्तरः, अयमस्मात् पूर्व्व इत्येवंविधे क्रमे कृतसंयमस्यात्यन्तसूक्ष्मेऽपि क्षणक्रमे यदा भवति साक्षात्कारः, तदा अन्यदपि सूक्ष्मं महदादि साक्षात्करोतीति विवेकज्ञानोत्पत्तिः॥५२॥

अस्यैव संयमस्य विषयविशेषोपक्षेपणायाह‡ ।

जाति-लक्षण-देशैरन्यतानवच्छेदात्तुल्ययोस्ततः प्रतिपत्तिः ॥५३॥

पदार्थानां भेदहेतवः 'जाति-लक्षण-देशा भवन्ति। क्वचिद्भेदहेतुः 'जातिः', यथा गौरियं महिषीयमिति। जात्या तुल्ययोः 'लक्षणं', भेदहेतुः, यथा इयं कर्व्वुरा इयमरुणेति। जात्या लक्षणेन चाभिन्नयोर्भेदहेतुः 'देशः', दृष्टः, यथा तुल्यप्रमाणयोरामलकयोर्भिन्नदेशस्थितयोः। यत्र पुनर्भेदोऽवधारयितुं न शक्यते, यथैकदेशस्थितयोः शुक्लयोः पार्थिवयोः परमाण्वोः। तथाविधे विषये भेदाय कृतसंयमस्य यदा भेदेन ज्ञानमुपजायते, तदा तदभ्यासात् सूक्ष्माण्यपि तत्त्वानि भेदेन प्रतिपाद्यन्ते। एतदुक्तं भवति, यत्र केनचिदु-

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* क्षणक्रमयोरिति H पुस्तकपाठः।

† विवेकज्ञानमिति H पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ विषयविवेकोपयोगमाहेति C पुस्तकपाठः।

पायेन भेदो नावधारयितुं शक्यस्तत्र संयमाद्भवत्येव भेदप्रतिपत्तिः सूक्ष्माणां तत्त्वानां ॥ ५३ ॥

उक्तस्य विवेकजन्यज्ञानस्य संज्ञां विषयं स्वभावञ्च व्याख्यातुमाह ।

तारकं सर्व्वविषयं सर्व्वथाविषयमक्रमञ्चेति विवेकजं ज्ञानं ॥ ५४ ॥

उक्तसंयमबलादन्त्यायां भूमिकायामुत्पन्नं 'ज्ञानं', 'तारकं', इति । तारयत्यगाधात् संसारपयोधेः* योगिनं इत्यान्वर्थिकया संज्ञया 'तारकं', इत्युच्यते । अस्य विषयमाह, 'सर्व्वविषयं' इति, सर्व्वाणि तत्त्वानि महदादीनि विषयोऽस्येति 'सर्व्वविषयं' । स्वभावश्चास्य सर्व्वथाविषयत्वं । सर्व्वाभिरवस्थाभिः स्थूल-सूक्ष्मादिभेदेन तैस्तैश्च परिणामैः सर्व्वेणाकारेणावस्थितानि तत्त्वानि विषयोऽस्येति 'सर्व्वथा विषयं' । स्वभावान्तरमाह । 'अक्रमञ्च', इति । निःशेषनानावस्था-परिणतद्व्येकभावग्रहणे† नास्य क्रमो विद्यते इति 'अक्रमं' । सर्व्वं करतलामलकवद्युगपत् पश्यतीत्यर्थः ॥ ५४ ॥

अस्माच्च विवेकजातात्तारकाख्यज्ञानात् किं भवतीत्याह ।

सत्त्व-पुरुषयोः शुद्धिसाम्ये कैवल्यं ॥ ५५ ॥

'सत्त्व-पुरुषौ' उक्तलक्षणौ । तयोः 'शुद्धिसाम्ये कैवल्यं' ।

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* संसारसागरादिति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

† निःशेषनानावस्थापरिणतन्यात्मकभावग्रहणे इति H पुस्तकपाठः । निःशेषनानावस्थापरिणतन्यूनाधिकभावग्रहणे इति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

चित्तसत्त्वस्य सर्व्वथा कर्त्तृत्वाभिमाननिवृत्त्या स्वकारणेऽनुप्रवेशः शुद्धिः। पुरुषस्य शुद्धिरुपचरितभोगाभावः। इति द्वयोः समानायां शुद्धौ पुरुषस्य कैवल्यं उत्पद्यते, मोक्षो भवतीत्यर्थः।

तदेवमन्तरङ्गयोगाङ्गत्रयमभिधाय तस्य च संयमसञ्ज्ञां कृत्वा संयमस्य विषयप्रदर्शनार्थं परिणामत्रयमुपपाद्य संयमबलोत्पद्यमानाः पूर्व्वान्तापरान्त-मध्यभावाः सिद्धीरुपदर्श्य समाध्याश्वासोत्पत्तये बाह्या भुवनज्ञानादिरूपा आभ्यन्तराश्च कायव्यूहज्ञानादिरूपाः प्रदर्श्य समाध्युपयोगायेन्द्रियप्राणादिजयपूर्व्विकाः प्रदर्श्य परमपुरुषार्थसिद्धये यथाक्रममवस्थासहितभूतजयेन्द्रिय-सत्त्वजयोद्भवाश्च व्याख्याय विवेकज्ञानोत्पत्तये तांस्तान् उपायान् उपन्यस्य तारकस्य सर्व्वसमाध्यवस्थापर्य्यन्तभवस्य स्वरूपमभिधाय तत्समापत्तेः कृताधिकारस्य चित्तसत्त्वस्य स्वकारणानुप्रवेशात् कैवल्यमुत्पद्यते इत्यभिहितं इति व्याकृतो विभूतिपादः॥ ५५॥

इति महाराजाधिराजश्रीभोजदेवविरचितायां राजमार्त्तण्डाभिधायां पातञ्जलयोगशास्त्रसूत्रवृत्तौ विभूतिपादस्तृतीयः॥ ३॥

अथ चतुर्थः पादः ।

यदाश्रयैव कैवल्यं विनोपायैः प्रजायते ।
तमेकमजमीशानं चिदानन्दमयं स्तुमः ॥

इदानीं विप्रतिपत्तिसमुत्यभ्रान्तिनिराकरणेन युक्त्या कैवल्यस्वरूपावस्थापनाय* कैवल्यपादोऽयमारभ्यते ।

तत्र याः पूर्व्वमुक्ताः सिद्धयस्तासां नानाविधजन्मादिकारणप्रतिपादनद्वारेणैवं बोधयति, एताः सिद्धयः सर्व्वाः पूर्व्वजन्माभ्यस्तसमाधिबलाज्जन्मादिनिमित्तमात्रमाश्रित्य प्रवर्त्तन्ते । ततश्चानेकभवसाध्यस्य समाधेर्न चतिरस्तीत्याश्वासोत्पादनाय समाधिसिद्धेश्च प्राधान्यख्यापनार्थं कैवल्योपयोगार्थञ्चाह ।

जन्मौषधि-मन्त्र-तपः-समाधिजाः सिद्धयः ॥ १ ॥

काश्चन 'जन्मनिमित्ता एव सिद्धयः । यथा पक्ष्यादीनामाकाशे गमनादयः । यथा वा कपिलमहर्षिप्रभृतीनां जन्मसमनन्तरमेव उपजायमाना ज्ञानादयः सांसिद्धिका गुणाः । 'ओषधिसिद्धयो यथा पातालादौ रसायनाद्युपभोगात् शरीरदार्ढ्यादयः । 'मन्त्रसिद्धिर्यथा मन्त्रजपात् केषाञ्चिदाकाशगमनादि । 'तपःसिद्धिर्यथा विश्वामित्रादीनां । 'समाधिसिद्धिर्यथा प्रागेव प्रतिपादिताः । एताः सिद्धयः पूर्व्वजन्मनि चयितक्लेशानामेवोपजायन्ते, तस्मात् समाधिसिद्धाविव

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* कैवल्यस्वरूपस्थापनायेति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

अन्यासां सिद्धीनां समाधिरेव जन्मान्तराभ्यस्तः कारणं, मन्त्रादीनि तु निमित्तमात्राणि ॥ १ ॥

ननु नन्दीश्वरादीनां जात्यादिपरिणामः अस्मिन्नेव जन्मनि दृश्यते तत् कथं जन्मान्तराभ्यस्तसमाधेः कारणत्वमुच्यते* इत्याशङ्क्याह।

जात्यन्तरपरिणामः प्रकृत्यापूरात् ॥ २ ॥

योऽयमिहैव जन्मनि नन्दीश्वरादीनां 'जात्यादिपरिणामः', सः 'प्रकृत्यापूरात्'। पाश्चात्या एव हि प्रकृतयोऽस्मिन् जन्मनि विकारानापूरयन्ति जात्यन्तराकारेण परिणमन्ति॥ २ ॥

ननु धर्माऽधर्मादयस्तत्र क्रियमाणा उपलभ्यन्ते, तत् कथं प्रकृतीनामापूरणे कारणत्वमित्याह।

निमित्तमप्रयोजकं प्रकृतीनां वरणभेदस्तु ततः क्षेत्रिकवत् ॥ ३ ॥

'निमित्तं' धर्मादि। तत् 'प्रकृतीनां', अर्थान्तरपरिणामे न 'प्रयोजकं'। न हि कार्य्येण कारणं प्रवर्त्तते। कुत्र तर्हि तस्य धर्मादेर्व्यापार इत्याह। 'वरणभेदस्तु ततः क्षेत्रिकवत्'। 'ततः' तस्मादनुष्ठीयमानाद्धर्म्मादेः, यत् 'वरणं' आवरकं अधर्म्मादिः, तस्यैव विरोधित्वात् 'भेदः' क्षयः, क्रियते, तस्मिन् प्रतिबन्धके क्षीणे प्रकृतयः स्वयमभिमतकार्य्याय प्रभवन्ति। दृष्टान्तमाह। 'क्षेत्रिकवत्', यथा क्षेत्रिकः

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* कारणभाव उच्यत इति C पुस्तकपाठः।

कृषीवलः केदारात् केदारान्तरं जलं निनीषुः जलप्रतिबन्धक-वरणभेदमात्रं करोति, तस्मिन् भिन्ने जलं स्वयमेव प्रसरद्रूपं परिणामं गृह्णाति, न तु जलप्रसरणे तस्य कश्चित् प्रयत्नः। एवं धर्मादेर्बोद्धव्यं ॥ ३ ॥

यदा साक्षात्कृततत्त्वस्य योगिनो युगपत् कर्मफलोपभोगाया-त्मीयनिरतिशयविभूत्यनुभावात्* युगपदनेकशरीरनिर्मिमित्सा उप-जायते तदा कुतस्तानि चित्तानि प्रभवन्तीत्याह।

निर्माणचित्तान्यस्मितामात्रात् ॥ ४ ॥

योगिनः स्वयं निर्मितेषु कायेषु यानि 'चित्तानि', तानि मूल-कारणात् 'अस्मितामात्रात्', एव तदिच्छया प्रसरन्ति, अग्नेर्विस्फुलिङ्गा इव युगपत् परिणमन्ति ॥ ४ ॥

ननु बहूनां चित्तानां भिन्नाभिप्रायत्वान्नैककार्य्यकर्तृत्वं स्यादि-त्याह।

प्रवृत्तिभेदे प्रयोजकं चित्तमेकमनेकेषां ॥ ५ ॥

तेषां 'अनेकेषां', चेतसां, 'प्रवृत्तिभेदे' व्यापारनानात्वे 'एकं', योगिनः 'चित्तं', 'प्रयोजकं' प्रेरकमधिष्ठातृत्वेन। तेन न भिन्नमतत्वं। अयमर्थः यथा आत्मीये शरीरे मनः चक्षुःपाण्यादीनि यथेच्छं प्रेरयत्यधिष्ठातृत्वेन, एवं कायान्तरेष्वपीति† ॥ ५ ॥

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* निरतिशयविभूत्यनुभवायेति C पुस्तकपाठः।

† कार्य्यान्तरेष्वपीतीति B पुस्तकपाठः।

जन्मादिप्रभवत्वात् सिद्धीनां चित्तमपि तत्प्रभवं पञ्चविधमेव अतो जन्मादिप्रभवात् चित्तात् समाधिप्रभवस्य चित्तस्य वैलक्षण्यमाह।

तत्र ध्यानजमनाशयं ॥ ६ ॥

'ध्यानजं' समाधिजं यच्चित्तं, तत् पञ्चसु मध्ये 'अनाशयं' कर्म्मवासनारहितं, इत्यर्थः ॥ ६ ॥

यथेतरचित्तेभ्यो योगिनश्चित्तं क्लेशादिरहितं विलक्षणं तथा कर्म्मापि विलक्षणमित्याह।

कर्म्माशुक्लाकृष्णं योगिनस्त्रिविधमितरेषां ॥ ७ ॥

शुभफलप्रदं कर्म्म यागादि शुक्लं। अशुभफलप्रदं ब्रह्महत्यादि कृष्णं। उभयसङ्कीर्णं शुक्लकृष्णं। तत्र शुक्लं कर्म्म विचक्षणानां दानतपः-स्वाध्यायादिमतां पुरुषाणां। कृष्णं कर्म्म नारकानां। शुक्लकृष्णं मनुष्याणां। 'योगिनान्तु संन्यासवतां एवंविधकर्म्मविपरीतलक्षणं, तत् फलत्यागानुसन्धानेनैवानुष्ठानात् न किञ्चित् फलमारभते ॥ ७ ॥

अस्यैव कर्म्मणः फलमाह।

ततस्तद्विपाकानुगुणानामेवाभिव्यक्तिर्वासनानां ॥८॥

इह द्विविधाः कर्म्मवासनाः स्मृतिमात्रफलाः जात्यायुर्भोगफलाश्च। तत्र जात्यायुर्भोगफला एकानेकजन्मभवाः* इत्यनेन पूर्व्वमेव कृत-

* एकानेकजन्मफला इति F पुस्तकपाठः।

निर्वैयाः । यास्तु स्मृतिमात्रफलास्तासामभिव्यक्तिस्ततः कर्मणः । येन कर्मणा यादृक् शरीरमारब्धं देव-मनुष्य-तिर्य्यगादिभेदेन*, तस्य विपाकस्य याः 'अनुगुणा अनुरूपा वासनाः, तासामेव तस्मात् 'अभिव्यक्तिः', 'वासनानां', भवति । अयमर्थः येन कर्मणा पूर्व्वं देवतादिशरीरमारब्धं जात्यन्तरशतव्यवधाने पुनस्तथाविधस्यैव शरीरस्यारम्भे तदनुरूपा एव स्मृतिफला वासनाः प्रकटीभवन्ति । लोकान्तरेष्वेवार्थेषु तस्य स्मृत्यादयो जायन्ते । इतरास्तु सत्योऽपि न्यग्भूतास्तिष्ठन्ति† । न तस्यां दशायां नारकादिशरीरोपभोगभवा वासना अभिव्यक्तिमायान्ति ॥ ८ ॥

आसामेव वासनानां कार्य्यकारणभावानुपपत्तिमाशङ्क्य समर्थयितुमाह ।

जाति-देश-काल-व्यवहितानामप्यानन्तर्य्यं स्मृति-संस्कारयोरेकरूपत्वात् ॥ ९ ॥

इह नानायोनिषु भ्रमतां संसारिणां काञ्चिद्योनिमनुभूय यदा योन्यन्तरसहस्रव्यवधानेन पुनस्तामेव योनिं प्रतिपद्यन्ते, तदा तस्यां पूर्व्वानुभूतायां योनौ तथाविधशरीरादिव्यञ्जकापेक्षया वासना याः प्रकटीभूता आसंस्तथाविधव्यञ्जकाभावात्तिरोभूताः पुनस्तथाविधव्यञ्जकशरीरादिलाभे प्रकटीभवन्ति । 'जाति-देश-कालव्यवधानेऽपि तासां स्वानुरूपस्मृत्यादिफलसाधने 'आनन्तर्य्यं' नैरन्तर्य्यमेव । कुतः ।

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* देवमनुष्यतिर्य्यगादिभेदमिति H पुस्तकपाठः ।
† अव्यक्तसंज्ञास्तिष्ठन्तीति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

'स्मृतिसंस्कारयोरेकरूपत्वात्'। तथा हि अनुष्ठीयमानात् कर्म्मणश्चित्तसत्त्वे वासनारूपः संस्कारः समुत्पद्यते, स च स्वर्गनरकादीनां फलानामङ्कुरीभावः, कर्म्मणां वा यागादीनां शक्तिरूपतयावस्थानं, कर्त्तुर्व्वा तथाविधभोग्यभोक्तृत्वरूपं सामर्थ्यं, संस्कारात् स्मृतिः, स्मृतेश्च सुखदुःखोपभोगः, तदनुभवाच्च पुनरपि संस्कारस्मृत्यादयः। एवञ्च यस्य स्मृतिसंस्कारादयो भिन्नास्तस्यानन्तर्य्याभावे दुर्लभः कार्य्यकारणभावः। अस्माकन्तु यदानुभव एव संस्कारीभवति, संस्कारश्च स्मृतिरूपतया परिणमते, तदा एकस्यैव चित्तस्याऽनुसन्धातृत्वेन स्थितत्वात् कार्य्यकारणभावो न दुर्घटः॥ ९॥

भवत्वानन्तर्य्यं कार्य्यकारणभावश्च वासनानां। यदा तु प्रथममेवानुभवः प्रवर्त्तते तदा किं वासनानिमित्त उत निर्न्निमित्त इति शङ्कां व्यपनेतुमाह।

तासामनादित्वमाशिषो नित्यत्वात्॥ १०॥

'तासां' वासनानां। 'अनादित्वं' न विद्यते आदिर्यस्य तस्य भावस्तत्त्वं। आसामादिर्नास्तीत्यर्थः। कुतः* 'आशिषो नित्यत्वात्'। येयमाशीर्महामोहरूपा सदैव सुखसाधनानि मे भूयासुः मा कदाचन तैर्मम वियोगो भूयादिति यः सङ्कल्पविशेषो वासनानां कारणं तस्य नित्यत्वादनादित्वादित्यर्थः। एतदुक्तं भवति कारणस्य सन्निहितत्वादनुभवसंस्कारादीनां कार्य्याणां प्रवृत्तिः केन वार्य्यते, अनुभव-

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* कुत इत्यत आहेति F पुस्तकपाठः।

संस्काराद्यनुविद्धं संकोच-विकासधर्मि चित्तं तत्तदभिव्यञ्जकविपाक-लाभात् तत्फलरूपतया परिणमत इत्यर्थः ॥ १० ॥

आसामानन्त्यात् हानं कथं सम्भवतीत्याशङ्क्य हानोपायमाह ।

हेतु-फलाश्रयालम्बनैः सङ्गृहीतत्वादेषामभावे तदभावः ॥ ११ ॥

वासनानामनुभवो हेतुः, तस्यानुभवस्य रागादयः, तेषामविद्या इति साक्षात् पारम्पर्य्येण च 'हेतुः' । 'फलं' शरीरादि स्मृत्यादि च । 'आश्रयः' बुद्धितत्त्वं । 'आलम्बनं' यदेवानुभवस्य तदेव वासनानां । अतस्तैः 'हेतु-फलाश्रयालम्बनैः', अनन्तानामपि वासनानां 'संगृहीतत्वात्', तेषां हेत्वादीनां 'अभावे' ज्ञान-योगाभ्यां दग्धबीजकल्पत्वे विहिते, निर्मूलत्वात् न वासनाः प्ररोहन्ति* न कार्य्यमारभन्त इति तासां 'अभावः' ॥ ११ ॥

ननु प्रतिक्षणं चित्तस्य नश्वरत्वोपलब्धेर्वासनानां तत्फलानाञ्च कार्य्यकारणभावेनायुगपद्भावित्वात् भेदे कथमेकत्वमित्याशङ्क्य एकत्व-समर्थनायाह ।

अतीतानागतं स्वरूपतोऽस्त्यध्वभेदाद्धर्म्माणां ॥ १२ ॥

इह अत्यन्तमसतां भावानामुत्पत्तिर्न युक्तिमती तेषां सत्त्वसम्बन्धायोगात् । नहि शशविषाणादीनां क्वचिदपि सत्त्वसम्बन्धो दृष्टः । निरुपाख्ये च कार्य्ये किमुद्दिश्य कारणानि प्रवर्त्तेरन् । नह्यसत्त्वं विष-

* प्ररोहमुपयान्तीति B, F पुस्तकद्वयपाठः ।

थमालोच्य कश्चित् प्रवर्त्तते। सतामपि विरोधान्नाभावसम्बन्धोऽस्ति। यत् स्वरूपेण लब्धसत्ताकं तत् कथं निरुपाख्यतामभावस्वरूपतान्न भजते, न विरुद्धं रूपं स्वीकरोतीत्यर्थः। तस्मात् सतां नाशासम्भवात् असतासोत्पत्त्यभावात् तैस्तैर्धर्मैर्विपरिणममानो धर्मी सदैकरूप एवावतिष्ठते। धर्मास्तु ते त्र्यध्वकत्वेन व्यवस्थिताः*। स्वस्मिन् स्वस्मिन्नध्वनि व्यवस्थिताः स्वरूपं त्यजन्ति,† वर्त्तमानेऽध्वनि व्यवस्थिताः केवलं भोग्यतां भजन्ते। तस्माद्धर्माणामेव अतीतानागताद्यध्वभेदस्तेनैव च रूपेण कार्य्यकारणभावोऽस्मिन् दर्शने प्रतिपद्यते, तस्मादपवर्गपर्य्यन्तमेकमेव चित्तं धर्म्मितयानुवर्त्तमानं न निह्नोतुं पार्य्यते॥ १२॥

त एते धर्म्म-धर्म्मिणः किंरूपा इत्याह।

ते व्यक्त-सूक्ष्मा गुणात्मानः॥ १३॥

य एते धर्म-धर्म्मिणः प्रोक्ताः 'ते', 'व्यक्त-सूक्ष्मभेदेन व्यवस्थिताः। 'गुणाः' सत्त्वरजस्तमोरूपाः। तदात्मानस्तत्स्वभावास्तत्परिणामरूपा इत्यर्थः। यतः सत्त्वरजस्तमोभिः सुखदुःखमोहरूपैः सर्व्वासां वाह्याभ्यन्तरभिन्नानां भावव्यक्तीनामन्वयाऽनुगमो दृश्यते, यच्च यदन्वयि तत् तत्परिणामरूपं दृष्टं। यथा घटादयो मृदन्विता मृत्परिणामरूपाः॥ १३॥

यद्येते त्रयो गुणाः सर्व्वत्र मूलकारणं, कथमेको धर्मीति व्यपदेशः इत्याशङ्क्याह।

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* त्र्यध्वकत्वेन त्रैकालिकत्वेन व्यवस्थिता इति F पुस्तकपाठः।

† न स्वरूपं त्यजन्तीति C पुस्तकपाठः।

परिणामैकत्वाद्वस्तुतत्त्वं ॥ १४ ॥

यद्येते त्रयो गुणास्तथापि तेषामङ्गाङ्गिभावगमनलक्षणो यः 'परिणामः' क्वचित् सत्त्वमङ्गि क्वचिद्रजः क्वचिच्च तम इत्येवंरूपः, तस्य 'एकत्वात्', 'वस्तुनः, 'तत्त्वं' एकत्वमुच्यते। यथेयं पृथिवी अयं वायुरित्यादि ॥ १४ ॥

ननु विज्ञानव्यतिरिक्ते सत्यर्थे वस्त्वेकमनेकं वा वक्तुं युज्यते यदा विज्ञानमेव वासनावशात् कार्य्यकारणभावेनावस्थितं तथा तथा प्रतिभाति, तदा कथमेतच्छक्यते वक्तुमित्याशङ्क्याह।

वस्तुसाम्ये चित्तभेदात्तयोर्व्विविक्तः पन्थाः ॥ १५ ॥

'तयोः' ज्ञान-ज्ञेययोः, 'विविक्तः पन्थाः' विविक्तो मार्गभेद इति यावत्। कथं? 'वस्तुसाम्ये चित्तभेदात्', समाने वस्तुनि स्त्र्यादावुपलभ्यमाने नानाप्रमातॄणां चित्तभेदः सुख-दुःख-मोहरूपतया समुपलभ्यते। तथाहि एकस्यां रूपलावण्यवत्यां योषिति उपलभ्यमानायां सरागस्य सुखमुत्पद्यते, सपत्न्यास्तु द्वेषः, परिव्राजकादेर्घृणेत्येकस्मिन् वस्तुनि नानाविधचित्तोदयात् कथञ्चिन्न कार्य्यत्वं वस्तुनः। एकचित्तकार्य्यत्वे वस्तु एकरूपतयैवावभासेत। किञ्च चित्तकार्य्यत्वे वस्तुनः यस्य चित्तस्य यद् वस्तु कार्य्यं, तस्मिन् अर्थान्तरव्यासक्ते चित्ते तद्वस्तु न किञ्चित् स्यात्। भवत्विति चेन्न। तदेव कथमन्यैर्बहुभिरुपलभ्यते। उपलभ्यते च तस्मान्न चित्तकार्य्यं। अथ युगपद्बहुभिः सोऽर्थः क्रियते तदा बहुनिर्म्मितस्य तस्य* एकनिर्म्मितादवैलक्षण्यं स्यात्। यदि

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* कार्य्यस्येति C पुस्तकपाठः।

वैलक्षण्यं नेष्यते तदा कारणभेदे सति कार्य्यभेदस्याभावे निर्हेतुक-मेकरूपं वा जगत् स्यात् । एतदुक्तं भवति सत्यपि भिन्ने कारणे यदि कार्य्यस्याभेदः तदा समयं जगन्नानाविधकारणजन्यमेकरूपं स्यात्, कारणभेदाननुगमात् स्वातन्त्र्येण निर्हेतुकं वा स्यात् । यद्येवं कथं तेन त्रिगुणात्मनार्थेनैकस्यैव प्रमातुः सुख-दुःख-मोहम-यानि ज्ञानानि जन्यन्ते । मैवं । यथा अर्थस्त्रिगुणस्तथा चित्तमपि त्रिगुणं, तस्य च अर्थप्रतिभासोत्पत्तौ धर्म्मादयः* सहकारिकारणं । तदुद्भवाभिभववशाच्चित्तस्य तेन तेन रूपेणाभिव्यक्तिः । तथा च कामुकस्य सन्निहितायां योषिति धर्म्मसहकृतं चित्तं सत्त्वस्याङ्गितया परिणममानं सुखमयं भवति । तदेवाधर्म्मसहकारि रजसोऽङ्गितया दुःखरूपं सपत्नीमात्रस्य भवति । तीव्राधर्म्मसहकारितया तमसो-ऽङ्गित्वेन कोपनायाः सपत्न्या मोहमयं भवति । तस्माद्विज्ञानव्यति-रिक्तोऽस्ति ग्राह्योऽर्थः† । तदेवं विज्ञानार्थयोः‡ तादात्म्यविरोधान्न कार्य्यकारणभावः । कारणाभेदे सत्यपि कार्य्यभेदे अतिप्रसङ्गादिति ज्ञानाद्व्यतिरिक्तत्वमर्थस्य व्यवस्थापितं ॥ १५ ॥

यद्येकं ज्ञानं प्रकाशकत्वात् ग्रहणस्वभावमर्थस्य प्रकाश्यत्वाद्ग्राह्य-स्वभावः तत् कथं युगपत् सर्व्वानर्थान्न गृह्णाति न स्मरति चेत्याशङ्क्य परिहारं कर्त्तुमाह ।

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* धर्म्माधर्म्मादय इति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

† बाह्यार्थ इति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ विज्ञानवस्तुनोरिति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

तदुपरागापेक्षित्वाच्चित्तस्य वस्तु ज्ञाताज्ञातं ॥ १६ ॥

'तस्य' अर्थस्य, 'उपरागादाकारसमर्पणात्, चित्ते वाह्यं 'वस्तु', 'ज्ञातमज्ञातञ्च भवति । अयमर्थः, सर्व्वः पदार्थः स्वात्मलाभे सामग्रीमपेक्षते, नीलादिज्ञानञ्चोपजायमानं इन्द्रियप्रणालिकया समागतमर्थोपरागं सहकारिकारणत्वेनापेक्षते व्यतिरिक्तस्यार्थस्य सम्बन्धाभावाद्ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात् । ततश्च येनैवार्थेन तस्य ज्ञानस्य स्वरूपोपरागः कृतः तमेवार्थं तज्ज्ञानं व्यवहारयोग्यतां नयति । ततश्च सोऽर्थो ज्ञात इत्युच्यते । येन चाकारो न समर्पितः सोऽज्ञातत्वेन व्यवह्रियते । यस्मिंश्चानुभूतेऽर्थे सादृश्यादिरर्थः संस्कारमुद्बोधयन् सहकारिकारणतां प्रतिपद्यते तस्मिन्नेवार्थे स्मृतिरुपजायते इति सर्व्वत्र न ज्ञानं, नापि सर्व्वत्र स्मृतिरिति न कश्चिद्विरोधः* ॥ १६ ॥

यद्येवं प्रमातापि पुरुषो यस्मिन् काले नीलं संवेदयते न तस्मिन् काले पीतं अतश्चित्तवत्तस्यापि कदाचिद्ग्रहीतृरूपत्वादाकारग्रहणे परिणामित्वं प्राप्तमित्याशङ्क्य परिहर्त्तुमाह ।

सदा ज्ञाताश्चित्तवृत्तयस्तत्प्रभोः पुरुषस्यापरिणामात्† ॥ १७ ॥

या एताः 'चित्तस्य', प्रमाण-विपर्य्ययादिरूपाः 'वृत्तयः', ताः 'तत्प्रभोः' तस्य चित्तस्य ग्रहीतुः, 'पुरुषस्य', 'सदा' सर्व्वकालमेव, 'ज्ञाताः, तस्य चिद्रूपतया 'अपरिणामात्' परिणामित्वाभावादित्यर्थः ।

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* कश्चिद्विरोध इति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

† पुरुषस्यापरिणामित्वादिति काशीमुद्रितभाष्यपुस्तकपाठः ।

यद्यसौ परिणामी स्यात्तदा परिणामस्य कादाचित्कत्वात्तासां चित्त-वृत्तीनां सदा ज्ञातत्वं नोपपद्यते। अयमर्थः, पुरुषस्य चिद्रूपस्य सदैवाधिष्ठातृत्वेन व्यवस्थितस्य यदन्तरङ्गं निर्मलं सत्त्वं तस्यापि सदैवावस्थितत्वात् तद्येन येनार्थेनोपरक्तं भवति तथाविधस्यार्थस्य सदैव चिच्छायासंक्रान्तिसद्भावः, तस्यां सत्यां सिद्धं सदा ज्ञातृत्वमिति न कदाचित्परिणामित्वाशङ्का॥ १७॥

ननु चित्तमेव सत्त्वोत्कर्षाद्यदि प्रकाशकं तदा स्वपरप्रकाशरूपत्वात्* आत्मानमर्थञ्च प्रकाशयतीति तावतैव व्यवहारसमाप्तिः किं ग्रहीचन्तरेण इत्याशङ्कामपनेतुमाह।

न तत् स्वाभासं दृश्यत्वात्॥ १८॥

'तत्' चित्तं, 'स्वाभासं' स्वप्रकाशं, न भवति, पुरुषवेद्यं भवतीति यावत्। कुतः 'दृश्यत्वात्', यत् किल दृश्यं तद्द्रष्टृवेद्यं, यथा घटादि। दृश्यञ्चं चित्तं तस्मान्न स्वाभासं॥ १८॥

ननु साध्याविशिष्टोऽयं हेतुः दृश्यत्वमेव चित्तस्यासिद्धं, किञ्च स्वबुद्धिसंवेदनद्वारेण पुरुषाणां हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहाररूपा वृत्तयो दृश्यन्ते, तथाहि क्रुद्धोऽहं भीतोऽहं न मे राग इत्येवमाद्या संविद्बुद्धेरसंवेदनान्नोपपन्नेत्याशङ्कां निरसितुमाह।

एकसमये चोभयानवधारणं॥ १९॥

अर्थस्य संविन्निरिदन्तया व्यवहारयोग्यतापादनं अयमर्थः सुख-

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* स्वपरप्रकाशकत्वादिति C पुस्तकपाठः।

† वेद्यत्वेति C पुस्तकपाठः।

हेतुर्दुःखहेतुर्वेति । बुद्धेश्च संवित् अहमित्येवमाकारेण सुखदुःख-रूपतया व्यवहारक्षमतापादनं । एवंविधस्य व्यापारद्वयमर्थप्रत्यक्षकाले न युगपत्कर्त्तुं शक्यं विरोधात् । न हि विरुद्धयोर्व्यापारयोर्युगपत्सम्भ-वोऽस्ति । अतः ‘एकस्मिन् काले, ‘उभयस्य’ स्वरूपस्यार्थस्य च, अवधारयितुमशक्यत्वान्न चित्तं स्वप्रकाशकमित्युक्तं भवति । किञ्चैवं-विधव्यापारद्वयं निष्पाद्य फलद्वयस्यासंवेदनाद्बहिर्मुखतयैवार्थनिष्ठमेव चित्तस्य स्वयमसंवेदनात्* अर्थनिष्ठमेव फलं न स्वनिष्ठमित्यर्थः ॥१८॥

ननु माभूद्बुद्धेः स्वयं ग्रहणं बुद्ध्यन्तरेण तु भविष्यति इत्या-शङ्क्याह ।

चित्तान्तरदृश्ये बुद्धिबुद्धेरतिप्रसङ्गः स्मृतिसङ्करश्च ॥२०॥

यदि हि बुद्धिर्बुद्ध्यन्तरेण संवेद्यते तदा सापि बुद्धिः स्वयमबुद्धा बुद्ध्यन्तरं प्रकाशयितुमसमर्थेति तस्या ग्राहकं बुद्ध्यन्तरं कल्पनीयं तस्या अप्यन्यदित्यनवस्थानात् पुरुषायुषेणाप्यर्थप्रतीतिर्न स्यात् । नहि प्रतीतावप्रतीतायामर्थः प्रतीतो भवति । स्मृतिसङ्करश्च प्राप्नोति । रूपे रसे वा समुत्पन्नायां बुद्धौ तद्ग्राहिकाणामनन्तानां बुद्धीना-मुत्पत्तेर्बुद्धिजनितैः संस्कारैर्यदा बह्व्यः स्मृतयः क्रियन्ते, तदार्थबुद्धे-रपर्य्यवसानाद् बुद्धिस्मृतीनां युगपदुत्पत्तेः कस्मिन्नर्थे स्मृतिरियमु-त्पन्नेति ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वात् ‘स्मृतिसङ्करः’,† स्यादियं रूपस्मृतिरियं रसस्मृतिरिति न ज्ञायेत ॥ २० ॥

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* स्वरूपसंवेदनाभावादिति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

† स्मृतीनां सङ्कर इति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

ननु बुद्धेः स्वप्रकाशत्वाभावे बुद्ध्यन्तरेण चासंवेदने कथमयं विषयसंवेदनरूपो व्यवहार इत्याशङ्क्य स्वसिद्धान्तमाह।

चितेरप्रतिसङ्क्रमायास्तदाकारापत्तौ स्वबुद्धिसंवेदनं ॥२१॥

पुरुषश्चिद्रूपत्वात् 'चितिः, सा 'अप्रतिसङ्क्रमा, न विद्यते प्रतिसङ्क्रमोऽन्यत्र गमनं यस्याः सा तथोक्ता अन्येनासङ्कीर्णेति यावत्। यथा गुणा अङ्गाङ्गिभावलक्षणे* परिणामे अङ्गिनं गुणिनमुपसंक्रामन्ति तद्रूपतामिवापद्यन्ते, यथा वा लोके परमाणवः प्रसरन्तो विषयमारोपयन्ति नैवं चितिशक्तिः, तस्याः सर्व्वदैकरूपतया स्वप्रतिष्ठितत्वेन व्यवस्थितत्वात्। अतस्तत्सन्निधाने यदा बुद्धिस्तदाकारतामापद्यते चेतनेवोपजायते, बुद्धिवृत्तिप्रतिसङ्क्रान्ता च यदा चिच्छक्तिः बुद्धिवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नतया† संवेद्यते तदा बुद्धेः स्वस्यात्मनो वेदनं सम्भवतीत्यर्थः॥ २१ ॥

इत्थं स्वसंविदितं चित्तं सर्व्वार्थग्रहणसामर्थ्येन सकलव्यवहारक्षमं भवतीत्याह।

द्रष्टृ-दृश्योपरक्तं चित्तं सर्व्वार्थं ॥ २२ ॥

'द्रष्टा' पुरुषः, तेन 'उपरक्तं' तत्सन्निधाने तद्रूपतामिवापन्नं,‡ 'दृश्योपरक्तं' गृहीतविषयाकारपरिणामं, यदा भवति तदा तदेव सर्व्वार्थग्रहणसमर्थं जायते। यथा निर्म्मलस्फटिकदर्पणाद्येव प्रतिबिम्बग्रहणसमर्थं एवं रजस्तमोभ्यामनभिभूतं सत्त्वं शुद्धत्वाच्चिच्छाया-

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* अङ्गाङ्गिभावगमनलक्षणे इति F पुस्तकपाठः।

† बुद्धिवृत्तिविशिष्टतया इति F पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ तद्रूपतामिव प्राप्तमिति F पुस्तकपाठः।

ग्रहणसमर्थं भवति, न पुनरशुद्धत्वाद्रजस्तमसी। तत् न्यग्भूत-रजस्तमोरूपमलितया सत्त्वं निश्चलप्रदीपशिखाकारं सदैवैकरूपतया परिणममाणं चिच्छायाग्रहणसामर्थ्यादामोक्षप्राप्तेरवतिष्ठते। यथा अयस्कान्तसन्निधाने लौहस्य चलनमाविर्भवति, एवं चिद्रूपसन्निधाने सत्त्वस्याभिव्यङ्ग्यमभिव्यज्यते चैतन्यं। अत एवास्मिन् दर्शने द्वे चिच्छक्ती नित्योदिताऽभिव्यङ्ग्या च। नित्योदिता चिच्छक्तिः पुरुषः। तत्सन्नि-धानादभिव्यक्तचैतन्यं सत्त्वमभिव्यङ्ग्या चिच्छक्तिः। तदत्यन्तं सन्निहित-त्वादन्तरङ्गं पुरुषस्य भोग्यतां प्रतिपद्यते। तदेव शान्तब्रह्मवादिभिः साङ्ख्यैः पुरुषस्य परमात्मनोऽधिष्ठेयं कर्म्मानुरूपसुखदुःखभोक्तृतया व्यप-दिश्यते। यत्त्वत्यन्तानुद्रिक्तत्वादेकस्यापि गुणस्य, कदाचित्कस्यचिदङ्गि-त्वात्त्रिगुणं प्रतिक्षणं परिणममानं सुख-दुःख-मोहात्मकं न निर्म्मलं, तत्तस्मिन् कर्म्मात्मरूपे शुद्धे सत्त्वे स्वाकारसमर्पणद्वारेण संवेद्यता-मापादयति। तच्छुद्धमाद्यं चित्तसत्त्वमेकतः प्रतिसंक्रान्तचिच्छायमन्यतो गृहीतविषयाकारेण चित्तेनोपढौकितस्वाकारं चित्संक्रान्तिबलाच्चेत-नायमानं वास्तवचैतन्याभावेऽपि सुख-दुःखरूपभोगमनुभवति। स एव भोगोऽत्यन्तसान्निध्येन विवेकाग्रहणाद्भोक्तुरपि पुरुषस्य भोग इति व्यप-दिश्यते। अनेनाभिप्रायेण विन्ध्यवासिनोक्तं। "सत्त्वतप्यत्वमेव पुरुष-तप्यत्वं" इति। अन्यत्रापि "बिम्बे प्रतिबिम्बमानच्छायासदृशच्छायान्त-रोद्भवः प्रतिबिम्बशब्देनोच्यते। एवं सत्त्वेपि पौरुषेयचिच्छायासदृश-चिच्छायान्तराभिव्यक्तिः प्रतिसङ्क्रान्तिशब्दार्थः"*। ननु प्रतिबिम्बनं

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* प्रतिबिम्बशब्दार्थं इति C पुस्तकपाठः। चिच्छायाशब्दार्थं इति H पुस्तकपाठः।

नामानिर्मलस्य नियतपरिणामस्य* निर्मले दृष्टं, यथा मुखस्य दर्पणे। अत्यन्तनिर्मलस्य व्यापकस्य अपरिणामिनः पुरुषस्य तस्मादनिर्मले सत्त्वे कथं प्रतिबिम्बनमुपपद्यते। उच्यते। प्रतिबिम्बनस्य स्वरूपमनवगच्छता भवतेदमभ्यधायि। येव सत्त्वगताया अभिव्यङ्ग्याया चिच्छक्तेः पुरुषस्य सान्निध्यादभि[illegible] सैव प्रतिबिम्बनमुच्यते। यादृशी पुरुषगता चिच्छक्तिस्तच्छाय[illegible] तस्याविर्भवति। यदप्युक्तमत्यन्तनिर्मलः पुरुषः कथमनिर्मले सत्त्वे प्र[illegible]संक्रामतीति तदप्यनैकान्तिकं। नैर्मल्यादपकृष्टेऽपि जलादौ आदित्यादयः प्रतिसंक्रान्ताः समुपलभ्यन्ते। यदप्युक्तमपरिच्छिन्नस्य नास्ति प्रतिसंक्रान्तिरिति तदप्ययुक्तं। व्यापकस्याकाशस्य दर्पणादौ प्रतिसंक्रान्तिदर्शनात्। एवं सति न काचिदनुपपत्तिः प्रतिबिम्बदर्शनस्य॥

ननु सात्त्विकपरिणामरूपे बुद्धिसत्त्वे पुरुषसन्निधानादभिव्यङ्ग्यायाश्चिच्छक्तेर्बाह्याकारसंक्रान्तौ पुरुषस्य सुखदुःखरूपो भोग इत्युक्तं तदनुपपन्नं, तदेव चित्तसत्त्वं प्रकृतावपरिणतायां कथं सम्भवति, किमर्थश्च तस्याः परिणामः। तत्रोच्यते‡। पुरुषस्यार्थोपभोगसम्पादनं तया कर्त्तव्यमतः पुरुषार्थकर्त्तव्यतया तस्याः युक्त एव परिणामः॥

नन्वनुपपन्नं पुरुषार्थकर्त्तव्यताया एवानुपपत्तेः। पुरुषार्थो मया कर्त्तव्य इत्येवंविधोऽध्यवसायः पुरुषार्थकर्त्तव्यतोच्यते, जडायाश्च प्रकृतेः कथमेवंविधोऽध्यवसायः। अस्ति चेदध्यवसायः, कथं जडत्वं।

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* नियतपरिमाणस्येति C पुस्तकपाठः।

† तड़ामाशाविति C पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ यथोच्यत इति C पुस्तकपाठः।

ऽभिधीयते। अनुलोमप्रतिलोमलक्षणे परिणामद्वये सहजं शक्तिद्वयमस्ति, तदेव पुरुषार्थकर्त्तव्यतोच्यते। सा च शक्तिरचेतनायाः प्रकृतेः सहजा एव। तत्र महदादिमहाभूतपर्य्यन्तोऽस्या बहिर्मुखतयानुलोमः परिणामः। पुनः स्वकारणानुप्रवेशद्वारेणास्मितान्तः प्रतिलोमः परिणामः। इत्थं पुरुषस्य भोगपरिसमाप्तेः सहजशक्तिद्वयक्षयात् कृतार्था प्रकृतिर्न पुनः परिणाममारभते। एवं विधायाञ्च पुरुषार्थकर्त्तव्यतायां जडाया अपि प्रकृतेर्न काचिदनुपपत्तिः॥

ननु यदीदृशी शक्तिः सहजैव प्रधानस्यास्ति तत् किमर्थं मोक्षार्थिभिः* मोक्षाय यत्नः क्रियते, मोक्षस्य चानर्थनीयत्वे तदुपदेशकस्य शास्त्रस्यानर्थक्यं। उच्यते। योऽयं प्रकृतिपुरुषयोरनादिर्भोग्यभोक्तृभावलक्षणः सम्बन्धः, तस्मिन् सति व्यक्तचेतनायाः प्रकृतेः कर्तृत्वाभिमानात् दुःखानुभवे सति कथमियं दुःखनिवृत्तिरात्यन्तिकी मम स्यादिति भवत्येवाध्यवसायः। अतो दुःखनिवृत्त्युपायोपदेशकशास्त्रोपदेशापेक्षास्त्येव प्रधानस्य। तथाभूतमेव कर्म्मानुरूपं बुद्धिसत्त्वं† शास्त्रोपदेशस्य विषयः। दर्शनान्तरेष्वप्येवंविध एवाविद्यास्वभावः शास्त्रेऽधिक्रियते। स च मोक्षाय प्रयतमान एवंविधमेव शास्त्रोपदेशं सहकारिणमपेक्ष्य मोक्षाख्यं फलमासादयति। सर्व्वाण्येव कार्य्याणि प्राप्तायां सामग्र्यां‡ आत्मानं लभन्ते, अस्य च प्रतिलोमपरिणामद्वारेणैवोत्पाद्यस्य मोक्षाख्यस्य कार्य्यस्य ईदृश्येव सामग्री प्रमाणेन निश्चिता, प्रकारान्तरेणानुपपत्तेः। अतस्तां विना कथं

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* तदर्थिभिरिति F पुस्तकपाठः।

† कर्म्मात्मरूपं बुद्धिसत्त्वमिति C पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ समग्रायां सामग्र्यामिति F पुस्तकपाठः।

भवितुमर्हति। अतः स्थितमेतत्। संक्रान्तविषयोपरागमभिव्यक्त-चिच्छायं बुद्धिसत्त्वं विषयनिश्चयद्वारेण समग्रां लोकयात्रां निर्व्वाहयतीत्येवंविधमेव चित्तं पश्यन्तो भ्रान्ताः स्वसंवेदनं चित्तं, चित्तमात्रञ्च जगदित्येवं ब्रुवाणाः प्रतिबोधिता भवन्ति॥२२॥

ननु यद्येवंविधादेव चित्तात् सकलव्यवहारनिष्पत्तिः* कथं प्रमाणशून्यो द्रष्टा अभ्युपपद्यते† इत्याशङ्क्य द्रष्टुः‡ प्रमाणमाह।

तदसङ्ख्येयवासनाभिश्चित्रमपि§ परार्थं संहत्यकारित्वात्॥२३॥

'तत्' एतच्चित्तं, 'असङ्ख्यातुमशक्याभिः, 'वासनाभिः', 'चित्रमपि' नानारूपमपि, 'परार्थं' परस्य स्वामिनो भोक्तुर्भोगापवर्गलक्षणमर्थं साधयतीति। कुतः, 'संहत्यकारित्वात्' संहत्य सम्भूय मिलित्वा अर्थक्रियाकारित्वात्। यच्च संहत्यार्थक्रियाकारि तत्परार्थं दृष्टं, यथा शयनासनादि। सत्त्व-रजस्तमांसि च चित्तलक्षणपरिणामभाञ्जि संहत्यकारीणि, अतः परार्थानि। यस्य परः स पुरुषः॥

ननु च यादृशेन शयनासनादिना परेण शरीरवता परार्थत्वमुपलब्धं,|| तद्दृष्टान्तबलेन तादृश एव परः सिध्यति, यादृशश्च भवतां परोऽसंहतरूपोऽभिप्रेतस्तद्विपरीतस्य सिद्धेरयमिष्टविघातकृद्धेतुः¶। उच्यते।

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* सकलव्यवहारनिर्वृत्तिरिति C पुस्तकपाठः।

† अभ्युपगम्येत इति C. अभ्युपगन्तव्य इति F पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ अन्वेरीति C पुस्तकपाठः।

§ चित्रमपीति C पुस्तकपाठः। परन्त्वयं न समीचीनः।

|| पारार्थ्यमुपलब्धमिति F पुस्तकपाठः।

¶ अयमिष्टविघातको हेतुरिति C पुस्तकपाठः।

यद्यपि सामान्येन परार्थमात्रे व्याप्तिर्गृहीता तथापि सत्त्वादि-
विलक्षणधर्मिपर्यालोचनया तद्विलक्षण एव भोक्ता परः सिध्यति ।
यथा चेन्धनाहृते शिखरिणि विलक्षणाद्धूमादग्निरनुमीयमान इतर-
वह्निविलक्षणस्येन्धनप्रभव एव प्रतीयते, एवमिहापि विलक्षणस्य
सत्त्वाख्यस्य भोग्यस्य परार्थत्वेऽनुमीयमाने तथाविध एव भोक्ताऽधि-
ष्ठाता परश्चिन्मात्ररूपोऽसंहतः सिध्यति । यदि वा तस्य परत्वं
सर्व्वात्मकत्वमेव प्रतीयते, तथापि तामसेभ्यो विषयेभ्यः प्रकृष्यते शरीरं
प्रकाशरूपेन्द्रियाश्रयत्वात् । तस्मादपि प्रकृष्यन्ते इन्द्रियाणि । ततो-
ऽपि प्रकृष्टं सत्त्वं प्रकाशरूपं । तथापि यः प्रकाशकः प्रकाश्यविल-
क्षणः स चिद्रूप एव भवतीति कुतस्तस्य संहतत्वं ॥ २३ ॥

इदानीं शास्त्रफलं कैवल्यं निर्णेतुं दशभिः सूत्रैरुपक्रमते ।

विशेषदर्शिन आत्मभावभावनानिवृत्तिः ॥ २४ ॥

एवं सत्त्वपुरुषयोरन्यत्वे साधिते* यस्तयोर्विशेषं पश्यति अयमस्मा-
दन्य इत्येवंरूपं,† तस्य विज्ञातचित्तसत्त्वस्वरूपस्य चित्ते या 'आत्म-
भावभावना', सा निवर्त्तते । चित्तमेव कर्तृ ज्ञातृ भोक्तृ इत्यभिमानो
निवर्त्तते ॥ २४ ॥

तस्मिन् सति किं भवतीत्याह ।

तदा विवेकनिम्नं कैवल्यप्राग्भारं‡ चित्तं ॥ २५ ॥

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* प्रतिपादिते इति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

† अहमस्मादन्य इत्येवंरूपमिति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ कैवल्यप्रभवमिति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

यदस्याज्ञाननिम्नं वहिर्मुखं विषयोपभोगफलं चित्तमासीत्तदिदानीं 'विवेकनिम्नं'* विवेकमार्गमन्तर्मुखं, 'कैवल्यप्राग्भारं' कैवल्यफलं, कैवल्यप्रारम्भं वा सम्पद्यत इति ॥ २५॥

अस्मिंश्च† विवेकवाहिनि चित्ते येऽन्तरायाः प्रादुर्भवन्ति तेषां हेतुप्रतिपादनद्वारेण त्यागोपायमाह।

तच्छिद्रेषु प्रत्ययान्तराणि संस्कारेभ्यः ॥ २६ ॥

तस्मिन् समाधौ स्थितस्य, 'छिद्रेषु' अन्तरालेषु, यानि 'प्रत्ययान्तराणि' व्युत्थानरूपाणि ज्ञानानि, तानि प्राग्भवेभ्यः‡ व्युत्थानानुभवजेभ्यः 'संस्कारेभ्यः', अहं ममेत्येवंरूपाणि क्षीयमाणेभ्योऽपि प्रभवन्ति। अन्तःकरणोच्छित्तिद्वारेण तेषां हानं कर्त्तव्यमित्युक्तं भवति ॥ २६ ॥

हानोपायस्च पूर्व्वमेवोक्त इत्याह।

हानमेषां क्लेशवदुक्तं ॥ २७ ॥

यथा 'क्लेशानामविद्यादीनां, हानं पूर्व्वमुक्तं, तथा संस्काराणामपि कर्त्तव्यं। यथा ते ज्ञानाग्निना प्लुष्टा दग्धवीजकल्पा न पुनश्चित्तभूमौ प्ररोहं लभन्ते, तथा संस्कारा अपि ॥ २७ ॥

एवं प्रत्ययान्तरानुदये स्थिरीभूते§ समाधौ याट्टशस्य योगिनः समाधेः प्रकर्षप्राप्तिर्भवति, तथाविधमुपायमाह¶।

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* विवेकविषयमिति E पुस्तकपाठः।

† तस्मिंश्चेति F पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ प्राक्तनेभ्य इति H पुस्तकपाठः।

§ स्थिरीकृत इति F पुस्तकपाठः।

¶ एतत्पाठः सर्व्वत्र वर्त्तते, परन्तु उपायमिति न समीचीनं याट्टशस्य योगिन इति पाठेन सह विरुद्धत्वात्।

प्रसङ्ख्यानेऽप्यकुसीदस्य सर्व्वथा विवेकख्यातेर्धर्म्ममेघः समाधिः ॥ २८ ॥

'प्रसङ्ख्यानं' यावतां तत्त्वानां यथाक्रमं व्यवस्थितानां परस्परविलक्षणस्वरूपविभावनं, तस्मिन् सति 'अपि', 'अकुसीदस्य' फलमलिप्सोः, प्रत्ययान्तराणामनुदये 'सर्व्वप्रकारविवेकख्यातेः' परिशेषात् 'धर्म्ममेघः समाधिः' भवति, प्रकृष्टमशुक्लकृष्णं धर्म्मं परमपुरुषार्थसाधकं मेहति सिञ्चतीति 'धर्म्ममेघः' । अनेन प्रकृष्टधर्म्मस्यैव ज्ञानहेतुत्वमित्युपपादितं भवति ॥ २८ ॥

तस्माद्धर्म्ममेघात् किं भवतीत्याह* ।

ततः क्लेशकर्म्मनिवृत्तिः ॥ २९ ॥

'क्लेशानामविद्यादीनामभिनिवेशान्तानां, 'कर्म्मणाञ्च शुक्लादिभेदेन त्रिविधानां, ज्ञानोदयात् पूर्व्वपूर्व्वकारणनिवृत्त्या 'निवृत्तिः', भवतीत्यर्थः ॥ २९ ॥

निवृत्तेषु तेषु किं भवतीत्याह ।

तदा सर्व्वावरणमलापेतस्य ज्ञानस्यानन्त्याज्ज्ञेयमल्पं ॥ ३० ॥

आव्रियते चित्तमेभिरिति 'आवरणानि' क्लेशाः, त एव 'मलाः', तेभ्यः 'अपेतस्य' तद्विरहितस्य, 'ज्ञानस्य' गतघनगगननिभस्य, 'आन-

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* भवतीत्यत आहेति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

नयात्' अनवच्छेदात्, 'ज्ञेयं', 'अल्पं' गणनास्पदं भवति, अक्लेशेनैव सर्व्वं ज्ञेयं जानातीत्यर्थः ॥ ३० ॥

ततः किमित्याह ।

ततः कृतार्थानां परिणामक्रमसमाप्तिर्गुणानां ॥ ३१ ॥

'कृतः' निष्पादितः, भोगापवर्गलक्षणः पुरुषार्थः प्रयोजनं यैस्ते 'कृतार्थाः', 'गुणाः' सत्त्व-रजस्तमांसि, तेषां 'परिणामः' आ पुरुषार्थ-समाप्तेरानुलोम्येन प्रातिलोम्येन चाङ्गाङ्गिभावावस्थितिलक्षणः, तस्य योऽसौ 'क्रमः' वक्ष्यमाणः, तस्य परिसमाप्तिः' निष्ठा, न पुनरुद्भव इत्यर्थः ॥ ३१ ॥

क्रमस्योक्तस्य लक्षणमाह ।

क्षणप्रतियोगी परिणामापरान्तनिर्ग्राह्यः क्रमः ॥३२॥

'क्षणः' अल्पीयान् कालः, तस्य योऽसौ 'प्रतियोगी' एकक्षणवि-लक्षणः । 'परिणामापरान्तनिर्ग्राह्यः' अनुभूतेषु क्षणेषु पश्चात् सङ्कल-नबुद्ध्या यो गृह्यते स क्षणानां 'क्रमः' उच्यते । न ह्यननुभूतेषु क्षणेषु क्रमः परिज्ञातुं शक्यः ॥ ३२ ॥

इदानीं फलभूतस्य कैवल्यस्यासाधारणं स्वरूपमाह ।

पुरुषार्थशून्यानां गुणानां प्रतिप्रसवः कैवल्यं स्वरूप-प्रतिष्ठा वा चितिशक्तिरिति ॥ ३३ ॥

समाप्तभोगापवर्गलक्षणपुरुषार्थानां 'गुणानां', यः 'प्रतिप्रसवः'

प्रतिलोमपरिणामसमाप्तौ विकारानुद्भवः, यदि वा चिच्छक्तेर्वृत्तिसा-
रूप्यनिवृत्तौ स्वरूपमात्रेणावस्थानं तत् 'कैवल्यं' उच्यते ॥

न केवलमस्मद्दर्शने चेतनः कैवल्यावस्थायामेवम्भूतश्चिद्रूपः, यावद्दर्शना-
न्तरेष्वपि विमृश्यमाण एवंविधरूपोऽवतिष्ठते । तथाहि संसारदशाया-
मात्मा कर्तृत्व-भोक्तृत्वानुसन्धातृत्वमयः प्रतीयते । अन्यथा यद्ययमेकः
चेतनस्तथाविधो न स्यात्तदा ज्ञानक्षणानामेव पूर्व्वापरानुसन्धानाभावे*
नियतकर्म्मफलसम्बन्धो न स्यात्, कृतनाशाकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गश्च । यदि
येनैव शास्त्रोपदिष्टमनुष्ठितं कर्म्म तस्यैव भोक्तृत्वं भवेत् तदा हिता-हित-
प्राप्तिपरिहारार्थं सर्व्वस्य प्रवृत्तिर्घटते । सर्व्वस्यैव व्यवहारस्य हानोपा-
दानलक्षणस्यानुसन्धानेनैव व्याप्तत्वात् ज्ञानक्षणानां परस्परभेदेनानु-
सन्धानशून्यत्वात् तदनुसन्धानाभावे‡ कस्यचिदपि व्यवहारस्यानुपपत्तेः
कर्त्ता भोक्तानुसन्धाता यः स आत्मेति व्यवस्थाप्यते । मोक्षदशायान्तु
सकलग्राह्य-ग्राहकलक्षणव्यवहाराभावात् चैतन्यमात्रमेव तस्यावशिष्यते ।
तच्च चैतन्यं चितिमात्रत्वेनैवोपपद्यते न पुनरात्मसंवेदनेन, यस्मा-
द्विषयग्रहणसमर्थत्वमेव चितेरूपं, नात्मग्राहकत्वं । तथाहि अर्थस्तथा
गृह्यमाणः अयमिति गृह्यते । स्वरूपं गृह्यमाणमहमिति । न पुन-
र्युगपद्बहिर्मुखतान्तर्मुखतालक्षणव्यापारद्वयं परस्परं विरुद्धं कर्त्तुं
शक्यं । अत एकस्मिन् समये व्यापारद्वयस्य कर्त्तुमशक्यत्वात् चिद्रूप-
तयैवावशिष्यते । अतो मोक्षावस्थायां निवृत्ताधिकारेषु गुणेषु

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* ज्ञानलक्षणानामेव पूर्व्वापरानुसन्धानशून्यानां भावे इति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

† हितहितप्राप्यपरिहारायेति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

‡ अनुसन्धानाभावे इति C पुस्तकपाठः । तदनुसन्धानभाव इति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

चिन्मात्र एवात्मावतिष्ठत इत्येवं युक्तं। संसारदशायान्तु एवंभूतस्य कर्त्तृत्वं भोक्तृत्वमनुसन्धातृत्वञ्च सर्व्वमुपपद्यते। तथाहि योऽयं प्रकृत्या महदादिर्नैसर्गिकोऽस्य भोग्य-भोक्तृभावलक्षणः सम्बन्धः अविवेकख्यातिमूलः, तस्मिन् सति पुरुषार्थकर्त्तव्यतारूपयन्निद्वयसद्भावे या महदादिभावेन परिणतिस्तस्यां संयोगे सति यदात्मनोऽधिष्ठातृत्वं चिच्छायासमर्पणसामर्थ्यं, बुद्धिसत्त्वस्य च सङ्क्रान्तचिच्छायाग्रहणसामर्थ्यं, चिद्वष्टम्भायाश्च बुद्धेर्योऽयं कर्त्तृत्व-भोक्तृत्वाध्यवसायस्तत एव सर्व्वस्यानुसन्धानपूर्व्वकस्य व्यवहारस्य निष्पत्तेः किमन्यैः फल्गुभिः कल्पनाजालैः।

यदि पुनरेवम्भूतमार्गव्यतिरेकेण पारमार्थिकमात्मनः कर्त्तृत्वाद्यङ्गीक्रियते, तदास्य परिणामित्वप्रसङ्गः, परिणामित्वाच्चानित्यत्वे तस्यात्मत्वमेव न स्यात्। न ह्येकस्मिन्नेव समये एकेनैव रूपेण परस्परविरुद्धावस्थानुभवः सम्भवति। तथाहि यस्यामवस्थायां आत्मसमवेते समुत्पन्ने सुखे तस्यानुभवितृत्वं, न तस्यामेवावस्थायां दुःखानुभवितृत्वं। अतोऽवस्थानानात्वात्तदभिन्नस्यावस्थावतोपि नानात्वं, नानात्वेन च परिणामित्वाचात्मत्वं नापि नित्यत्वं। अत एव शान्तब्रह्मवादिभिः साङ्ख्यैरात्मनः सदैव संसारदशायां मोक्षदशायाञ्चैकरूपत्वमङ्गीक्रियते।

ये तु वेदान्तवादिनश्चिदानन्दमयत्वमात्मनो मोक्षं मन्यन्ते, तेषां न युक्तः पक्षः। तथाहि आनन्दस्य सुखस्वरूपत्वात् सुखस्य च संवेद्यमानतयैव प्रतिभासात् संवेद्यमानत्वञ्च संवेदनव्यतिरेकेणानुपपन्नमिति संवेद्य-संवेदनयोर्द्वयोरभ्युपगमात् अद्वैतहानिः। अथ सुखात्मकत्वमेव तस्योच्यते। तत् विरुद्धधर्माध्यासादनुपपन्नं। न हि संवेदनं संवेद्यञ्चैकं भवितुमर्हति। किञ्चाद्वैतवादिभिः कर्म्मात्म-परमात्मभेदेनात्मा द्विविध

उच्यते* । तत्र येनैव रूपेण सुख-दुःखभोक्तृत्वं कर्मात्मनः, तेनैव रूपेण यदि परमात्मनः स्यात्तदा कर्मात्मकपरमात्मनः परिणामित्वमविद्यास्वभावत्वञ्च स्यात्। अथ न साक्षाद्भोक्तृत्वं, किन्तु तदुपढौकितमुदासीनतयाधिष्ठातृत्वेन स्वीकरोति, तदाऽसहर्षेणानुप्रवेशः। ज्ञानस्वरूपता च पूर्व्वमेव निराकृता। किञ्चाविद्यास्वभावत्वे निःस्वभावत्वात्मनां कः शास्त्राधिकारी। न तावन्नित्यनिर्मुक्तत्वात् परमात्मा, नाप्यविद्यास्वभावत्वात् कर्मात्मा। ततश्च सकलशास्त्रवैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गः। अविद्यामयत्वे च जगतोऽङ्गीक्रियमाणे कस्याविद्येति विचार्यते। न तावत्परमात्मनः नित्यनिर्मुक्तत्वात् विद्यारूपत्वाच्च। कर्मात्मनोऽपि निःस्वभावतया शशविषाणप्रख्यत्वे कथमविद्यासम्बन्धः। अथोच्यते एतदेवाविद्याया अविद्यात्वं यदविचारणीयत्वं नाम। य द्धि विचारेण दिनकरकरस्पृष्टनीहारवद्विलयमुपयाति, सैवाविद्येत्युच्यते। नैवं। यद्वस्तु किञ्चित्कार्य्यं करोति तदवश्यं कुतश्चिद्भिन्नमभिन्नं वा वक्तव्यं, अविद्यायाश्च संसारलक्षणप्रपञ्चकार्य्यकर्तृत्वमवश्यमङ्गीकर्त्तव्यं, तस्मिन् सत्यपि यद्यनिर्व्वाच्यत्वमुच्यते, तदा कस्यचिदपि वाच्यत्वं न स्यात् ब्रह्मणोऽप्यवाच्यताप्रसक्तिः। तस्मादधिष्ठातृरूपतातिरेकेण नान्यदात्मनो रूपमुपपद्यते। अधिष्ठातृत्वञ्च चिद्रूपत्वमेव तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य धर्म्मस्य कस्यचित् प्रमाणानुपपत्तेः।

यैरपि नैयायिकादिभिरात्मा चेतनायोगाच्चेतन इत्युच्यते, चेतनापि तस्य मनःसंयोगजा। तथाहि इच्छा-ज्ञान-प्रयत्नादयो गुणास्तस्य

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* इष्यत इति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

व्यवहारदशायां त्वात्ममनःसंयोगादुत्पद्यन्ते। तैरेव च गुणैः स्वयं ज्ञाता कर्त्ता भोक्तेति व्यपदिश्यते। मोक्षदशायान्तु मिथ्याज्ञाननिवृत्तौ तन्मूलानां दोषाणामपि निवृत्तेस्तेषां बुद्ध्यादीनां विशेषगुणानामत्यन्तोच्छित्तिः स्वरूपमात्रप्रतिष्ठत्वमात्मनोऽङ्गीकृतं। तेषां च तुच्छः पक्षः। यतस्तस्यां दशायां शिलाकल्पत्वमात्मनः। व्यापकत्वादयो गुणा आकाशादीनामपि सन्ति। अतस्तद्वैलक्षण्येनात्मनः किञ्चिद्रूपमवश्यमङ्गीकर्त्तव्यं। आत्मानात्मनोर्व्यतिरेक इति चेत्। न। सर्व्वस्यैव हि व्यतिरेकः स्वतोऽस्ति। अतोऽन्याभ्यो वैलक्षण्यमात्मनोऽवश्यमङ्गीकर्त्तव्यं। तच्चाधिष्ठातृत्वं चिद्रूपस्यैव घटते नान्यथा।

यैरपि मीमांसकैः कर्म्म-कर्त्तृरूप आत्माङ्गीक्रियते। तेषामपि न युक्तः पक्षः। तथाहि अहंप्रत्ययग्राह्य आत्मेति तेषां प्रतिज्ञा अहंप्रत्यये च कर्त्तृत्वं कर्म्मत्वञ्चात्मन एव। न चैतद्विरुद्धत्वादुपपद्यते कर्त्तृत्वं प्रमातृत्वं, कर्म्मत्वञ्च प्रमेयत्वं। न चैतद्विरुद्धधर्म्माध्यासो युगपदेकस्य घटते, यद्विरुद्धधर्म्माध्यस्तं न तदेकं। यथा भावाभावौ। विरुद्धे च कर्त्तृत्व-कर्म्मत्वे। ननूच्यते। न कर्त्तृत्व-कर्म्मत्वयोर्विरोधः, किन्तु कर्त्तृत्व-करणत्वयोः। नैतद्युक्तं, विरुद्धधर्म्माध्यासस्य तुल्यत्वात्। तस्मादहंप्रत्ययग्राह्यत्वं परिहृत्यात्मनोऽधिष्ठातृत्वमेवोपपन्नं, तच्च चेतनत्वेन।

यैरपि द्रव्यपर्यायाभ्यामात्मनोऽनेकरूपस्य शरीरपरिमाणस्य परिणामित्वमिष्यते, तेषामप्युक्तवत्परास्त एव पक्षः। परिणामित्वे चिद्रूपत्वहानिः। चिद्रूपत्वाभावे शिलाकल्पत्वमात्मनः। तस्मादात्मनोऽवश्यमपरिणामिता चिद्रूपत्वेनाङ्गीकर्त्तव्यं तच्चाधिष्ठातृत्वमेव।

केचित् कर्त्तृरूपमेवात्मानमिच्छन्ति। तथाहि विषयसान्निध्ये या ज्ञानलक्षणा क्रिया समुत्पन्ना तस्या विषयसंवित्तिः फलं, तस्याञ्च फलरूपायां संवित्तौ स्वरूपं प्रकाशरूपतया प्रतिभासते, विषयस्य ग्राह्यतया, आत्मा ग्राहकत्वेन। घटमहं जानामीत्यनेनाकारेण तस्याः समुत्पत्तेः। क्रियायाः कारणं कर्त्तैव भवतीत्यतः कर्त्तृत्वं भोक्तृत्वञ्चात्मनो रूपमिति। तदनुपपन्नं। यस्मात्तासां संवित्तीनां किं कर्त्तृत्वं युगपत् प्रतिपद्यते क्रमेण वा। युगपत्कर्त्तृत्वे क्षणान्तरे तस्य कर्त्तृत्वं न स्यात्। अथ क्रमेण कर्त्तृत्वं, तदैकरूपस्य न घटते। एकेन रूपेण चेत्तस्य कर्त्तृत्वं तदा एकस्य सदैव सन्निहितत्वात् सर्व्वं फलमेकरूपं स्यात्। अथ नानारूपतया तस्य कर्त्तृत्वं तदा परिणामित्वं। परिणामित्वाच्च न चिद्रूपत्वं। अतश्चिद्रूपत्वमात्मन इच्छद्भिर्न साक्षात्कर्त्तृत्वमङ्गीकर्त्तव्यं। यादृशमस्माभिः कर्त्तृत्वमात्मनः प्रतिपादितं कूटस्थस्य नित्यस्य चिद्रूपस्य तदेवोपपन्नं।

एतेन स्वप्रकाशस्यात्मनो विषयसंवित्तिद्वारेण ग्राहकत्वमभिव्यज्यत इति ये वदन्ति, तेऽप्येतेनैव निराकृताः।

केचिद्विमर्शात्मकत्वमात्मनश्चिन्मयत्वमिच्छन्ति। ते ह्याहुर्न विमर्शव्यतिरेकेण चिद्रूपत्वमात्मनो निरूपयितुं शक्यं। जडात् किल वैलक्षण्यं चिद्रूपत्वमुच्यते। तच्च विमर्शव्यतिरेकेणानिरूप्यमाणं नान्यथावतिष्ठते। तदनुपपन्नं। इदमित्यमेवंरूपमिति यो विचारः स विमर्श इत्युच्यते, स चास्मिताव्यतिरेकेणोत्थानमेव न लभते। तथाहि आत्मन्युपजायमानो विमर्शः अहमेवम्भूत इत्यनेनाकारेण संवेद्यते। ततस्तत्रांशत्रयसम्भिन्नस्यात्मलक्षणस्यार्थस्य तत्र स्फुरणाच्च विकल्पस्वरूप-

तातिक्रमः। विकल्पस्याध्यवसायात्मा बुद्धिधर्मो न चिद्धर्मः। कूटस्थनित्यत्वेन चितेः सर्वैकरूपत्वान्नाहंकारानुप्रवेशः। तदनेन सविमर्शत्वमात्मनः प्रतिपादयता बुद्धिरेवात्मत्वेन भ्रान्त्या प्रतिपादिता, न प्रकाशात्मनः परस्य पुरुषस्य स्वरूपमवगतमिति।

एवं सर्व्वेष्वपि दर्शनेष्वधिष्ठातृत्वं विहाय नान्यदात्मनो रूपमुपपद्यते। अधिष्ठातृत्वञ्च चिद्रूपत्वं। तच्च जडाद्विलक्षणमेव। चिद्रूपतया यदधितिष्ठति तदेव भोग्यतां नयति*। यच्च चेतनाधिष्ठितं तदेव सकलव्यवहारयोग्यं भवति। एवञ्च सति कृतकृत्यत्वात् प्रधानस्य व्यापारनिवृत्तौ यदात्मनः कैवल्यमस्माभिरुक्तं तद्विहाय दर्शनान्तराणामपि नान्या गतिरस्ति तस्मादिदमेव युक्तमुक्तं वृत्तिसारूप्यपरीहारेण स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठा चितिशक्तेः कैवल्यं।

तदेवं सिद्धान्तरेभ्यो विलक्षणां सर्व्वसिद्धिमूलभूतां समाधिसिद्धिमभिधाय जात्यन्तरपरिणामलक्षणस्य च सिद्धिविशेषस्य प्रकृत्यापूरणमेव कारणमित्युपपाद्य धर्म्मादीनां प्रतिबन्धकनिवृत्तिमात्र एव सामर्थ्यमिति प्रदर्श्य निर्म्माणचित्तानामस्मितामात्रादुद्भव इत्युक्त्वा तेषाञ्च योगिचित्तमेवाधिष्ठानात्मकमिति प्रदर्श्य योगिचित्तस्य चित्तान्तरवैलक्षण्यमभिधाय तत्कर्म्मणामलौकिकत्वञ्चोपपाद्य विपाकानुगुणानां वासनानामभिव्यक्तिसामर्थ्यं कार्य्यकारणयोरैकत्वप्रतिपादनेन व्यवहितानामपि वासनानामानन्तर्य्यमुपपाद्य तासामानन्त्येऽपि हेतुफलादिद्वारेण हानमुपदिश्यातीतादिष्वध्वसु धर्म्माणां सद्भावमुपपाद्य वि-

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* भोग्यतामेतीति C पुस्तकपाठः।

ज्ञानवादं निराकृत्य साकारवादं प्रतिष्ठाप्य पुरुषस्य ज्ञातृत्वमुक्त्वा चित्तद्वारेण सकलव्यवहारनिष्पत्तिमुपपाद्य पुरुषसिद्धौ प्रमाणमुपदर्श्य कैवल्यनिर्णयाय दशभिः सूत्रैः क्रमेणोपयोगिनोऽर्थानभिधाय शास्त्रान्तरेष्वेतदेव कैवल्यमित्युपपाद्य कैवल्यस्वरूपं निर्णीतमिति व्याकृतः कैवल्यपादः ।

सर्व्वे यस्य वशप्रतापवपुषः पादान्तसेवावधि-
प्रभावस्फुटितेषु मूर्द्धसु दधत्याज्ञां धरित्रीभृतः ।
पदव्याजमवाप्य गर्व्वमसमं शास्त्रेष्वमत्रापि मिता
स श्रीभोजमहीपतिः फणिपतेः सूत्रेषु वृत्तिं व्यधात् ॥

इति श्रीमहाराजाधिराजश्रीभोजदेवविरचितायां राजमार्त्तण्डाभिधायां पातञ्जलयोगशास्त्रवृत्तौ कैवल्यपादश्चतुर्थः । समाप्ता चेयं पातञ्जलयोगसूत्रवृत्तिः ॥०॥

सूत्राणां सूची।